新农村建设与农村公共品投入机制创新

新农村建设需要加大公共品投入力度.本文认为农村公共品的投入是两个层次的投入:纯公共品的投入和准公共品的提供.农村当前主要问题是准公共品的投入,即"拥挤"产品的投入.通过分析农村公共品需求范围、特点,指出农村公共品缺位的主要方面.提出建立农村公共品投入机制的思路:政府和市场多渠道投入.具体:增加财政支农支出的规模和总量,创新财政支出方式,广泛应用利益诱导机制,财政补贴机制,财政减免税机制等吸引"私人"供给农村公共产品.     

公共品私人自愿提供决策的实验研究

本文利用实验数据对公共品私人自愿提供机制的多个经典特征事实进行了实证检验,其结论基本支持诸如"公共品私人自愿供给的存在性"、"捐献率随重复捐献次数的增加而有下降的趋势"和"公共品投资的私人边际回报率和交流的正效应"等特征事实.同时,实验还得到了一些新的发现,如"期初平均捐献水平较低"、"口头协议效果显著"、"经验分享存在积极作用"和"小组的合作程度存在巨大的差异"等.这些结论说明通过合理的制度设计和安排可以达到部分公共品由私人自愿提供的目的.     

我国区域公共品提供的博弈分析

区域内各地区在合作提供区域公共品时 ,各地区在合作的博弈过程中陷入了两难选择 ,造成了我国区域公共品提供不足与过剩并存的局面。因此 ,有必要进行制度创新来改变这一局面 ,包括加强区域经济发展规划与立法、明确区域公共品的提供层次或者是成立拥有提供区域公共品能力的区域合作组织。     

农村公共品提供:社会与政府的互补机制

为了提高农村公共品供给规模、质量与效率,实现乡村振兴,政府既需要鼓励引导社会资本参与农村公共品供给,也需要提高政府公共支出的效率。本文从集体行动的角度研究宗族多样性对中国农村公共品供给的影响,包括其对农村公共品私人供给的影响,及社会与政府相互作用提高政府在农村公共支出效率的影响。基于中国21个省758个县1949—1990年前后农村公共品私人供给数据及20世纪80年代反映宗族多样性的姓氏数目和姓氏集中度数据,本文发现,姓氏数目与农村公共品私人供给存在显著负相关关系,而姓氏集中度与农村公共品私人供给存在显著正相关关系。本文还发现,社会力量有效地补充了政府的作用,在姓氏数目少、姓氏集中度高的地区,政府公共支出效率更高,具体表现在对农村公共品私人供给的促进作用更显著。     

农村公共品性质与分配型动员

取消农业税后,国家开始向农村转移大量资源用于建设农村公共品,国家与农民的关系发生根本性改变。借助资源下乡,国家力量在基层变得无比强大,基层治理自主性空间变得狭窄,农民从农村公共品供给的主要提供者变成被动的受益人。基层治理出现内卷,治理有效成为问题。最近十多年成都市借助城乡统筹试验区建设,以村庄为单位,由财政提供村庄公共服务资金,鼓励农民通过村民议事会分配资源,建设村庄公共品,形成具有地方特色的分配型民主。成都试验为中国农村基层治理提供了有益的启示,具体来说,国家可以将部分惠农资源按人均转移到村庄,作为村庄可以自由使用的公共服务资金,再经由村庄民主程序进行资源分配。在资源分配过程中,通过党建领航,发掘积极分子,动员村民参与,激发村庄活力,形成分配型动员体制,以有效使用国家资源,真正实现基层治理有效,建设一个与强国家相匹配的强社会。     

中国乡村公共品的提供:连带团体的作用

在威权和转轨体制下，民主和官僚政治制度通常很薄弱，为什么处于这种制度下的政府官员所提供的公共品，往往还超过了足够维护社会稳定所需的最低水平呢？案例研究表明，即使正式责任制度很薄弱，非官方惯例和规则的约束仍然能够促使当地官员设立并履行其公共责任。而这些非正式责任制度由特定类型的连带团体提供并在全社区发挥其道德权威。在其他条件都相同的情况下，存在这类集团的村庄比没有这类集团的村庄更有可能获得较好的公共品供应。     

从东亚地区国际公共品的提供看东亚地区化

在地区化和全球化日益加速的情况下,东亚地区的公共品发展为地区地缘政治的稳固和经济水平的提高作出了突出贡献.但是,各主权国积极提供公共品的背后,仍有着不利于公共品发展的负面干扰,存在严重的搭便车效应、缺乏强制力和监管机构问题;同时,也有共同的传统文化、地理资源等促进不同利益群体携手合作的内因,促进着东北亚地区的合作与发展.     

