Optimal order placement in limit order markets

To execute a trade, participants in electronic equity markets may choose to submit limit orders or market orders across various exchanges where a stock is traded. This decision is influenced by characteristics of the order flows and queue sizes in each limit order book, as well as the structure of transaction fees and rebates across exchanges. We propose a quantitative framework for studying this order placement problem by formulating it as a convex optimization problem. This formulation allows the study of how the optimal order placement decision depends on the interplay between the state of order books, the fee structure, order flow properties and the aversion to execution risk. In the case of a single exchange, we derive an explicit solution for the optimal split between limit and market orders. For the general case of order placement across multiple exchanges, we propose a stochastic algorithm that computes the optimal routing policy and study the sensitivity of the solution to various parameters. Our algorithm does not require an explicit statistical model of order flow but exploits data on recent order fills across exchanges in the numerical implementation of the algorithm to acquire this information through a supervised learning procedure.     

Anonymity,liquidity and fragmentation

We examine the effects of the removal of broker identifiers from the central limit order book of the Australian Stock Exchange. We find that spreads and order aggressiveness decline, and order book depth increases, with the introduction of anonymous trading. This is consistent with the hypothesis that limit order traders are more willing to expose their orders when they can do so anonymously. Anonymous markets attract order flow from non-anonymous substitute markets, but this effect is only seen in large stocks. Our results suggest that exchanges operating in fragmented markets should consider anonymous trading to improve price competition and liquidity, although some of these benefits may be significant only if the stocks are sufficiently large and liquid.     

Anatomy of a regulatory race to the top: Changes in delisting rules at Korea's two stock exchanges, 1999–2002

One dimension of competition among stock exchanges is the quality of products they have to offer. In order to attract listings and trading volume, exchanges can affect the quality of their listed firms by altering their standards for firm disclosure and governance. We identify a competition with respect to delisting standards between Korea's two stock exchanges and show that it complies with the three components of a regulatory race to the top: external trigger, mobility among diverse regimes and meaningful changes that converge to similar rules. The race between the two Korean exchanges ended with stricter rules and better protected minority shareholders. The race also ended, however, with neither exchange gaining market share with respect to trading volume or new listings. Korea's experience, therefore, suggests a reason why these races are rare. In the absence of an external trigger, exchanges will be reluctant to enter a race if they think it will result in rule convergence and no winner.     

Post-Reform Market-Order Execution Quality: Multidimensional Comparisons Across Market Centers

We use market‐order data to determine execution quality on the NYSE, four regional stock exchanges, and the Nasdaq InterMarket. We examine a sample period after the reduction in the minimum price variation and after the SEC imposed new order‐handling rules, and analyze dimensions of execution quality in addition to trade prices. We find that in the postreform environment, the NYSE offers execution prices that are more favorable to the investor. However, the regional exchanges and the InterMarket offer executions that are faster and that more frequently allow investors to execute orders with sizes exceeding the quoted depth at the quoted price.     

The Behavior of Bid–Ask Spreads and Volume in Options Markets during the Competition for Listings in 1999

In August 1999, U.S. exchanges began to compete directly for order flow in many options that had been exclusively listed on another exchange, shifting 37% of option volume to multiple‐listing status by the end of September. Effective and quoted bid–ask spreads decrease significantly after multiple listings with spreads generally maintaining their initial lower levels 1 year later. These results hold for both time series and pooled regressions and are robust. We reject that economies of scale in market making cause the decrease in spreads and support the view that interexchange competition reduces option transaction costs.     

Liquidity-Based Competition for Order Flow

We present a microstructure model of competition for order flowbetween exchanges based on liquidity provision. We find thatneither a pure limit order market (PLM) nor a hybrid specialist/limitorder market (HM) structure is competition-proof. A PLM canalways be supported in equilibrium as the dominant market (i.e.,where the hybrid limit book is empty), but an HM can also besupported, for some market parameterizations, as the dominantmarket. We also show the possible coexistence of competing markets.Order preferencing—that is, decisions about where ordersare routed when investors are indifferent—is a key determinantof market viability. Welfare comparisons show that competitionbetween exchanges can increase as well as reduce the cost ofliquidity.     

