Why do intermediaries divert search?

We analyze the incentives to divert search for an information intermediary who enables buyers (consumers) to search affiliated sellers (stores). We identify two original motives for diverting search (i.e., inducing consumers to search more than they would like): (i) trading off higher total consumer traffic for higher revenues per consumer visit; and (ii) influencing stores’ choices of strategic variables (e.g., pricing). We characterize the conditions under which there would be no role for search diversion as a strategic instrument for the intermediary, thereby showing that it occurs even when the contracting space is significantly enriched. We then discuss several applications related to online and brick‐and‐mortar intermediaries.     

What do we know about the second moment of financial markets?

Recent research shows that the vast majority of scientific studies published in leading finance journals fails scientific replication (Hou, Xue, and Zhang, 2020; Harvey, Liu, and Zhu; 2016). This study argues that p-hacking, publication pressure and the selection bias from leading finance journals are perhaps not the underlying root cause for this issue. This study shows that standard methodologies often used in finance research are inevitably sample-specific due to the very nature of financial markets. While the consensus of earlier research postulates a rejection of the time-honored Levy hypothesis, the results of this study strongly indicate that the variance of variance does not exist in any of the financial key markets that are considered. An unexpected finding of this study is that the variance process governing the U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate market is generating more extreme events than the Bitcoin market. The results cast doubts on the validity of methodologies currently used in finance research.     

Corporate financial policy: What really matters?

Reliable access to funding, as in Myers and Majluf (1984), is what really matters, but there are nontrivial indeterminacies in how such access is arranged and in the debt, cash-balance, and payout components of financial policy. These inferences are from a corporate “twins” comparison study of the financial policies of Henry Ford at Ford Motor Co. and Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. at General Motors Corp. The documented testimony of Ford and Sloan indicates that both focused on funding their business, with debt as a funding tool, not an element of an optimized leverage ratio. Their financial policies differ in five important respects, including (i) the use of debt versus large cash balances to meet funding needs and (ii) a commitment to paying large dividends versus a strong aversion to payouts. The data also point to the importance of the inability of managers to identify optimal policies with reliable precision.     

What do dividend reductions signal?

Dividend reductions have long been considered a “last resort” action for firm managers. Managerial reluctance to reduce dividends emanates from the view that dividend drops signal managerial pessimism regarding future earnings. Contrary to expectations, studies show that earnings rebound significantly following a dividend reduction; yet investors react negatively to the dividend-drop announcement. We present an explanation for the anomalous behavior of earnings and returns around the time of a dividend drop. Our evidence suggests that a reduction in a firm's established dividend coincides with a decrease in the value of the firm's real options. Earnings rebound following the dividend reduction due to the savings that result as the firm allows growth options to expire; however, announcement period returns suggest that investors recognize the lost value associated with the forthcoming expiration of growth options.     

How do financial contracts evolve for new ventures?

While previous research has characterized the key features of contracts between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, little is known about the contracts' evolution over time and across funding rounds. We overcome significant data challenges to compile a novel panel dataset of U.S. early-stage ventures that includes the main financial and control rights offered to investors at each (equity) funding round. We find that there is a ‘default contract’ with a distinct combination of rights that the majority of companies gravitate to. This default contract is typically implemented in the initial Series A funding round and rarely deviated from in later rounds. Whenever deviations do occur, terms are usually revised in favour of investors, and not entrepreneurs. Due to this stickiness of the default contract, for successful startups we argue that post-money valuations in later rounds can be a reasonable proxy for the economic value of the firm.     

What do we know about the role of financial reporting in debt contracting and debt covenants?

