Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model

Summary. This paper describes optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model with stochastic monitoring. An agent operates a risky project on behalf of a principal who can observe the projects revenues at a cost. We show that an optimal contract exists such that, at any history, either the principal claims the projects entire revenues or promises to claim nothing in the future. In particular, the agents expected income rises with time. Moreover, except in at most one period, the principal claims all revenues when audit occurs. We provide conditions under which all optimal contracts satisfy these properties.Received: 4 February 2004, Revised: 4 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D8, C7. Correspondence to: Cyril MonnetWe wish to thank Patrick Bolton, Vitor Gaspar, Mark Guzman, Martin Hellwig, Narayana Kocherlakota, Thorsten Koeppl, Albert Marcet, Benny Moldovanu, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden and seminar participants at the University of Mannheim, the University of Minnesota, the Society for Economics Dynamics Meetings in New York and the Society for the Advancement in Economic Theory in Rhodos for helpful comments and discussions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and may not reflect the views of the European Central Bank, the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.     

When vagueness induces indirect competition: strategic incompleteness of contracts

Summary. A class of employment contracts entailing production targets and consequent rewards is studied. In a nondiscriminatory environment, a principal hiring many agents faces the problem of writing a common contract which induces the highest possible effort from each one of his agents. While a very high target may get the best out of highly skilled agents, low skilled ones tend to shirk. On the other hand, although low targets make every agent put positive effort, there are efficiency losses from the high skilled agents. Also, in such environments the principal often has better information regarding the skills of all his agents than what each agent has regarding the rest of the agents at work. We show that if skills of agents are sufficiently close, the informed principal earns strictly higher profits by offering incomplete contracts as against being specific, as incomplete contracts reduce flow of information and induce indirect competition amongst agents. Received: May 19, 2000; revised version: August 28, 2001     

Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts

Summary Theory suggests that optimal contracts should include many contingencies to achieve optimal risk sharing. However, in practice, few contracts are as complex as theory suggests. This paper develops a model which is consistent with this observation. The lack of risk sharing results from the interplay of two factors. First, contingencies must be based on information produced by measurement systems, which may be manipulable. Second, when two parties to a contract meet, they often have incomplete information. The type of contract offered may reveal information about the party who proposes it. Different types of agents have different preferences over contingent contracts, because they have different abilities to manipulate the measurement system. These differences in preferences allow the parties to signal their types through the contracts they offer. Noncontingent contracts may be chosen in equilibrium because they are the only contracts which do not give any type an incentive to distort the measurement system and, hence, do not reveal information about the party proposing the contract.We have benefited from conversations with Oliver Hart, Rick Lambert, Michael Riordan and Jean Tirole and the comments of Michel Habib, Nick Yannelis and two anonymous referees. Financial support from the National Science Foundation under grants SES-8920048 and SES-8720589 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Non-commitment and savings in dynamic risk-sharing contracts

Summary. We characterize the solution to a dynamic model of risk sharing under non-commitment when saving is possible. Savings can play two important roles. First savings can be used to smooth aggregate consumption across different periods. Second, when savings are observable, they can act as a collateral that can be seized in the case of default. This relaxes the non-commitment constraint. When the aggregate income is fixed or when one of the agent is risk neutral, the allocation tends to first-best consumption. When one of the agent is risk neutral, this convergence occurs in an expected finite number of periods.Received: 17 March 2004, Revised: 8 March 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C7, D9.Michel Poitevin: Correspondence toWe gratefully acknowledge financial support from F.C.A.R., C.R.S.H. and C.I.R.A.N.O.     

When prices hardly matter: Incomplete insurance contracts and markets for repair goods

This paper looks at markets characterized by the fact that the demand side is insured. In these markets, a consumer purchases a good to compensate consequences of unfavorable events, such as an accident or an illness. Insurance policies in most lines of insurance base indemnity on the insured's actual expenses, i.e., the insured would be partially or completely reimbursed when purchasing certain goods. In this setting, we discuss the interaction between insurance and repair markets by focusing, on one hand, upon the development of prices and the structure of markets with insured consumers, and, on the other hand, the resulting backlash on optimal insurance contracting. We show that even in the absence of ex post moral hazard the extension of insurance coverage will lead to an increase in prices as well as to a socially undesirable increase in the number of repair service suppliers if repair markets are imperfect.     

Indeterminacy in dynamic models: When Diamond meets Ramsey

We consider an aggregate two-periods overlapping generations model with endogenous labor, consumption in both periods of life, homothetic preferences and productive external effects coming from the average capital and labor. We show that under realistic calibrations of the parameters, in particular a large enough share of first period consumption over the wage income, local indeterminacy of equilibria cannot occur with capital externalities alone. It can nevertheless occur when there are only, even very small, vanishing labor externalities provided that the elasticity of capital-labor substitution and the wage elasticity of the labor supply are large enough. We also show that if labor externalities are slightly stronger, but still small enough to be plausible, and the elasticity of labor supply is larger, local indeterminacy occurs in a Cobb-Douglas economy. Finally, we show that a locally indeterminate steady state is generically characterized by an under-accumulation of capital. It follows therefore that while agents live over a finite number of periods, the conditions for the existence of locally indeterminate equilibria are very similar to those obtained within infinite horizon models and that from this point of view, Diamond meets Ramsey.     

Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model

In an equilibrium model of the labor market, workers and firms enter into dynamic contracts that can potentially last forever, but are subject to optimal terminations. Upon termination, the firm hires a new worker, and the worker who is terminated receives a termination contract from the firm and is then free to go back to the labor market to seek new employment opportunities and enter into new dynamic contracts. The model permits only two types of equilibrium terminations that resemble, respectively, the two kinds of labor market separations that are typically observed in practice: involuntary layoffs and voluntary retirements. The model allows for the simultaneous determination of a large set of important labor market variables including equilibrium unemployment and labor force participation. An algorithm is formulated for computing the model's equilibria. I then simulate the model to show quantitatively that the model is consistent with a set of important stylized facts of the labor market.     

When the fine print isn't so fine: reviewing contracts of health plan service providers

Most employers delegate responsibilities for health plan administration to one or more service providers or vendors. Recent legal developments make it increasingly important for employers to ensure that the contracts with their vendors provide appropriate protections against liability, hold vendors accountable for performing the services they agree to provide and enable plans to comply with an ever-expanding list of federal and state law requirements.     

The propensity to hedge using futures contracts: the case of potato futures contracts

This paper studies why UK non-financial firms hedge with potato futures contracts. It is found that the financial characteristics of firms in the sample play an important role in influencing the propensity to hedge. For example, it is found that firms that hedge are on average larger than firms that do not hedge. Firms that hedge also have more volatile earnings. Furthermore, firms that do hedge appear to want to smooth earnings to reduce the costs of financial distress and avoid entering the highest tax threshold.     

Linear contracts as incentives: a puzzle

This paper reexamines the linear schedule of compensation as a tool for providing incentives to managers when contractible output is a function of costly effort and a random shock. Two puzzling situations compatible with linear schemes of compensation are presented. First, if the model parameters are such that the optimal participation on output is below 50%, the variable compensation turns out to have a negative effect on manager’s utility. Second, if it is below 25%, linear incentives allow situations in which larger utilities are reached by means of smaller rewards.      

From families to formal contracts: An approach to development

This paper develops a theory in which individuals can use one of two types of human/social capital to enforce contracts: “Local capital” relies on families and other personal networks; “market capital” relies on impersonal market institutions such as auditors and courts. Local capital is efficient when most trading is local, but only market capital can support trading between strangers that allows extensive division of labor and industrialization. We show that economies with a low cost of accumulating local capital (say, because people live close together) are richer than economies with a high cost of accumulation when long distance trade is difficult, but are slower to transition to impersonal market exchange (industrialize) when long distance trade becomes feasible. The model provides one way to understand why the wealthiest economies in 1600 AD, China, India, and the Islamic Middle East, industrialized more slowly than the West. We report an array of historical evidence documenting the pre-industrial importance of family and kinship networks in China, India, and the Islamic world compared to Europe, and the modernization problems linked to local capital.     

FIDIC条件下合同的终止及其风险防范

我国加入世界贸易组织已经成为现实。这就意味着我国将严格遵守世贸组织的规定，遵循国际惯例，在重大基础建设中采用招投标制，执行FIDIC条款和其他国际通用标准和规范，允许外国监理咨询公司参与项目的设计和监理工作。同时我们应当清醒地认识到，虽然我国80年代初期就开始进入国际承包市场，市场份额占有量也逐渐增大，国内基础建设近十年来也逐步执行招投标制，在国际金融组织贷款项目采用FIDIC合同条件，但是我国的项目管理水平与西方发达国家相比，仍然有较大差距，我国有对外经营权的公司虽然众多，但在国际承包市场与西方国家公…     

Labour contracts in a stock market economy

In this paper, labour contracts are examined in the context of a general stock market economy where all shareholders are risk averse, and firms act in shareholders interest. The problem considered is whether some firm can offer a wage contract that will make all its shareholders better off. We show by example that, contrary to the arguments in the partial equilibrium framework, it is possible that no such contract will exist, even when there are potential gains to risk sharing. A sufficient condition for the existence of a feasible pareto improving contract is given. It is shown that contract trading will arise provided some firm has no large shareholders.     

Undiscounted optimal growth in the two-sector Robinson-Solow-Srinivasan model: a synthesis of the value-loss approach and dynamic programming

We highlight two features of undiscounted optimal growth in the context of a two-sector model due to Robinson, Solow and Srinivasan. First, we use the value-loss approach of Radner-Gale-McKenzie to show a multiplicity of optimal programs in situations when optimality does not coincide with value-loss minimization. Second, we use a theory of undiscounted dynamic programming, not available in the literature, to derive properties of the optimal policy correspondence. In terms of a methodological perspective, we suggest a synthesis of the two methods for the analysis of problems of optimal intertemporal resource allocationThis essay is dedicated to Mukul Majumdar on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, with affection and admiration. We would like to thank Robert Becker, Minako Fujio and Ron Jones for useful discussions and to a referee of this journal for very insightful comments. We are grateful to the Center for Analytic Economics at Cornell and to the Center for a Livable Future at Johns Hopkins for research support     

Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps

Should a firm favor insiders (handicap outsiders) when selecting a CEO? One reason to do so is to take advantage of the contest to become CEO as a device for providing current incentives to employees. An important reason not to do so is that this can reduce the ability of future CEOs and, hence, future profits. The trade-off between providing current incentives and selecting the most able individual to become CEO is the focus of this paper. If insiders are good enough (better or nearly as good as outsiders), incentive provision to insiders typically dominates and it is optimal to handicap outsiders, sometimes so severely that they have no chance to win the contest. However, if outsiders are sufficiently better than insiders, selection dominates and it is the insiders who are severely handicapped. This finding is in sharp contrast to the existing literature which has so far ignored this trade-off. In all, our model provides useful insight into contests to become CEO and rationalizes empirical regularities in the source of CEOs chosen by firms. In particular, our analysis helps to explain the lower tendency of firms in more heterogeneous industries and firms with a product or line of business organizational structure to select an outsider as CEO.