Dynamic Entry and Investment in New Infrastructures: Empirical Evidence from the Fixed Broadband Industry

In the telecommunications industry, the ladder-of-investment approach claims that service-based competition (when entrants lease access to incumbents’ facilities) can serve as a “stepping stone” for facility-based entry (when entrants build their own infrastructures to provide services). In this paper, we build an empirical model that encompasses a complete ladder-of-investment, composed of three rungs: bitstream access, local loop unbundling and new access facilities. Using data from the European Commission’s “Broadband access in the EU” reports covering 15 European member states for 17 semesters, we test the ladder-of-investment hypothesis. We find no empirical support for this hypothesis, that is, for the transition from local loop unbundling to new access infrastructures, and weak empirical support for the transition from bitstream access lines to local loop unbundling. These results are robust when we take into account the migration effect, the number of access rungs, the development of broadband cable, the regulatory performance, and the evolution of local loop unbundling prices.     

How to price the unbundled local loop in the transition from copper to fiber access networks?

In many countries worldwide access networks are in the transition from copper to fiber access. During the transition phase copper and fiber networks are operated in parallel. All regulators facing this situation of technological change have to decide how to price unbundled access to the copper loop in this transition phase. Should they keep the usual forward looking long-run incremental cost standard charge, or should they move to some different approach? The authors propose to price copper access based on the modern equivalent asset (MEA) of fiber access. Since fiber access is superior to copper access, the cost of fiber access (as a basis for pricing copper access) should, however, be corrected by the performance delta between copper and fiber access.     

Local competition and the role of regulation: the EU debate and Britain's experience

Competition in local access networks and local loop unbundling have been central in the 1999 review of the EU communications regulatory framework. These issues also figure high on national policy agendas. Competition in local access is thought to stimulate internet penetration and the development of e-commerce and interactive applications, all key elements for the move towards a ‘new economy’. Following an analysis of different ways to promote competition in local access networks and a review of the respective EU debate, this paper then concentrates on the relevant developments in Britain. At a broader level, it explores the interplay between EU debates and British policies and actions and the scope for harmonisation of national regulatory regimes. At a more specific level, the paper assesses the evolution of local access competition and relates this to the role of regulation and the question of facilities- vs. services-based entry. It is argued that the introduction of new market restructuring initiatives, such as local loop unbundling, requires a larger involvement by regulators, particularly in the early stages, rather than just a reliance on general competition rules.     

Unbundling and infrastructure competition for broadband adoption: Implications for NGA regulation

The common idea of open access policy is that it refers to the sharing of particular elements, such as wholesale access networks, backhaul, under-sea cable and internet exchange points in fixed and mobile networks. In broadband networks, the use of open access policy usually refers to the infrastructure parts, which are considered a bottleneck. Many regulators have generally focused open access policy on fixed broadband networks, especially digital subscriber line (DSL) technology, in the last decade. Local loop unbundling (LLU) regulation is one of the main strategies for the regulator to open access to an incumbent’s bottleneck network in order to soften its monopoly power and encourage competition in the DSL broadband market. The OECD countries have different strategies regarding unbundling local loop and infrastructure competition, as the characteristics and infrastructure networks of countries vary. There are currently more choices of next generation network (NGN) technologies to develop. While local loop unbundling may not be applied fully to NGN development (the cost is not sunk, more technologies are available to implement, incentive of investment by operator), it can indicate benefits and drawbacks of open access policy in the past decade that can be adapted to NGN.The empirical results of this study show that during 2002–2008, LLU regulation was one of the strategies used to increase broadband adoption in countries that had difficulty encouraging infrastructure competition. Unbundling regulation can therefore be implemented carefully and differently in each country that has inefficiency that is harmful to consumers in its market from a monopoly incumbent. Infrastructure competition, on the other hand, is introduced as another strategy to increase broadband adoption. The empirical results of this study indicate that infrastructure competition can be used as a strategy when there are already enough infrastructures in the area or country. These results support the idea of using open access and infrastructure competition policy depending on the existing competition of broadband infrastructure in each country.     

Race to the top: Does competition in the DSL market matter for fibre penetration?

