Earnings quality and corporate payout policy linkages: An Indian context

We investigate the role of accounting quality as an antecedent of dividend payout decision of firms, for both dividend levels and dividend event, in an emerging market context. Using the data for Indian firms through the years 2006–2016, we evaluate the impact of discretionary accruals on payout decision employing Tobit and Logit regression models amid set of idiosyncratic controls. We report that better earnings quality, on average, is associated with large dividend payments for Indian firms. Moreover, the likelihood of dividend payment reduces with poor earnings quality and more so when earnings manipulation is done to increase earnings. Nonetheless, we show that higher earnings quality reduces dividends during the crisis period and also for group-affiliated firms. However, the same doesn’t hold true for dividend likelihood. The relationship is robust to the idiosyncratic controls and the causality test confirms that results are not susceptible to endogeneity issue. Overall, we conclude that better earnings quality takes care of free cash flow problems and alleviates the agency and information asymmetry related costs, thereby stimulating payout policy.     

卖空管制放松与上市公司现金股利：促进还是抑制？

基于2006—2020年中国A股上市公司的数据,验证卖空管制放松对上市公司现金股利分配的影响。研究发现,相比于不可卖空的公司,可卖空公司在被列入卖空标的后,其现金股利分配意愿、分配规模与分配平稳性均显著提升。机制检验发现,卖空管制放松对现金股利分配的促进在代理问题严重、投资机会少的公司中更显著,这支持了代理成本机制;同时,在信号传递能力强、信号传递需求大的公司中,卖空管制放松对现金股利分配的促进更显著,这支持了信号传递机制。进一步分析发现,现金股利分配能力不足的公司在应对卖空压力时并未使用“高送转”作为替代。而对于我国资本市场中广泛存在的达标式分配,卖空管制放松能够产生抑制作用,且抑制作用体现在没有再融资需求的公司中。研究表明,卖空管制放松促进了上市公司现金股利分配,卖空机制能够为我国资本市场中的现金股利监管提供市场化路径。     

Share repurchases,shareholder rights,and corporate governance provisions

Grounded in agency theory, this study seeks to explore how repurchase activity is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. The empirical evidence shows that firms where shareholder rights are weaker tend to repurchase less stock. I argue that this is because managers of firms with weak shareholder rights are better able to exploit the weak shareholder rights and retain more cash within the firm, potentially to extract private benefits as alleged by the free cash flow hypothesis. Managers of firms with strong shareholder rights, on the contrary, are forced to disgorge cash to stockholders in the form of repurchases. In addition, I test the dividend-substitution hypothesis and find no evidence that repurchases substitute for dividends.     

On the financial characteristics of firms that initiated new dividends during a period of economic recession and financial market turmoil

The initiation of new dividends and increases in dividend payout ratios occur infrequently because once initiated it would be expected by most investors that the new dividends will be maintained. Dividend announcements are said to have informational content concerning the value of the firm, and financial signaling theory would lead investors to conclude that the initiation of new dividends is an indication that the firm expects increased cash flows in the future. Thus, unless the initiation is identified beforehand as a special dividend resulting from unanticipated cash inflows, it is difficult to reverse the action without having an adverse effect on the value of the firm. In periods of economic recession and financial turmoil most firms conserve cash and the initiation of new dividends or increases in the dividend payout ratio in such periods are extraordinary and noteworthy. The purpose of this study is to provide a financial analysis of those firms described by Value Line as having initiated or increased the dividend payout ratio in the most recent period of economic recession and financial market turmoil. Specifically, the analysis will test for significant differences in the financial profiles of those firms that initiated new dividends in such a period, and companies selected at random but from the same industries. A unique financial profile is established for the dividend initiating firms, and it is suggested that the profile may be used to identify firms that will initiate new dividends in future periods of economic downturn. As in previous studies of this nature Multiple Discriminant Analysis is used.     

LIFO adoption and dividend payout

Adoption of the LIFO inventory costing method tends to decrease reported earnings but increases cash flows to adopting firms. This study examines the change in dividend payout ratios (cash dividends divided by earnings) accompanying LIFO adoption. The question addressed is whether adopting firms likely paid out incremental cash flows or retained them to the benefit of management. The evidence suggests that managers and directors adjusted payout ratios to partially offset the negative earnings effect of LIFO. The adjustments made were not sufficient in magnitude to achieve a neutral LIFO effect on dividend payout, and the net result was the retention of incremental cash flows generated by LIFO adoption.     

