审计失败国外研究进展

审计质量具有外部效应，真实、可靠、有效的审计报告对于市场、投资者以及整个社会都会产生积极影响，一旦出现审计失败必然导致公众对审计质量的不信任。审计师的独立性和专业能力是保障审计质量、防止审计失败的关键因素，审计未能达到预期结果也可能会使公众对审计师的独立性提出质疑。文章借助文献分析法，以审计质量和审计师独立性作为研究起点，梳理国外审计失败研究进展，以期对国内研究有所启发。     

财务困境公司审计意见购买行为研究 ——来自持续经营审计意见的经验证据

公司持续经营是学术界和实务界日益关注的重要话题.本文从持续经营审计意见角度,对财务困境公司的审计意见购买行为进行了研究,结果发现:财务困境公司不仅会为规避非标审计意见而进行审计意见购买,还会进一步为规避持续经营审计意见而进行审计意见购买.相对而言,财务困境公司规避非标审计意见的动机弱于非财务困境公司,而规避持续经营审计意见的动机强于非财务困境公司.进一步研究发现,财务困境公司为规避持续经营审计意见而进行审计意见购买后,股票市场表现变好、可获得贷款增加,但经营业绩却持续恶化.这表明,审计意见购买虽可暂时帮助财务困境公司"摆脱"持续经营疑虑,但却会损害审计意见的决策有用性、降低资本市场资源配置效率.本文从持续经营审计意见角度,进一步拓展和细化了审计意见购买的相关研究,研究结论对于政策制定部门完善持续经营审计准则,以提高审计师对上市公司尤其财务困境公司持续经营风险评估的准确性,遏制其审计意见购买行为具有一定启示.     

上市公司持续经营审计意见判断证据研究

以现行审计准则规范之外的持续经营审计判断证据的发掘为目标,以审计判断流程与节点为基础,构建了以审计准则规范为主体、理论研究成果与实务经验累积为补充的持续经营重大疑虑事项的审计判断证据体系,并确立了相应的指标化检验框架；以2003～2008年的上市公司持续经营审计意见为样本,检验所寻求的新的审计判断证据的有效性,为修订完善现行准则规范提供证据.     

企业破产重整审计研究——以甲公司为例

各国资本市场一直以来都将审计工作作为上市公司的重要工作安排。审计是公司最为重要的外部治理措施之一,审计工作的质量直接决定着资本市场能否获得高效的运行和有效的监管。由于持续经营的不确定性较高,审计师的判断是审计实务工作的重点。站在长远角度来说,上市公司破产重整的核心目标就是恢复可持续经营能力,审计师以此为主要依据做出审计判断,以促进其可持续经营目标的实现。因此,本文以甲公司破产重整案为例,对企业破产重整中的审计内容和风险工作进行了研究,以供参考。     

重要客户损害了审计独立性吗?——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

审计独立性的经济理论认为审计师牺牲独立性的动机与客户的重要性有关。本文选取了2001—2002年间1297家收到标准无保留意见的上市公司为研究样本,使用审计师是否从事了审计意见购买行为作为审计独立性的衡量指标,考察了重要客户与审计独立性之间的关系。研究发现,重要客户的确对审计独立性造成了损害,而当审计师预期到其丧失独立性的行为在事后被发现的可能性较大时,审计独立性受到损害的可能性较小。     

网络平台互动与审计定价：言多必失?

