Modelling credit in the transmission mechanism of the United Kingdom

Studies have focused heavily on money in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. In this article we explore the empirical importance of credit. The paper provides a framework in which to analyse the balance sheets of, and financial flows between, different sectors of the UK economy, and an econometric model of the interactions between non-financial firms, households and credit offered by banks and non-bank financial intermediaries. The paper also provides a dynamic structural model of bank and building society credit, money and decisions to consume and invest and then adds credit from non-bank financial intermediaries. Our bottom line is that credit is an important part of the transmission process of UK monetary policy.     

A lost century in economics: Three theories of banking and the conclusive evidence

How do banks operate and where does the money supply come from? The financial crisis has heightened awareness that these questions have been unduly neglected by many researchers. During the past century, three different theories of banking were dominant at different times: (1) The currently prevalent financial intermediation theory of banking says that banks collect deposits and then lend these out, just like other non-bank financial intermediaries. (2) The older fractional reserve theory of banking says that each individual bank is a financial intermediary without the power to create money, but the banking system collectively is able to create money through the process of ‘multiple deposit expansion’ (the ‘money multiplier’). (3) The credit creation theory of banking, predominant a century ago, does not consider banks as financial intermediaries that gather deposits to lend out, but instead argues that each individual bank creates credit and money newly when granting a bank loan. The theories differ in their accounting treatment of bank lending as well as in their policy implications. Since according to the dominant financial intermediation theory banks are virtually identical with other non-bank financial intermediaries, they are not usually included in the economic models used in economics or by central bankers. Moreover, the theory of banks as intermediaries provides the rationale for capital adequacy-based bank regulation. Should this theory not be correct, currently prevailing economics modelling and policy-making would be without empirical foundation. Despite the importance of this question, so far only one empirical test of the three theories has been reported in learned journals. This paper presents a second empirical test, using an alternative methodology, which allows control for all other factors. The financial intermediation and the fractional reserve theories of banking are rejected by the evidence. This finding throws doubt on the rationale for regulating bank capital adequacy to avoid banking crises, as the case study of Credit Suisse during the crisis illustrates. The finding indicates that advice to encourage developing countries to borrow from abroad is misguided. The question is considered why the economics profession has failed over most of the past century to make any progress concerning knowledge of the monetary system, and why it instead moved ever further away from the truth as already recognised by the credit creation theory well over a century ago. The role of conflicts of interest and interested parties in shaping the current bank-free academic consensus is discussed. A number of avenues for needed further research are indicated.     

Do banks have a future?: A study on banking and finance as we move into the third millennium

Are banks special intermediaries? Do they play any unique role in the economy? And if so, will they retain their specialness in the ever-faster changing world of finance? The rapid evolution of finance over the last two decades and the breathtaking “e-age” revolution have persuaded many that, eventually, banks will be indistinguishable from other financial intermediaries since all their functions can, at least as efficiently, be carried out by nonbanks. This study re-explores the issue of the specialness of banks in light of the large existing literature on the subject, and presents an approach which identifies the banks' specialness with their unique capacity to lend out claims on their own debt which the public accepts and uses as money. The study discusses various structural and policy implications deriving from the approach, and draws on it to point to the continuing relevance of banking in a world where nonbanks are taking business away from banks, lending to production has become relatively less important, and the use of e-money may soon be dominating financial transactions.     

The competition for deposits and the impact of monetary policy

Financial intermediation in Britain can be said to have reached maturity before the war, since when the growth of banks has been critically a question of market share. Until the shift in monetary policy away from direct restriction of bank lending that began about nine years ago, credit restriction added to other factors, like taxation and the bank cartel, limiting the ability of the banks to compete. The author argues that an open-market policy directed toward money supply control need not discriminate against banks. However, the re-introduction of bank lending restrictions through the use of Special Deposits and, even more so, through the use of Supplementary Special Deposits has worked to favour non-bank deposit intermediaries. The distortions caused by the Supplementary Special Deposits not only discriminate against the banks; they are also likely to undermine the use of monetary policy itself. What are required are government policies, especially with regard to the size of the public sector borrowing requi rement, that make possible the goal of a non-discriminatory open-market policy, without the need for direct controls on lending by financial institutions.     

