Can a minimum wage increase employment and reduce prices in a neoclassical perfect information economy?

This paper investigates the possibility that the imposition of a minimum wage increases employment in the affected sector, measured in terms of hours of work, and lowers product prices. Unlike related prior theoretical research, I consider a neoclassical perfect information economy. Both labor and product markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Workers choose the number of hours of work and their effort level. Workers can potentially, but not necessarily, differ in their preferences over income, leisure, and effort. Effort is perfectly observable by the employers. The general framework that highlights the channels through which a minimum wage can increase employment and reduce prices is introduced and necessary and sufficient conditions derived. The paper also develops a number of comparative statics and some illustrative examples. The results provide a simple theoretical foundation that explains some recent findings of the empirical literature on minimum wages. Auxiliary results help explain the effects of minimum wage on the entire wage distribution in a way that is consistent with empirical findings. Finally, welfare analysis shows that worker welfare and employment tend to go in opposite directions; in particular, if employment increases after the imposition of the minimum wage, worker welfare will be reduced, though not necessarily vice versa (the opposite is true for consumer welfare). Strikingly, if a minimum wage increases worker welfare, the chief beneficiaries are not the affected workers but those with incomes that exceed the minimum wage.     

A SURVEY OF THE EFFECTS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE ON PRICES

Abstract.  It is well established in the literature that minimum wage increases compress the wage distribution. Firms respond to these higher labour costs by reducing employment, reducing profits, or raising prices. While there are hundreds of studies on the employment effect of the minimum wage, there are merely a handful of studies on its profit effects, and only a couple of dozen studies on its price effects. Furthermore, a comprehensive survey on minimum wage price effects is not available in the literature. Given the policy relevance of this neglected issue, in this paper we summarize and critically compare the available evidence on the effects of minimum wages on prices.     

THE IMPACT OF LABOR MARKET REGULATION ON EMPLOYMENT IN LOW‐INCOME COUNTRIES: A META‐ANALYSIS

Controversy over labor market policy often centers on achieving a balance between preventing worker exploitation, and avoiding loss of productivity or employment through excessive regulation. Although the literature documenting the impact of labor market regulation on employment is extensive, there is a dearth of evidence on the impact of such policies in low‐income countries (LICs). Since it is easier for workers, especially women, to slip into the informal sector in LICs, regulations are likely to have stronger impacts on formal employment in these countries (but lower impacts on unemployment). We systematically reviewed available research from countries that are, or were until recently, LICs. Most studies document that more stringent labor regulations are associated with lower formal sector employment and higher informal sector employment. We also conducted a metaregression analysis of the impact of minimum wages on formal and informal employment. After controlling for publication bias, higher minimum wages are associated with lower formal employment and a higher share of informal workers.     

The effects of multiple minimum wages throughout the labor market: The case of Costa Rica

This paper investigates the effects of legal minimum wages on employment and hours worked among workers covered by minimum wage legislation as well as those for whom it does not apply (the uncovered sector) in Costa Rica. This country's large uncovered sector and complex minimum wage policy, which has for decades set numerous wages throughout the wage distribution, provide a stimulating counterpoint to the U.S. framework for the analysis of the impact of minimum wages. Using 1988–2000 micro data, we find that a 10% increase in minimum wages lowers employment in the covered sector by 1.09% and decreases the average number of hours worked of those who remain in the covered sector by about 0.6%. We do not find a significant impact on hours worked in the uncovered sector. Finally, we show that despite the wide range of minimum wages, the largest impact on the employment of covered sector workers is in the lower half of the skill distribution.     

Minimum wages,wages and employment in various sectors in Honduras

This paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of minimum wages on labor markets of developing countries, where there are often multiple minimum wages and compliance is weak. We examine how changes in more than 22 minimum wages over 1990–2004 affect employment, unemployment and average wages of workers in different sectors, defined by coverage under the legislation. The evidence suggests that minimum wages are effectively enforced only in medium and large-scale firms, where a 1% increase in the minimum wage leads to an increase of 0.29% in the average wage and a relatively large reduction in employment of ? 0.46%. We find that public sector wages emulate minimum wage trends but the higher cost of labor does not reduce employment there. There are no discernable effects of minimum wages on the wages of workers in small-firms or the self-employed; yet, higher minimum wages may create more unemployment. We conclude that (even under our upper bound estimate of the effect on the wages of workers) the total earnings of workers in the large-firm covered sector fall with higher minimum wages in Honduras, which warrants a policy dialogue on the structure and level of minimum wages.     

