Outside Directors on Korean Boards: Governance and Institutions

Drawing on institutional theory, this study examines the factors that pressured Korean firms to appoint outside directors to their boards. While this practice could be considered to be a management innovation in Korea, in the Anglo‐American corporate governance system it has long been used as one of several mechanisms to mitigate agency costs between management and shareholders. As such, this response by Korean firms, following the 1997–98 currency crisis in Asia, could be seen as an example of corporate governance convergence on the Anglo‐American model, where higher levels of outside director representation on the board are the norm. We examine the antecedents of having a higher proportion of outside directors on Korean boards. Our findings indicate that larger firms that are under stricter control by the government have higher representation of outside directors on the board. We also find a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of outside directors and business group affiliation, poor prior firm performance, higher levels of debt and foreign ownership.     

Board gender diversity and corporate environmental performance: The moderating role of family and dual‐class majority ownership structures

While prior work has investigated the impact of (a) ownership structure and (b) board gender diversity separately on corporate environmental performance, researchers have not studied the potentially important relationship between ownership control and female board diversity in influencing corporate environmental performance jointly. We do so in the context of majority ownership in family‐controlled and dual‐class firms whose motives and influence are theoretically different from that of the firm's minority shareholders. Drawing on resource dependency, socioemotional wealth theory, and secondary agency theory, we hypothesize that majority family owners and dual‐class owners likely choose women directors to help advance their personal preferences for environmental corporate social responsibility. Our empirical tests utilizing 2,755 U.S. firm years over the 2010–2015 show that, as hypothesized, these two majority ownership types interact with board gender diversity to positively influence corporate environmental performance.     

Boards of Directors and Shark Repellents:Assessing the Value of an Agency Theory Perspective

Because shark repellents decrease the vulnerability of firms (and their incumbent managers) to the market for corporate control, the decision to adopt these devices represents an excellent test of agency theory. In this empirical study, we examined the relationships between the adoption of shark repellents and several mechanisms that, according to agency theory, should align the interests of corporate board members and shareholders and/or make directors more effective monitors of management behaviour. Of the variables included, only board stock ownership (especially by employee directors) was linked to a reduced propensity to adopt shark repellents in the predicted manner. Two variables not immediately as- sociated with agency theory — the proportion of inside directors appointed by the incumbent chief executive officer (CEO) and a lower ratio of CEO compensation to the compensation of other top executives — were linked to higher rates of shark repellent adoption. Given that agency theory explains relatively little of the variance in shark repellent adoption, we advocate serious consideration of other theoretical formulations for corporate governance, including two approaches — stewardship theory and agent morality — that take the moral ('other regarding') obligations of directors seriously.     

公司治理与代理成本——来自上市公司的经验证据

本文利用上市公司的数据,分析了公司治理与代理成本之间的关系。结果发现:股权集中度国家股比例、董事会规模、监事会规模、治理环境、公司透明度、企业规模与代理成本显著负相关;股权制衡度、领取报酬的董事比例、领取报酬的监事比例、董事会会议次数、股东大会会议次数与代理成本显著正相关;高管持股、独立董事比例、监事会会议次数、两职分离与代理成本无显著关系;财务杠杆率与代理成本的关系是混合的;国有上市公司和民营上市公司的公司治理与代理成本之间的关系与总样本基本一致。     

Executive pay and performance: the moderating effect of CEO power and governance structure

This paper examines the crucial question of whether chief executive officer (CEO) power and corporate governance (CG) structure can moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) using a large up-to-date South African data-set. Our findings are threefold. First, when direct links between executive pay and performance are examined, we find a positive, but relatively small PPS. Second, our results show that in a context of concentrated ownership and weak board structures; the second-tier agency conflict (director monitoring power and opportunism) is stronger than the first-tier agency problem (CEO power and self-interest). Third, additional analysis suggests that CEO power and CG structure have a moderating effect on the PPS. Specifically, we find that the PPS is higher in firms with more reputable, founding and shareholding CEOs, higher ownership by directors and institutions, and independent nomination and remuneration committees, but lower in firms with larger boards, more powerful and long-tenured CEOs. Overall, our evidence sheds new important theoretical and empirical insights on explaining the PPS with specific focus on the predictions of the optimal contracting and managerial power hypotheses. The findings are generally robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneities, pay, and performance proxies.     

Boards of directors in Russian publicly traded companies in 1998–2014: Structure,dynamics and performance effects

This article provides new evidence on the structure, dynamics and performance effects of corporate boards in publicly traded companies in Russia. It takes advantage of a new and unique longitudinal dataset of virtually all Russian companies whose shares were traded in the RTS/MICEX/MOEX over 1998–2014. The analysis highlights a number of strong trends in the evolution of boards of directors, such as a declining participation of insider directors and an increasing participation of foreign and female directors. It also shows that board characteristics are linked to company performance (market-to-book ratio, Tobin’s Q, ROE and ROA), suggesting that boards of directors play a non-trivial role in corporate governance in Russia. Testing for structural breaks in the relationship between board composition and firm performance provides some evidence of the changing role of corporate boards over time.     