Ownership and technical efficiency of microfinance institutions: Empirical evidence from Latin America

By using stochastic frontier analysis, this article examines the technical efficiency of different types of microfinance institutions in Latin America. In particular, it tests whether differences in technical efficiency, both intra- and interfirm, can be explained by differences in ownership. With a focus on non-governmental organizations, cooperatives and credit unions, non-bank financial intermediaries, and banks, the data set contains 1681 observations from a panel of 315 institutions operating in 18 Latin American countries. The results show that non-governmental organizations and cooperatives have much lower interfirm and intrafirm technical efficiencies than non-bank financial intermediaries and banks, which indicates the importance of ownership type for technical efficiency.     

Can banks individually create money out of nothing? — The theories and the empirical evidence

This paper presents the first empirical evidence in the history of banking on the question of whether banks can create money out of nothing. The banking crisis has revived interest in this issue, but it had remained unsettled. Three hypotheses are recognised in the literature. According to the financial intermediation theory of banking, banks are merely intermediaries like other non-bank financial institutions, collecting deposits that are then lent out. According to the fractional reserve theory of banking, individual banks are mere financial intermediaries that cannot create money, but collectively they end up creating money through systemic interaction. A third theory maintains that each individual bank has the power to create money ‘out of nothing’ and does so when it extends credit (the credit creation theory of banking). The question which of the theories is correct has far-reaching implications for research and policy. Surprisingly, despite the longstanding controversy, until now no empirical study has tested the theories. This is the contribution of the present paper. An empirical test is conducted, whereby money is borrowed from a cooperating bank, while its internal records are being monitored, to establish whether in the process of making the loan available to the borrower, the bank transfers these funds from other accounts within or outside the bank, or whether they are newly created. This study establishes for the first time empirically that banks individually create money out of nothing. The money supply is created as ‘fairy dust’ produced by the banks individually, "out of thin air".     

Financial integration and business cycles in a small open economy

The purpose of this study is to examine a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium framework with financial and informational frictions and foreign borrowing in the case of money growth and technology shocks for a small open economy and to analyze the implications of varying degrees of financial integration for aggregate fluctuations and propagation mechanisms in the economy. The existence of informational asymmetries among the agents in the model necessitates financial intermediation in the economy. Moreover, there is uncertainty involved in the production process which leads to collateralized borrowing by firms and, therefore, has to be taken into account in the design of the loan contracts between firms and financial intermediaries. It is shown that increasing financial integration amplifies the effect of a positive, temporary monetary shock on output, consumption, investment, labor demand and loans; whereas it has barely any implication for the impact of a positive, temporary technology shock on the economy.     

货币政策、消费品和投资品通货膨胀——基于金融加速器视角

本文建立一个包含消费品和投资品生产的两部门新凯恩斯DSGE模型,并且引入金融加速器以分析货币政策对消费品和投资品通货膨胀的影响机制,同时使用1999Q1至2015Q4的中国宏观经济数据对模型进行贝叶斯估计。估计结果表明,两个部门的菲利普斯曲线都具有较高的价格粘性。外部融资溢价对两个部门企业投资的影响存在异质性,投资品部门的金融加速器效应更加明显。脉冲响应分析表明货币政策扩张时,投资品部门的产出和通胀膨胀上升幅度比消费品部门更大。理论模型的脉冲响应与VAR实证分析得到的经验事实相一致。金融摩擦导致的消费品和投资品部门需求结构的异质性是解释货币政策对两个部门影响差异的关键。数值模拟分析发现金融加速器机制主要改变货币政策对投资品产出和通货膨胀的影响,对消费品部门影响改变较小。方差分解结果表明加总技术冲击、投资边际效率冲击和货币政策冲击是经济波动的主要来源。     

THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE

The American corporate financing system, unlike that of most other countries, has not been organized around a set of “universal banks” that perform a variety of functions for their clients. Indeed, the distinguishing feature of American financial history is the number and variety of financial intermediaries, and their relationships with corporations (and one another). Besides commercial banks, there are investment banks, insurance companies, venture capitalists, commercial paper dealers, mutual funds, and many others. The economic role of such intermediaries is to reduce market frictions such as “asymmetric information” and “agency problems” that otherwise raise the cost of outside capital for U.S. companies. This article views the changing menu of such intermediaries and their networks as the driving force behind the evolution of American corporate finance. U.S. financial history is seen as a series of institutional and financial innovations designed in large part to work around costly restrictions on relationships–particularly, limits on the scale and scope of U.S. banks–that do not exist in most other countries. In terms of its success in reducing the information and control costs of corporate finance, the history of the American financial system includes periods of significant progress as well as major reversals. Three relatively successful periods– the early 19th-century in New England, the “incipient” universal banking of the 1920s, and modernday financial capitalism–are separated by periods of drastic reductions in the menu of financial relationships– particularly the Great Depression and its 20-year aftermath. Besides new financial claims like preferred stock and new intermediaries such as venture capitalists, another important innovation is new forms of cooperation among intermediaries– especially among banks, venture capitalists, trusts, pensions, and investment banks–that have enabled the U.S. financial system to provide some of the key advantages of universal banking systems. Some of the largest U.S. commercial banks today can be viewed as positioning themselves to play a central coordinating role in these new coalitions of intermediaries. In so doing, they may become the platform for a distinctively American universal banking system.     

Integration of Lending and Underwriting: Implications of Scope Economies

Informational scope economies provide a cost advantage to universal banks offering “one‐stop shopping” for lending and underwriting that enables them to “lock in” their clients' subsequent business. This market power reduces universal banks' incentive, relative to that of specialized investment banks, to apply costly underwriting efforts; consequently, universal banks are less successful in selling their clients' securities. Our results suggest that an integrated financial services market is less innovative than one with specialized intermediaries. Our analysis also identifies economy, intermediary, and firm characteristics that motivate either the integration or segmentation of bank lending and underwriting.     

Monetary policy and financial (in)stability: An integrated micro–macro approach

Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.     

Assessing Systemic Risk Exposure from Banks and GSEs Under Alternative Approaches to Capital Regulation

A key function of capital regulation is to mitigate the potential for systemic financial risk by maintaining public confidence in the ability of regulated market participants to honor their financial obligations in times of market stress. While it is well known that the portfolios of banks and non-banks, especially those intermediaries specializing in mortgage securitization or in specialized mortgage lending, differ in important respects, debate over alternative capital regulations has yet to recognize the implications of these differences, despite the increasing importance of non-bank intermediaries in risk-sharing markets. This paper uses a simple two-date discrete state space exchange economy with opportunities for moral hazard on the part of financial intermediaries to investigate the design of capital regulations to control systemic risk. Holding constant asset risks, we show that intermediaries that issue contingent liabilities may exhibit low or no risk of insolvency while holding significantly less capital than deposit-taking institutions because banks primarily issue claims that promise fixed payments in all states of nature. We also show that, rather than raising capital requirements, the control of systemic risk may involve lowering capital requirements and extending guarantees to liability-holders, without a necessary increase in expected subsidy payments, if such requirements account for shareholder incentives. Specifically, we analyze an example of regulatory policy in which lower capital requirements and an ex post penalty schedule reduce systemic risk by increasing the volume of tradable securities exchanged and by offering a credible mechanism by which intermediaries can signal the true riskiness of their portfolios to liability-holders.     

Variety expansion,preference shocks,and financial intermediaries

We investigate the effect of lifetime uncertainty on economic growth by incorporating preference shocks into a variety-expansion model and comparing financial autarky and financial intermediaries. In this economy, long-term investment facilitates the promotion of R&D investment and the creation of new differentiated goods. Our results suggest that when risk aversion is high, an increase in number of differentiated goods slows down R&D investment through a decrease in the price index. Further, if the risk of early withdrawal and the liquidation cost of long-term investment are high, financial intermediaries have significant effects on the growth of variety.     

The new monetary and financial initiatives: Finance regaining its position as servant of the economy

Alternative financial and monetary innovations constantly multiply. Following major financial crises, propositions abound in an attempt to build new monetary and financial tools that break with conventional approaches; the aim is to “do differently.” Rather than official institutions, it is the general public – through the creation of communities – that takes charge of the issue, and thus initiatives fall within a bottom-up approach. But even more striking than the fact that this phenomenon is driven by economic actors is that all these initiatives – these financial innovations – reveal and even embody a real challenge to the conventional financial system, and directly criticize its functioning. Indeed, all are carriers of messages, values, etc. Curiously, most of the critics do stress the reality of finance and rehabilitate it in its economic and social role: that of being the servant of the economy.     

