The public incumbent's defeat in mobile competition: Implications for the sequencing of telecommunications reform

Within a mere 5 years of market competition, the mobile communications sector in Taiwan has exceeded a 100% penetration rate, currently ranking near the top of the world. In an even more stunning development, the public incumbent, Chunghwa Telecom, has handed the leadership status to a market entrant, Taiwan Cellular Corp., despite phenomenal mobile communications growth. This paper explores the factors that hamstrung Chunghwa Telecom in competition against its rival entrants. Our econometric analysis substantiates the fact that handset subsidies are the most effective instrument for mobile firms to gain market share. Chunghwa Telecom, due to its public ownership status, was nevertheless prohibited at first from adopting such a marketing strategy.The empirical results provided in this paper indeed pinpoint the importance of the sequencing of reform mandates in developing telecommunications: a prolonged privatization could help to promote competition in the industry. Public ownership makes Chunghwa Telecom vulnerable to political intervention and operational inefficiency, which is a barricade to performance and competitiveness for the not-yet-privatized company in a liberalized market. Taiwan's case presents an interesting deviation from conventional development theories, while it deserves scrutiny as it paves a shortcut to successful implementation of telecommunication reform in a timely fashion.     

Estimating consumer surplus in the mobile telecommunications market: The case of Korea

This paper estimates consumer surplus in the Korean mobile telephone services (MTS) market. The Korean mobile telecommunications market has grown rapidly since 1997 when competition was introduced and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technology was commercialized. Because consumer surplus is relevant to the controversy over establishing an appropriate price level between consumers and service providers, the need for a robust measurement of benefit from MTS is increasing. The measured net consumer surplus estimated by means of elasticities of demand reached about US$48.8 billion in the period 1996–2004 and the changes amounted to about US$8.8 billion during the same period. In particular, after competition was introduced into the market with an accompanying price decrease and increase in the number of subscribers, consumers have benefited greatly. Therefore, it can be inferred that a facility-based competition policy and the reduction in price of access such as handset subsidies all played a positive role in the early diffusion of MTS in Korea. The estimated consumer surplus in this paper does not include network externality (option externality); if this were considered, the total social welfare of the consumer would be larger.     

Bertrand equilibrium with differentiated products considering fixed costs: Korean price regulation in the mobile telephone industry

In some industries such as telecommunications and electricity, the fixed costs are so high that competition is not sustainable without considering the fixed cost in pricing. The sustainability of competition is as important as enhancing competition when an industry is in the transitional period from being a monopoly owned or managed by the government to a competitive market structure driven by the market. A price competition model with asymmetric firms and product differentiation is considered in which firms compete with a normal profit constraint. The constraint is related to the sustainability of competition and can be realized through price regulation. With this constraint, firms gain only normal profit in equilibrium despite the asymmetry, and consumer surplus is maximized. The equilibrium is meaningful in defining the industry performance intended through the regulation. Moreover, the price regulation of the Korean mobile telephone market is considered to discuss any implications of this equilibrium.     

Diffusion of mobile telephony: An empirical study in Taiwan

Mobile telephony penetration is a major indicator of mobile telephony diffusion. Taiwan had a mobile telephony penetration of 108% in 2002, ranking first in the world. This study analyzes this accelerated diffusion in terms of growth model and determinants of the diffusion rate. To eliminate the inherent uncertainty associated with choosing the optimal growth model, this study compares the performance of three conventional models, namely Gompertz, Logistic and Bass, to identify the most appropriate model, and to distinguish the forces driving the diffusion rate. Empirical results indicate that the most appropriate model is the Logistic model. Network externalities, which this study shows to be the same as the imitation effect in the Bass model, explain the superiority of the Logistic model. Moreover, market competition, which markedly reduces service prices, is identified as a primary driver of the diffusion rate of mobile telephony in Taiwan. Economic conditions, technological innovation and number of operators are insignificant factors. Finally, mobile telephony is a substitute for fixed-line telephony in Taiwan.     

Impacts of handset bundling on mobile data usage: The case of Finland

Promotion of the adoption of new services has emerged as a possible driver for the regulation of handset bundling and subsidies. Handset bundling, however, has complex implications not only on mobile data service adoption, the focus of this research, but also more broadly on the mobile market dynamics. Due to the complexity, regulators have difficulties in anticipating the possible resulting impacts. Using a case study, expert interviews, and usage measurements as research method, an empirical framework was constructed to make the service usage impacts more explicit. The framework enables the identification of the regulator's steering options and their qualitative impacts. Results are based on observations before and after the change of law on handset bundling in the Finnish market. According to the findings, handset bundling regulation is a possible but risky tool for steering the market.     

