Market response to bank relationships: Evidence from Korean bank reform

This paper examines how the forced closure of failing banks and the transfer of their loans to surviving banks affect the market value of firms that borrow from the closed banks. Pre-existing relationships between firms and the banks that acquire their loans are detrimental to the positive valuation effects of the event. Banks may have an incentive to favor pre-existing relationships to increase the value of previously extended loans. Therefore, loan renewals to firms with prior relationships do not signal borrower quality to the market, which is aware of the banks’ conflicts of interest. This study highlights the importance of the specific mechanisms employed to replace failed banks without decreasing the value of their client firms.     

CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions

We analyze how the structure of executive compensation affects the risk choices made by bank CEOs. For a sample of acquiring U.S. banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that CEOs with higher pay-risk sensitivity engage in risk-inducing mergers. Our findings are driven by two types of acquisitions: acquisitions completed during the last decade (after bank deregulation had expanded banks' risk-taking opportunities) and acquisitions completed by the largest banks in our sample (where shareholders benefit from ‘too big to fail’ support by regulators and gain most from shifting risk to other stakeholders). Our results control for CEO pay-performance sensitivity and offer evidence consistent with a causal link between financial stability and the risk-taking incentives embedded in the executive compensation contracts at banks.     

The effects of focus versus diversification on bank performance: Evidence from Chinese banks

This paper investigates the effects of focus versus diversification on bank performance using data on Chinese banks during the 1996–2006 period. We construct a new measure, economies of diversification, and compare the results to those of the more conventional focus indices, which are based on the sum of squares of shares in different products or regions. Diversification is captured in four dimensions: loans, deposits, assets, and geography. We find that all four dimensions of diversification are associated with reduced profits and higher costs. These results are robust regardless of alternative measures of diversification and performance. Furthermore, we observe that banks with foreign ownership (both majority and minority ownership) and banks with conglomerate affiliation are associated with fewer diseconomies of diversification, suggesting that foreign ownership and conglomerate affiliation may play important mitigating roles. This analysis may provide important implications for bank managers and regulators in China as well as in other emerging economies.     

Bank ownership and executive perquisites: New evidence from an emerging market

Direct bank ownership is a common practice in emerging markets. The current paper studies how bank ownership affects firm performance through corporate executive perquisites (perks) in China, a leading emerging economy. In addition to common factors known to influence the level of executive perks, we find a significantly positive link between bank ownership of company shares and executive perquisites. Further analyses suggest that higher level of executive perquisites hurt firm operating efficiency. Specifically, perks are positively associated with interest rate paid by the firms. We find some evidence consistent with the notion that the conflict of interests that banks face as both lenders and shareholders in the emerging markets induces banks to play less effective monitoring if they are concerned with the security of their loans or aim to obtain better arrangement for their loans. Our results reveal a particular mechanism through which bank ownership influences firm decisions and performance.     

Board quality and the cost of debt capital: The case of bank loans

We analyze the relation between comprehensive measures of board quality and the cost as well as the non-price terms of bank loans. We show that firms that have higher quality boards with a greater advisory presence borrow at lower interest rates. This relation exists even after controlling for ownership structure, CEO compensation policy, and shareholder protection, as well as the size and financial characteristics of the borrower and of the loan. We also show evidence that board quality and other governance characteristics influence the likelihood that loans have covenant requirements, but the relations differ by covenant type. When we combine the direct and indirect costs of bank loans we find that firms with large, independent, experienced, and diverse boards and lower institutional ownership borrow more cheaply. Overall, the evidence indicates that board quality impacts the cost of bank debt.     

Basel II and bank lending to emerging markets: Evidence from the German banking sector

This paper investigates whether the new Basel Accord will induce a change in bank lending to emerging markets using a comprehensive new data set on German banks’ foreign exposure. We test two interlinked hypotheses on the conditions under which the change in the regulatory capital would leave lending flows unaffected. This would be the case if (i) the new regulatory capital requirement remains below the economic capital and (ii) banks’ economic capital to emerging markets already adequately reflects risk. On both accounts the evidence indicates that the new Basel Accord should have a limited effect on lending to emerging markets.     

Evidence on the effects of bank competition on firm borrowing and investment

This paper presents evidence on the financial and real effects of bank competition using a large panel of privately held firms. I trace the firm-level impact of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, which increased the competitiveness of U.S. banking markets. Following the deregulation, newly formed firms used significantly less external debt, were smaller, and realized higher returns on assets, consistent with their investing less due to greater financial constraints. These effects diminish as firms age, ultimately reversing sign. The differential impact that banking market reforms may have on newer and more established firms is underscored.     