High speed broadband creates potential productivity gains and has a positive impact on economic growth. Achieving Europe's broadband access objectives will require large scale investment in next generation broadband networks, and it is imperative that an appropriate investment climate is created to encourage fibre network rollout. This study considers whether and how competition in the DSL market affects the incentives of operators to invest in the deployment of high-end fibre optic networks. Most earlier research on the drivers of investment in broadband technology has focused on the effect of mandatory access policies, such as local loop unbundling, or competing infrastructures. We posit that competition in the DSL sector may also influence fibre penetration, possibly to a considerable extent. We find that the relationship between service-based competition and fibre penetration is non-linear: a lack of or severe DSL competition is correlated with a negative effect on fibre penetration, but if a moderate degree of competition is already present in the market, more service-based competition may positively influence fibre penetration. The scale of these effects however varies with the openness of the DSL market: operators' incentives to invest in fibre appear to be more sensitive to changes in DSL competition if there is extensive local loop unbundling.     

Access issues: Operational Support Systems and regulation

This article examines the regulatory issues surrounding Operational Support Systems (OSSs). Equal and non-discriminatory access to the incumbents’ OSSs, which perform a number of functions and are critical in market differentiation for operators, is a key element in enabling meaningful competition. This article assesses the regulation of access to OSSs in the US and the EU. It concludes that, as attention now turns to competition in access networks, resale and local loop unbundling, regulators have an important role to play in putting forward guidelines concerning minimum requirements for access to OSSs so as to enable real competition.     

Legal unbundling can be a golden mean between vertical integration and ownership separation

We study an industry in which an upstream monopolist supplies an essential input at a regulated price to several downstream firms. Legal unbundling means in our model that a downstream firm owns the upstream firm, but this upstream firm is legally independent and maximizes its own upstream profits. We allow for non-tariff discrimination by the upstream firm and show that under quite general conditions legal unbundling never yields lower quantities in the downstream market than ownership separation and integration. Therefore, typically, consumer surplus will be largest under legal unbundling. Outcomes under legal unbundling are still advantageous when we allow for discriminatory capacity investments, investments into marginal cost reduction and investments into network reliability. If access prices are unregulated, however, legal unbundling may be quite undesirable.     

Estimating broadband diffusion in the EU using NUTS 1 regional data

In this paper we use panel data on NUTS 1 regional data for 27 EU countries in the years 2006–2010 to analyze determinants of broadband diffusion. We estimate both linear demand specification and the logistic diffusion function. We find that, after controlling for regional differences due to socioeconomic factors, inter-platform competition approximated by an inter-platform Herfindahl index has a significant positive impact on broadband diffusion. Broadband deployment is lower in countries in which DSL has a greater share in Internet access and it is higher in countries in which cable modem has a greater share in Internet access. Moreover, we find that competition between DSL providers has a significant and positive impact on broadband penetration. First, higher prices for a fully unbundled local loop connection, which represent the cost of providing copper-based Internet services, have a significant and negative impact on broadband penetration. Second, a greater incumbent share in DSL connections has a significant and negative impact on broadband penetration.     

A combinatorial auction to sell TV broadcasting rights in league sports

The centralized sale of TV broadcasting rights in league sports constitutes a cartel which in many European countries is allowed only if it complies with certain conditions set by competition authorities. Two of the most important conditions are: i) partial unbundling, i.e. the rights must be unbundled into several separate packages; and ii) the no-single-buyer rule, i.e. the packages must be sold to different broadcasters. This article shows how a combinatorial auction can be employed to sell broadcasting rights allocating them endogenously based on the broadcasters’ bids and, thus, without requiring the seller to pre-determine the packages of such rights. This feature can address various competition policy issues, including facilitating market entry and preventing coordination among bidders. Also, a combinatorial auction has the potential to achieve higher levels of allocative efficiency and higher revenue levels compared to auctions with pre-determined packages of broadcasting rights.     

