DIMENSIONS,TRANSACTIONS COSTS AND COALITIONS IN LEGISLATIVE VOTING*

Dimensional studies of Congressional voting have found a single dominant “ideological” dimension, while regression estimates find that constituency variables and party are dominant. Koford (1989b) recalibrated the dimensional studies, and found that several dimensions are important. This study reviews those findings, and then considers additional reasons why dimensional studies might understate the number of dimensions. It then examines the regression estimates for biases that overstate the number of dimensions. Overall, fewer dimensions are found than seem consistent with the wide variety of constituents' preferences on issues. A model is developed in which the transactions costs of building coalitions reduces the number of dimensions visible on roll-call votes below the underlying dimensionality of preferences in the issue space. When legislative parties build internal coalitions to pass and defeat bills, voting on randomly drawn bills has a single party-oriented dimension. Natural ideological dimensions are reinforced when parties write bills and logroll along natural lines of cohesion. Numerical examples suggest that these effects could be important, and suggest lines for empirical investigation of the underlying issue space.     

THE POLITICS OF PRECOMMITMENT WITH ELECTORAL UNCERTAINTY AND TRANSACTION COSTS

Despite the lack of legal channels through which binding commitments can be made by the government, economic and political factors enable it to affect future outcomes. In practice, large transaction costs are associated with any significant change of policy, and therefore the current government can adopt policies so that certain outcomes are more likely to be realized by its successor. In this paper it is argued that transaction costs combined with electoral uncertainty are likely to drive the current government to adopt a policy which is extreme relative to the preferences of the existing political parties. This policy is adopted in order to ensure that due to transaction costs, the future government will not depart radically from the most preferred policy of the current government. If the current policy is likely to affect the election outcome, then, in addition to the above considerations, the electorate attitudes would have to be taken into account by the government. Hence, the current government confronts two factors in choosing its policies: the behavior of the future government and the behavior of the electorate. The interplay between the two factors determines the choice of the current policy.     

NON-WAGE LABOUR COSTS, POLICY UNCERTAINTY AND LABOUR DEMAND – A THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT

Labour costs in various European countries have reached a record high in recent years. The topic of non‐wage labour costs is therefore increasingly being discussed among and between the political parties because non‐wage labour costs are likely to have major negative effects on employment. We follow the real options approach, which allows us to investigate the value to a firm of waiting to adjust labour when the firm's wage and non‐wage costs are stochastic and adjustment costs are sunk. Simulation exercises show that the interaction between hiring and firing costs, non‐wage labour costs and uncertainty can have important ramifications for employment dynamics.     

EQUILIBRIUM GROWTH IN A MONETARY ECONOMY WITH TRANSACTIONS COSTS*

The paper describes a dynamic general equilibrium monetary economy with technological primitives that are consistent with the possibility of asymptotic equilibrium growth. The paper focuses on the relationship between equilibrium financing constraints on investment goods, transaction costs and economic growth. A generalized growth condition is derived that involves both monetary growth rates and transaction costs. The condition is used to show that (i) although inflation taxes can potentially exert a negative influence on long-run economic growth, these growth effects cannot in general be arbitrarily large; and (ii) for some monetary growth rates, money is superneutral in contrast to the models of Stockman and Abel. Numerical work indicates that although the welfare and growth effects of decreasing nominal interest rates from a benchmark are large, the costs associated with raising nominal interest rates from benchmark are not.     

