Of Yeast and Mushrooms: Patterns of Industry-Level Productivity Growth

Abstract. In this paper we analyse labour productivity growth in the United States, four European countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands and United Kingdom), Australia and Canada between 1987 and 2003 from an industry perspective. Rather than analysing broad industry groups, we compare the pattern of growth in all industries through Harberger diagrams. We introduce new summary measures, which indicate the pervasiveness of growth patterns. These indicators show that investment in both information and communication technology (ICT) and non-ICT capital is fairly balanced or 'yeasty', driven by overall macro-economic conditions. However, growth of total factor productivity (TFP) is much more localized or 'mushroom-like'. In particular we find a clear distinction between countries in continental Europe, in which TFP is decelerating after 1995 and becoming more localized, and Anglo-Saxon countries in which TFP growth is accelerating and becoming more broad-based, especially after 2000. The increased breadth of Anglo-Saxon TFP growth is consistent with delayed effects of intangible investments that are complementary to ICT investments.     

Are ICT Spillovers Driving the New Economy?

Some observers have raised the possibility that production spillovers and network effects associated with information and communications technology (ICT) are an important part of the "New Economy." Across U.S. manufacturing industries, however, ICT capital appears correlated with the acceleration of average labor productivity (ALP) growth as predicted by a standard production model, but not with total factor productivity (TFP) growth as these New Economy forces imply. Once one allows for productivity differences across industries, measured TFP growth is uncorrelated with all capital inputs, including ICT capital. This provides little evidence for a New Economy story of ICT-related spillovers or network effects driving TFP growth throughout U.S. manufacturing.     

The productivity paradox and the new economy: The Spanish case

This paper studies the impact of the information and communication technologies (ICT) on economic growth in Spain using a dynamic general equilibrium approach. Contrary to previous works, we use a production function with six different capital inputs, three of them corresponding to ICT assets. Calibration of the model suggests that the contribution of ICT to Spanish productivity growth is very relevant, whereas the contribution of non-ICT capital has been even negative. Additionally, over the sample period 1995–2002, we find a negative TFP growth and productivity growth. These results together aim at the hypothesis that the Spanish economy could be placed within the productivity paradox.     

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? ICT,INTANGIBLE INVESTMENT,AND BRITAIN'S PRODUCTIVITY RECORD REVISITED

Despite the apparent importance of the "knowledge economy," U.K. macroeconomic performance appears unaffected: investment rates are flat, and productivity has slowed. We investigate whether measurement issues might account for this puzzle. The standard National Accounts treatment of most spending on "knowledge" or "intangible" assets is as intermediate consumption. Thus they do not count as either GDP or investment. We ask how treating such spending as investment affects some key macro variables, namely, market sector gross value added (MGVA), business investment, capital and labor shares, growth in labor and total factor productivity (TFP), and capital deepening. We find: (a) MGVA was understated by about 6 percent in 1970 and 13 percent in 2004; (b) instead of the business investment/MGVA ratio falling since 1970 it has been rising; (c) instead of the labor share being flat since 1970 it has been falling; (d) growth in labor productivity and capital deepening has been understated and growth in TFP overstated; and (e) TFP growth has not slowed since 1990 but has been accelerating.     

Mind the Gap! International Comparisons of Productivity in Services and Goods Production

Abstract. In this paper, we make a comparison of industry output, inputs and productivity growth and levels between seven advanced economies (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States). Our industry-level growth accounts make use of input data on labour quantity (hours) and composition (schooling levels), and distinguish between six different types of capital assets (including three information and communication technology (ICT) assets). The comparisons of levels rely on industry-specific purchasing power parities (PPPs) for output and inputs, within a consistent input–output framework for the year 1997. Our results show that differences in productivity growth and levels can be mainly traced to market services, not to goods-producing industries. Part of the strong productivity growth in market services in Anglo-Saxon countries, such as in Australia and Canada, may be related to relatively low productivity levels compared with the United States. In contrast, services productivity levels in continental European countries were on par with the United States in 1997, but growth in Europe was much weaker since then. In terms of factor input use, the United States is very different from all other countries, mostly because of the more intensive use of ICT capital in the United States.     