Order Flow Distribution, Bid–Ask Spreads, and Liquidity Costs: Merrill Lynch's Decision to Cease Routinely Routing Orders to Regional Stock Exchanges

Merrill Lynch's decision to redirect order flow in exchange-listed equity securities from regional exchanges to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) provides an opportunity to examine (1) whether order flow affects market makers' spread-setting behavior and (2) whether brokers can capture liquidity-cost differences between market centers for their customers. Merrill's market-order customers appear to obtain better prices on the NYSE than on the regionals. Consistently with market microstructure theory, the NYSE's quoted spread for stocks affected by Merrill's decision falls relative to a control sample and decreases absolutely for a subsample of stocks we believe most sensitive to order-flow distribution.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D40, G10.     

证券交易所竞争上市公司资源研究综述

本文把证券交易所上市资源竞争看成是证券交易所、企业和投资者三方间的博弈，并从证券交易所间竞争的途径与方法、企业的上市选择、投资者选择证券交易所以及证券交易所竞争产生的影响等方面归纳总结国内外学者的研究成果，希望能给国内学者进一步深入研究提供参考，同时给我国证券交易所应对上市资源竞争和企业上市选择提供借鉴。     

Competition among stock exchanges for equity

We consider cross-border competition by stock exchanges for listings from firms that have controlling shareholders who have private benefits. We examine exchanges’ choices of their listing standards and firms’ choices of the exchanges where they cross-list their shares. We show that the share price compensates controlling shareholders for giving up some private benefits and enables firms with growth opportunities to obtain listings on exchanges with different listing standards. In particular, firms with high-growth opportunities tend to obtain listings on stock exchanges with high listing standards. We empirically examine these predictions and find that they are consistent with evidence.     

从区域货币运行看跨境资金流动对货币政策的影响

该文介绍了近年来江苏省外向型经济发展与跨境资金流动的主要态势,梳理了跨境资金流动对区域货币供需影响的传导路径,并实证检验了跨境资金流动与区域货币供应的相关性。鉴于跨境资金流动对区域货币运行产生的影响,以及对本外币政策协调带来的挑战,文章提出了相应政策建议。     

Competition between Exchanges: Euronext versus Xetra

Exchanges in Europe are in a process of consolidation. After the failure of the proposed merger between Deutsche Börse and Euronext, these two groups are likely to become the nuclei for further mergers and co‐operation with currently independent exchanges. A decision for one of the groups entails a decision for the respective trading platform. Against that background we evaluate the attractiveness of the two dominant continental European trading systems. Though both are anonymous electronic limit order books, there are important differences in the trading protocols. We use a matched‐sample approach to compare execution costs in Euronext Paris and Xetra. We find that both quoted and effective spreads are lower in Xetra. The differences are more pronounced for less liquid stocks. When decomposing the spread we find no systematic differences in the adverse selection component. Realised spreads, on the other hand, are significantly higher in Euronext. Neither differences in the number of liquidity provision agreements nor differences in the minimum tick size or in the degree of domestic competition for order flow explain the different spread levels. We thus conclude that Xetra is the more efficient trading system.     

Trade size and components of the bid-ask spread

The relation between theorized components of the bid-ask spreadand trade size for a sample of NYSE firms is examined. We findthat the adverse selection component increases uniformly withtrade size. Conversely, order processing costs decrease withincreased in trade size for all but the largest trades. We findthat order persistence decreases with trade size. The adverseselection component is highest at the beginning of the day andlowest at the end of the day for all but the largest trades.Trades of NYSE firms executed on regional exchanges or NASDAQcontain a large order processing cost component but no significantadverse information effect.     

Exchange introduction and market competition: The entrance of MEMX and MIAX

In September of 2020, two new equity exchanges, Members Exchange and Miami International Holdings Pearl Equities Exchange, were introduced further fragmenting an already vast array of venues that trade equities in the United States. In this paper we examine several aspects exchange competition following the introduction of these exchanges. We find that NASDAQ appears to lose market share and IEX appears to gain market share in the post-introduction period. This is interesting as IEX is a fee-based model, where order routers will not receive a rebate, and also introduces a speed bump, which could result in slower executions. Using Rule 605 data we document that IEX exhibits faster execution following the introduction. Finally, we examine clientele effects and find that known proxies for algorithmic trading and retail trading increase in the post introduction period.     

Competition and cooperation among exchanges: A theory of cross-listing and endogenous listing standards

We analyze firms’ choice of exchange to list equity and exchanges’ choice of listing standards when insiders have private information about firm value, but outsiders can produce (noisy) information at a cost. Exchanges are populated by two kinds of investors, whose numbers vary across exchanges: sophisticated (low information production cost) investors and ordinary (high–cost) investors. While firms are short-lived, exchanges are long-lived, value-maximizing agents whose listing and disclosure standards evolve over time. The listing standards chosen by exchanges affect their “reputation,” since outsiders can partially infer the rigor of these standards from the post-listing performance of firms. We show that, while exchanges use their listing standards as a tool in competing for listings with other exchanges, this will not necessarily lead to a “race to the bottom” in listing standards. Further, a merger between two exchanges may result in a higher listing standard for the combined exchange relative to that of either of the merging exchanges. We develop several other implications for firms’ listing choices and resulting valuation effects, the impact of competition and co-operation among exchanges on listing standards, and the optimal regulation of exchanges.     