伴随着信息技术的快速发展，网络互动平台已成为加强市场参与者之间信息沟通的重要工具。不同于现有文献着重强调网络平台互动的“信息效率提升效应”,本文基于代理理论分析管理层私利动机下的网络平台互动对审计师定价决策的影响。从2010至2020年企业在“互动易”和“上证e互动”平台答复投资者提问的现实表现出发，检验结果发现，企业与投资者更高的互动频次和更多的互动内容均会显著提升审计费用，且这种效应主要存在于民营企业。有关作用机制的检验发现，更多的网络平台互动对企业信息透明度产生了不利影响，具体表现为降低了分析师盈余预测的精确度并为企业带来了显著更高的股价崩盘风险。上述结论为不规范的网络平台互动可能引发的消极效应提供了实证证据，拓展了有关审计定价影响因素和互联网沟通经济后果的研究，对进一步完善市场参与主体之间的网络互动机制具有重要的现实启示。     

经营业绩与审计意见：形成机制、信息含量与治理效应

文章从审计意见的形成机制、信息含量、外部治理效应三个视角对企业经营业绩与审计意见的关系进行了深入探讨。研究发现,企业经营业绩是审计意见形成中的"不可避"因素;审计师在对企业经营状况充分考量下所形成的审计意见能够在一定程度上预示企业未来的经营业绩;上述两点促使了审计意见具备一定的外部治理效应,使得审计意见可以影响到企业未来的经营业绩。     

审计师变更和审计意见的相关性研究

本文主要从审计质量的角度来研究审计师变更对企业和投资市场带来的影响。研究了审计师变更后面是否隐藏着企业为了一己之利的意图,是否有明显的证据表明企业变更审计师是为了购得审计意见,以维护审计市场的健康和提高投资市场中审计意见的可信度。这对提升我国审计市场的健康、证券市场信息的真实具有很大的作用,尤其是针对我国证券市场近几年来出现的一些舞弊现象能提出合理的建议。     

“临阵换所”与审计意见购买——基于变更时点的分析

本文以2007—2020年审计师变更为样本,考察年后变更审计师对审计意见购买的影响。研究发现,年后变更审计师的公司,进行了更多审计意见购买。业务复杂度、公司治理机制以及审计收费是影响年后变更公司能否实现审计意见购买的关键因素。进一步研究发现,年后变更审计师的公司,审计质量更差,体现为更多的应计盈余管理及财务违规。短期内投资者对年后变更审计师行为呈现出非理性的过度乐观,但长期来看,年后变更审计师的公司伴随着长期的股东价值损耗。研究结论表明,日常监督和充足的审计时间对审计意见购买及审计质量具有重要影响,审计师变更时点是具有丰富信息含量的风险信号。     

审计职业判断的环境影响因素分析

审计职业判断是指审计师在一定判断环境下运用知识、经验、记忆等自身禀赋,收集充分、适当的审计证据与相关的判断标准进行对照,对审计事项和自身行为等各审计命题进行评价以得出审计结论的决策过程。提高注册会计师职业判断的准确性,是从根本上实现审计目标、降低审计风险、提高审计质量的重要途径。职业判断环境是指审计人员进行判断时所面临的各种主客观因素的总和。本文对影响审计职业判断的内、外环境因素进行了具体分析。     

Ethical Behaviour in the U.K. Audit Profession: The Case of the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Under Going-Concern Uncertainties

External auditors owe a professional duty to the company's stockholders and to society in general. However their remuneration is determined by management. The resulting conflicts of interest are particularly acute in distressed companies where the auditors are required to disclose uncertainties regarding future survival. We focus on the consequentialist self-fulfilling prophecy argument whereby auditors may fail to disclose such uncertainties due to the belief that the disclosure itself would precipitate the company's bankruptcy. We find no empirical support for such beliefs for a sample of distressed U.K. companies with audit reports published between 1986 and 1993. Companies whose auditors disclose going concern uncertainties are no more likely to fail than those without such disclosures; indeed three out of four reports containing going concern uncertaintiesare not followed by failure before publication of a subsequent set of accounts. Instead we find that it is the degree of financial distress that drives both bankruptcy and the auditor's going concern disclosure rather than that the disclosure itself causes failure. Belief in the self-fulfilling prophecy effect nevertheless persists, and this despite the profession's clear ethical guidelines that audit opinions should provide an objectively true and fair view, paying no regard to possible consequences. It may be that the continued attractiveness of the self-fulfilling prophecy belief is due to its providing a means of resolving intense auditor/management conflict in what is a particularly complex decision situation. We argue that, if the profession's clear ethical guidelines are to play a greater role in this area, issues such as enforcement will need to be addressed.     