中美两国制造业全要素生产率比较研究

本文报告了根据 Jorgenson 方法所做的中国与美国的制造业分行业的全要素生产率的国际比较,以及中国制造业1985—1994年间全要素生产率的增长率。比较发现,就资本生产率和全要素生产率来说,中美之间的差距相对比较小,而就劳动生产率的差距来说,中美之间的差距相当大。美国制造业劳动生产率大约是中国制造业劳动生产率的17.67倍,但是美国制造业的全要素生产率大约是中国制造业全要素生产率的5倍。而中国制造业全要素生产率在1986—1994年间的平均增长实际有0.67%的减退。     

Declining output growth volatility: A sectoral decomposition

A decomposition of the U.S. aggregate output growth volatility using two-digit industry-level data shows that more than 60% of the post-1983 reduction in aggregate output growth volatility is attributed to the lowered comovement in total factor productivity (TFP) growth between industries. In contrast, stabilized input and TFP growths within an industry contribute little.     

The economic contribution of the “C” in ICT: Evidence from OECD countries

Numerous studies have documented the contribution of ICT to growth. Less has been done on the contribution of communications technology, the “C” in ICT. We construct an international dataset of fourteen OECD countries and present contributions to growth for each ICT asset (IT hardware, CT equipment and software) using alternative ICT deflators. Using each country’s deflator we find that the contribution of CT capital deepening to productivity growth is lower in the EU than the US. Thus we ask: is that lower contribution due to a lower rate of CT investment or differing sources and methods for measurement of price change? We find that: (a) there are still considerable disparities in measures of ICT price change across countries; (b) in terms of growth-accounting, price harmonisation has a greater impact on the measured contributions of IT hardware and software in the EU relative to the US, than that of CT equipment; over 1996–2013, harmonising investment prices explains just 15% of the gap in the EU CT contribution relative to the US, compared to 25% for IT hardware; (c) over 1996–2013, CT capital deepening accounted for 0.11% pa (6% as a share) of labour productivity growth (LPG) in the US, compared to 0.03% pa (2.5% of LPG) in the EU-13 when using national accounts deflators; and (d) using OECD harmonised deflators, the figure for the EU-13 is raised to 0.04% pa (4% of LPG).     

Information and Communications Technology as a General-Purpose Technology: Evidence from US Industry Data

Abstract. Many people point to information and communications technology (ICT) as the key for understanding the acceleration in productivity in the United States since the mid-1990s. Stories of ICT as a 'general-purpose technology' suggest that measured total factor productivity (TFP) should rise in ICT-using sectors (reflecting either unobserved accumulation of intangible organizational capital; spillovers; or both), but with a long lag. Contemporaneously, however, investments in ICT may be associated with lower TFP as resources are diverted to reorganization and learning. We find that US industry results are consistent with general-purpose technology (GPT) stories: the acceleration after the mid-1990s was broad-based – located primarily in ICT-using industries rather than ICT-producing industries. Furthermore, industry TFP accelerations in the 2000s are positively correlated with (appropriately weighted) industry ICT capital growth in the 1990s. Indeed, as GPT stories would suggest, after controlling for past ICT investment, industry TFP accelerations are negatively correlated with increases in ICT usage in the 2000s.     

ICT and Productivity in Europe and the United States Where Do the Differences Come From?

In this paper we analyse labour productivity growth in 51 industriesin European countries and the United States. Using shift-sharetechniques we identify the industries in which the U.S. is leadingmost strongly. With a detailed decomposition analysis we identifywhether the sources of the U.S. advantage are due to fasterproductivity growth, higher industry productivity levels relativeto the country aggregate, different employment shares or fasterchange in employment shares of rapidly growing industries. Theresults show that U.S. productivity has grown faster than inthe EU because of a larger employment share in the ICT producingsector and faster productivity growth in services industriesthat make intensive use of ICT. Wholesale and retail trade andthe financial securities industry account for most of the differencein aggregate productivity growth between the EU and the U.S.(JEL N10, O47, O57)     

