Industrialization and environmental externalities in a Solow-type model

In this paper we examine the role played by environmental externalities in shaping the dynamics of an economy with two sectors (a farming sector and an industrial one), free inter-sectoral labor mobility and heterogeneous agents (workers/farmers and industrial entrepreneurs). We find that, in the presence of the environmental pressure of the economic activity of the industrial sector, the stability properties of the equilibria and their features in terms of environmental preservation, welfare outcomes and sectoral allocation of labor are sensitive to the level of carrying capacity. We show that an endogenous process of industrialization associated with a reduction in farmers/workers׳ welfare can emerge.     

The Irrelevance of Control Rights in Agency Models under Risk Neutrality

The allocation of control rights is a key issue in incomplete contracts. In this paper, we add an exit option, the right of early termination, to the standard agency model for employment contracts. We address two questions: (1) Who should have this right? (2) What is the effect of its inclusion in a contract? Under risk neutrality, we find that (1) it does not matter for investments and economic efficiency to whom this right belongs, although it may affect contractual terms and income sharing, and (2) although the allocation of this right does not matter, its inclusion can have either a positive or a negative effect on economic efficiency. Our analysis provides a benchmark for more general analyses on control rights under risk aversion. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Indeterminacy in a finance constrained unionized economy

We introduce labor unions and unemployment in a finance constrained monetary economy with heterogenous agents and productive labor externalities. We find that unions, introducing endogenous markup variability, influence the dynamics of the model. Although a lower bound for labor externalities is always required for indeterminacy, this lower bound decreases with union power when the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is above one. For values of this elasticity below one, this result is reversed. We also show that Hopf bifurcations may occur as union bargaining power crosses a critical value. Finally, we find that unions increase simultaneously steady state employment, capital accumulation and welfare iff the (equilibrium) marginal productivity of labor is decreasing in employment.     

Formula Apportionment: Factor Allocation and Tax Avoidance

This paper addresses the question of how firms react to tax incentives in a formula apportionment (FA) tax regime. Under FA, the profits of all consolidated entities of a business group are summed and then allocated according to a formula based on FA factors. We hypothesize that firms may change the allocation of real production factors and/or manipulate the FA factor through tax avoidance strategies. Analyzing FA tax effects of the German local business tax with payroll expense as the exclusive FA factor, we find empirical evidence consistent with both hypotheses. Regarding the allocation of production factors, we observe significant tax effects on labor input at the intensive margin but not on labor input at the extensive margin. In addition, we find evidence of an indirect FA spillover effect on capital investment. Our findings on tax avoidance proxies are consistent with tax-induced manipulations of payroll expense as an FA factor to save tax payments.     

Turning Agents into Psychological Principals: Aligning Interests of Non‐Owners through Psychological Ownership

Principals who delegate tasks to agents face the perennial challenge of overcoming agency problems. We investigate whether feelings of ownership among senior managers in the absence of formal ownership can align agents' interests with those of principals, thus turning agents into psychological principals. Using a moderated mediation model, we find that psychological ownership is positively related to company performance through the mediating effect of individual‐level entrepreneurial behaviour. We also find that the effect of psychological ownership on individual‐level entrepreneurial behaviour and, ultimately, company performance is weaker for high levels of monitoring compared to low levels. These findings offer important contributions to agency, psychological ownership, and entrepreneurship literatures.     

A closed-form solution for the continuous-time consumption model with endogenous labor income

In this paper, we study the consumption, labor supply, and portfolio decisions of an infinitely lived individual who receives a certain wage rate and income from investment into a risky asset and a risk-free bond. Uncertainty about labor income arises endogenously, because labor supply evolves randomly over time in response to changes in financial wealth. We derive closed-form solutions for optimal consumption, labor supply and investment strategy. We find that deferring the retirement age stimulates optimal consumption over time and discourages optimal labor supply during the working life. We also find explicitly that optimal portfolio allocation becomes more ‘conservative’ when the individual approaches his prescribed retirement age. The effects of risk-aversion coefficients on optimal decisions are examined.     

Compensation Schemes and Labor Market Competition: Piece Rate versus Wage Rate

We investigate the choice of compensation scheme by firms. Our basic model shows that the unique equilibrium choice for profit maximizing duopsonists in a labor market is for one firm to offer a wage rate and for the other to offer a piece rate. This result arises because the firms recognize that, by offering different compensation schemes, they induce self-selection among workers, which thereby decreases the intensity of competition in the labor market. We find this asymmetry to be robust to allowing for firing, free entry, and a class of more general compensation schemes. When we broaden our model to permit firms to be differentiated in the eyes of workers (either geographically or by "other working conditions," e.g.), we find that our results are preserved when differentiation is low, but that both firms choose to offer a piece rate when differentiation is high.     