The paper examines the role of financial reporting in debt contracting and in particular focuses on the definition, measurement, and monitoring of accounting-based covenants used to manage agency relationships arising from borrowing by firms. The paper also reviews research in areas of financial reporting where the presence of accounting-based covenants provides incentives to managers, notably choice of accounting method, lobbying on standard setters' proposals, and accounting earnings management. Although US dominated and latterly increasingly focused on large datasets and quantitative and analytical methods, relevant research is available from a range of methodologies and countries and the paper reflects this variety and identifies both inter-jurisdictional differences and inter-temporal changes in debt contracting practices. Despite the extensive research which is reviewed important areas for new research remain.     

How do financial institutions react to a tax increase?

This paper empirically highlights the role and significance of taxes for the capital structure decisions of banks. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, I show that an increase in the local U.S. state corporate tax rate affects the banks’ financing as well as their operating choices. Better-capitalized banks raise their long-term non-depository debt and thus benefit from an enlarged tax shield. Worse-capitalized banks instead reduce their lending because a higher tax rate increases the tax-adjusted cost of funding, which renders the marginal loan unprofitable.     

What do retail FX traders learn?

What is the benefit of experience? Using data from a leading trading platform we find no evidence that retail FX traders learn to trade better, but they do appear to learn about their innate abilities as traders and respond appropriately. In particular, following an unsuccessful trading day, they are more likely to cease trading, to trade smaller amounts and to trade less frequently. These effects are stronger for younger and less experienced traders who might be expected to have more to learn than older, more experienced traders. As regards learning through experience, surprisingly we find that more seasoned traders demonstrate a slight decline in performance once we account for the endogenous decision to cease trading, and even very experienced traders consistently lose money.     

What do two plus two equal?

A mathematician,an accountant and an economistapply for the same job.The interviewer calls in the mathematician and asksWhat do two plus two equal?The mathematician     

What is the systemic risk exposure of financial institutions?

I compare the performance of three measures of institution-level systemic risk exposure — Exposure CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016), systemic expected shortfall (Acharya et al., 2016), and Granger causality (Billio et al., 2012). I modify Exposure CoVaR to allow for forecasting, and estimate the ability of each measure to forecast the performance of financial institutions during systemic crisis periods in 1998 (LTCM) and 2008 (Lehman Brothers). I find that Exposure CoVaR forecasts the within-crisis performance of financial institutions, and provides useful forecasts of future systemic risk exposures. Systemic expected shortfall and Granger causality do not forecast the performance of financial institutions reliably during crises. I also find, using cross-sectional regressions, that foreign equity exposure and securitization income determine systemic risk exposure during the 1998 and 2008 crises, respectively; financial institution size determines systemic risk exposure during both crisis periods; and executive compensation does not determine systemic risk exposure.     

The financial crisis: What is there to learn?

Many are currently studying the origins of the financial crisis in an attempt to answer two seemingly simple questions: why did it happen, and can another crisis be prevented? Those two questions have proved incredibly divisive. The majority opinion of The United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was submitted with two dissenting positions. Furthermore, The 2010 Economic Report of the United States President does not perfectly align with any opinion presented in that report. Few studies, however, provide proper consideration to the evolution of macroeconomic thought and lengthening of the business cycle preceding the current crisis.     

How do financial analysts interpret industrial firms' corporate refocusing announcements?

This study investigates how analysts perceive the effect of corporate refocusing announcements on UK industrial firms' future earnings by examining current-year and one-year-ahead earnings forecast revisions, current-year target price revisions and earnings forecast errors in the five years surrounding a refocusing announcement year. The results reveal that analysts adjust their earnings forecasts downward in a refocusing announcement year and the following two years, predicting that operating performance in the post-refocusing period is likely to decline relative to their former earnings forecasts. Secondly, there is no evidence that analysts issue biased earnings forecasts after refocusing announcements or that their forecasts appear less accurate. Thirdly, they adjust their earnings forecasts downward in a refocusing announcement year with downward market movement. However, they do not similarly adjust their earnings forecast upward with upward market movement. The magnitude of downward adjustments exceeds that of upward adjustments. They also adjust current-year target price forecasts downward with downward market movement in the year prior to a refocusing announcement.     