Director Ownership and Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Hong Kong Evidence

Weakness of corporate governance and lack of transparency are often considered causes of or contributors to the Asian Financial Crisis. Publicly listed companies in Hong Kong, like other Asian firms, have concentrated director ownership. The study uses voluntary segment disclosure above the benchmark minimum as a proxy for transparency and examines its relationship to the ownership structure and composition of corporate boards in Hong Kong. We find that: (1) high (concentrated) board ownership explains the extent of low voluntary segment disclosure and this negative relationship is stronger when firm performance is very poor; (2) the contribution of non‐executive directors to enhance voluntary segment disclosure is effective for firms with low director ownership but not for concentrated‐ownership firms. These results have implications for policy makers and regulators in the Asia‐Pacific region striving to improve governance and transparency.     

Board Antecedents of CEO Duality and the Moderating Role of Country‐level Managerial Discretion: A Meta‐analytic Investigation

CEO duality reduces boards’ monitoring capacity. But governance substitution theory holds that boards of directors who can effectively monitor their CEOs are more likely to adopt the CEO duality governance structure. By examining relationships between board characteristics underlying their monitoring capacity and CEO duality, we bring evidence to bear on governance substitution theory. Further, by applying a managerial discretion theory lens to CEO duality, we extend governance substitution theory to the cross‐country context where institutional features vary in their constraints on managerial discretion. Meta‐analytic results from a dataset of 297 studies across 32 countries/regions provided support for the majority of our predictions. As predicted, board independence and certain types of board human capital were positively related to CEO duality. Unexpectedly, board ownership was negatively related to CEO duality. Additionally, country‐level managerial discretion significantly moderated the board independence‐ and human capital‐duality relationships (but not the board‐ownership‐duality relationship) as predicted.     

Do Women Leaders Promote Sustainability? Analyzing the Effect of Corporate Governance Composition on Environmental Performance

In this study, we investigate the impact women leaders have on the corporate environmental strategies of organizations. Using a dataset of all Fortune 500 CEOs and boards of directors for a ten‐year period, we examine several aspects of gender in leadership on environmental strategy. Specifically, we test the impact of women CEOs, the proportion of women on the BOD, the number of interlinks women board members hold, and the interactive and cumulative effects of women CEOs and gender diverse boards. Findings suggest that firms characterized by gender diverse leadership teams are more effective than other firms at pursuing environmentally friendly strategies. This study contributes to research on corporate governance and environmental performance by showing how the gender composition of leaders affects corporate practice. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

The determinants of board composition: An agency theory perspective

This study examines the interrelation between board composition and variables that capture various agency and financial dimensions of the firm. The agency literature suggests that outside directors on the board provide important monitoring functions in an attempt to resolve, or at least mitigate, agency conflicts between management and shareholders. The agency literature indicates that other mechanisms such as managerial equity ownership, dividend payments, and debt leverage also serve as important devices in reducing agency conflicts in firms. This study argues and documents that an inverse relationship exists between the proportion of external members on the board and managerial stock ownership, dividend payout, and debt leverage. This is consistent with the hypothesis that individual firms choose an optimal board composition depending upon alternative mechanisms employed by the firm to control agency conflicts. Board composition is also found to be systematically related to a number of other variables including institutional holdings, growth, volatility, and CEO tenure.     

The Resource Dependence Role of Corporate Directors: Strategic Adaptation of Board Composition in Response to Environmental Change

Most research on corporate directors has focused on two roles: agency and resource dependence. While these two roles are theoretically and practically distinct, previous research has used the same classification scheme for measuring board composition regardless of role examined. Our paper examines the resource dependence role of directors and posits that the widely used insider/outsider categorizations do not adequately capture this role of directors. A taxonomy of directors is presented specifically for studying the resource dependence role. We then apply the taxonomy to a sample of US airline firms undergoing deregulation, and examine how board composition changes parallel the changing resource dependence needs of the firms. We conclude that the board's function as a link to the external environment is an important one, and that firms respond to significant changes in their external environment by altering board composition.     

国有企业法人治理结构初探

文章认为,国有企业改革是中国经济体制改革的重点、热点和难点,其中关于国有企业法人治理结构问题无论在理论还是在实践上更引人关注,国有企业法人治理结构是国有企业现代化企业制度得以建立的核心,是国有企业组织机构现代化、法治化的关键,而目前我国国有企业法人治理结构存在诸多缺陷,如股权过度集中、董事会运作失范、监事会监督机制弱化、对企业经营者激励不足、约束不力等等,建立科学合理的法人治理结构已经迫在眉睫了。     

Delegation of board work to committees in Europe

A sample of 6169 firm year observations in 14 western European countries between 2002 and 2009 is used to investigate how committee practice within boards of directors is related to company characteristics, and to the existence of alternative corporate governance instruments in place. We find that committees in Europe are prevalent in larger companies, and in companies with large and independent boards. However, we also find that leverage, director interlocking, concentrated ownership, and the presence of managers on the board mitigate the use of committees, suggesting that committee use is limited by the existence of alternative governance mechanisms. Consequently, recent regulatory changes in Europe that promote the creation of committees within boards may be unsuited for certain types of company, especially smaller companies and those with concentrated ownership.     