Noncompliance and the effects of the minimum wage on hours and welfare in competitive labor markets

This paper shows that increases in the minimum wage rate can have ambiguous effects on the working hours and welfare of employed workers in competitive labor markets. The reason is that employers may not comply with the minimum wage legislation and instead pay a lower subminimum wage rate. If workers are risk neutral, we prove that working hours and welfare are invariant to the minimum wage rate. If workers are risk averse and imprudent (which is the empirically likely case), then working hours decrease with the minimum wage rate, while their welfare may increase.     

Estimating the effects of the minimum wage in a developing country: A density discontinuity design approach

This paper proposes a framework to identify the effects of the minimum wage on the joint distribution of sector and wage in a developing country. I show how the discontinuity of the wage distribution around the minimum wage identifies the extent of noncompliance with the minimum wage policy, and how the conditional probability of sector given wage recovers the relationship between latent sector and wages. I apply the method in the “PNAD,” a nationwide representative Brazilian cross‐sectional dataset for the years 2001–2009. The results indicate that the size of the informal sector is increased by around 39% compared to what would prevail in the absence of the minimum wage, an effect attributable to (i) unemployment effects of the minimum wage on the formal sector and (ii) movements of workers from the formal to the informal sector as a response to the policy.     

Employment,Inequality and the UK National Minimum Wage over the Medium‐Term*

We assess the impact of the national minimum wage (NMW) on employment and inequality in the UK over the decade since its introduction. We evaluate its effects in each year, using an incremental differences‐in‐differences (IDiD) estimator. Identification is based on variation in the bite of the NMW across local labour markets and the different sized year on year up‐ratings. We find that an increased bite of the NMW is associated with falls in lower tail wage inequality. While the average employment effect over the entire period is broadly neutral, there are small but significant positive NMW effects from 2003 onwards.     

最低工资对正规部门、非正规部门工资和就业的影响

本文根据是否遵守最低工资标准,将劳动部门分为正规部门和非正规部门。利用中国健康与营养调查（CHNS）微观数据,运用固定效应模型和Multinomial Logit模型,本文实证研究了2004年以来,最低工资对正规部门和非正规部门工资和就业的影响。研究发现：最低工资每提高1%,正规部门工资会增加0.5%,非正规部门平均工资下降统计不显著,而处于最低工资线附近的非正规部门劳动者工资下降0.77%;最低工资提高使得失业者向非正规部门流动,而非正规部门劳动者向正规部门流动,最终将有利于劳动者在正规部门就业。因此,政府在制定最低工资制度时应全面考虑最低工资标准作用效果的部门差异。     

The consequences of minimum wage legislation

A policy which could raise wages in the low-wage labour market without job losses would be remarkable. Employers will respond to a wage floor not only by changing the employment level but by altering the other components of job packages. The'new economics'of the minimum wage largely ignores such effects.     

Union wages,hours of work and the effectiveness of partial coordination agreements

Small monopoly trade unions decide upon the wage rate per hour and the hours of work subject to firm's demand for union members. Since the resulting Nash equilibrium is characterized by excess unemployment, we study the employment and welfare effects when trade unions try to coordinate their policies. Firstly, we consider a joint agreement about marginal wage moderation, where trade unions remain free to choose the hours of work non-cooperatively. Secondly, we analyze in which way a joint change in the hours of work affects employment and welfare if trade unions are free to choose the wage rate.     

Gains from Wage Flexibility and the Zero Lower Bound*

We analyse the welfare impact of greater wage flexibility in the presence of an occasionally binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate. We show that the ZLB constraint generally amplifies the adverse effects of greater wage flexibility on welfare when the central bank follows a conventional Taylor rule. When demand shocks are the driving force, the ZLB implies that an increase in wage flexibility reduces welfare even under the optimal monetary policy with commitment.     

Gains from Wage Flexibility and the Zero Lower Bound*

We analyse the welfare impact of greater wage flexibility in the presence of an occasionally binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate. We show that the ZLB constraint generally amplifies the adverse effects of greater wage flexibility on welfare when the central bank follows a conventional Taylor rule. When demand shocks are the driving force, the ZLB implies that an increase in wage flexibility reduces welfare even under the optimal monetary policy with commitment.     

Social dumping and relocation: is there a case for imposing a social clause?

