Dynamic Entry and Investment in New Infrastructures: Empirical Evidence from the Fixed Broadband Industry

In the telecommunications industry, the ladder-of-investment approach claims that service-based competition (when entrants lease access to incumbents’ facilities) can serve as a “stepping stone” for facility-based entry (when entrants build their own infrastructures to provide services). In this paper, we build an empirical model that encompasses a complete ladder-of-investment, composed of three rungs: bitstream access, local loop unbundling and new access facilities. Using data from the European Commission’s “Broadband access in the EU” reports covering 15 European member states for 17 semesters, we test the ladder-of-investment hypothesis. We find no empirical support for this hypothesis, that is, for the transition from local loop unbundling to new access infrastructures, and weak empirical support for the transition from bitstream access lines to local loop unbundling. These results are robust when we take into account the migration effect, the number of access rungs, the development of broadband cable, the regulatory performance, and the evolution of local loop unbundling prices.     

Access issues: Operational Support Systems and regulation

This article examines the regulatory issues surrounding Operational Support Systems (OSSs). Equal and non-discriminatory access to the incumbents’ OSSs, which perform a number of functions and are critical in market differentiation for operators, is a key element in enabling meaningful competition. This article assesses the regulation of access to OSSs in the US and the EU. It concludes that, as attention now turns to competition in access networks, resale and local loop unbundling, regulators have an important role to play in putting forward guidelines concerning minimum requirements for access to OSSs so as to enable real competition.     

Regulating European telecommunications markets: unbundled access to the local loop outside urban areas

This paper examines the topic of unbundled access to the local loop in areas which show characteristics of non-contestable natural monopolies outside the large cities. Under the heading ‘local loop unbundling’ three variants are discussed, full unbundling, line sharing, and bitstream access. An obligation to provide competitors access to local networks on an unbundled basis is a strong intervention into the property rights of the regulated firm. In this light, the following points particularly come into question: Who should be granted the right to access local loops on an unbundled basis? Which form(s) of local loop unbundling should be enforced?     

Unbundling and infrastructure competition for broadband adoption: Implications for NGA regulation

The common idea of open access policy is that it refers to the sharing of particular elements, such as wholesale access networks, backhaul, under-sea cable and internet exchange points in fixed and mobile networks. In broadband networks, the use of open access policy usually refers to the infrastructure parts, which are considered a bottleneck. Many regulators have generally focused open access policy on fixed broadband networks, especially digital subscriber line (DSL) technology, in the last decade. Local loop unbundling (LLU) regulation is one of the main strategies for the regulator to open access to an incumbent’s bottleneck network in order to soften its monopoly power and encourage competition in the DSL broadband market. The OECD countries have different strategies regarding unbundling local loop and infrastructure competition, as the characteristics and infrastructure networks of countries vary. There are currently more choices of next generation network (NGN) technologies to develop. While local loop unbundling may not be applied fully to NGN development (the cost is not sunk, more technologies are available to implement, incentive of investment by operator), it can indicate benefits and drawbacks of open access policy in the past decade that can be adapted to NGN.The empirical results of this study show that during 2002–2008, LLU regulation was one of the strategies used to increase broadband adoption in countries that had difficulty encouraging infrastructure competition. Unbundling regulation can therefore be implemented carefully and differently in each country that has inefficiency that is harmful to consumers in its market from a monopoly incumbent. Infrastructure competition, on the other hand, is introduced as another strategy to increase broadband adoption. The empirical results of this study indicate that infrastructure competition can be used as a strategy when there are already enough infrastructures in the area or country. These results support the idea of using open access and infrastructure competition policy depending on the existing competition of broadband infrastructure in each country.     

Race to the top: Does competition in the DSL market matter for fibre penetration?

