Working capital management during the global financial crisis: Evidence from Japan

This paper demonstrates the adjustment speed of firm working capital and the relationships between working capital and firm performance in Japan during the global financial crisis. Using quarterly firm-level data, we find that the adjustment of working capital was weaker during the crisis. Moreover, the negative relationship between excess working capital and firm performance became more significant during the crisis, especially for larger firms. However, this crisis-related working capital–firm performance effect does not appear to persist for very long, because to finance any excess working capital, firms borrow from banks and reduce their internal cash both during and outside periods of crisis.     

Origins of the financial crisis and requirements for reform

This paper examines the causes of the global financial crisis (focusing in particular on why residential mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps exploded from around 2004) and the policy reform agenda. Arbitrage opportunities in capital rules and the tax system were available, and changes in regulations affecting the leverage of international banks (IBs) played a key role in allowing these opportunities to be exploited on a greater scale. Changes to the Basel rules also actively contributed to the sharp rise in toxic securities. The policy agenda focuses on the need to deal with toxic assets, and for broader reforms to incentive structures, not only of capital rules, but also of corporate governance and banking structures. Specific policy reform recommendations are made. Recent numbers on the capital needs of banks suggest that we are not very far into the process of dealing with the crisis, and lack of transparency in this respect is a major issue in Europe. The longer-run reform process too is not focusing on the ideal building blocks.     

Bank dependence and financial constraints on investment: Evidence from the corporate bond market paralysis in Japan

This paper investigates whether firms are able to substitute bank loans for public debt when the latter become less available to firms. To do so, this paper utilizes the 2008 financial crisis and its impact on Japanese markets as a natural experiment. Because the Japanese banking sector remained functional while the corporate bond markets were paralyzed, the data from Japan during this period provide us with an ideal environment to examine this hypothesis. I specifically examined whether firms with large holdings of corporate bonds maturing in FY2008 were financially constrained, by comparing the changes in their capital investment expenditures and borrowing conditions with those of bank-dependent firms. The main empirical results indicate that (1) firms with large holdings of corporate bonds maturing in FY2008 did not reduce investment expenditures; (2) instead, they exhibited higher increments in bank loans; and (3) firms that maintained relatively close bank-firm relationships had greater access to bank loans with low borrowing costs. These findings demonstrate that Japanese firms were able to substitute bank loans for public debt during the crisis and imply that the Japanese banking sector worked efficiently to replace public debt markets during the crisis.     

External balance sheets as countercyclical crisis buffers

The external balance sheets of many emerging market countries are distinguished by their holdings of assets primarily in the form of foreign debt and foreign exchange reserves, while their liabilities are predominantly equity, either foreign direct investment or portfolio equity. We investigate the claim that this composition served as a buffer for the emerging markets during the global financial crisis of 2008–09. We use data from a sample of 67 emerging market and advanced economies, and several indicators of the crisis are utilized: GDP growth rates in 2008–09, the occurrence of bank crises and the use of IMF credit. Our results show that those countries that issued FDI liabilities had higher growth rates, fewer bank crises and were less likely to borrow from the IMF. Countries with debt liabilities, on the other hand, had more bank crises and were more likely to use IMF credit. We conclude that the “long debt, short equity” (hold debt assets, issue equity liabilities) strategy of emerging markets did mitigate the effects of the global financial crisis.     

Predictors of bank distress: The 1907 crisis in Sweden

This paper studies the Swedish experience of the international crisis of 1907, which is often compared with the crisis of 2008. By constructing a new dataset from previously unanalyzed monthly bank-level data, we document high-frequency changes in bank outcomes throughout the 1907 crisis. While distressed banks suffered substantial withdrawals of foreign funds and liquid domestic liabilities, we show that banks’ asset structures, along with observable fundamentals and institutional characteristics, played a more significant role in their subsequent fate. Higher shares of non-performing assets and lending against equities were the most important balance sheet predictors of distress. These balance sheet fundamentals, as well as over-extended branch networks, significantly shortened the lifespan of Swedish banks in the aftermath of the 1907 crisis.     

What sort of financial sector should Indonesia have?

At the time of the 1997 Asian crisis, Indonesia's financial sector had serious weaknesses. This made it vulnerable to the key element of the crisis: massive reversal of foreign capital flows. Despite huge expenditures on restructuring, many of these weaknesses remain and the current strategy does not seem likely to overcome them. The alternative strategy explored here advocates the creation of ‘savings banks’, holding government bonds as their principal asset. With these safe assets, deposits in such institutions would be secure, even in the event of a major economic crisis. With this safe ‘core’, the rest of the financial system could develop on conventional lines (allowing removal of the current blanket guarantee, and making it more feasible to close banks without this causing a run on the system as a whole). The inherent risk to the taxpayer of another expensive bail-out would be greatly diminished.     

