Employee Stock Options, Equity Valuation, and the Valuation of Option Grants Using a Warrant-Pricing Model

We investigate the use of a warrant‐pricing approach to incorporate employee stock options (ESOs) into equity valuation and to account for the dilutive effect of ESOs in the valuation of option grants for financial reporting purposes. Our valuation approach accounts for the jointly determined nature of ESO and shareholder values. The empirical results show that our stock price estimate exhibits lower prediction errors and higher explanatory powers for actual share price than does the traditional stock price estimate. We use our valuation approach to assess the implications of dilution on the fair‐value estimates of ESO grants. We find that the fair value is overstated by 6% if we ignore the dilutive feature of ESOs. Furthermore, this bias is larger for firms that are heavy users of ESOs, small, and R&D intensive, and for firms that have a broad‐based ESO compensation plan.     

The Timing of Option Repricing

We investigate whether executive stock option repricings are systematically timed to coincide with favorable movements in the company's stock price. For a sample of 236 repricing events, we observe sharp increases in stock price in the 20‐day period following the repricing date. In addition, repricing dates tend to either precede the release of good news or follow the release of bad news in the quarterly earnings announcements. Since information about stock option repricing is not generally released to the public around the repricing date, these findings suggest that CEOs opportunistically manage the timing of the option repricing date.     

Non-marketability and the value of employee stock options

We adapt the Benninga et al. (2005) framework to value employee stock options (ESOs). The model quantifies non-diversification effects, is computationally simple, and provides an endogenous explanation of ESO early-exercise. Using a proprietary dataset of ESO exercise events we measure the non-marketability ESO discount. We find that the ESO value on the grant date is approximately 45% of a similar plain vanilla Black–Scholes value. The model is aligned with empirical findings of ESOs, gives an exercise boundary of ESOs and can serve as an approximation to the fair value estimation of share-based employee and executive compensation. Using the model we give a numerical measure of non-diversification in an imperfect market.     

Accelerated Vesting of Employee Stock Options in Anticipation of FAS 123-R

In December 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) mandated the use of a fair value–based measurement attribute to value employee stock options (ESOs) via Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123-R. In anticipation of FAS 123-R, between March 2004 and November 2005, several firms accelerate the vesting of ESOs to avoid recognizing existing unvested ESO grants at fair value in future financial statements. We find that the likelihood of accelerated vesting is higher if (1) acceleration has a greater effect on future ESO compensation expense, especially related to underwater options, and (2) firms suffer greater agency problems, proxied by fewer blockholders, lower pension fund ownership, and top five officers holding a greater share of ESOs. We also find a negative stock price reaction around the announcement of the acceleration decision. Furthermore, stock returns are significantly negative before the new vesting dates and positive afterward, suggesting that vesting dates could have been backdated.     

ESO compensation: The roles of default risk, employee sentiment, and insider information

This paper derives a pricing model for employee stock options (ESO) that includes default risk and considers employee sentiment. Using ESO data from 1992 to 2004, the study finds that the average executive's subjective value is about 55% of the Black-Scholes value. Only employees who over-estimate firm returns (or insiders who know that the firm is under-valued) by about 10% per annum will prefer ESOs over cash compensation. Our model also shows that work incentives offered by ESOs may be far lower than those implied by Black-Scholes but that ESOs may induce less risk-taking behavior, contrary to typical moral hazard arguments. Findings may impact relevant accounting regulations as well as compensation decisions.     

Should there exist secondary markets for executive stock options?

This paper investigates the potential disadvantages of the secondary markets for executive stock options (ESOs). The benefits of such markets are evident, but they might also have negative effects for shareholders. Executives might, for example, use inside information to time their ESO selling. We investigate two personal motives of managers that can be assumed to affect their optimal selling decision, that is, managers' personal portfolio management issues and the use of inside information. We explore these motives by analyzing unique data from Finland, where there are secondary markets for ESOs. The results of the study support the traditional portfolio diversification hypothesis according to which managers tend to sell their ESOs when holding an ESO is equivalent to holding the underlying stock; that is, in such a case a manager's wealth is closely tied to the stock price of the firm. With respect to the use of inside information the results indicate that ESO selling activity is not related to future stock price behaviour, suggesting that managers do not use inside information to determine the selling time of their ESOs. These results imply that the existence of secondary markets for ESOs does not weaken the usefulness of ESOs as the management compensation, although the benefits of such markets are evident.     