签字会计师繁忙度与审计质量——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文以我国2007~2014年的上市公司为样本,实证研究签字会计师繁忙度对审计质量的影响.结果显示,在其他条件相同的情况下,签字会计师繁忙度越高,审计质量越低,支持了"压力效应".进一步研究发现,在发生两名签字会计师轮换的样本中,由于继任签字会计师缺乏客户层面的审计经验,签字会计师繁忙度对审计质量的消极影响更加显著;其次,在大客户中,签字会计师繁忙度对审计质量的消极影响被显著削弱,表明繁忙的签字会计师会对大客户保持更多的关注度和职业谨慎,并投入更多时间和精力,从而保障更高的审计质量.最后,区分了签字会计师角色后,发现只有复核签字会计师繁忙才会导致审计质量下降,而项目签字会计师繁忙度与审计质量无关.     

媒体治理对注册会计师收费的影响机理研究

受众并非被动地接纳媒体信息,而是依据情况分析和利用媒体信息,重构自我认知。显然,作为媒体信息使用者的审计师,其认知重构必然会受到媒体的影响。本文基于2005－2010年A股上市公司数据,从事务所声誉、公司治理和产权性质三个视角,研究了审计师利用媒体的约束机制。研究发现：十大事务所对媒体报道反应更加强烈,从而提出更高的收费溢价;媒体关注会弱化股权制衡的审计收费溢价效应;审计师对国有企业的媒体关注提出更高风险溢价。研究结果表明,媒体通过外部审计机制发挥了治理效应,且该效应受到事务所声誉、股权制衡和企业产权性质的影响。     

审计师个人视角下客户影响力与审计质量的关系研究

利用中国A股上市公司2012～2015年的数据,采用面板数据模型与文本挖掘方法检验了审计师层面的客户费用影响力、规模影响力、舆论影响力与审计质量的关系.研究发现: 客户的费用影响力、舆论影响力与审计质量显著正相关,在控制了事务所层面的客户影响力与内生性问题后该结果依然稳健.进一步研究显示,审计师部分个人特征、客户所处的法律环境、舆论环境等因素会对主要结果起到一定的调节作用.研究结果为客户影响力与审计质量的关系提供了进一步的理论解释和全新的经验证据,其重要启示是: 在我国的审计市场中,客户影响力并未迫使审计师在审计质量上做出让步,为避免审计失败可能造成的声誉损害、经济损失和诉讼风险,审计师有动机为影响力高的客户提供高质量的审计服务.     

自愿性会计政策变更与非标审计意见的相关性研究——来自1998～2002年深沪上市公司的经验证据

本文以 1 998～ 2 0 0 2年间进行了各种自愿性会计政策变更的上市公司为研究对象 ,考察注册会计师对企业自愿性会计政策变更行为所持的态度 ,并进一步分析导致不同态度的影响因素。结果表明 :利润影响程度、有无盈余管理动机、企业财务状况和审计客户规模是会计师事务所出具非标审计意见的主要考虑因素 ;会计师事务所的规模对非标审计意见的出具并没有显著影响 ,大事务所与小事务所的审计质量并无明显区别。     

职业声誉、信息质量与信息吸收效率

中国的审计市场正处于发展阶段,存在大量声誉差异较大的审计事务所,这为研究声誉机制如何为企业带来价值提供了特殊的制度环境。从证券分析师视角出发,以"四大"作为高职业声誉事务所的代表,研究结果发现:聘用"四大"审计的企业,分析师预测精确度较高,预测分歧度较低。这表明聘用高职业声誉的事务所能够提供更高质量的信息,降低了投资者对企业内部价值相关信息的分歧,提高了市场对信息的吸收效率。上述结果为研究声誉在证券市场中的作用机制提供了新的证据。     

