Managerial Ownership and Corporate Hedging

Abstract:  Using information on 443 UK non-financial companies, this work provides evidence supporting the hypothesis that managerial risk aversion is an incentive to deviate from the optimal hedging position. Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers are at the centre of the decision about the firm's risk profile but are not relevant as determinants of the decision to hedge. This is rather associated with factors enhancing the firm's expected value (underinvestment, scale economies, tax savings).     

股票增值权激励有效吗

股票增值权是上市公司对管理层实施激励的重要做法,在我国大型国有控股境外上市公司中普遍采用。本文以中国石化为研究对象,对实施股票增值权计划后的公司财务绩效、治理机制与管理层代理成本、股票市场反应等作了实证检验。本文认为,股票增值权计划对公司财务绩效提升、治理机制改善具有一定的积极正面效应;股票增值权在等待期结束后的开始行权年度激励效果最大;股票市场对股票增值权的行权存在着过度反应。最后本文提出了改进股票增值权激励的政策建议。     

商业银行股权激励的特殊意义与现实问题分析

银行业普遍存在的管制,使银行面临着有限的控制权市场和接管威胁,从而大大降低了市场约束银行管理者的能力,因此对银行而言,通过股权激励机制协调股东和管理者的利益、降低代理成本显得尤为重要.我国商业银行实施股权激励不应盲目照搬西方国家的范例,应慎重选择股权激励的实施范围,目前最好只局限在高级管理人员,通过对股权激励机制的合理设计来充分发挥其长期激励效应,切不可盲目扩大激励范围,将股权激励演变成一种新的福利措施.应尽快建立起以经济资本为核心的业绩考核体系,在经济资本的约束下实现业务发展模式和盈利模式的转变.股权激励机制的有效实施离不开完善的银行治理结构.     

商业银行股权激励的特殊意义与现实问题分析

银行业普遍存在的管制,使银行面临着有限的控制权市场和接管威胁,从而大大降低了市场约束银行管理者的能力,因此对银行而言,通过股权激励机制协调股东和管理者的利益、降低代理成本显得尤为重要.我国商业银行实施股权激励不应盲目照搬西方国家的范例,应慎重选择股权激励的实施范围,目前最好只局限在高级管理人员,通过对股权激励机制的合理设计来充分发挥其长期激励效应,切不可盲目扩大激励范围,将股权激励演变成一种新的福利措施.应尽快建立起以经济资本为核心的业绩考核体系,在经济资本的约束下实现业务发展模式和盈利模式的转变.股权激励机制的有效实施离不开完善的银行治理结构.     

Incentives of Stock Option Based Compensation

We introduce explicitly the effort as a choice variable in a continuous time utility maximisation framework of an executive who is partly compensated with stock options. We solve the model in the case where the executive is not allowed to trade in the company’s stock but is able to achieve a partial insurance through trading in a correlated market portfolio. We define the executive’s value of the options through a certainty equivalence approach both in the case of European call options and non-standard capped stock options and study the behaviour of the reservation price as relevant parameters change.JEL Classification: G13, G30, G32, J33, M12     

政治联系、债务融资与企业研发投入——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

以2009~2012年连续四年披露研发投入的中国上市公司为样本,实证检验政治联系、债务融资对企业研发投入行为的影响。结果表明,企业的研发投入面临债务融资约束,债务融资比例(银行借款)与研发投入强度之间呈现负相关关系,长期借款对研发投入强度的债务制约作用比短期借款更大,政治联系对企业的研发投入产生了\"挤占\"效应,抑制了RD投资,虽然给企业带来了一定的长期债务资源,但并未能如预期产生显著的\"资源效应\",扭转企业债务融资困境。     

“I Do”: Does Marital Status Affect How Much CEOs “Do”?

This paper explores whether a CEO's marital status reveals unobservable risk preferences which influence their firm's investment and compensation policies. Using biographical data for CEOs of large domestic companies, we find that corporate deal‐making activity (e.g., mergers, joint ventures, major capital expenditures, etc.) and overall firm riskiness both increase significantly with personal life restructuring (e.g., marriages and divorces). This relation is supported by an instrumental variables analysis and also an investigation surrounding CEO turnover. Finally, the link between a CEO's marital status and preference for option‐based compensation further suggests that personal restructuring may be an indicator of executive risk appetites.     

Risk-taking incentives of executive stock options and the asset substitution problem

Various theoretical models show that managerial compensation schemes can reduce the distortionary effects of financial leverage. There is mixed evidence as to whether highly levered firms offer less stock‐based compensation, a common prediction of such models. Both the theoretical and empirical research, however, have overlooked the leverage provided by executive stock options. In principle, adjusting the exercise prices of executive stock options can mitigate the risk incentive effects of financial leverage. We show that the near‐universal practice of setting option exercise prices near the prevailing stock price at the date of grant effectively undoes most of the effects of financial leverage. In a large cross‐sectional sample of Canadian option‐granting firms, we find evidence that executives' incentives to take equity risk are negatively rather than positively related to the leverage of their employers.     

混改背景下国有企业股权性质变化对企业创新效率的影响

党的十九大强调了“发展混合所有制经济”,国企混改将对企业创新效率产生一定的影响。为此,基于2009-2018年上市公司的财务数据和专利数据,运用双重差分模型和中介效应模型考察改制后国有企业的专利数量和质量的变化情况。结果表明：国有企业改制对企业的专利产出效率有积极作用,但是对企业的专利质量效率有消极作用,即国有企业改制会通过改变企业的融资约束和研发投入对企业的创新效率产生影响,融资约束和研发投入均对专利数量有遮掩作用,对专利质量有部分中介效用,改制后企业将更加重视企业经济目标,注重短期的专利数量成果,从而忽视创新专利的质量。     

The q-theory explanation for the external financing effect: New evidence

Several studies document a robust negative association between net external financing and average stock returns, which is referred to as the external financing effect. Using total asset growth as a comprehensive measure of overall corporate investment and total profitability gross of R&D expenditures as a measure of true economic profitability, we provide new evidence in support of the q-theory explanation for the external financing effect. We also test the market timing explanation for the external financing effect but fail to document supportive evidence.     

Penetrating the Book-to-Market Black Box: The R&D Effect

The book-to-market (BM) phenomenon – the positive association between BM and subsequent returns – looms large among capital market enigmas. Economic theory postulates that the difference between market and book values of companies reflects their future abnormal profits. We capture these abnormal profits for a large sample of science-based companies by estimating the value of the off-balance sheet investment generating those profits – the value of R&D capital – and show empirically: (i) Firms' R&D capital is associated with their subsequent stock returns. (ii) For R&D intensive firms, this 'R&D effect' subsumes the 'book-to-market effect.' (iii) The association between R&D and subsequent returns appears to result from an extra-market risk factor inherent in R&D, rather than from stock mispricing. We thus provide an explanation for the book-to-market phenomenon of R&D companies.