High speed broadband creates potential productivity gains and has a positive impact on economic growth. Achieving Europe's broadband access objectives will require large scale investment in next generation broadband networks, and it is imperative that an appropriate investment climate is created to encourage fibre network rollout. This study considers whether and how competition in the DSL market affects the incentives of operators to invest in the deployment of high-end fibre optic networks. Most earlier research on the drivers of investment in broadband technology has focused on the effect of mandatory access policies, such as local loop unbundling, or competing infrastructures. We posit that competition in the DSL sector may also influence fibre penetration, possibly to a considerable extent. We find that the relationship between service-based competition and fibre penetration is non-linear: a lack of or severe DSL competition is correlated with a negative effect on fibre penetration, but if a moderate degree of competition is already present in the market, more service-based competition may positively influence fibre penetration. The scale of these effects however varies with the openness of the DSL market: operators' incentives to invest in fibre appear to be more sensitive to changes in DSL competition if there is extensive local loop unbundling.     

Functional separation in Swedish broadband market: Next step of improving competition

Technological development together with liberalization policy has led to competition in the telecommunications market. Broadband has been recognized as a driving force in the social and economic development of nations, and many countries have introduced policies and/or regulatory frameworks to improve competition in broadband markets. An evolution can be seen from the 1980s until the present day through open access to local loop unbundling to several degrees of separation including functional separation. There are several countries implementing functional separation such as the UK, Italy, Sweden and, recently the EU. It has been suggested that functional separation can be an effective policy for increasing competition in broadband markets under certain circumstances. Sweden has implemented functional separation by amending the Swedish Telecommunications Act in 2008 to include mandatory functional separation as one of the powers of the PTS, the Swedish telecommunications regulator. Although TeliaSonera, the incumbent fixed line operator decided to voluntarily separate part of their business, the amendments to the law were debated with arguments similar to the debates in the EU following the new regulatory framework implemented in 2009. Against this background, this paper provides an overview of the development of functional separation in the EU and European countries such as Sweden and the UK. The paper also provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the implementation of functional separation. The evolution of functional separation in Sweden is explained and ends with a discussion of the implementation of functional separation in the Swedish broadband market.     

Maximizing the adoption of fixed number portability within the EU: An empirical analysis

Number portability (NP) is considered by the European Commission as a key measure for promoting competition within the telecom sector especially regarding network access infrastructure. However, NP requires several modifications to the network architecture and to the business processes of each operator that, depending on network size, may result in a significant financial cost. This is true for fixed networks in particular. Given the requirement for such an investment, National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) desire a clear picture on what to expect, in terms of progress in access competition, when introducing fixed NP in their respective markets. The paper approaches this question by correlating several fixed telephony market indices related to access competition to the degree of success of fixed NP. Relevant analysis based on European Union member states’ data indicates that fixed NP does not significantly contribute to local loop unbundling (LLU) adoption in markets where there are other access technologies available. In these markets, access competition via these other technologies and fixed NP initially achieve similar penetration rates. Consequently, when access competition exceeds a certain threshold and given a reasonable pricing regime then fixed NP is further boosted to include broadband connections based on several broadband technologies/methodologies such as LLU and cable as well as existing narrowband access technologies (e.g. narrowband cable connections). In markets where LLU is the only alternative for access then the rate of Fixed NP adoption is directly correlated with the success of LLU. Consequently, these conclusions are considered within a high-level stepwise approach for NP implementation, which is based on the experience acquired from the respective Greek national project.     

The endless need for regulation in telecommunication: An explanation

Telecommunication services have existed as a legal monopoly nearly throughout its entire history. In 1998, telecom market liberalisation was achieved across the European Union (EU) through the introduction of competition among telephone services. Asymmetrical obligations were deemed necessary in order to compensate the market power of the former monopolist.As the evolution of asymmetrical regulation in Spain illustrates, obligations and the telecommunications operators subject to them increased with the regulatory framework established in 2002 in the EU. This new regulatory framework may continue to expand through the inclusion of functional separation as another possible asymmetrical obligation. In short, it seems that the regulatory pressure on the telecommunications industry is increasing, despite the lapse in time since the liberalisation of the industry.In this paper, a methodology developed by the Austrian School of Economics is applied in order to explain why the telecommunication market is subject to increasing regulation in Europe, rather than deregulation, after more than 10 years of liberalisation. In particular, Mises's theory of price control is used to explain the evolution of the regulation of local loop unbundling.     

