Firm-specific Human Capital Accumulation: Evidence from Brazil*

We introduce firm-specific returns to experience and tenure into a standard two-way fixed effects model, show that they are separately identified under the standard exogenous mobility assumption and with sufficient between firm mobility, and provide a new evidence on heterogeneity of returns to experience and tenure across firms using the administrative data from Brazil over the years 1999–2014. We document that (1) returns to tenure are not strongly related to firm wage premia, (2) returns to experience are strongly negatively correlated with firm wage premia, (3) the relationship between firm wage premium and return to experience is stronger for ‘blue collar’ firms.     

Managers and Wage Policies

Do individual top managers matter for wages and wage policies? Are there general differences in “style” among managers with respect to worker compensation? To shed light on these questions, we exploit a large panel dataset from Portugal that allows us to match workers, firms, and managers, and follow the movements of the latter across different firms over time. While accounting for the effect of worker and firm heterogeneity, we estimate the role of top manager fixed effects in determining wages and wage policies. The estimates suggest that (i) top managers have a significant influence on wages and wage policies; (ii) there exists different managerial “styles”; and (iii) managers’ (observable) attributes matter for worker compensation.     

Just‐cause provisions,severance pay,and the efficiency wage hypothesis

A simple model of employment contracting is employed to examine the effectiveness of just‐cause provisions in alleviating employer opportunism in two types of efficiency wage contracts—standard contracts, in which wages exceed the worker's marginal contribution, and deferred wages, which are paid after a period of tenure in the firm. It is argued that just‐cause employment policies are necessary and sufficient to prevent employer opportunism when standard efficiency wages are utilized. However, just‐cause policies are not sufficient to deter employer opportunism when employment contracts are of the delayed‐payment type. In these contracts, other contractual provisions, such as severance provisions, are also necessary. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial Compensation and Capital Structure

We investigate the interaction between financial structure and managerial compensation and show that risky debt affects both the probability of managerial replacement and the manager's wage if he is retained by the firm. Our model yields a rich set of predictions, including the following: (i) The market values of equity and debt decrease if the manager is replaced; moreover, the expected cash flow affirms that retain their managers exceeds that affirms that replace their managers, (ii) Managers affirms with risky debt outstanding are promised lower severance payments (golden parachutes) than managers affirms that do not have risky debt. (Hi) Controlling for firm's size, the leverage, managerial compensation, and cash flow of firms that retain their managers are positively correlated, (iv) Controlling for the firm's size, the probability of managerial turnover and firm value are negatively correlated, (v) Managerial pay-performance sensitivity is positively correlated with leverage, expected compensation, and expected cash flows.     

Indexation and Wage Change Settlements: Evidence from Spanish Manufacturing Firms

An endogenous switching model of ex-ante wage changes under indexed and non-indexed settlements is estimated for the Spanish manufacturing sector using collective bargaining firm data for the 1984–1991 period. The likelihood of indexing the settlement is higher for nationwide unions than for other union groups within the works council and increases with the expected level of inflation. For wage change equations, a common structure for indexed and non-indexed settlements is strongly rejected, showing a source of nominal rigidity. For indexed contracts, the expected ex-ante total inflation coverage is nearly complete. It is also shown that workers pay a significant ex-ante change premium (differential) to obtain a cost of living allowance clause. However, the realised contingent compensation exceeds such a premium for all industries. Finally, important spillover efffects in wage setting and the decision to index the settlement have been detected.     

What is the most flexible component of wage bill adjustment? Evidence from Belgium

This paper decomposes wage bill changes at the firm level into components due to wage changes, and components due to flows of employment. It relies on an administrative matched employer–employee dataset of individual earnings merged with firms' annual accounts for Belgium over the period 1997–2001. The results are in line with what one would expect in a downward wage rigidity environment. On average, wage bill contractions result essentially from employment cuts in spite of wage increases. Wage growth of job stayers is moderated but positive; and wages of entrants compared with those of incumbents are no lower. The labour force cuts are achieved through both reduced entries and increased exits, due to more layoffs, especially in smaller firms, and wider use of early retirement, especially in manufacturing. In addition, the paper points out the role of overtime hours, temporary unemployment and interim workers in adapting hours worked to economic circumstances.     

Wage–hours contracts,overtime working and premium pay

This paper offers a contract-based theory to explain the determination of standard hours, overtime hours and overtime premium pay. We expand on the wage contract literature that emphasises the role of firm-specific human capital and that explores problems of contract efficiency in the face of information asymmetries between the firm and the worker. We first explore a simple wage–hours contract without overtime and show that incorporating hours into the contract may itself produce efficiency gains. We then show how the introduction of overtime hours, remunerated at premium rates, can further improve contract efficiency. Our modelling outcomes in respect of the relationship between the overtime premium and the standard wage rate relate closely to earlier developments in hedonic wage theory. Throughout, we emphasise the intuitive reasoning behind the theory and we also supply relevant empirical evidence. Mathematical derivations are provided in an Appendix.     