金字塔结构特征对上市公司现金股利政策的影响

以2004年至2010年715家上市公司为样本,构建面板数据模型研究我国金字塔结构特征对上市公司现金股利政策的影响,结果表明:控制权、现金流权与现金股利支付倾向及支付力度显著正相关;两权分离度与现金股利支付力度显著负相关;金字塔结构较复杂、终极控制人具有集团性质时,现金股利支付倾向与支付力度较低;现金股利支付倾向受终极控制人产权性质影响。     

Cross-listing in the U.S. and domestic investor protection

Using the change in ordinary dividend payout as a proxy for improved governance, we show that cross-listing in the U.S. is associated with enhanced protection for the minority ordinary shareholders of exchange-listed non-U.S. firms. These firms substitute dividends for enhanced governance. We find no such effect for Rule 144a Portal firms. Interestingly, we document evidence inconsistent with the legal bonding hypothesis for Level 1 OTC firms. We believe that their ability to pay lower dividends post-listing is primarily due to their ability to credibly commit to fair treatment of their minority investors, given their record for equitable treatment of their ordinary shareholders. They achieve this reputation by consistently paying out a sizable proportion of their earnings as dividends. In addition, we find that the firm-level governance of Level 1 OTC firms, as measured by the number of closely held shares improves in the post-listing period. We find no such effect for SEC Rule 144a traded firms. Our results have also important implications for the agency models of dividends.     

Payout initiation by IPO firms: The choice between dividends and share repurchases

This study evaluates the economics of the choice of form of payout initiation mechanism adopted by IPO firms. Our results suggest that IPO firms demonstrate a preference for repurchases over dividends as the specific form of payout initiation mechanism. We however, find that while the market views post-IPO payout initiations favorably, it is indifferent to the specific form of payout mechanism adopted. Further, we find that dividends and repurchases represent distinct payout mechanisms adopted by IPO firms with fundamentally different characteristics and motivation to initiate payouts during the post-IPO phase. Our results suggest that while dividend initiations are primarily driven by life cycle and catering theory considerations, signaling theory provides the more likely explanation for payout initiations through share repurchases.     

Deregulation of short selling and corporate cash dividend policy: A quasi-natural experiment from China

This study takes China’s short selling deregulation as a quasi-natural experiment, employs a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2017, and tests the impact of a short selling pilot on firms’ cash dividends using a difference-in-differences model (DID). We find that China’s short selling pilot significantly increases the pilot firms’ cash dividends. The mechanism test shows that short selling can improve the pilot firms’ cash dividends by playing a corporate governance role to restrain dual agency costs such as management fees and major shareholders’ tunneling. Furthermore, we identify that short selling restrains the behavior of “large stock dividends” and increases the cash dividends of “large stock dividends” firms. Moreover, the governance effect of short selling is complementary to the external governance environment. The higher the degree of marketization and government quality, the more significant the governance effect of short selling to increase the pilot firms’ cash dividends. This study enriches not only the research related to cash dividends in emerging economies, but also provides new empirical evidence for the evaluation of China’s short selling deregulation and offers valuable lessons to other emerging economies.     

The effect of takeover defenses on the dividend decision

Many firms have sought protection from hostile takeovers by passing defensive amendments to their corporate charter and/or lobbying their state legislatures for statutory protection. Agency theory would suggest that any such takeover defenses alter the principal-agent relationship. A consequence of such a change may be a change in corporate decision making. The objective of this research is to test the effect that passage of antitakeover amendments has on a firm's dividend policy. We use six alternate measures of dividend activity: total dividends paid, dividends per share and dividends relative to earnings, cash flow, market value, and book value. Our results indicate that firms that adopt antitakeover amendments, when compared to an industry control sample, tend to have a slower rate of growth in dividend payout as measured by the proxy variables. These results suggest that entrenchment is not a likely outcome of such amendments.     

Is corporate payout taxation a long run phenomenon? Evidence from international data

This paper examines whether dividend and capital gains taxation influences corporate payout policy using the country level data of 21 countries in panel versions of time series models. We find that dividend relative to capital gains tax penalty is cointegrated with corporate payouts (dividends and share repurchases) i.e. corporate payout taxation may be a long run phenomenon. Further, the cointegrating vector estimates are largely consistent with the traditional view of dividend taxation whereby the tax penalty discourages dividends, while the estimates give limited support to the premise that firms substitute dividends for share repurchases in response to an increase in dividend tax penalty. Long run causality also operates between the tax penalty and payouts in the error correction models. Additionally, dividend tax appears to be more influential than capital gains tax on dividend payout decisions. Lastly, taxation affects dividends more significantly in countries with high investor protection.     

The determinants of board composition: An agency theory perspective

This study examines the interrelation between board composition and variables that capture various agency and financial dimensions of the firm. The agency literature suggests that outside directors on the board provide important monitoring functions in an attempt to resolve, or at least mitigate, agency conflicts between management and shareholders. The agency literature indicates that other mechanisms such as managerial equity ownership, dividend payments, and debt leverage also serve as important devices in reducing agency conflicts in firms. This study argues and documents that an inverse relationship exists between the proportion of external members on the board and managerial stock ownership, dividend payout, and debt leverage. This is consistent with the hypothesis that individual firms choose an optimal board composition depending upon alternative mechanisms employed by the firm to control agency conflicts. Board composition is also found to be systematically related to a number of other variables including institutional holdings, growth, volatility, and CEO tenure.     