Is five too many? Simulation analysis of profitability and cost structure in the Korean mobile telephone industry

Four new nationwide entrants were introduced into the Korean mobile telephone industry provoking intense competition among the five carriers by late 1997. Some assert that there is excessive competition and industry restructuring is needed. In this paper, we analyze the profitability of mobile telephone carriers and the degree to which cost is reduced through M&A, thereby obtaining principal information on the economic incentives for industry restructuring.     

Demand for telecommunication services in developing countries

Living standards and economic growth in developing countries are invariably linked to the availability and use of telecom services. Effective policy decisions require the best estimates of the drivers of these services. In this paper, telecommunications demand is estimated in models for residential mainline and mobile telephone service for developing countries for the period 1996–2003. The paper tests for cross-price effects between mainline and mobile service and its findings have important policy implications. It finds residential monthly price elasticity to be insignificant for developing countries, but the connection elasticity is larger than generally found in the literature. Mobile monthly price elasticities are very large. A new and important empirical finding is that although wireline phones are substitutes in the mobile market, the contrary is not true—mobile phones are not substitutes in the wireline market, and in fact may be considered complements. This lack of symmetry has important implications for properly defining telecom markets. Universal service subsidies and competitive market initiatives should be reevaluated in light of the paper's elasticity estimates. Increased competition, income growth and enhanced education may be the ultimate universal service promoters.     

Toward universal telephone access: Market progress and progress beyond the market

The last 10 years have seen an explosion in access to telephone services worldwide based on rapid technology advance in increasingly competitive markets. The mobile phone has driven expansion in subscribers and access, especially in the developing world. This paper estimates global mobile footprint coverage based on 2002 data and calculates that as much as 77 percent of the world's population may live in an area covered by a mobile signal. Nonetheless, many people remain without access to telephony. The paper estimates the maximum likely cost in terms of cross subsidy within the industry and outside financing for achieving universal access using competitively awarded subsidies to private providers in a reformed market. This upper-end cost is estimated at $5.7 billion, with costs that could not be supplied by a reasonable tax on existing providers (and so required from outside the sector) estimated at $1.8 billion.     

Prices for long-distance voice telephony in Germany

This paper examines the first 16 months of competition in the German market for long-distance voice telephony on the fixed network. It concentrates on price level and price structure. Competition induced by the entry of both network operators and switch-based service providers decreased the price level substantially. Furthermore, after initial attempts to design innovative price structures, most firms gave up differentiation, and instead charged uniform prices for long-distance calls for residential customers. Moreover, the decrease in the price level seems to have induced a shift in the peak-load structure, which raises concern about the regulation of the peak-load structure of interconnection charges.     

Can a margin squeeze indicate the need for deregulation? The case of fixed network voice telephony markets

In the beginning of fixed network liberalisation in Europe in the late 1990s, the main concern of regulators was to lower retail call prices. This was done by introducing wholesale regulation and promoting service-based competition. Some years later, the concern of some regulators turned from too high retail call prices to too low call prices, which might ‘squeeze’ entrants out of the market. This paper looks at a simple model in which this development is explained by increasing competitive pressure from an ‘outside opportunity’, most notably mobile telephony and cable. It is concluded that a margin squeeze is not necessarily used by the incumbent as a device to drive competitors out of the market and to increase market power but can also result from increased inter-modal competition. If this is the case, it is argued that the appropriate response would be deregulation or – under particular circumstances – a switch from cost-oriented access prices to alternatives such as retail-minus or capacity-based interconnection.     