The emergence of market monitoring in Japanese banks: Evidence from the subordinated debt market

This paper uses a unique data set on the spreads of subordinated debts issued by Japanese banks to investigate the presence of market monitoring. The results show that subordinated debt investors punished weak banks by requiring higher interest rates. Moreover, I find that the spreads and the sensitivity of spreads to Moody’s bank ratings both increased dramatically after the Japanese government allowed a large city bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, to fail and passed the Financial Reform Act and the Rapid Revitalization Act in the late 1990s. These results suggest that the decline of conjectural guarantee led to the emergence of market monitoring. In addition, I find the relationship between spreads and accounting measures of bank risk to be quite fragile.     

The impact of European bank mergers on bidder default risk

We analyze the implications of European bank consolidation on the default risk of acquiring banks. For a sample of 134 bidding banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that, on average, bank mergers are risk neutral. However, for relatively safe banks, mergers generate a significant increase in default risk. This result is particularly pronounced for cross-border and activity-diversifying deals as well as for deals completed under weak bank regulatory regimes. Also, large deals, which pose organizational and procedural hurdles, experience a merger-related increase in default risk. Our results cast doubt on the ability of bank merger activity to exert a risk-reducing and stabilizing effect on the European banking industry.     

The flight home effect: Evidence from the syndicated loan market during financial crises

This paper shows that the collapse of the global market for syndicated loans during financial crises can in part be explained by a flight home effect whereby lenders rebalance their loan portfolios in favor of domestic borrowers. The home bias of lenders' loan origination increases by approximately 20% if the bank's home country experiences a banking crisis. This flight home effect is distinct from flight to quality because borrowers of different quality are equally affected. The results indicate that the home bias in capital allocation tends to increase when adverse economic shocks reduce the wealth of international investors.     

The role of bank monitoring in corporate governance: Evidence from borrowers’ earnings management behavior

In this paper, we examine the corporate governance role of banks by investigating the effect of bank monitoring on the borrowers’ earnings management behavior. Our analyses suggest that a borrowing firm’s earnings management behavior generally decreases as the strength of bank monitoring increases. The strength of bank monitoring is measured as (1) the magnitude of a bank loan, (2) the reputation (rank) of a lead bank, (3) the length of a bank loan, and (4) the number of lenders. These results imply that bank monitoring plays an important role in the corporate governance of bank-dependent firms. We further examine other bank loan characteristics (collateral, refinancing, loan types, and loan purposes) and their effects on borrowers’ earnings management behavior. Our analyses show that collateral and loan types are significantly associated with borrowers’ earnings management behavior while refinancing and loan purposes have no association.     

Mutual funds’ ownership and firm performance: Evidence from China

Mutual funds have emerged and rapidly developed since 2000 in China. This study tests empirically the impact of mutual funds’ ownership on firm performance in China, using a large sample for the period of 2001–2005. We find that equity ownership by mutual funds has a positive effect on firm performance. The result is robust to several measures of firm performance and various estimations. Our finding supports recent regulatory efforts in China to promote mutual funds as a corporate governance mechanism and suggests that pooling diffuse minority interests of individual shareholders who are prone to free-rider problems via mutual funds is beneficial.     

Product market competition and the cost of bank loans: Evidence from state antitakeover laws

The extant literature documents a positive relationship between a firm’s takeover vulnerability and its agency cost of debt. Using state antitakeover laws as an exogenous measure of variation in takeover vulnerability, I investigate whether product market competition has a disciplinary effect that can lower a firm’s cost of bank loans. After taking into account the industry composition of borrowers, I find that banks charge higher spreads to borrowers that are vulnerable to takeovers, but only in concentrated industries. In the absence of disciplinary competitive pressure, the effect of takeover vulnerability on the cost of bank loans is mitigated for larger firms, firms followed by analysts, firms with existing credit ratings, non-family firms, and for borrowers with shorter maturity loans or loans with covenants and collateral in place. Taken together, the results suggest that the effect of governance on the cost of financing is not homogenous across all industries, and that concentrated industry firms may need to use supplementary governance mechanisms to mitigate debt holder agency problems.     