CORPORATE BOARD SIZE, COMPOSITION AND CORPORATE FAILURES IN RETAILING INDUSTRY[1]

In recent years some activists have advanced proposals to reform corporate boards, notably their structure and process, to assure desirable corporate governance. the empirical question, however, is whether such formal board changes would guarantee good governance. This paper examines this issue by studying the differences in the board size and board composition of 21 pairs of failed and non-failed firms. the results suggest that the non-failed retailing firms, as compared to failed ones, tend to have bigger boards within the size range suggested by the activists. the differences in the percent of outsider directors and multiple offices held by C.E.O.s between the failed and non-failed firms were not significant. Implications of the results for the evaluation of board reforms are discussed.     

How do the ownership structure and board of directors' features impact earnings management? The Spanish case

This paper examines how the ownership structure and board of directors' features determine the managerial opportunistic behavior exemplified in the management of accounting earnings. This study contributes to the literature by investigating the relationship of firm‐level and country‐level corporate governance systems on the earnings management in the Spanish corporate sector. Results reveal that the varying efficiency of the corporate governance systems is reflected in the way in which accounting discretion is performed. We found evidence that earnings management is reduced as the voting rights of the controlling shareholder increased and that there is an inverse U‐shaped relationship between insiders' ownership and the earnings manipulation. Regarding the board characteristics, we observe that larger, independent boards, those with a larger proportion of female members, and those with an audit committee compounded by a greater proportion of outside independent directors oversee managers more efficiently, constraining their capacity to manage earnings. To the contrary, board duality increases the likelihood of opportunistic manipulation of financial reporting. We found that when the institutional environment improves in the Spanish context, the discretionary power of the corporate sector to overstate the financial statements is reduced. The findings prove the necessity of reinforcing the rules and regulations toward a more transparent disclosure of the financial statements.     

国有企业公司治理结构诊断及完善对策

与国际上规范的公司治理结构相比,我国国有企业公司治理结构的＂形似而神不似,形备而实不至＂,一直是困扰国有企业和政府部门的一道难题。完善公司治理结构,必须加快企业产权结构调整,规范董事会制度建设,理顺＂新三会＂与＂老三会＂及经理层的关系,严格实行规范化、制度化管理。     

Insider Trading, Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence Based on Hong Kong Firms

We document positive association between earnings management and insider selling after the fiscal year‐end for Hong Kong firms. This positive association is especially evident before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Our findings suggest that Hong Kong executives manage reported earnings to maximize their private benefits from insider selling. Additionally, we find that a higher proportion of independent directors (INED) on corporate boards moderate the positive association between insider selling and earnings management. Stricter monitoring of earnings management by INED is especially evident when no member of the family with majority ownership is present on corporate boards as a director. This suggests that the presence of family members with majority ownership on corporate boards significantly reduces INED's monitoring effectiveness. Our findings suggest that strict regulations are needed to control insider trading, and independence of corporate boards is important for monitoring of earnings management associated with insider trading. Furthermore, appointment of family members with majority shareholdings should be avoided to enhance independence and to monitor effectiveness of corporate boards.     

Board composition in small enterprises

This paper reports the results of three empirical studies of boards of directors in small enterprises in Norway. Most studies of boards of directors are concerned with the situation in large corporations. This article provides insights into board attributes and board functions in small firms. The Studies reported found that board composition is an important factor in describing and analyzing directorates. They also found that the composition of the board of directors is a function of company size and ownership structure, and that board composition varies with industry. The studies found differences in the board's strategy involvement between industries.     

The Association between Board Composition and Different Types of Voluntary Disclosure

Abstract

This study examines the association between board composition and voluntary disclosure in annual reports. In particular, it addresses the incentives within the agency theory framework for both inside and independent directors to disclosure additional information voluntarily. Further, it provides evidence on the relation between the overall total voluntary disclosure and the components of voluntary disclosure, such as forward looking, strategic, non-financial and historical financial disclosures and board composition. Our sample is based on 181 Australian companies. We have developed and hand-collected 67 items from annual reports to develop the total voluntary disclosure index and the sub-indices of voluntary disclosure. Using two-stage multivariate analyses, our results provide some important insights. First, we find that there is a positive association between board composition and the voluntary disclosure of information in annual reports. Second, we also find that independent boards provide more voluntary disclosure of forward looking information and strategic information. However, board structure has no bearing on the voluntary disclosure of non-financial and historical financial information. Our findings are enhanced by different empirical specifications and sensitivity tests.     

Board ownership and IPO returns

This study examines the role of the board of directors for IPO pricing irregularities. Theory suggests that initial underpricing may be the result of asymmetric information and the long-run underperformance may be the result of managerial mismanagement of new funds due to agency conflicts. A strong board of directors can potentially reduce both asymmetric information and agency problems. We find that the structure of the board is related to IPO pricing anomalies. Initial returns are directly related to share ownership by insiders and the percentage of independent outsiders, and long-run returns are directly related to share ownership by insiders.