Endogenous household interaction

Most econometric models of intrahousehold behavior assume that household decision making is efficient, i.e., utility realizations lie on the Pareto frontier. In this paper, we investigate this claim by adding a number of participation constraints to the household allocation problem. Short-run constraints ensure that each spouse obtains a utility level at least equal to what they would realize under (inefficient) Nash equilibrium. Long-run constraints ensure that each spouse obtains a utility level at least equal to what they would realize by cheating on the efficient allocation and receiving Nash equilibrium payoffs in all successive periods. Given household characteristics and the (common) discount factor of the spouses, not all households may be able to attain payoffs on the Pareto frontier. We estimate these models using a Method of Simulated Moments estimator and data from one wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We find that both short- and long-run constraints are binding for sizable proportions of households in the sample. We conclude that it is important to carefully model the constraint sets household members face when modeling household allocation decisions, and to allow for the possibility that efficient outcomes may not be implementable for some households.     

Agency Problems in Diverse Contexts: A Global Perspective

abstract    Bruce, Buck and Main (2005 ) offer two criticisms of agency theory as a valid model of executive behaviour. First, they suggest that because researchers have failed to find a strong empirical link between executive pay and firm performance, and since this research generally rests on models derived from agency theory, then we must question the theory. Second, they suggest that agency theory is under-socialized and therefore lacks generalizability to settings where social solutions would seem to eliminate the agency problem. In our response we make three points. First, agency theory rests on an assumption of self-interest that does not necessarily reflect opportunism. Second, agency theory does not make any reference to pay-performance sensitivity, and the failure of this research can be attributable to a variety of problems with the research. Third, we agree that agency theory does not explicitly recognize contextual factors, but suggest that this abstraction from context, gives agency theory greater generalizability. Finally, we review the UK and German contexts discussed by Bruce, Buck and Main to show that socialized solutions do not prevent the occurrence of agency problems.     

Costly external finance and labor market dynamics

We study the role of agency frictions and costly external finance in cyclical labor market dynamics, with a focus on how credit-market frictions may amplify aggregate TFP shocks. The main result is that aggregate TFP shocks lead to large fluctuations of labor market quantities if the model is calibrated to the empirically observed countercyclicality of the finance premium. A financial accelerator mechanism thus amplifies labor market fluctuations by rendering rigidity in real wage dynamics. In contrast, if the finance premium is procyclical, which the model can be parameterized to accommodate, amplification is absent, and labor-market fluctuations display the Shimer (2005) puzzle.     

Spousal Complementarity in Home Production

A bstract .   Economists have increasingly recognized the growing role of married women in the labor market by treating the labor supply decisions of married couples as joint decisions. However, they have yet to apply the same reasoning to home production. We build a more complete model of household time allocation that consists of a system of simultaneous equations estimating hours of labor supply and home production. Using data on white couples from Wave XXV of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we find that working wives act as if their husbands are substitutes for home production while other wives do not. Husbands' responses to their wives' behavior depends upon whether children are present.     

Left behind to farm? Women's labor re-allocation in rural China

The transformation of work during China's rapid economic development is associated with a substantial but little noticed re-allocation of traditional farm labor among women, with some doing much less and some much more. We study how the health, work and time allocation of non-migrant women are affected by the migration of others in their household. We find little impact on their health outcomes but do find that the women left behind are doing more farm work than would have otherwise been the case. We show that this may be a persistent effect, and not just temporary re-allocation. In stark contrast, no such impacts are found for left-behind men.     

劳动力跨部门配置与居民收入差距——基于省级面板数据的实证分析

本文从劳动力跨部门配置效应的角度,分析了我国劳动力跨部门配置的时期和地区特征,使用面板数据模型估计了我国劳动力转移对城乡居民收入差距的作用。结果表明,在改革开放的后一阶段,我国劳动力转移的收入分配均等化效应下降,且西部地区下降更加显著。而收入均等化效应下降的一个重要原因是各次产业部门间生产率差距扩大。文章指出产业协调发展是提高劳动力转移收入分配效应的迫切要求。     

二元劳动力市场资源优化配置模型与仿真研究

本文在王文举（2005）从生产函数出发建立的二元劳动力市场资源优化配置模型及其结论的基础上，建立了该模型的计算机仿真模型，在不同的假设条件下对该模型进行了仿真实验，从实验的角度说明了降低我国劳动力从农村向城市流动成本的合理性，同时利用实验的结果验证了该模型的正确性。     

Informality in developing economies: Regulation and fiscal policies

This paper proposes a unified theoretical framework where formal and informal firms coexist and face the same type of product and labor market imperfections: they have monopoly power in the goods market, they are subject to matching frictions in the labor market, and wages are determined by bargaining between large firms and their workers, through either individual or collective bargaining. Our model matches the main stylized facts on informality for developing countries and appears to be a good candidate for policy analysis. In this framework, we study the impact on informality, wages and unemployment of policies that may be used to reduce informality. We consider changes in product market regulation (PMR) and in two types of fiscal policies, labor taxes and formality enforcement. We find that lessening PMR decreases informality and unemployment simultaneously, indicating that there is not necessarily a tradeoff between informality and unemployment. The tradeoff appears when fiscal policies are used, though. Moreover, the impacts of PMR on unemployment and on wages are larger under collective than individual bargaining. With respect to wage inequality, lessening PMR reduces it, while lower taxes tend to increase the formal sector wage premium.     