FURTHER EXAMINATION OF PRICE DISCOVERY ON THE NYSE AND REGIONAL EXCHANGES

I re‐examine price discovery on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and regional exchanges. I employ three common‐trend cointegration models to analyze the equilibrium dynamics between the NYSE and regional exchanges for the thirty Dow stocks. The overall results show that whether the regional exchanges free‐ride on the NYSE in obtaining equilibrium prices depends on whether trade prices or quotes are examined. The regional exchanges play a significant (though less important) role in the price‐discovery process for trade prices. However, the contributions of regional exchanges in price discovery of quotes are negligible. I explain the inconsistency between the results using quotes and those using trades. I also highlight the problems of using either quotes or trades in examining this free‐riding hypothesis and suggest future research on the different informativeness of trades on the NYSE and regional exchanges. JEL classification: G20, C32.     

证券市场参与者之间关系及其变化的比较研究

本文主要探讨了证券市场主要参与者间关系及其变化。研究发现,与国外证券交易所之间的竞争不同,我国沪深两个交易所之间的竞争主要表现为监管竞争与对板块上市机会的主动争取上;证监会与交易所之间的关系是一种领导关系而非监管、合作关系;就证监会与被监管者而言,除监管关系以外,证监会与被监管者之间还存在着容忍、合谋等关系;上市公司与投资者之间的关系主要是一种合作与监督关系。     

全球证券交易所并购风潮及对我国的启示

文章针对危机后全球出现的新一轮证券交易所并购浪潮，分析了本轮交易所并购风潮的特点，认为主要包括追求规模效应的内部驱动力、大国经济博弈的外部推动力，及资本流动需求的客观要求等。文章随后分析了本轮证交所全球并购对交易所业务的影响和对中国交易所发展的启示，指出需提升对资本市场发展重要性的认识和危机意识，应重点增进大中华地区资本市场的合作等。     

UNLISTED TRADING PRIVILEGES,LIQUIDITY, AND STOCK RETURNS

In this study we examine the effect of dual trading through unlisted trading privileges (UTPs) on liquidity and stock returns. Stocks with UTPs trade in a different market structure than stocks listed and traded only on the AMEX and NYSE. Differences in market structure may affect stock returns through liquidity services provided by the competing markets. The sample comprises 852 AMEX and NYSE firms that began unlisted trading on the Philadelphia, Pacific, Midwest, or Cincinnati exchanges between 1984 and 1988. The results show significantly positive abnormal returns around the SEC's announcement of a regional exchange's filing for UTPs. The results also suggest that increased competition improves trading liquidity. Only stocks with low liquidity before UTPs announcements experience significantly improved liquidity and positive stock returns.     

Competition and Integration among Stock Exchanges in Europe: Network Effects, Implicit Mergers and Remote Access

The economic theory of network externalities and a simple-game theoretical framework are used to explore the issue of competition among stock exchanges and the possibility of consolidation in the European stock-exchange industry. The paper shows the existence of equilibria where exchanges may decide, even unilaterally, to achieve full compatibility through implicit mergers and remote access, specialising only in trading or listing services. Thus the consolidation of European exchanges into one may occur with a welfare-efficient outcome or with a lock-in to a Pareto-inferior equilibrium, due to the network externalities and the different starting points of the various exchanges. 'Implicit mergers' among exchanges together with remote access are always weakly (in half of the cases, strictly) more efficient than the actual competition. This finding also sheds light on the existence and efficacy, of ATS and rating agencies, which can be viewed respectfully as exchanges specialising in trading and listing services.     

Rebuilding the limit order book: sequential Bayesian inference on hidden states

The limit order book of an exchange represents an information store of market participants’ future aims and for many traders the information held in this store is of interest. However, information loss occurs between orders being entered into the exchange and limit order book data being sent out. We present an online algorithm which carries out Bayesian inference to replace information lost at the level of the exchange server and apply our proof of concept algorithm to real historical data from some of the world’s most liquid futures contracts as traded on CME GLOBEX, EUREX and NYSE Liffe exchanges.