ICT and Growth: The Role of Rates of Return and Capital Prices

We revisit the widely discussed contribution of investment in ICT to economic growth, focusing on differences in productivity and quality of ICT across countries and time. In a growth accounting approach, we look at the way rates of return and rates of asset price decline measure these aspects. Conducting a sensitivity analysis with data from the EU KLEMS database for the years 1990–2007, we introduce a constant rate of return and a constant rate of ICT price decline. Both alternative measurements somewhat downplay the role investment played relative to growth in multifactor productivity in the U.K. and the U.S. during 1995–2000. Moreover, we show that more than half of the ICT contribution to labor productivity growth results from changes in capital quality and composition rather than from quantity.     

Sources of the German Productivity Demise: Tracing the Effects of Industry-Level Information and Communication Technology Investment

Abstract. While the United States experienced two successive labor productivity surges in 1995 and 2000, Germany's productivity declined dramatically during the same period. We examine the sources of Germany's productivity demise using the ifo industry growth accounting database that provides detailed industry-level investment information. While much attention has focused on the reduction in German labor hours, our data show that information and communication technology (ICT) investment in Germany was deeply lacking in the mid-1990s as compared with the United States. The transition to the new economy mitigated the German productivity slowdown, but did not reverse it. After 2000, we find that a recovery in Non-ICT investment was offset by a widespread collapse in German total factor productivity. Over half of the German industries (accounting for almost 50 per cent of German output) experienced negative total factor productivity growth. This second major difference between the United States and German industry performance explains Germany's secular departure from the technological frontier.     

ChinHow R&D Investments Influence TFP Growth: Evidence from China’s Large and Medium- Sized Industrial Enterprises

This paper investigates the potential channels through which R&D may influence TFP growth using industry-level panel data of China’s large and medium-sized industrial enterprises over the period of 2000–2007. Comparing with existing literature, we provide a closer look of the relationship between R&D and TFP growth by decomposing TFP growth into efficiency change and technical change components using Malmquist productivity index and distinguishing between upstream R&D spillovers and downstream R&D spillovers. We find TFP grow slightly during 2000–2007, and R&D investment indeed serves as an engine of productivity growth just as endogenous growth theories argued, which is largely because R&D accelerates technical progress even it also results in enlarging technical inefficiency. However, we find a robust negative effect of downstream R&D spillovers on TFP growth, the effects of upstream is positive but not statistically significant. In addition, we do not find the positive effects of human capital on TFP as endogenous growth theories indicated, but find human capital severs as “assimilation device” for R&D spillovers both in promoting TFP growth and increasing technical efficiency even the effects on technical progress is adverse.     

Information Technology and Productivity Growth in the 2000s

Abstract. US productivity growth experienced continued productivity growth after 2000 even as investment, particularly in information technology (IT), slowed. This paper uses industry-level data to examine the link between average labor productivity (ALP) growth and IT in the post-2000 period. We use difference-in-difference and cross-sectional regressions to show that the link between ALP growth and IT-intensity is weaker after 2000 than before. These results are robust to alternative measures of IT-intensity such as the IT share of capital services, the level of IT capital depth, and the share of IT capital services in total output. We conclude that the post-2000 productivity gains in the United States do not appear to have been driven directly by IT.     

How R&;D investments influence TFP growth: Evidence from China’s large and medium-sized industrial enterprises

This paper investigates the potential channels through which R&D may influence TFP growth using industry-level panel data of China’s large and medium-sized industrial enterprises over the period of 2000–2007. Comparing with existing literature, we provide a closer look of the relationship between R&D and TFP growth by decomposing TFP growth into efficiency change and technical change components using Malmquist productivity index and distinguishing between upstream R&D spillovers and downstream R&D spillovers. We find TFP grow slightly during 2000–2007, and R&D investment indeed serves as an engine of productivity growth just as endogenous growth theories argued, which is largely because R&D accelerates technical progress even it also results in enlarging technical inefficiency. However, we find a robust negative effect of downstream R&D spillovers on TFP growth, the effects of upstream is positive but not statistically significant. In addition, we do not find the positive effects of human capital on TFP as endogenous growth theories indicated, but find human capital severs as “assimilation device” for R&D spillovers both in promoting TFP growth and increasing technical efficiency even the effects on technical progress is adverse.     