Regulation and the promotion of investment in next generation networks—A European dilemma

The paper discusses the dilemmas facing European regulators (the European Commission and the national regulatory authorities) over the promotion of investment in Next Generation Access Networks (NGANs). Whereas the US has adopted a deregulatory approach and parts of Asia takes an approach linked to industrial policy considerations, the EU has largely left the process to operators working subject to a framework of regulation of access. While this may be enough to elicit investment where there is competition among networks, the incentives to invest are weaker where there is only one fixed network, as is the case in most of the territory of the EU. In reaching this view, the paper examines the prospects for competition from both wireless and municipal networks. It recommends that steps be taken fully to mobilise incentives to invest in NGANs where there is competition. Elsewhere, it may be necessary to consider a broader range of policies to create conditions for investment.     

A CDS approach to induce facilities-based competition over NGA networks

The current regulatory framework in the European NGA market provides the basic principles for the gradual migration from service-based competition over the legacy copper access networks to facilities-based competition over fiber-based Next Generation Access (NGA) networks. This paper initially reviews the related literature and shows that: (i) an unbundling policy that boosts entry by alternative operators promotes service-based competition but provides operators with disincentives to invest in network upgrade; (ii) there is no consensus about the optimal regulatory policy that promotes competition and encourages investments in NGA networks; and (iii) the reviewed research articles are not consistent with the current regulatory framework in the European NGA market in terms of both the evolution of the regulatory goals over time and the recommended regulatory settings. This paper aims to propose a novel approach in order to effectively meet the current regulatory goals using the recommended settings. It is shown that the proposed approach, which is based on the basic principles governing a Credit Default Swap (CDS), provides an effective migration path towards facilities-based competition over NGA networks.     

The involvement of utilities in the development of broadband infrastructure: A comparison of EU case studies

Energy companies and other utility providers have been often involved in the provision of telecommunications services. Nevertheless, their contribution to broadband development has varied significantly over time. In the late 1990s, both local and national utilities in the European Union (EU) engaged in the provision of broadband networks, but only few of them managed to establish themselves as major broadband providers. More recently, new projects involving national utilities have been announced in several EU countries, opening new scenarios for utilities’ contribution to Next Generation Access (NGA) development. This paper identifies and explores the factors affecting the entry and the success of utilities in the EU broadband market, through the comparison of four case studies from four EU countries (Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK). The evolution of utility involvement in the EU broadband markets is assessed against the interaction of market, technology and policy factors, focusing on the impact of policy and regulatory measures. As a result, this paper provides fruitful insights into the relevance and effectiveness of public interventions in broadband markets. Across the four case studies, public support and public ownership emerged as the main drivers for the involvement of utilities in EU broadband markets, with regulatory measures and economies of scope exerting a limited and decreasing influence. However, the contribution of utilities has varied significantly across the cases studied, reflecting the different approaches taken at national and local level to support broadband development, in spite of the common regulatory framework.     

Vertical disintegration in the European electricity sector: Empirical evidence on lost synergies

The EU has been promoting unbundling of the transmission grid from other stages of the electricity supply chain with the aim of fostering competition in the upstream stage of electricity generation. At present, ownership unbundling is the predominant form of unbundling in Europe. From a policy perspective, a successful unbundling regime would require that the benefits of increased competition in power generation would at least offset the associated efficiency losses from vertical divestiture. Since evidence on this topic is scarce, this study helps fill this void by empirically estimating the magnitude of economies of vertical integration (EVI) between electricity generation and transmission based on a quadratic cost function. For this purpose we employ unique firm-level panel data of European electricity utilities. Our results confirm the presence of substantial EVI of 14% for the median sized integrated utility. Moreover, EVI tend to increase with firm size.     