Public opinion in Europe seems worried about the relocation of production plants toward low wage countries often accused of practicing ‘social dumping’. To reduce the incentives for relocation trade unions proposed the adoption of ‘social clauses’ protecting domestic markets from commodities produced in countries where minimal labor condition are not met. We analyze the effects of the adoption of a social clause in a vertically differentiated Bertrand duopoly. We assess how such a policy affects firms’ relocation decisions in order to be able to assess its welfare implications. We also characterize the optimal social clause policy, both under domestic welfare maximization, and from an efficiency point of view. While we show that a social clause policy cannot be dismissed on domestic (or world) welfare grounds, its case is weaker the higher is the domestic wage and the lower is the foreign wage.     

The interrelated dynamics of unemployment and low‐wage employment

This paper examines the extent of state dependence in unemployment and the role played in this by intervening low‐wage employment. A range of dynamic random and fixed‐effects estimators are compared. Low‐wage employment is found to have almost as large an adverse effect as unemployment on future prospects and the difference in their effects is found to be insignificant. Evidence is presented that low‐wage jobs act as the main conduit for repeat unemployment and considerably increases its probability. Obtaining a higher‐wage job reduces the increased risk of repeat unemployment to insignificance. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of minimum wage hikes on employment: Evidence from regional panel data from Romania

Minimum wage hikes aim to increase the income of low-wage workers and improve their labour market participation. However, there are concerns that large increases may reduce employment, especially in countries where minimum wages increased quickly and whose competitiveness depends, at least partly, on low production costs. This study examines the employment effect of large increases in the minimum wage in Romania between 2008 and 2016. It uses regional (NUTS III) data and dynamic panel methods. The results do not support the hypothesis that minimum wage hikes reduce employment. They are robust to the use of different econometric methods, plausible variations of the specification and definitions of the key variables. Moreover, the results suggest insignificant effects even for low wage, less developed or high unemployment regions.     

Industry Dynamics and Competition from Low‐Wage Countries: Evidence on Italy

This article analyses the effect of competition from low‐wage countries on domestic activity, using data on 230 Italian manufacturing sectors between 1995 and 2007. It finds that low‐wage import penetration is negatively related to employment and other measures of activity. The effect is significantly smaller in more skill, capital and R&D‐intensive sectors and in more vertically differentiated sectors. There is also evidence of significant effects of low‐wage competition through inter‐industry linkages: employment is negatively related to low‐wage import penetration in downstream sectors but positively related to low‐wage import penetration in upstream sectors.     

The distributive and welfare effects of product and labour market deregulation

This paper studies the effects of product and labour market deregulation on wage inequality and welfare. By constructing an analytically tractable model in which the level of product market competition and the wages are endogenously distributed among sectors, I show that deregulation in goods market has mixed effects on inequality: the wage variance and the Gini index are lower, but the ratio of the highest over the lowest wage paid in the economy increases. Moreover, deregulation in labour markets raises the aggregate level of employment and the average real wage but reduces the welfare of trade unions in sectors with a low level of competition.     

How low can U go?

• ? Although there is growing evidence that wage growth is building in response to low and falling unemployment in the advanced economies, there is scope for unemployment rates to fall further without triggering a pay surge.
• ? For a start, current unemployment rates in comparison to past cyclical troughs overstate the tightness of labour markets. Demographic trends associated with the ageing ‘baby boomer’ bulge have pushed down the headline unemployment rate – unemployment rates among older workers are lower than those of younger cohorts. And in a historical context, Europe still has a large pool of involuntary part‐timers.
• ? In addition, rising participation rates mean that demographics are less of a constraint on employment growth than widely assumed. In both 2017 and 2018, had it not been for increased activity rates (mainly for older cohorts), unemployment would have had to fall more sharply to accommodate the same employment increase. We expect rising participation rates to continue to act as a pressure valve for the labour market.
• ? Finally, unemployment rates were generally far lower during the 1950s and 1960s than now. If wages stay low relative to productivity, as was the case during that prior era, employment growth may remain strong, with unemployment falling further. In the post‐war era, low wages were partly a function of a grand bargain in which policy‐makers provided full employment in return for low wage growth.
• ? There is evidence to suggest that many post‐crisis workers have opted for the security of their existing full‐time job and its associated benefits despite lower wage growth, rather than change job and potentially earn more; the rise of the ‘gig economy’ has led some workers to value what they already have more. Put another way, the non‐accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) has fallen. So, the role of labour market tightness in pushing wage growth higher may continue to surprise to the downside.

     

The verdict on the minimum wage: guilty on all counts

Some recent research in the US has challenged the long-held view among economists that raising the minimum wage reduces employment. However, most economists continue to hold to the orthodox view, which continues to be confirmed in academic journals. Furthermore, research continues to find other negative effects from the minimum wage that are sufficient to oppose it even if there is no loss of employment.