INTANGIBLE CAPITAL AND U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH

Published macroeconomic data traditionally exclude most intangible investment from measured GDP. This situation is beginning to change, but our estimates suggest that as much as $800 billion is still excluded from U.S. published data (as of 2003), and that this leads to the exclusion of more than $3 trillion of business intangible capital stock. To assess the importance of this omission, we add intangible capital to the standard sources-of-growth framework used by the BLS, and find that the inclusion of our list of intangible assets makes a significant difference in the observed patterns of U.S. economic growth. The rate of change of output per worker increases more rapidly when intangibles are counted as capital, and capital deepening becomes the unambiguously dominant source of growth in labor productivity. The role of multifactor productivity is correspondingly diminished, and labor's income share is found to have decreased significantly over the last 50 years.     

The long-run impact of ICT

This paper examines the growth impact of digital capital in the US and the EU-15 countries from a long-run perspective. It estimates the elasticity of output with respect to Information and Communication Technology (ICT) within a production function framework, by means of a panel cointegration analysis. ICT capital is found to significantly spur GDP growth over time, and above its income share. This sharply contrasts with existing aggregate evidence, and with the view that the growth impact of this factor is confined to the contribution given to the productivity resurgence of the 1990s.     

Federal regulation and aggregate economic growth

We introduce a new time series measure of the extent of federal regulation in the U.S. and use it to investigate the relationship between federal regulation and macroeconomic performance. We find that regulation has statistically and economically significant effects on aggregate output and the factors that produce it—total factor productivity (TFP), physical capital, and labor. Regulation has caused substantial reductions in the growth rates of both output and TFP and has had effects on the trends in capital and labor that vary over time in both sign and magnitude. Regulation also affects deviations about the trends in output and its factors of production, and the effects differ across dependent variables. Regulation changes the way output is produced by changing the mix of inputs. Changes in regulation offer a straightforward explanation for the productivity slowdown of the 1970s. Qualitatively and quantitatively, our results agree with those obtained from cross-section and panel measures of regulation using cross-country data.     

资本深化、资源配置效率与全要素生产率：来自小企业的发现*

关于资本深化促进生产率提升、资源错配导致企业全要素生产率低下的问题，学术界基于大中型企业的研究已基本达成共识，而针对小企业研究较少。本文构建三者之间的理论模型，并基于江苏省小企业数据进行实证检验。研究发现，资本深化对资源配置效率的影响呈现倒U型，而与生产率为U型关系。资本深化程度较低或较高的企业改善资源配置效率可以促进生产率提升，而中等水平的企业呈现抑制效应。这在小规模企业、低技术行业中更加明显。小企业面对劳动工资、利率水平上涨，其资源配置效率被抑制，但是能够提升企业生产率。本文的政策启示是政府在支持中小企业投融资的同时，对中小企业人才和用工政策应予以更多支持。     

CAN INVESTMENT IN INTANGIBLES EXPLAIN THE SWEDISH PRODUCTIVITY BOOM IN THE 1990s?

In the early 1990s the Swedish economy experienced a severe economic and financial crisis which resulted in a substantial GDP decrease. Even though the crisis was not a complete surprise for many economists, almost no one expected that the Swedish economy would be prospering with booming productivity growth only a few years later. Economists have presented three explanations for the fast recovery and productivity growth in 1995–2006: market reforms, crisis recovery, and the impact of ICT. This paper offers an alternative view, emphasizing instead firms' substantial investment in intangible assets such as R&D, design, and advertising. Based on the growth accounting framework, intangible capital accounted for more than 30 percent of the labor productivity growth in the Swedish business sector from 1995 to 2006. Thus, Swedish TFP growth, one of the highest among OECD countries, is reduced substantially when investment in intangibles is included in the growth accounting analysis.