The ladder of investment in Europe,in retrospect and prospect

The ladder of investment was adopted by many European (and other) regulators in the era of copper networks as a means of implementing unbundling in a way which progressively promotes competitive providers׳ infrastructure investment in fixed networks. The paper reviews the evidence of its application and effects, in comparison with the most likely alternative, argues that it probably conferred benefits. In the more recent era of transition to fibre in Europe, regulatory priorities have shifted towards promoting roll-out. Two broad approaches are identified; one continues the focus on a programme of infrastructure competition in taking fibre to the home; another, relying on fibre to the cabinet, reverses it with bitstream used as the access product. It is soon to evaluate the two approaches.     

Investigating the intertwining impact of wholesale access pricing and the commitment to net neutrality principle on European next-generation access networks private investment plans: An options-game application for capturing market players' competitive interactions

Whilst the deployment of next generation access networks (NGANs) is undoubtedly beneficial to the economy, new legal developments in the United States (US) regarding the issue of net neutrality (NN) pose a new challenge not only to policy makers but to telecommunication providers as well, that could justify a fresh approach when assessing NGANs investments. In particular, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) subverted extant NN rules in the US and if the European Union (EU) decides to follow a similar deregulatory path in the future it could change the way telecommunications providers on both sides of the Atlantic lay down their optical-fibre network infrastructure investment plans. For instance, if traffic prioritization is allowed then diversification of revenue sources can be achieved by charging customers for privileged data delivery to their premises. Currently, NGANs roll-out throughout EU is an ongoing process in a setting whereby access regulation in the form of network element unbundling is already imposed. As a result, these legal developments form a new context within which it makes sense to assess the role of NGANs wholesale access pricing in tandem with the degree of commitment to NN rules so as to i) determine their combinatorial impact on private telecommunications operators' financial figures and ii) capture their competitive interactions. Towards this end, an important aspect of particular value to market players (i.e. incumbents and competitive providers – CPs), and policy makers (i.e. National Regulatory Authorities – NRAs) that this article aims to examine is how to employ the option-game (OG) analysis, that reflects the intersection of game theory (GT) and real options (ROs), to model the competitive interactions between participants in a particular competition game set-up by means of deriving possible Nash-equilibrium (NE) outcomes within a regulatory setting part of which is the commitment or non-commitment to the NN principle. This, hybrid, evaluation tool is applied on top of a conventional discounted cash flow (DCF) techno-economic analysis assessment of an NGAN investment opportunity.     

The long-run effects of copper-loop unbundling and the implications for fiber

Policies mandating unbundling of copper telecommunications networks have now been in place for more than 15 years, and it is thus becoming possible to study their long-run effects. This paper reviews the existing evidence on the effects of copper unbundling, and presents new empirical results based on regression analyses of broadband penetration in OECD countries from 2001 to 2010. The results show that the long-run effect of copper unbundling on household broadband penetration rates is negative, a finding which is consistent with previous research, including with research suggesting that copper unbundling has slowed the deployment of FTTP infrastructures, especially in Europe. Based on an analysis of the similarities and differences between the unbundling of copper networks and fiber networks, the paper concludes that mandated unbundling of fiber networks would likely deter deployment of Next Generation Access networks (NGAs).     

Competitive dynamics in Polish telecommunications, 1990–2000: growth,regulation, and privatization of an infrastructural multi-network

This paper analyzes the relationship between governmental regulatory policies and competitive dynamics amongst private operators and the national monopolist, TP SA, in three network segments of the Polish telecommunications sector. Special attention is paid to the evolution of organizational strategies in a regulatory environment characterized by constant strategic indecision and reorientations of national policy makers. The paper finds that regulatory/competition coevolution has taken diverse forms in the three network subsegments, with asymmetric duopoly operating in the local fixed network, hidden competition at work in the long-distance fixed network, and oligopolistic technology-driven competition characterizing the high-growth cellular network. The conclusion reached is that Polish telecommunications to date has been stuck in a broad stage of pre-competitive market maneuverings by domestic and international capital, in preparation for privatization of the national operator and for full liberalization as part of EU integration.     