话说公共品

公共品,它不是一般意义上的物品或服务,是不可能被私有化的;也不是用来交换的一般产品或商品,是不可能靠市场经济的方式来运作的。试图对公共品的定义和对公共品的置疑作了一些梳理,以期使读者能更通俗、更直观和更深入地了解公共品。     

全球性农业公共品供给问题探讨

全球性公共品(GPG)是20世纪90年代以来在国际政治经济关系中备受关注的问题之一。与农业发展密切相关的区域性和全球性的粮食安全与援助、动植物疾病防治和控制、农业生态环境的保护、农业科学技术研究等日益成为全球性公共品的内容之一。因此,本文试图从全球性公共产品出发,提出全球性农业公共产品(GAPG)的内涵,缘由,特点,分析其供给现状,评价供给途径。给出我国立足国内实际积极参与全球性公共品供给,分享其带来的巨大机遇,加快和促进我国农业健康发展等建议。     

土地一级市场垄断与地方公共品供给

在当前制度背景下,地方政府既是公共品的提供者,又是垄断了土地交易一级市场、"经营"土地的"企业家"。本文建立一个理论模型阐明了,尽管垄断更多的国有土地能够放松财政约束,但均衡时地方政府会将更多的财政资源投入到能让土地增值和未来税收增长的基础设施建设中,教育、医疗和社会保障等公共服务并不一定是宽裕财政收入的受益者。利用全国284个地级市2003—2008年的面板数据的实证研究发现:在控制住其他变量后,地方政府垄断更多国有土地转让会显著增加经济性公共品的供给,非经济性公共品的供给则会显著下降。     

Public Versus Private Provision of Public Goods

It is well known that public goods are underprovided in a static setting with voluntary contributions. Public provision—in a median voter framework with proportional taxation—generally exceeds private provision. This paper compares private and public provision of public goods in a dynamic setting. In a dynamic setting, voluntary donations can result in efficient provision. Also, majority‐rule solutions exist even when taxes are not proportional to income. At low discount factors, public provision tends to exceed private provision. As patience increases, however, private provision may exceed public provision. This occurs because many outcomes with a low level of public good provision—and potentially large targeted transfer payments to particular individuals—become sustainable under public provision. Under private provision, however, large targeted transfers are unsustainable. To finance the public good, private provision tends to result in benefit taxation, and public provision tends to result in progressive taxation.     

Voluntary Provision of Public Goods and Technology

This paper highlights issues in the theory of voluntary provision of public goods, building on the investigation by Peacock in connection with the contributions by Coase and Buchanan. Our goal is twofold. We first draw attention to the early literature investigating the provision of public goods and to the successive theoretical analysis. We then focus on the impact of technology on supply and demand. Examples of different types of public goods are provided, with special attention to the cultural sector, to investigate whether and how technology affects the efficiency and the effectiveness of the related public goods provision. The implementation and exploitation of technological advancements are investigated in view of the role of different actors (public, private) at different levels of government.     

Social Norms and Private Provision of Public Goods

The formation of social norms for voluntary contributions to a public good is analyzed in a game in which people have preferences for private consumption, a public good, and social approval. Each person chooses to be one of the two types: a contributor or a non‐contributor. Thereafter, each person meets people who can observe his type. A non‐contributor feels disapproval, whereas a contributor feels approval if he believes that a contributor observes his type. The game has two asymptotically stable states: one in which everybody is a contributor, and one in which nobody is a contributor. Governmental subsidization of the public good can move the society to the former state, whereas a governmental contribution to the public good can move the society to the latter. Indeed, this crowding in or crowding out prevails even after policy reversal.     