Wage premia and skill upgrading in Italy: why didn't the hound bark?

This paper presents firm-level evidence on the change of the employment share and the wage premium of non-manual workers in Italian manufacturing during the nineties. We find that the relative stability of the aggregate wage premium and employment share hides offsetting disaggregate forces: technical progress raises the relative demand for skilled labor within firms, whereas demand changes associated with trade reduce the relative demand for skills. Moreover, it is within the class of non-manual workers that most of the action takes place: the wage premium and employment share of executives rise substantially, while those of clerks fall in a similar proportion. Finally, we find that the export status of firms plays a key role in explaining labor market dynamics: exporters account for most of both demand-related and technology-related shifts. Overall, our results for Italy question the conventional view that the labor market is “rigid” due to labor market institutions.     

On the effectiveness of individual wage incentive plans in manufacturing firms

This study was designed to investigate individual wage incentive plans (IWIPs) in manufacturing industry. Two sets of hypotheses were formulated. The first dealt with certain characteristics, primarily organizational, that distinguish firms with IWIPs from those that did not introduce such plans. The second proposed certain correlates of the effectiveness of IWIPs.

These hypotheses were tested in a random probability sample (n = 80) of manufacturing firms in Israel. In each firm, at least two management representatives were interviewed. The analyses were all conducted at the firm level.

Firms with IWIPs (n = 60) were found to be larger and older relative to those without such plans. No difference was observed in the extent to which these two groups of firms used other types of wage incentives (e.g. group incentives). The second set of hypotheses was tested only in the subsample of firms with IWIPs. As expected, in this subsample a firm's labour productivity (mean level = 121 per cent) was closely related (r = .44) to the mean premium (36 per cent) that the covered employees received. The technical characteristics of the time study procedure, used to set performance standards for the IWIPs, were found not to be related to the level of either labour productivity or premium paid. These two criteria of IWIP effectiveness were found to be significantly higher in firms wherein the local union initiated the plan (n = 18) relative to the firms wherein management was the initiating party (n = 42). These and related findings are discussed in the broader context of current opinions on the pros and cons of IWIPs.     

Ownership,firm size and rent sharing in Bulgaria

Using a unique three-digit firm-level data set of all medium and large manufacturing enterprises in Bulgaria covering the years 1997–1998, we investigate how wages are affected by ownership status, firm size and rent sharing. Our pooled OLS, panel and first-difference TSLS estimates clearly point to ownership structure as an important determinant of both the wage level (for given productivity) and the degree of rent sharing. Rent sharing is very pronounced in state-owned firms but far less pronounced in private domestic and foreign firms. The results strongly confirm the existence of a multinational wage premium. In addition, we find weak evidence of a positive firm size-wage effect and a positive effect of firm size on the degree of rent sharing. If these effects exist, they are often more pronounced in private domestic firms.     

Managerial optimism and investment choice

This paper analyzes whether it might be desirable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain R&D strategy. I consider a Cournot model with an ex‐ante R&D stage where firms can invest in cost reduction before product market competition takes place. I show that firms want to hire overoptimistic managers and argue that a manager's type may serve as a substitute for strategic delegation via contracts. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO compensation: does it pay to be green?

The relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and various organizational variables (i.e., size, length of tenure of the CEO, board composition and firm performance) has been explored in academic research. However, the relationship between CEO compensation and the firm's reputation based on the firm's commitment to the community and the environment has been relatively unexamined in the academic research. This study's purpose is to empirically examine this relationship using the Fortune Reputation Index as revised by Brown and Perry (1995) . Using a sample of 186 firms in 1990 and 188 firms in 1991, the relationships between CEO compensation and organization size, financial performance and environmental reputation are examined. The results of the study demonstrate that there is a strong relationship between CEO compensation and firm environmental reputation, firm size and firm financial performance. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment     

The modern corporation as a safe haven for taste-based discrimination: An agency model of hiring decisions

This paper proposes a principal-agent model of labour market discrimination. In this model, the firm manager is a taste-based discriminator and has to make unobservable hiring decisions that determine the shareholder's profits, because workers differ in skill. The model shows that performance-based contracts may moderate the manager's propensity to discriminate, but that they are unlikely to fully eliminate discrimination. Moreover, the model predicts that sectors with high skill leverages discriminate less. Finally, the impacts of a wage gap between groups and of a diversity premium are investigated.     