An empirical analysis of the factors determining the financial crisis in Asia

This article tests a hypothesis that the causes of the Asian financial crisis are weaknesses in the balance sheet of financial institutions, high international interest rates, high short-term external debts, excessive loans, and continuing large current account deficits. It also tests a hypothesis regarding the determination of nonperforming bank loans. Empirical tests are carried out with panel data on seven countries in Asia—Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand—for the 1995 through 1997 period. The 3-month LIBOR interest rate and nonperforming loan rates of banks are found to be the major determinants of the Asian financial crisis. The nonperforming bank loan ratios are explained by the corporate leverage ratio. In addition, both the corporate high leverage ratio and LIBOR interest rates are found to significantly affect the outcome of the Asian crisis. Lowering world interest rates and taking the measures of individual Asian countries to reduce nonperforming assets and debt-to-equity ratios would be very effective in preventing reoccurrence of the crisis.     

Bank capital shocks and portfolio risk: Evidence from Japan

Despite the downward trend of land prices and the ex post low return on real estate loans, Japanese banks increased their lending to the real estate sector during the 1990s. We argue that this phenomenon can be explained by the risk-shifting incentives of banks and discover that banks with low capital-to-asset ratios and low franchise value chose high-risk assets such as real estate loans. Unlike previous studies, we show that the capital–risk relationship is non-linear and changes from positive to negative as franchise value falls. We also find that a capital adequacy requirement did not prevent risk-taking behavior of under-capitalized banks since they then just issued more subordinated debts to meet this requirement. In contrast, government capital injections led banks to reduce risky loans at the margin. Recapitalization by issuing subordinated debts helped banks recover their capital losses and mitigated the credit crunch, but consequently allowed them to increase their exposure to the real estate sector and worsened the bad loan problems.     

The dynamic contagion of the global financial crisis into Japanese markets

This paper investigates the risk contagion channel of the global financial crisis into Japan using daily data on bond risk premiums for the financial and manufacturing industries from July 18, 2006 to May 25, 2010. We employ a bivariate EGARCH model with the constant exogenous contagion impacts of foreign industries and the time-varying endogenous contagion impacts of domestic industries. We find evidence that: (i) a constant exogenous impact from foreign industries appears in the risk premium for 5-year bonds issued by manufacturing industry firms, and (ii) contagion only exists from the manufacturing industry to the financial industry, and that there is no evidence of any reverse causation, even during the Lehman Brothers shock on September 15, 2008. Thus, in Japan, risk transfers from foreign industries to the domestic manufacturing industry, and thence to the domestic financial industry.     

日本银行的信贷扩张及其危机效应

通常人们将日本银行的坏账和不良资产问题归咎于日本的泡沫经济以及东南亚的经济危机．而在具体、现实的解释上，日本银行自身经营的失败和机制的缺陷才是最重要、最直接的危机成因，对日本银行信贷扩张历程的分析展现了日本银行不良资产困境及其危机效应的形成过程。     

Banking crisis and productivity of borrowing firms: Evidence from Japan

We investigate the effects of bank distress on the productivity of borrowing firms by using data on listed companies in the Japanese manufacturing industry during the 1990s. We find that deterioration in the financial health of banks, which is measured by a decline in the capital-asset ratio, decreased the productivity of their borrowers during the period of the severe financial crisis (FY1997–1998). Our finding empirically confirms the theoretical view that an increase in financial friction negatively affects the productivity of the corporate sector.     

Impact of international expansion strategy on the performance of Japanese banks

The effect of cross-border diversification on bank performance is part of the broader debate on how multinational banking and financial integration affect the global financial economy. Previous studies that examined this relationship present mixed results - namely that cross-border diversification improves bank performance but also increases bank risks that could lead to systemic failure. Even so, this line of debate has not been examined in the case of Japanese banks conducting international operations. The present study questions whether cross-border diversification improves the performance of Japanese banks and to what extent each cross-border expansion activity affects bank performance. The latter was largely ignored in previous studies. Our results show that cross-border diversification improves cost efficiency but decreases/harms the profit efficiency of the banks analyzed. In addition, we find that the expansion of foreign assets and foreign branch operations present funding risks and operational inefficiency. We offer two important recommendations. First, as a major player in international lending, the current expansion activities of Japanese banks require close monitoring and supervision to prevent systemic risk resulting from aggressive and risky overseas expansion activities. Second, the current expansion strategies of Japanese banks, especially the expansion of overseas assets and branch operations (retail banking), should be re-examined.     