内外经济政策不确定对中国出口贸易及其发展边际的影响*

本文分析了国内和国外政策不确定对中国出口贸易及其分解的影响,探究了它们的作用差异、具体特点及影响渠道。本文研究发现,国内和国外政策的不确定均显著阻碍了中国出口贸易及其广义边际、集约边际的发展,且前者作用格外突出。同时,控制了经济运行周期、经济危机的影响后,本文的基本结论仍比较稳健。此外,扩展研究发现政策不确定对中国出口的作用还依赖出口市场特点、行业要素密集度和出口沉没成本等因素。最后,本文还利用微观数据进行了简单的机制验证。     

CRYPTOCURRENCIES,NETWORK EFFECTS,AND SWITCHING COSTS

Cryptocurrencies are digital alternatives to traditional government‐issued paper monies. Given the current state of technology and skepticism regarding the future purchasing power of existing monies, why have cryptocurrencies failed to gain widespread acceptance? I offer an explanation based on network effects and switching costs. In order to articulate the problem that agents considering cryptocurrencies face, I employ a simple model developed by Dowd and Greenaway (1993) (Dowd, K., and D. Greenaway. “Currency Competition, Network Externalities, and Switching Costs: Towards an Alternative View of Optimum Currency Areas.” The Economic Journal, 103(420), 1993, 1180–89). The model demonstrates that agents may fail to adopt an alternative currency when network effects and switching costs are present, even if all agents agree that the prevailing currency is inferior. The limited success of bitcoin—almost certainly the most popular cryptocurrency to date—serves to illustrate. After briefly surveying episodes of successful monetary transition, I conclude that cryptocurrencies like bitcoin are unlikely to generate widespread acceptance in the absence of either significant monetary instability or government support. (JEL E40, E41, E42, E49)     

ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY,MONETARY UNCERTAINTY AND THE DEMAND FOR MONEY IN AUSTRALIA

The demand for money and its stability in Australia has received a great deal of attention in the past and has resulted in its own literature. Depending upon estimation method and period of analysis, previous research has provided mixed findings. By including a measure of economic uncertainty and a measure of monetary uncertainty (both GARCH‐based) in the long‐run money demand for M3, and by using the bounds testing approach under which variables could be stationary or non‐stationary, we provide strong evidence that the M3 money demand in Australia is stable. Both uncertainty measures do have short‐run as well as long‐run effects on the demand for M3 in Australia, factors that previous research did not consider.     

通货膨胀、政府收益与社会福利损失

传统"Cagan规则"认为,政府通货膨胀税收益最大化的条件是,通货膨胀率应该为(货币需求关于)利率半弹性的倒数。这一规则是局部均衡条件下的结果,并未考虑通胀的实际经济效应。本文基于交易成本方法在一般均衡框架内讨论收益最大化时通货膨胀率的决定问题。该框架中收益最大化的通货膨胀率小于Ca-gan规则值,这一结论得到了中国1945—1949年恶性通胀时期经验数据的支持。经验结果还表明,相对于Cagan规则,根据交易成本方法设定的通货膨胀率尽管并没有明显提高政府的通货膨胀税收益,却大幅降低了社会福利损失。     

RISK,UNCERTAINTY AND CHINA'S EXPORTS*

Both theoretical and empirical models were developed in this paper to examine how exporters’ response to real exchange rate volatility (RERV) and real exchange rate misalignment (RERM) varies across industries in China. The theoretical model indicates that the impact of RERV depends on exporters’ attitude to risk while the effect of RERM is ambiguous. Using disaggregated industry data, Chinese exporters were found to be averse to RERV and RERM. This suggests that the negative impact on China's exports resulting from a revaluation of the RMB will be mitigated by a positive impact due to the reduction of RERM.     

外包与不确定环境的最优资本投资

本文以需求不确定性为切入点,为外包生产行为提出一个解释。当需求存在不确定性时,我们分别考虑存在与不存在外包可能性的两种情况下的最优资本投资模型。我们发现,当存在不确定性时,外包行为具有帕累托改进的性质,而且,在存在外包可能性的情况下,生产品牌产品的垄断厂商可以借此降低固定资产投资。此外,我们还发现外包的成本对于垄断厂商的资本投资具有显著的影响。     

FISCAL CONSTRAINTS, COLLECTION COSTS, AND TRADE POLICIES

The last two decades witnessed trade liberalization in many developing countries. What caused this trend, and why have trade barriers been so ubiquitous when economic theory overwhelmingly supports free trade? This paper proposes that governments' revenue needs are the driving force. Governments may rely disproportionately on trade taxes because they are inexpensive to collect. Trade liberalization is an integral part of a tax reform: a tax base expansion is necessary to allow governments to reduce tariff rates. This hypothesis is supported by a panel data analysis of 27 developing countries.     