Heterogeneity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

We investigate the effects of heterogeneity and incomplete information on aggregate contributions to a public good using the voluntary contribution mechanism. The non-linear laboratory environment has three-person groups as partners under varying conditions of information and communication. Bergstrom, Blum and Varian predict that increasing heterogeneity will have no effect on aggregate contributions in a no-communication environment. Ledyard conjectures a positive effect of incomplete information, a negative effect of heterogeneity, and a positive interaction of heterogeneity and incomplete information. We find that incomplete information has a small but significant negative effect. Heterogeneity has a positive effect on aggregate contributions, but its effects interact unexpectedly with communication. In a no-communication environment, heterogeneity in two dimensions (endowment and preferences) increases contributions substantially while heterogeneity in a single dimension (endowment or preferences) has little effect. In the communication environment we find the reverse. We also find a positive interaction between heterogeneity and incomplete information. Thus we reject the Bergstrom, Blume and Varian invariance result and provide mixed evidence on Ledyard's conjectures.     

Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods*

Some public goods are provided entirely with private contributions, others with a mixture of public and private funding, and still others are entirely publicly funded. In order to study this variation, a model of dual provision is developed that endogenizes public and private funding. Households vote over an income tax that finances public supply of the good and on whether to permit private contributions. While permitting private contributions may lead to a reduction in total provision, a majority always favors permitting private contributions. Results are developed for small and large economies, and the relevance of nonexcludability and noncongestion are investigated.     

区位性因素与公共品的最优供给

本文分析了两种区位性因素对地方公共品最优供给(质量与数量)的影响。一类区位性因素为某公共品在城市中所在的区域。分析表明,位于城市边缘地区的公共品的最优质量要小于位于城市中心地区公共品的最优质量。另一类区位性因素为某公共品与居民的相对位置(距离),这一因素在具体分析中被转化为使用居民出行半径表示的指标。结论表明,出行半径的增加一方面加大了中间投票人与公共品之间的距离,另一方面也使得原先距离公共品较远的居民得以有机会享用该公共品。前一种影响对公共品的最优质量起抑制作用,后一种影响的效果则相反。而公共品的最优质量随出行半径如何变化,将取决于这两种效应之间的比较。本文还根据公共品之间是否存在替代性区分了替代性公共品与非替代性公共品,并分析了这两种不同性质的公共品受区位性因素影响而在最优质量与最优供给数量上所呈现出的差异。     

Factor Endowments and the Private Provision of Public Goods

The paper examines the consequences of increasing the size of the community in the standard model of the private provision of public goods when costs are variable. In contrast to an economy with fixed costs, the provision of the public good can fall with a larger community, and an increased provision of the public good is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for individual utility to rise. The paper also contributes to the literature on immiserizing growth in that it shows that capital accumulation can possibly result in lower utility for all individuals.     

Repeated Interaction and the Public Provision of Private Goods

The literature suggests that governments can use in-kind transfers to design efficient and targeted redistribution schemes if individual incomes are not directly observable. We investigate the extent to which the self-selection property of in-kind transfers carries through if redistributive transfers are made repeatedly. In a two-period setting, the government may gain information about the individuals' incomes in the first period and exploit this information for making targeted transfers in the second-period. This, however, also triggers changes in the individuals' behavior. If the government can commit to its future policy, the least cost policy may involve randomization between cash and in-kind transfers. Without commitment, the dynamic setting works against the government's interest. It may no longer be able to use in-kind transfers to generate information about the individuals' types.
JEL classification : H 42; H 2     

Group Structure and Public Goods Provision in Heterogeneous Societies

I consider a society with heterogeneous individuals who can form organizations for the production of a differentiated public good. A decentralized arrangement of organizations is said to be split‐up stable whenever there is no majority to split any of the organizations. Compared to the social optimum, decentralization yields too few organizations if they provide broad services and potentially too many if they are highly specialized. Conclusions are broadly similar in the presence of an outside opportunity where only some individuals join organizations.     

The Time‐Consistent Public Goods Provision

In this study, we reconsider the optimal nonlinear tax problem with the public good from the perspective of the commitment issue and examine how it affects the condition of the public good provision. We show that the Samuelson rule should be modified when the government cannot commit and the skill types of taxpayers are revealed in the first period. This is true even if the preference of the taxpayers is separable and additive with respect to consumption and leisure. Our analysis also shows how the lack of commitment affects the formula of the marginal cost of public funds and the level of public good provision. Our findings imply that the level of the public good may be excessive in comparison to the case where the government can commit to its tax policy.