美国电力管理体制的改革

美国电力工业从上世纪九十年代起开始改革。二十多年来,美国联邦能源监管委员会在建立电力批发市场方面以及在建立区域输电系统方面进行了一系列改革,包括对电力企业实行放松管制、引入竞争机制,开放输电网络、市场定价,无歧视入网、搁浅成本的处理、输电系统的信息透明化等,最终使美国的电力系统效率更高、电价更低,服务质量逐步提高。     

Regulation and the Development of Competition in the U.K. Gas Supply Industry

When the U.K. gas supply industry was privatised, it retained its monopoly vertically integrated structure. We discuss the forces which led to the deregulation of the U.K. gas supply industry. Important factors in the process include a number of critical reports by the regulatory authorities, the growth of alternative gas supplies including the development of the spot-market, and the success of independents in gaining market share in markets opened up to competition. We also present surveys of gas users and independent gas suppliers and find that price advantage has been the critical factor in the increase in market share gained by the independent gas suppliers.     

Lessons from the deregulation transition in Chile's local telephony market

There is no experience in the world where entry to local telephony has been as significant as in Chile. This paper addresses two related questions: (i) whether the local telephony segment in Chile is competitive enough so as to deregulate rates and (ii) whether competition thus far achieved could be at risk in the case where asymmetric regulation is ended. The paper suggests that the market is competitive enough, that the regulation mechanism is extremely costly, and that subsidizing entry in order to have infrastructure competition is not necessary. It concludes that deregulation of consumer's rates would be in their own consumers’ interest.     

The Finnish telecommunications market: Advantage of local access incumbency

The introduction of long distance and local competition in the sophisticated Finnish market in 1994 has resulted in unparalleled growth of the Finnet group of companies, which is the incumbent in local markets and the entrant in the long distance market. The former long distance monopolist, Telecom Finland, has gained little market share in local markets. Finnet’s success was due to its hold on the local access bottleneck, the initial lack of number portability when switching carriers and its right to refuse resale of its access lines to Telecom Finland (both until June 1997). The Finnish case illustrates the importance of ownership of the local loop, even in the face of numerous independent local-only operators.     

Accounting for ARPU: New evidence from international panel data

Average revenue per user (ARPU) is commonly used by regulators and industry observers to compare the performance of mobile telephony markets. Under the new EU electronic communications regulatory framework, some national regulatory authorities (NRAs) have linked higher ARPU with ‘significant market power’. This paper empirically examines the determinants of ARPU in a systematic way, taking account of service quality, market environment, regulation and quantity of service. The robust results suggest that concentration may not be a reliable indicator of competition in mobile markets; there are economies of density in mobile markets; and higher GDP per capita increases ARPU.     

Global political economy of technology standardization: A case of the Korean mobile telecommunications market

This paper examines empirical cases of standardization in the Korean mobile market as vehicles for approaching the broader political and institutional context of standardization in telecommunications. A consideration of Korean standardization in the mobile telecommunications market is particularly interesting because it reveals how the state's political interests influence standards decisions, which are primarily driven by market and technological changes in telecommunications. Judged from the social construction of technology perspective which sheds light not only on technology itself but also on political, social and economic interests that surround transformations in technology, this paper highlights power relations among the major actors that have made technology standards decisions in Korea regarding second (2G) and third-generation (3G) mobile telephony. The paper also attempts to show how the Korean government has dealt with the diverse interests of various market actors while pursuing its own policy agenda.     

Diffusion of digital mobile telephony: Are developing countries different?

Factors determining the diffusion of digital mobile telephony across developed and developing countries are studied with the aid of a Gompertz model. After controlling for other factors, the speed of diffusion per se is not significantly different between the two groups of countries. Standards competition hinders and market competition promotes diffusion in both groups. Various factors are, however, more important in a developing country context: having a large potential user base, accumulating network effects, being open, commanding a high (non-telecom) technological level, and introducing innovation(s) complementing mobile telephony. Late entrants experience faster diffusion promoting cross-country convergence.     

Quality differentiation and firms’ choices between online and physical markets

We study firms’ choices between online and physical markets with respect to product quality and competition, and examine consequences of transparency policies on price competition and market structure. We investigate two contrasting forces. First, since consumers cannot fully inspect an online product’s quality prior to purchase, conventional wisdom and some of the literature suggest that this attracts low-quality products to the online market (a pooling effect). On the other hand, the literature on vertical product differentiation indicates that a firm with a lower-quality product may prefer to reveal its product quality in the physical market because quality differentiation helps alleviate price competition (a differentiation effect). We show that an entrant firm with product quality lower than that of the offline incumbent may choose the physical market, whereas the entrant with a quality higher than the incumbent’s may sell online. More generally the two contrasting forces can give rise to a wide range of product quality—from low-end to high-end—in both markets.