Capital expenditure announcements and anti-takeover barriers

In this paper, we compare capital budget announcements by firms with anti-takeover mechanisms in place to announcements by firms without takeover barriers during the period 1980 to 1995. We find that anti-takeover provisions do not affect investors’ average reactions to investment choices. Market responses are heterogeneous; however, and differ according to size, growth opportunity, the availability of free cash flow and exposure to the capital markets. We find evidence consistent with managerial entrenchment when firms are insulated from the threat of takeover and have enough free cash flow to avoid raising external capital. We also find that for small firms, the reaction to capital investment announcements are positively related to free cash flow when managers have high growth opportunities, but negatively related when investment opportunity is small. This result is consistent with Noe (1988), who shows that restricting managers’ investment choices to positive NPV projects is necessary to obtain the pecking order results of Myers and Majluf (1984).     

Agency costs,corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: A panel data analysis

This paper examines the impact of governance and ownership variables on agency costs for a panel of large UK quoted companies. We use three measures of agency costs: the ratio of sales-to-total assets, the interaction of free cash flows and growth prospects and the number of acquisitions. We employ a range of techniques to analyse the data: fixed-effects, instrumental variables, and Tobit regressions. We find that the changes in board structures that have occurred in the post-Cadbury period have not, generally, affected agency costs. This suggests a range of mechanisms is consistent with firm value maximisation. We also find that having a nomination committee increases agency costs, which indicates that there are costs associated with certain governance mechanisms. Increasing board ownership also helps to reduce agency costs. We also find that debt reduces agency costs. Our results raise questions about the usefulness of the information sent to shareholders when firms adopt a recommended governance framework.     

Managerial Agency Costs of Socialistic Internal Capital Markets: Empirical Evidence from China

This study provides empirical evidence of managerial agency costs in socialistic internal capital markets. Listed Chinese companies are required to disclose the amount of resources that are reallocated to other firms of the parent company, which provides us with a direct measure of the socialistic subsidization of weak member firms by strong member firms within a business group. We hypothesize that in strong member firms, managerial compensation is less sensitive to firm performance because cross‐subsidization makes it difficult for group CEOs to hold the managers in strong firms accountable for their own firms' performance, and also increases the noise in performance measures. We also hypothesize that socialistic cross‐subsidization results in an increase in managerial agency costs of strong member firms due to the low pay‐performance sensitivity and low incentive to work hard. We document empirical results that are consistent with these two predictions.     

Cultural and macroeconomic determinants of cash holdings management

This study examines patterns in cash management, particularly cash holdings speed of adjustment (CH‐SOA), across 48 countries. I find that managerial cultural characteristics and country‐level macroeconomic factors influence the persistence of cash reserve levels, deviation from target, and the speed with which firms in different countries adjust their cash holdings. The findings support the idea that agency costs as well as market frictions influence CH‐SOA and other aspects of cash management. The findings are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of firm‐level characteristics, country‐level corporate‐governance variables, and an alternative cultural index.     

上市公司超能力派现信号效应实证研究

上市公司超能力派现已引起了广泛的关注,然而这一现象可能导致的市场反应却不为人们所了解。作者以深、沪两市2005年实行超能力派现上市公司为研究对象,根据股利公告日前后股价的变动资料,采取累计超额收益率进行实证研究,以此来分析市场对超能力派现的反应。实证研究结果表明,超能力派现对公司的股价具有负的信号传递作用。     

Managing Underpricing? The Case of Pre‐IPO Discretionary Accruals in China

Previous studies have found that companies use income‐increasing positive discretionary accruals (DAC) prior to initial public offerings (IPOs) to inflate earnings as a signal to anticipate future income and future dividends. This study, directly explores the role of DAC in prospectus information of 691 A‐shares IPOs in China during the period 1995–2002 and its relationship with market‐adjusted returns. The results suggest that in China, pre‐IPO non‐discretionary accruals (NDAC) as well as DAC have informative value in explaining first‐day returns as well as first‐year adjusted returns. However, in yearly cross‐sectional models, I find that firms use income‐decreasing accruals (conservative accounting) in prospectus financial statements. This downward manipulation or income “understatement” creates a regulatory setting that could explain initial underpricing and abnormally high IPO returns for A‐shares. In addition, the results show that as state ownership (SO) increases, cash flow also increases, exacerbating agency costs and adverse selection problems. These findings may suggest that managers might be using more conservative accounting in Prospectus financial data to offset the agency costs related to high cash flow, and high SO, by “banking income” and possibly therefore “smoothing” the effects of possible future suboptimal earnings.     

Debt finance and the cost of management ownership: Some elementary results

Increased debt reduces a company's equity base, which reduces the dollar investment a manager must make to hold a given proportion of stock. Therefore, it is often argued, managers' effort incentives are improved by high leverage. This paper shows that while risky debt reduces the cost of providing managers with substantial equity ownership, the cheaper equity captures less of the fruits of the manager's effort. Managers' effort incentives are improved by high debt levels only under quite restrictive conditions. These conditions are more plausible when agency problems are due to a managerial propensity to expand size by investing in negative net present value projects. The results also imply that when debt is increased to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow, the accompanying covenants should allow for substantial cash distributions to shareholders even before bondholder claims are satisfied.     

Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.