Financial Statement Frauds and Auditor Sanctions: An Analysis of Enforcement Actions in China

The rising tide of corporate scandals and audit failures has shocked the public, and the integrity of auditors is being increasingly questioned. It is crucial for auditors and regulators to understand the main causes of audit failure and devise preventive measures accordingly. This study analyzes enforcement actions issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission against auditors in respect of fraudulent financial reporting committed by listed companies in China. We find that auditors are more likely to be sanctioned by the regulators for failing to detect and report material misstatement frauds rather than disclosure frauds. Further analysis of the material misstatements indicates that auditors are more likely to be sanctioned for failing to detect and report revenue-related frauds rather than assets-related frauds. In sum, our results suggest that regulators believe auditors have the responsibility to detect and report frauds that are egregious, transaction-based, and related to accounting earnings. The results contribute to our knowledge of auditors’ responsibilities for detecting frauds as perceived by regulators.     

Understanding Auditors’ Sense of Responsibility for Detecting Fraud Within Organizations

The objective of this study is to evaluate auditors’ perceived responsibility for fraud detection. Auditors play a critical role in managing fraud risk within organizations. Although professional standards and guidance prescribe responsibility in the area, little is known about auditors’ sense of responsibility for fraud detection, the factors affecting perceived responsibility, and how responsibility affects auditor performance. We use the triangle model of responsibility as a theoretical basis for examining responsibility and the effects of accountability, fraud type, and auditor type on auditors’ perceived fraud detection responsibility. We also test how perceived responsibility affects auditor brainstorming performance given the importance of brainstorming in audits. A sample of 878 auditors (241 external auditors and 637 internal auditors) participated in an experiment with accountability pressure and fraud type manipulated randomly between subjects. As predicted, accountable auditors report higher detection responsibility than anonymous auditors. We also find a significant fraud type × auditor type interaction with external auditors perceiving the most detection responsibility for financial statement fraud, while internal auditors report similar detection responsibility for all fraud types. Analysis of the triangle model’s formative links reveals that professional obligation and personal control are significantly related to responsibility, while task clarity is not. Finally, the results indicate that perceived responsibility positively affects the number of detection procedures brainstormed and partially mediates the significant accountability–brainstorming relation.     

The Effect of Clients’ Auditing Experience and Concession-Timing Strategies on Auditor-Client Negotiations

The objective of this study was to examine the role of auditing experience, in auditor-client negotiations, in determining the value of the negotiated outcome. We also assessed whether it alters the effect of auditors’ concession timing-strategies on this outcome. Using an experimental method, we selected our respondents from two groups of financial officers (clients), those with and those without auditing experience. To determine the effect of the financial officers’ auditing experience and the concession-timing strategies adopted by their auditors, we measured the magnitude of the audit adjustment in an auditor-client negotiation. Our findings showed that auditing experience and concession-timing strategies affect the magnitude of the audit adjustments separately, but that auditing experience has no moderating effect on the relationship between concession timing and the final audit adjustment of the financial officers. A practical implication of this study is that it identified the ways in which auditor-client negotiations actually work. It is important that auditors obtain background information about their clients before they start a negotiation, as this information may affect its outcome.     

诉讼风险、审计师选择与盈余质量

本文分析诉讼风险对企业审计师选择决策的影响及其经济后果.检验发现,面临更高诉讼风险的企业,选择高质量审计师的概率越低.同时,高诉讼风险企业披露的盈余信息质量显著更差.但是,如果高诉讼风险企业选择了高质量审计师,那么诉讼风险对盈余质量不再具有显著影响.这表明,高质量审计师能有效缓解诉讼风险对盈余质量的消极效应,提升高诉讼企业的信息披露质量.上述结论为诉讼风险的经济后果提供了新的解释,也进一步丰富和拓展了有关审计师选择决策影响因素的研究.