国际电力体制改革经验及对中国的启发

迄今世界上100多个国家的电力改革实践对我国电力改革有几点基本的启示。(1)电力、经济、资源、政治、社会和文化价值等多方面的起始条件不同,决定了各国改革选择了不同的路径和垂直垄断结构的分拆顺序。没有一个模式是中国可以照搬的。(2)电力改革不仅有特性,而且有共性。我国电力改革在坚持因地制宜原则的同时,必须遵守电力市场改革的共同原则。(3)按照主要的原则,我国下一步改革需要进一步明确改革的多重目的及主次关系,对症施治;加强电网发展,为电力市场提供基本物质保证;着眼于电力市场运作,无论如何分拆必须坚持电网运营与市场参与者相独立的原则。     

Maximizing the adoption of fixed number portability within the EU: An empirical analysis

Number portability (NP) is considered by the European Commission as a key measure for promoting competition within the telecom sector especially regarding network access infrastructure. However, NP requires several modifications to the network architecture and to the business processes of each operator that, depending on network size, may result in a significant financial cost. This is true for fixed networks in particular. Given the requirement for such an investment, National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) desire a clear picture on what to expect, in terms of progress in access competition, when introducing fixed NP in their respective markets. The paper approaches this question by correlating several fixed telephony market indices related to access competition to the degree of success of fixed NP. Relevant analysis based on European Union member states’ data indicates that fixed NP does not significantly contribute to local loop unbundling (LLU) adoption in markets where there are other access technologies available. In these markets, access competition via these other technologies and fixed NP initially achieve similar penetration rates. Consequently, when access competition exceeds a certain threshold and given a reasonable pricing regime then fixed NP is further boosted to include broadband connections based on several broadband technologies/methodologies such as LLU and cable as well as existing narrowband access technologies (e.g. narrowband cable connections). In markets where LLU is the only alternative for access then the rate of Fixed NP adoption is directly correlated with the success of LLU. Consequently, these conclusions are considered within a high-level stepwise approach for NP implementation, which is based on the experience acquired from the respective Greek national project.     

Eine Konzeption zum Regulierungsmanagement im Kontext der Anreizregulierung

Strategic decisions of network operators are directly and indirectly affected by the current regulatory environment. Representing an important political and legal influence factor, the regulatory environment must be taken into account in the strategic decision-making process. Dealing with this factor is essential for an unbundled network operator, who’s main source of income is its grid access fee. Therefore, a comprehensive evaluation of the regulatory environment is indispensable for the success of network operators. This task should be handled by a department for regulatory management. However, as regulatory management is not clearly defined in business research, the present article intends to close this gap and develop a design for implementing a department for regulatory management. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of managerial behaviour under regulatory constraints. As part of our design, environmental analysis serves as an example to point out the specific challenges in regulated markets.     

Unbundling the incumbent and deployment of high-speed internet: Evidence from France

In this paper, we study the impact of competition on the legacy copper network on the deployment of high-speed broadband. We first develop a theoretical model, which shows that the relation between the number of competitors and investment in a quality-improving technology can be positive if the quality of the new technology is high enough, and is negative otherwise. We test these theoretical predictions using data on broadband deployments in France in more than 36,000 local municipalities. First, using panel data over the period 2011–2014, we estimate a model of entry into local markets by alternative operators using local loop unbundling (LLU). Second, using cross-sectional data for the year 2015, we estimate how the number of LLU entrants impacts the deployment of high-speed broadband with speed of 30 Mbps or more by means of VDSL, cable and fiber technologies, controlling for the endogeneity of LLU entry. We find that a higher number of LLU competitors in a municipality implies lower incentives to deploy and expand coverage of high-speed broadband with speed of 30 Mbps or more.     

The impact of different fibre access network technologies on cost,competition and welfare

Using a novel approach to the evaluation of new network technologies that combines an engineering cost model with a differentiated multi-player oligopoly model with wholesale access regulation this article evaluates the choice among different Fibre-to-the-Home (FTTH) architectures. The cost modelling relies upon an engineering bottom-up approach that feeds into a competition model. For addressing competition the pyramid model was chosen, which is an extension of the Hotelling model to multiple firms/services. The paper solves for price setting Nash equilibria between an incumbent, wholesale-access-based entrants and cable as an additional fully integrated network competitor. Welfare tradeoffs are highlighted with respect to cost differences and QoS differences between the various FTTH architectures and between the modes of regulation. According to the analysis architectures that can be unbundled (and that allow for greater speeds) outperform, from a social welfare perspective, architectures that (realistically) allow only for bitstream access.     