Employee stock options pricing and the implication of restricted exercise price: evidence from Taiwan

Employee stock option (ESO) issuance in Taiwan is associated with some unique characteristics. We believe this to be the first paper to examine the impact of different pricing model options on the theoretical price of ESOs in Taiwan. A clear consensus in terms of the time point to expense the ESO issuance and the setting of a restricted exercise price lead us to believe that the reset pricing model represents the most pertinent model to price Taiwanese ESOs. Furthermore, the factors that determine the decision to impose a restricted exercise price are also discussed. With an outreach of 24 logistic regressions, the empirical results show that the ultimate control power, operational performance and volatility of a firm are important indicators regarding the probability of adding a restriction on the exercise price.     

Which approach to accounting for employee stock options best reflects market pricing?

We use a residual income valuation framework to compare equity valuation implications of four approaches to employee stock options (ESOs) accounting: APB 25 “recognize nothing”, SFAS 123 (revised) “recognize ESO expense”, FASB Exposure Draft “recognize and expense ESO asset” and “recognize ESO asset and liability”. Theoretical analysis shows only grant date recognition of an asset and liability, and subsequent marking-to-market of the liability, results in accounting numbers that capture the dilution effects of ESOs on current shareholder value. Out-of-sample equity market value prediction tests and in-sample comparisons of model explanatory power also support the “recognize ESO asset and liability” method.     

How Might Companies Value ESOs?

There has been a steady growth in the use of employee equity compensation plans, and in the use of executive stock options (ESOs) in particular, along with a rise in shareholder and public perceptions that the values of compensation plans are not always fully disclosed. The IFSA of Australia recently called for separate reporting in financial statements of numbers and values of ESOs. Companies, when negotiating employment contracts, frequently agree to compensate an executive if a share option plan is subsequently not approved by shareholders. These facts suggest that reporting the value of an ESO plan is a useful and important exercise. We outline a model for the valuation of ESOs typically issued by Australian listed companies and illustrate the application of the model with a case study.     

A simulation-based algorithm for American executive stock option valuation

We present an algorithm that merges a certainty-equivalence framework with the least-squares Monte Carlo algorithm to obtain the executive stock option (ESO) value for a risk-averse and undiversified agent. We account for the difference between executive’s value and firm cost of the ESO. We show how early-exercise decisions depend on executive’s preferences and its diversification degree. Because of the algorithm flexibility, it allows for multiple state-variables. As an example, we consider the case of indexed ESOs revealing a significant improvement in terms of executive’s discount respect to fixed strike ESOs.     

Revisiting the incentive effects of executive stock options

We develop a multiperiod framework to evaluate the incentive effects of executive stock options (ESOs). For a given increase in the grant-date firm stock price (and a concurrent increase in return volatility), the increment of total value at the vesting date acts as a proxy for the incentive effects of ESOs. If the option is attached to the existing contract without adjusting cash compensation, we suggest that a firm should not always fix the strike price to the grant-date stock price; instead, the strike price should vary with the length of the vesting period. We also show that, compared with at-the-money options, restricted stock generates greater incentives to increase stock prices in some scenarios, especially when equity-based awards are vested early. If the vesting period is long, the firm could grant options instead of restricted stock to maximize incentives.     

The Effect of Exercise Date Uncertainty on Employee Stock Option Value

The IASC recently recommended that employee compensation in the form of stock options be measured at the 'fair value' based on an option pricing model and the value should be recognized in financial statements. This follows adoption of SFAS No. 123 in the United States, which requires firms to estimate the value of employee stock options using either a Black‐Scholes or binomial model. Most US firms used the B‐S model for their 1996 financial statements. This study assumes that option life follows a Gamma distribution, allowing the variance of option life to be separate from its expected life. The results indicate the adjusted Black‐Scholes model could overvalue employee stock options on the grant date by as much as 72 percent for nondividend paying firms and by as much as 84 percent for dividend paying firms. The results further demonstrate the sensitivity of ESO values to the volatility of the expected option life, a parameter that the B‐S model or a Poisson process cannot accommodate. The variability of option life has an especially big impact on ESO value for firms whose ESOs have a relatively short life (5 years, for example) and high employee turnover. For such firms, the results indicate a binomial option pricing model is more appropriate for estimating ESO value than the B‐S type model.     

Analytic Pricing of Employee Stock Options

We introduce a model that captures the main properties thatcharacterize employee stock options (ESO). We discuss the likelihoodof early voluntary ESO exercise, and the obligation to exerciseimmediately if the employee leaves the firm, except if thishappens before options are vested, in which case the optionsare forfeited. We derive an analytic formula for the price ofthe ESO and in a case study compare it to alternative methods.     