Structuring residual income and decision rights under internal governance: results from the Hungarian trucking industry

The paper offers a property rights and monitoring cost explanation for the allocation of residual income and decision rights between the carriers and truck drivers under internal governance. First, by applying the property rights theory, we argue that the structure of residual income rights depends on the importance of noncontractible (intangible) assets of the truck driver to generate residual surplus. The more important the truck driver's intangible knowledge assets, the more residual income rights should be transferred to him. Second, we controlled for the monitoring costs as an additional explanatory variable of the allocation of residual income rights. According to agency theory, the variable proportion of the driver's income should be higher where monitoring costs are higher. Third, we investigate the relationship between residual income and residual decision rights under internal governance. If the contractual relation is governed by an employment contract, residual decision and residual income rights may be substitutes because, under fiat, a certain incentive effect of the governance structure may result either from the allocation of high‐powered incentives or the transfer of residual decision rights to the driver. These hypotheses were tested by using data from the Hungarian trucking industry. The data provide partial support for the hypotheses. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Modeling the unintended consequences of short selling for innovation investment

We develop an innovation investment decision model for firms facing a short selling threat. We find that an endogenous agency problem may arise as an unintended consequence of short selling under the prevailing compensation structure. Specifically, the manager has strong incentives to seek better compensation at the expense of decreasing firm value by reducing long-term innovation investment to save cash reserves to protect the short-term price because the manager’s compensation is closely tied to this value. Finally, our model predicts that both the lending supply and short selling will induce the manager to underinvest and have a negative effect on firm value and the manager’s private benefit because they exacerbate agency conflicts.     

Expanding the boundaries of buyer-supplier agency problems: Moving from dyad to triad

Extant agency theory addresses dyads consisting of a principal and an agent. It informs us about how to overcome agency problems in the buyer-supplier relationship. In this conceptual paper, we propose a theoretical argument that if we expand the boundary conditions from dyads to triads, we find new solutions to dealing with agency problems. To the buyer-supplier dyad, we add the supplier’s supplier, the buyer’s other supplier, the supplier’s other customer, and the buyer’s customer. As such, we consider four types of triads in supply chains and propose that the buyer as the principal could reframe agency problems with the focal supplier by moving to one of these triads. In particular, we investigate alternative mechanisms that may reduce the level of goal incongruence, information asymmetry, and power asymmetry in the buyer-supplier relationship. Our conceptualization suggests that supply managers should look outside the buyer-supplier dyad for additional opportunities to resolve agency problems.     

投资者认知、审计质量与公司价值

投资者认知是决定市场资源配置的重要因素,认知水平越高,公司价值越大。审计作为一种降低信息不对称的制度安排,能够影响公司信息传递,进而正向调节认知效应;审计还具有缓解代理冲突的功能,而代理成本与审计质量存在对应关系,因此审计质量也体现为对认知效应的负向调节。我国股市目前主要体现为后一种情况,表明审计提升公司价值的主要路径是缓解公司的代理冲突,公司对高质量审计的需求动机远比满足投资者信息需求的动机更为强烈。聘用大型事务所能够向市场投资者传递积极信号,对认知提升公司价值的效应有正向调节作用。审计模式选择需要考虑公司的信息传递特征,并与投资者对公司的认知水平相契合。     

Residential Choice, Mobility, and the Labor Market

There is substantial evidence suggesting that the process of suburbanization creates new job opportunities that are not equally exploited by all workers. In order to explain this phenomenon, a simple model is developed which incorporates borrowing constraints as an important restriction on moving decisions, obstructing the necessary labor flows between jurisdictions required to equalize (net) wages. In essence, people who cannot borrow will be restricted in terms of their capability of changing residence location and therefore will have limited possibilities of working in distant labor markets, or they will be subject to excessive commuting. Furthermore, the labor allocation induced by households' behavior facing these constraints affects consumer welfare, production, and producers' profits. The outcomes with perfect credit markets and with borrowing restrictions are calculated and the economic welfare levels are compared. As wages are flexible, they adjust to reflect the relative scarcity of workers present in each jurisdiction. Consequently, some of the negative effects of the borrowing constraints are compensated, so the outcomes cannot be easily compared. Some numerical examples are constructed to have an idea of the possible outcomes under different conditions. Finally, it is found that allowing for moving cost deductions from taxable income may help to alleviate the problem.