金融危机与中国经济增长—基于省级面板数据实证分析

本文选取2008～2010年东、中、西部省市级18座代表城市的季度数据并运用面板数据模型,考察了金融危机对中国经济的影响。研究表明,出口额、实际利用外资、社会总消费水平对中国经济增长的相关关系为正数,但是出口额与实际利用外资对经济增长的贡献远不及社会总消费水平对中国经济增长贡献。因此得出,金融危机爆发后,中国经济主要依靠政府政策性调控,然而以政府为主导的经济增长方式并不利于经济的长期稳定发展。     

呆坏账处理是否蕴含着制度创新

中国四大国有银行率先剥离呆坏账,使得其呆坏账率大幅度降低,避免了紧缩和金融危机。次贷危机以来,美国金融当局多次向金融业大规模注资,插手濒临倒闭金融机构的拯救活动,欧洲一些国家也在做同样的事情。这种被逼出来的用国家信用支持银行信用的手法,似乎有悖传统的市场原则,但它带给人们更多的思考：正在被改变的游戏规则中,是否蕴含着制度的创新？     

Central Bank Balance Sheets and the Transmission of Financial Crises

Central banks usually “park” their foreign exchange reserves in safe or highly liquid foreign assets. The paper illustrates that when central banks invest instead in risky foreign assets, then domestic banking crises can cause a crisis in the market for the foreign asset and vice versa. The paper takes its motivation from Asian central banks’ recent appetite for US government agency-debt securities such as those issued by Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac.     

Japanese repo and call markets before,during, and emerging from the financial crisis

We empirically investigate the relationship between the Japanese general collateral (GC) repurchase agreement (repo) and uncollateralized call rates before, during, and emerging from the recent financial crisis. Unlike the US and many other countries, the Japanese GC repo rate had been higher than the uncollateralized call rate, despite the former being secured by collateral. Moreover, during the financial crisis, the Japanese GC repo rate rose, whereas the US Treasury GC repo rate decreased. The results of our empirical analysis suggest that segmentation between the Japanese repo and call markets was an important factor in explaining these features. Our results also imply that the Bank of Japan’s policy actions during and after the financial crisis were effective to some extent in lowering both the repo and call rates, and stabilizing the relationship between them.     

How do leverage ratios affect bank share performance during financial crises: The Japanese experience of the late 1990s

This study investigates the relationship between leverage ratios and bank share performance for a sample of Japanese banks during the period of financial crisis in the late 1990s. We differentiate between two types of leverage ratios: book leverage and market leverage. We show that market leverage instead of book leverage observed before the crisis has statistically and economically significant predictive power for the cross-sectional variation in bank performance during the crisis, even after controlling for a variety of other indicators reflecting bank’s characteristics and financial conditions. We also find that banks with lower market leverage ratios were affected more adversely by the failure announcements of large financial institutions during the crisis. The results are robust across alternative model specifications, statistical methodologies, lengths of sample intervals, and measures of bank share performance during the crisis. Our results therefore have important implications for regulators in identifying distressed banks that are vulnerable to the deterioration in conditions of the financial system.     

Exchange Rate Regime,Financial Market Bubbles and Long‐term Growth in China: Lessons from Japan

Since 2014, capital inflows into China have turned into capital outflows, reversing the gradual appreciation path of the renminbi against the US dollar into an erratic depreciation path. The paper explains the current capital outflows by comparing China and Japan with respect to the impact of exchange rate expectations on speculative capital flows. It is argued that both in China and Japan, given benign liquidity conditions in the USA, policy‐induced appreciation expectations have generated capital inflows that have contributed to overinvestment and financial market bubbles. The current reversal of capital flows is seen as a signal that the bubble in China has burst. To stabilize growth in China and to discourage speculative capital outflows a fixed exchange rate to the dollar is recommended. Given Japan's experience and given that China's foreign assets remain high, the depreciation pressure on the Chinese renminbi can be expected to abate.     

Bank financial structure in pre-crisis East and Southeast Asia

Seeking evidence on the role of bank governance in the 1997 crisis, we study financial structure and bank performance from 1987 to 1997. Financial performance ratios (capital adequacy, liquidity, profitability, and loan preference) are regressed on structural variables (bank assets, net income, administrative expenses, and time), focusing on banks’ management efficiency and financial performance. During financial liberalization, loan-preference ratios were higher, perhaps signaling more risk; so were capital-adequacy ratios. Capital adequacy falls, then rises as management size increases; profitability behaves oppositely, indicating diminishing returns. Thailand’s, Korea’s and Indonesia’s banks show stronger lending preference but weaker profitability; possible harbingers of crisis.     

关于城市商业银行改革发展思路的探索

随着国有商业银行的改制步伐加快、股份制银行引进外资,以及外资银行进入我国带来愈加紧迫的压力,历史上一直被认为发展受限制很多的城市商业银行的危机感日渐深重。在此背景下,作者以招商银行的优势和成功经验为参照,针对城市商业银行存在的问题,提出了今后应对新形势变化、适应新的监管要求的改革与发展思路。