The Cost of Employee Stock Option Grants: An Empirical Analysis

This study presents empirical evidence on the ex post costs of employee stock option (ESO) grants to issuing firms and examines whether the Black–Scholes [1973] model provides reasonable estimates of these values. Because there are no market prices for ESOs, the traditional avenues for testing option–pricing models are unavailable. This research relies instead on techniques from the economic forecasting literature, viewing model values as forecasts of the options' payoff. The theoretically appropriate rate at which to discount ESO payoffs is derived under the maintained hypothesis that the Black–Scholes model is valid. This rate is used in estimating ex post ESO costs at the time of grant, which are then compared with Black–Scholes estimates using Theil's [1966] tests of forecast rationality. Based on a sample of 966 ESO grants over 1963–1984, the results suggest that the Black–Scholes model, adjusted for concavity in the time to exercise using the Hemmer, Matsunaga, and Shevlin [1994] procedure, appears to provide reasonable estimates of ex post ESO costs for the average ESO grant. However, there is significant variability in the amount of model error on an individual grant basis.     

Valuing employee reload options under the time vesting requirement

Upon the exercise of an employee stock option, the embedded reload provision entitles the holder to receive additional units of new options from the employer. The number of units of new options received is equal to the number of shares tendered as payment of strike and the new strike is set at the prevailing stock price. The reload provision may be subject to a time vesting requirement, that is, after each exercise, the employee is prohibited from exercising the reload until the end of a vesting period. In this paper, we construct an efficient numerical algorithm that computes the market value of the employee reload options under a time vesting requirement. Also, we explore the analytic properties of the price functions and optimal exercise policies of the employee reload options.     

The Valuation of Executive Stock Options in an Intensity-Based Framework

This paper presents a general intensity-based framework to value executive stock options (ESOs). It builds upon the recent advances in the credit risk modeling arena. The early exercise or forfeiture due to voluntary or involuntary employment termination and the early exercise due to the executive's desire for liquidity or diversification are modeled as an exogenous point process with random intensity dependent on the stock price.Two analytically tractable specifications are given where the ESO value, expected time of exercise or forfeiture, and the expected stock price at the time of exercise or forfeiture are calculated in closed-form.     

The relation between corporate governance and CEOs’ equity grants

We investigate whether the firm’s corporate governance affects the value of equity grants for its CEO. Consistent with the managerial power view, we find that more poorly-governed firms grant higher values of stock options and restricted stock to their CEOs after controlling for the economic determinants of these grants. We show that the negative relation between governance strength and equity grants is not likely to be attributable to omitted economic factors or substitution effects between governance strength and equity incentives. As further evidence consistent with the managerial power view, we show that firms with poorer governance in the pre-Enron era cut back more on using employee stock options (ESOs) for their CEOs in the post-Enron era, a period when the accounting and outrage costs of ESOs increased, consistent with poorly-governed firms taking more advantage of opaque ESO accounting rules than better-governed firms. We show that the association between governance strength and abnormal equity grants is less negative in the post-Enron period than it was in the pre-Enron period, consistent with firms making more efficient equity-granting decisions after the corporate governance changes mandated by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and the major US stock exchanges took effect.     

Executive Option Repricing, Incentives, and Retention

While many firms grant executive stock options that can be repriced, other firms systematically restrict or prohibit repricing. This article investigates the determinants of firms' repricing policies and the consequences of such policies for executive turnover and retention. Firms that have better internal governance, that use more powerful stock-based incentives, or that face less shareholder scrutiny are more likely to maintain repricing flexibility. Firms that restrict repricing are more vulnerable to voluntary executive turnover following stock price declines. When share price declines are severe, restricting firms appear to award unusually large numbers of new options.     

Option Awards for Australian CEOs: The Who, What and Why

The compensation structure for Australian CEOs, and especially the extent to which they receive executive stock options, is explored. Evidence suggests that the award of executive stock options is common in Australia, but not in as systematic a manner as has been documented for US CEOs. Where ESOs are awarded, they form a significant component of total compensation, even allowing for limitations in the way we approximate their value. Modelling the use of ESOs shows relatively few empirical regularities, other than a positive association between firm size and ESO use. This is consistent with a view that ESOs are a form of "rent extraction" by CEOs, but it may also reflect a bias towards their use created by accounting rules.     

The Effect of Executive Stock Options on Corporate Innovative Activities

This study investigates whether the implicit optionality of executive stock options (ESOs) induce managers to undertake innovative activities associated with various types of risk. We find ESO risk incentive (vega) to be positively correlated with all types of corporate innovations. We also find greater ESO risk incentive effects for the product‐related innovative activities that are associated more with systematic risk than idiosyncratic risk. Finally, we document the following pecking order for the ESO risk incentive effects: improved product, new product, alliance, and new research and development. Our results suggest that executives have more incentive to invest in projects with higher systematic risk.