Regulation and investment behaviour in the telecommunications sector: policies and patterns in US and Europe

This paper reports the results of the quantitative analysis of international experience of the relationship between infrastructure investment in the deployment of capacity that can carry large volumes of voice and data traffic and regulatory policy changes in the telecommunications sectors. It looks at the relationship between infrastructure investment for these infrastructure assets and the access pricing régimes for local exchange carriers in the United States and Europe. It then looks at the relationship between various aspects of regulatory and institutional policy changes in Europe and how they affect access prices.The paper finds that a lower access price promotes greater deployment of digital technology among US incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs). Based on this finding, it suggests that it is in the ILECs interest to have access to their networks encouraged.The European data for interconnection are recent and far reaching conclusions are not feasible, but the findings, however, suggest that competition has worked by facilitating new entry through decreasing interconnection prices, although path dependencies, of existing and traditional concepts, in the mindsets of operators as well as regulators, may account for these findings.     

Analysing the C-Band spectrum auctions for 5G in Europe: Achieving efficiency and fair decisions in radio spectrum management

This paper offers a detailed analysis of selected regulatory parameters used as instruments to promote efficiency with fairness for all stakeholders (in the legal sense of equity) in 5G spectrum auctions. Data were collected from sixteen auctions for the C-band that took place in the Member States of the European Union (EU) and in the United Kingdom (UK) between 2017 and 2020 for the introduction of the fifth generation (5G) of mobile communication technology. The selected instruments of intervention are: spectrum packaging, spectrum caps, set-asides, geographical scope of the license, license duration, various forms of license obligations, reserve prices and auction format.Significant differences were observed in national approaches to spectrum packaging, license obligations and reserve prices for efficiency purposes. Our analysis also shows that European national regulators are paying increasing attention to concerns over fairness of decisions on spectrum, or equity, especially by creating opportunities for local private networks to access the spectrum and by imposing requirements on network operators to guarantee more uniform population coverage of newly created 5G networks.     

Multilevel governance and broadband infrastructure development: Evidence from Canada

This paper investigates the contributions of digital infrastructure policies of provincial governments in Canada to the development of broadband networks. Using measurements of broadband network speeds between 2007 and 2011, the paper analyzes potential causes for observed differences in network performance growth across the provinces, including geography, Internet use intensity, platform competition, and provincial broadband policies. The analysis suggests provincial policies that employed public sector procurement power to open access to essential facilities and channeled public investments in Internet backbone infrastructure were associated with the emergence of relatively high quality broadband networks. However, a weak essential facilities regime and regulatory barriers to entry at the national level limit the scope for decentralized policy solutions.     

Estimating broadband diffusion in the EU using NUTS 1 regional data

In this paper we use panel data on NUTS 1 regional data for 27 EU countries in the years 2006–2010 to analyze determinants of broadband diffusion. We estimate both linear demand specification and the logistic diffusion function. We find that, after controlling for regional differences due to socioeconomic factors, inter-platform competition approximated by an inter-platform Herfindahl index has a significant positive impact on broadband diffusion. Broadband deployment is lower in countries in which DSL has a greater share in Internet access and it is higher in countries in which cable modem has a greater share in Internet access. Moreover, we find that competition between DSL providers has a significant and positive impact on broadband penetration. First, higher prices for a fully unbundled local loop connection, which represent the cost of providing copper-based Internet services, have a significant and negative impact on broadband penetration. Second, a greater incumbent share in DSL connections has a significant and negative impact on broadband penetration.