How do UK financial institutions really price their banking products?

This paper has several objectives. The first is to explore the type (or types) of imperfect competition that prevailed in the retail banking sector in the 1990s. A general linearised pricing model is employed to test for the degree to which competition in certain markets deviated from the competitive ideal. The key finding, is that, with the exception of mortgage products, deposit and loan rate setting by UK financial institutions is best described by the Salop–Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, with bargain and rip-offs. Cournot type behaviour is evident in some cases. Indirectly, the presence of perfect contestability is largely ruled out. Another objective is to compare these findings with the results of a similar study conducted nearly a decade ago, when financial reforms introduced to encourage greater competition were relatively recent. Based on the results of this study, the policy lesson is that financial firms exhibit different types of price setting behaviour depending on the banking product. The policy implication is to require firms to produce comparable information for consumers, thereby helping to contain the loss of consumer surplus in imperfectly competitive markets.     

In which financial markets do mutual fund theorems hold true?

The mutual fund theorem (MFT) is considered in a general semimartingale financial market S with a finite time horizon T, where agents maximize expected utility of terminal wealth. The main results are:

What do price discovery metrics really measure?

A market is typically considered to dominate price discovery if it is the first to reflect new information about the fundamental value. Our simulations indicate that common price discovery metrics – Hasbrouck information share and Harris–McInish–Wood component share – are only consistent with this view of price discovery if the price series have equal levels of noise, including microstructure frictions and liquidity. If the noise in the price series differs, the information and component shares measure a combination of leadership in impounding new information and relative avoidance of noise, to varying degrees. A third price discovery metric, the ‘information leadership share’ uses the information share and the component share together to identify the price series that is first to impound new information. This third metric is robust to differences in noise levels and therefore correctly attributes price discovery in a wider range of settings. Using four recent empirical studies of price discovery we show that the choice and interpretation of price discovery metrics can have a substantial impact on conclusions about price discovery.     

What should regulators do about merger policy?

I argue that merger policy needs to be driven by different considerations in Europe, Japan and the United States. In Europe the main challenge is to set up a system so that efficient consolidation can occur once the single currency is established. In Japan the policy ought to be directed towards trying to attract foreign institutions to acquire under-capitalized domestic institutions. Japan does not seem to be taking this route. In the US consolidation it is already occurring and the current policy should be continued.     

Bank mergers: What should policymakers do?

These remarks discuss why the “cluster” of financial services and local banking markets are still relevant for antitrust analysis in banking. A key portion of the Federal Reserve’s Order approving the NationsBank–Barnett merger is interpreted, and the extent to which antitrust is a practical constraint on the development of a nationwide banking structure is commented upon.     

How do financial globalization,institutions and economic growth impact financial sector development in European countries?

This paper examines the role of financial globalization, institutions and economic growth on the development of financial sector in European countries. We use panel data covering the period of 1989−2016. Using the composite index of financial development covers various dimensions of financial market, that is, depth, access and efficiency and four-way classification of institutions as suggested by Rodrik (2005) and Law et al. (2018), the empirical results indicate that economic growth and institutional quality are positively associated with financial development. Contrarily, financial globalization hinders the process of financial sector development. The results are robust to using alternative proxies of economic growth, institutional indicators and capturing the period of financial crisis. These empirical findings suggest policy guidelines to develop financial sector by using globalization, institutional quality and economic growth as economic tools.     

The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt?

It is high time we rediscovered the role of the financial cycle in macroeconomics. In the environment that has prevailed for at least three decades now, it is not possible to understand business fluctuations and the corresponding analytical and policy challenges without understanding the financial cycle. This calls for a rethink of modelling strategies and for significant adjustments to macroeconomic policies. This essay highlights the stylised empirical features of the financial cycle, conjectures as to what it may take to model it satisfactorily, and considers its policy implications. In the discussion of policy, the essay pays special attention to the bust phase, which is less well explored and raises much more controversial issues.