Investment decisions and managerial compensation design in the presence of product market rivalry

We consider an economy where firms operate in an imperfectly competitive industry and mutually affect each others’ investment opportunities. Each firm is assumed to face a mutually exclusive choice of investing in either a short‐ or a long‐term project. For example, firm i's commitment to a short‐term project cuts into firm j's market in the short‐term but frees‐up firm j's long‐term market, and vice versa. Our results show that, even in the absence of an owner–manager conflict, the owner anticipates the product market rivalry and optimally compensates their managers with short‐ as well as long‐term compensation. Although the optimal compensation design induces myopic investment decisions, it is shown to be in the owners’ best interest. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Should managerial delegation contracts be made before or after union wage setting? A game‐theoretic analysis

This paper analyzes a multiple‐stage game in which, at the final stage, two (managerial) firms compete over quantities in the product market. Prior to this stage, firm‐specific unions set the workers' wages, while the owners of both firms hire managers and provide them with incentive contracts. Owners can freely decide to arrange the managerial contract before or after the (non‐managerial) wage determination stage. Hence, the endogenous choice of the incentive contract stage is derived. The possibility of multiple equilibria arises, where both owners choose managerial contracts before or after unions' wage setting, crucially depending on unions' preferences. Such results also prove to be true for a remarkable degree of asymmetry in preferences over wages vis‐à‐vis employment across unions.     

Wage differentials across firms: an application of multilevel modelling

Multilevel modelling techniques are applied to a dataset that matches firms and workers, to pinpoint and explain contrasts among company wage policies. Results indicate that wage differences across firms are statistically significant, affecting every parameter of the pay policy (returns to schooling, tenure, experience, the penalty imposed on newly hired workers and on women). Gross labour productivity, average schooling in the firm, firm size and economic sector are relevant forces shaping the contrast between employers' pay policies. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Should managers refrain from and investors ignore noisy dividend surprises? Some experimental evidence

A series of experiments is conducted in an asset market that contains a high productivity firm and a low productivity firm. Managers' compensation is a positive function of the market determined value of the firm. Investment decisions are made endogenously and are private information to the managers. The results of the experiments indicate that managers signal earning's information via noisy dividend announcements that result in suboptimal investment decisions. A manager's overinvestment in the signal does not generate significant increases in managerial compensation. The noisy signal does not pay off and in fact would result in a tendency for the market to underpredict earnings. This implies that even in the presence of suboptimal contracts between the managers and the firms, managers are not overcompensated. Thus, in these experiments the signal does not “solve” the dividend puzzle.     

Organizational differences in managerial compensation and benefits in Chinese firms

More than two decades of economic reforms have brought profound changes in human resource management practices in both the state and non-state sectors in China. This study focuses on the impact of organizational factors on compensation and benefits for Chinese managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), publicly listed firms (PLFs), and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). The empirical investigation of 465 firms located in three major Chinese cities, Shanghai, Nanjing and Guangzhou, provides evidence that organizational factors, such as ownership, firm size, firm age, location and industrial sector, have significant impacts on the variances in Chinese managers' compensation levels, compensation structures and benefits. The trends in the development of compensation and benefits for Chinese managers are also discussed as the Chinese economy moves closer to a more globalized, highly dynamic economy after China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001.     

Pensions,wage profiles,and retirement rules specific human capital approach

This paper clarifies how the loss of profits by quit-related work force disturbances and the endogeneity of the length of contracts play a critical role in determination of the compensation structure. Such a loss of profits is demonstrated to be a necessary and sufficient condition which induces (non-vested) pensions and mandatory retirement synchronously. Mandatory (or pensioned) retirement, however, does not always entail upward-tilted wage profiles except in the firms in which workers' quitting creates a serious work force disturbance. The optimal length of contract is determined as a function of market opportunities and firm-specific characteristics. Finally, based on our analysis, policy implications in Japan's contemporary industrial relations are derived.     

Foreign ownership,human capital,and the structure of wages in Japan

We examine the differences in the structure of wages between domestic and foreign-owned establishments in Japan. We use high-quality datasets from the Japanese government and construct a large employer–employee matched database consisting of 1 million workers in 1998. Our results confirm that foreign-owned establishments in Japan pay higher wages. We estimate that one percentage increase in foreign-ownership share of equity raises wages by 0.3%. We surmise that this foreign-ownership wage premium can be explained, at least in part, by compensating wage differentials. Workers in foreign-owned establishments are not protected by lifetime employment. They receive higher compensation for being exposed to higher risk and forfeiting their employment security. We also find that in foreign-owned establishments, wages are determined more by general skills, and less by firm-specific skills. These effects become more pronounced among establishments with a higher share of foreign ownership. The gender wage gap is considerably smaller among foreign establishments. Given the lack of long-term prospects for women in the Japanese labor market, foreign-owned establishments may be one source of ‘brain drain’ for highly skilled women there.