Credit Crunches from Occasionally Binding Bank Borrowing Constraints

We present a model in which banks and other financial intermediaries face both occasionally binding borrowing constraints, and costs of equity issuance. Near the steady state, these intermediaries can raise equity finance at no cost through retained earnings. However, even moderately large shocks cause their borrowing constraints to bind, leading to contractions in credit offered to firms, and requiring the intermediaries to raise further funds by paying the cost to issue equity. This leads to the occasional sharp increases in interest spreads and the countercyclical, positively skewed equity issuance that are characteristics of the credit crunches observed in the data.     

关于规范非标准化债权投资的研究与思考

为规范商业银行理财业务投资运作,中国银行业监督管理委员会对外发布了《关于规范商业银行理财业务投资运作有关问题的通知》,从非标准化债权资产的界定、理财产品与投资资产的对应、信息披露、规模控制、管理流程等不同角度,防范化解理财业务风险。该文件的出台对商业银行、非银行金融机构及投资者产生了多方面影响,可能导致银行强弱的进一步分化,促进理财产品的研发创新,以券商为主的非银行金融机构将长期受益。各银行、非银行金融机构及投资者应积极寻求应对措施,充分利用新规的利好空间。     

Evidence of a bank lending channel in the UK

Using balance sheet data for a panel of UK listed firms, we find evidence of a bank lending channel of monetary transmission. A higher interest rate induces more bank lending to listed companies, but this effect diminishes if monetary policy becomes tight enough to impose severe constraints on bank loan lending. The dynamic behaviour of bank debt versus non-bank debt shows that the lending channel works through cutting back loan supplies to small, bank-dependent firms while restricting the bank’s ability to provide financial assistance to other firms. We see cross-sectional differences between bank-dependent and non-bank-dependent listed companies, and between listed and non-listed companies: Both can contribute to the size effect of investment. Small firms bear most of the reductions in bank loan supplies, and since they do not have many alternatives to bank finance, they suffer more from monetary tightening than big firms. This is consistent with inventory behavior. Furthermore, we have found that big, non-bank-dependent firms can benefit more from the bank–firm relationship than small, bank-dependent firms.     

The anatomy of corporate securitizations and contract design

Collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), intermediaries situated between investors and traditional banks, play an increasingly central role in the provision of credit to constrained corporations, holding as much as 75% of all new institutional leveraged loans. Despite their ascendancy in the risky corporate credit market, there has been little academic research on the CLO market. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the design and structure of the CLO market, describing the general macroeconomic milieu that has facilitated the rapid growth of the market, the mechanics therein, as well as recent risks that have emerged. Understanding the anatomy and dynamics of CLOs is paramount for developing insights into the role of non-bank financial intermediaries in financial markets.     

现代金融中介理论视角下的我国金融体系模式选择

现代金融中介理论表明,商业银行等金融中介与经济增长之间存在密切的相关性。金融中介在促进经济增长的同时,也面临着许多复杂问题。本文从现代金融中介理论的视角出发,对银行导向型金融体系与市场导向型金融体系进行了国际比较,并从融资关系、风险管理、信息生产、公司治理等角度进行对比分析,得出在中国现实的环境下中介与市场发挥着不同作用,但金融中介的优势明显。因此,我国应选择以金融中介为主、资本市场为辅的金融体系,并加紧推出金融机构的混业经营模式。     

非银行金融科技与上市公司借贷成本——竞争压力还是信息溢出？

金融科技作为技术驱动的金融创新,是深化金融供给侧结构性改革、增强金融服务实体经济能力的重要引擎。基于我国A股上市公司数据,本文实证分析了针对中小微企业和个人的非银行金融科技发展对上市公司借贷成本的溢出效应。结果表明,非银行金融科技发展每提高10%,上市公司借贷成本平均下降1.6个百分点。进一步分析表明,这一结果同时受到“竞争压力”与“信息溢出”两种机制的作用:前者表现为在银行业竞争程度更高的地区,非银行金融科技的发展更能显著降低企业的借贷成本;后者表现为,非银行金融科技的发展能够显著降低商业银行不良贷款率,同时也能降低商业银行业务及管理费用开支。本文探索金融科技如何影响上市公司融资成本,为金融科技进一步增强金融服务实体经济能力提供了新的启示。