Functional separation in Swedish broadband market: Next step of improving competition

Technological development together with liberalization policy has led to competition in the telecommunications market. Broadband has been recognized as a driving force in the social and economic development of nations, and many countries have introduced policies and/or regulatory frameworks to improve competition in broadband markets. An evolution can be seen from the 1980s until the present day through open access to local loop unbundling to several degrees of separation including functional separation. There are several countries implementing functional separation such as the UK, Italy, Sweden and, recently the EU. It has been suggested that functional separation can be an effective policy for increasing competition in broadband markets under certain circumstances. Sweden has implemented functional separation by amending the Swedish Telecommunications Act in 2008 to include mandatory functional separation as one of the powers of the PTS, the Swedish telecommunications regulator. Although TeliaSonera, the incumbent fixed line operator decided to voluntarily separate part of their business, the amendments to the law were debated with arguments similar to the debates in the EU following the new regulatory framework implemented in 2009. Against this background, this paper provides an overview of the development of functional separation in the EU and European countries such as Sweden and the UK. The paper also provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the implementation of functional separation. The evolution of functional separation in Sweden is explained and ends with a discussion of the implementation of functional separation in the Swedish broadband market.     

“Open access:” the ideal and the real

“Open access” would allow ISPs to use a cable operator's broadband connection under regulated terms and conditions. Advocates stress the desirability of an “end-to-end” architecture for the Internet and the danger that cable operators will use their control over the last mile to limit consumer choice and stifle innovation. Opponents contend that wholesale price controls and other regulatory burdens under what they term “forced access” would in fact slow down the deployment of broadband, stifle innovation and harm consumers. The fears of “open access” advocates seem largely speculative at this point. Evidence from related policies also favors the opponents. “Closed” cable systems are beating their “open” DSL competitors in the market place; analogous regulation of cable TV did not serve consumers well; and forced “unbundling” of local service has been controversial and largely ineffective. In addition, relevant technology stocks declined in price with political and legal victories for “open access” and increased when it suffered setbacks.     

The long-run effects of copper-loop unbundling and the implications for fiber

Policies mandating unbundling of copper telecommunications networks have now been in place for more than 15 years, and it is thus becoming possible to study their long-run effects. This paper reviews the existing evidence on the effects of copper unbundling, and presents new empirical results based on regression analyses of broadband penetration in OECD countries from 2001 to 2010. The results show that the long-run effect of copper unbundling on household broadband penetration rates is negative, a finding which is consistent with previous research, including with research suggesting that copper unbundling has slowed the deployment of FTTP infrastructures, especially in Europe. Based on an analysis of the similarities and differences between the unbundling of copper networks and fiber networks, the paper concludes that mandated unbundling of fiber networks would likely deter deployment of Next Generation Access networks (NGAs).     

Unbundling the effects of institutions on firm resources: The contingent value of being local in emerging economy private equity

How do host country institutions influence the value of a firm's local resources? Using a novel dataset on the performance of 47 private equity (PE) firms in 49 emerging economies, we show evidence that the answer depends on the type of institution. Focusing on conditions at the time of initial investment, we find that PE firms with local origins and foreign PE firms with local experience performed better when contract enforcement institutions were weak than when they were strong. Financial development, in contrast, may have undermined the value of PE firm local origins. These results help reconcile contrasting findings on how host country institutions influence performance and lead us to contend that unbundling institutions is necessary for continued development of the institutions‐based view. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Eigentumsentflechtung,deep-ISO,der dritte Weg — wohin führt die Reise der Europäischen Energiemärkte?

This paper discusses vertical unbundling of networks from the commercial businesses in the European energy markets. The current status quo in the political field in Brussels is to implement a choice between three options: ownership unbundling, the “deep-ISO”, the “third way”. The “third way” is the strengthening of the current unbundling regulations, but will change hardly anything in the industry structure. The “deep-ISO” requires the separation of system operations into an independent entity, whereas transmission ownership does not change hands and thus possibly remains in one hand with the power plants. If the ISO decides and orders network investment, we speak of a “deep-ISO”. The more controversial proposal is ownership unbundling. A social-cost-benefit-analysis of the German transmission system operators (Brunekreeft, 2008) suggests that the likely overall effect for social welfare is slightly positive, but effects are small.