A comprehensive analysis of the effects of risk measures on bank efficiency: Evidence from emerging Asian countries

This study investigates the role of risk in determining the cost efficiency of international banks in eight emerging Asian countries. Researchers of this paper consider three distinct risk aspects under a total of eight risk measures: credit risk, operational risk, and market risk. We apply a heteroscedastic stochastic frontier model to estimate bank cost efficiency in our analysis. Additionally, this study analyzes the marginal effects of all risk measures on the inefficiency effect in order to explore a more detailed relationship between risks and efficiency. The empirical results indicate that the risk measures represent significant effects on both the level and variability of bank efficiency. We also find that these effects vary across countries and over time.     

Foreign bank entry,credit allocation and lending rates in emerging markets: Empirical evidence from Poland

Earlier studies have documented that foreign banks charge lower lending rates and interest spreads than domestic banks. We hypothesize that this may stem from the superior efficiency of foreign entrants that they decide to pass onto borrowers (“performance hypothesis”), but could also reflect a different loan allocation with respect to borrower transparency, loan maturity and currency (“portfolio composition hypothesis”). We are able to differentiate between the above hypotheses thanks to a novel dataset containing detailed bank-specific information for the Polish banking industry. Our findings demonstrate that banks differ significantly in terms of portfolio composition and we attest to the “portfolio composition hypothesis” by showing that, having controlled for portfolio composition, there are no differences in lending rates between banks.     

From state to private ownership: Issues from strategic industries

This paper investigates the effects of privatization for a panel of 189 firms from strategic industries headquartered in 39 countries, and privatized between 1984 and 2002. Strategic firms can hardly be compared to manufacturing or competitive industries as they are generally under state monopoly, and involve specific issues such as regulation, political and institutional constraints. We examine the change in ownership and postprivatization means of control by the government, and assess whether positive changes in performance obtain in these particular industries that include firms from the financial, mining, steel, telecommunications, transportation, utilities, and oil sectors. We document that governments continue to exert influence on former state-owned firms after three years by retaining golden shares and/or appointing politicians to key positions in the firm. Our multivariate results reveal a negative effect of state ownership on profitability and operating efficiency, which the presence of a sound institutional and political environment moderates.     

Interbank market integration, loan rates, and firm leverage

This paper investigates the effect of interbank market integration on small firm finance in the build-up to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. We use a comprehensive data set that contains contract terms on individual loans to 6047 firms across 14 European countries between 1998:01 and 2005:12. We account for the selection that arises in the loan request and approval process. Our findings imply that integration of interbank markets resulted in less stringent borrowing constraints and in substantially lower loan rates. The decrease was strongest in markets with competitive banking sectors. We also find that in the most rapidly integrating markets, firms became substantially overleveraged during the build-up to the crisis.     

The Structure of Multiple Credit Relationships: Evidence from U.S. Firms

When firms borrow from multiple concentrated creditors such as banks they appear to differentiate their allocation of borrowing. In this paper, we put forward hypotheses for this borrowing pattern based on incomplete contract theories and test them using a sample of small U.S. firms. We find that firms with more valuable and more homogeneous assets differentiate borrowing more sharply across concentrated creditors. Moreover, borrowing differentiation is inversely related to restructuring costs and positively related to firms' informational transparency. The results suggest that the structure of credit relationships is used to discipline creditors and entrepreneurs, especially during corporate reorganizations.     

The anatomy of bank diversification

We use panel data from nine countries over the period 1996–2008 to test how revenue diversification affects bank value. Relying on a comprehensive framework for bank performance measurement, we find robust evidence against a conglomerate discount, unlike studies concerned with industrial firms. Rather, diversification increases bank profitability and, as a consequence also market valuations. This indirect performance effect does not depend on whether diversification was achieved through organic growth or through M&A activity. We further demonstrate that previous results in the literature on the impact of diversification on bank value presumably differ due to the way diversification is measured, and the negligence of the indirect value effect via bank profitability. Our evidence against a conglomerate discount in banking remains robust also during the sub-prime crisis.     

Synchronicity and firm interlocks in an emerging market

Stock price synchronicity has been attributed to poor corporate governance and a lack of firm-level transparency. This paper investigates the association between different kinds of firm interlocks, control groups, and synchronicity in Chile. A unique data set containing equity cross-holdings, common individual owners, and director interlocks is used to map out firm ties and control groups. While there is a correlation between synchronicity and share ownership and equity ties, synchronicity is more strongly correlated with interlocking directorates. The presence of share directors is associated with either reduced firm-level transparency or increased correlation in firm fundamentals—due, for example, to joint resource allocation across the firms.