RESOURCE CURSE,POLITICAL ENTRY,AND DEADWEIGHT COSTS

A simple model of political entry in a two‐sector economy is developed to analyze the effects of natural resource wealth on economic policy, political development, and civil insurrection. The model emphasizes the role of political entry and deadweight costs of taxation on the joint determination of these economic and political outcomes. Contrary to popular belief, my model shows that natural resource abundance is an economic blessing even in a rent‐seeking society, although resource dependence can be negatively associated with economic performance. In a contested political market, dictators care about popular support and hence resource wealth can help reduce the deadweight cost of taxation (and hence the cost of public good provision). On the other hand, natural resource wealth can be a political curse, because it encourages political entry and hence it induces incumbent dictators to run more repressive regimes. With constant returns counterinsurgent technology, however, the equilibrium number of insurgents is independent of the size of resource wealth. The onset of civil war, therefore, depends on the counterinsurgent technology and whether the costs of entry deterrence are affected by resource wealth. This helps clarify the two seemingly contradictory hypotheses that “resource wealth enhances regime durability” and “resource wealth fuels conflict.”     

专业化产业集聚、空间成本与区域工业化

本文扩展了贸易成本的范围,认为贸易成本不仅包括产品运输成本,而且也包括要素流动成本,并引入前后向产业联系,认为中间产品使用及种类的增加所创造的成本和需求联系效应有利于提高最终产品的生产效率。在此基础上文章发展了可解的中心-外围模型,并探讨了在各种条件下相应的经济学含义,认为在推动我国区域经济一体化的进程中,对落后地区的技术支持必不可少,重视区域间产业发展的互动,否则,我国区域经济一体化进程难以有效推进。     

POLICY UNCERTAINTY,ELECTORAL SECURITIES,AND REDISTRIBUTION*

This article investigates how uncertainty about the adoption of a redistribution policy affects political support for redistribution when individuals can trade policy‐contingent securities in the stock market. In equilibrium the support for redistribution is smaller than where no “policy‐insurance market” is available. This implies that in economies with well‐developed financial markets redistribution decreases with the level of participation in these markets and with income inequality. Furthermore, the existence of a policy‐insurance market may lead to a less equal distribution of income than where no insurance is available even if a majority of individuals are redistributing resources through private transfers.     

COMMON COSTS AND CROSS-SUBSIDIES: MISESTIMATION VERSUS MISALLOCATION

Existing models of cross-subsidization have focused on either ex ante distortions to investments or misallocations of common costs as the principal sources of cross-subsidies in regulated firms. In this paper, we identify a third vehicle for such cross-subsidization that, given regulators' preferences, is not only likely but likely to be prominent; namely, the misestimation of the magnitude of common costs. Because our results incorporate regulators' preferences, they may provide the necessary building block for a positive theory of the magnitude of observed common costs that has, heretofore, been absent in the literature. ( JEL L51, L97 )     

REGIONAL SPECIALIZATION,URBAN HIERARCHY,AND COMMUTING COSTS*

We consider an economic geography model of a new genre: All firms and workers are mobile and their agglomeration within a city generates costs through competition on a housing market. In the case of two sectors, contrasted patterns arise. When one good is perfectly mobile, the corresponding industry is partially dispersed whereas the other is agglomerated, thus showing regional specialization. When one sector supplies a nontradeable consumption good, this sector is more agglomerated than the other. The corresponding equilibrium involves an urban hierarchy in that a larger array of varieties of the two goods is produced within the same city.