Audit committee equity holdings,the risk of reporting problems,and the achievement of earnings thresholds

There is conflicting evidence on whether audit committee equity holdings enhance or undermine committee effectiveness. Some researchers contend that equity holdings motivate audit committees to minimize the risk of reporting problems, while others believe equity holdings align the committees’ incentives with management. To reconcile these seemingly contradictory positions, I hypothesize that the influence of audit committee equity holdings depends upon the risk of reporting problems. I contend that when the risk of reporting problems is low (high) equity holdings motivate audit committees to give managers greater (less) discretion over reporting policies because the expected benefits from giving the discretion is greater (less) than the expected cost of the reporting problems that might occur from giving the discretion. I test whether the influence of audit committee equity holdings varies with the risk of reporting problems using a sample of 1370 firm-observations with earnings near the prior year’s earning level and a sample of 2389 firm-observations near analyst forecasts. I find the influence of audit committee equity holdings on the likelihood that a firm meets the prior year’s earnings level varies with the CEO’s equity incentives and the level of high-risk assets. I also find the influence of audit committee equity holdings on the likelihood that a firm meets analysts’ forecast varies with the CEO’s equity incentives and the effectiveness of internal controls. Collectively, my results suggest equity holdings enhance audit committee effectiveness by increasing a committee’s responsiveness to risk factors.     

The effect of CEO reputation and explanations for poor performance on investors’ judgments about the company’s future performance and management

Two experiments are conducted in which MBA students make judgments about a company’s future performance and management’s reputation after the company reports poor financial results. Information about the CEO’s pre-existing reputation is manipulated at three levels (favorable, unfavorable, or none) and the plausibility of management’s explanation is manipulated at two levels (plausible or implausible). Generally, the results indicate that management’s explanations influence investors’ judgments of the company’s future performance and that judgments about management were jointly influenced by both manipulated factors. Specifically, our results indicate that a pre-existing favorable management reputation is an enduring trait that is not damaged even when management offers an implausible explanation. Our results are consistent with Mercer (2004) but inconsistent with other research (40 and 53) suggesting that a good reputation is easily lost. Our results also indicate that offering a plausible explanation improves the reputation of managers with an unfavorable reputation. We also find that judgments about management’s intentions for explaining poor performance represent a partial mediator for judgments about management’s reputation. Finally, we provide evidence that judgments about the company’s future performance and management’s reputation are consequential in that they are associated with investors’ equity judgments.     

Improving earnings quality: The effect of reporting incentives and accounting standards

We investigate the different effects on earnings quality of accounting standards and reporting incentives for Germany over the period 1994 to 2005. To this end, we control for reporting incentives at the firm level, instead of the country level, by using the timing of voluntary IFRS adoption as a proxy for reporting incentives. We then include reporting incentives in an analysis of earnings management and information asymmetry. Contrary to common expectation, we find that IFRS reporting potentially decreases earnings quality on average; but also that reporting incentives appear to have lower effects on earnings quality in IFRS statements than in GGAAP statements. Thus, IFRS may lead to more homogenous earnings quality across firms.     

Incentives for risk reporting — A discretionary disclosure and cheap talk approach

This paper adopts and reviews discretionary disclosure and cheap talk models to analyze risk reporting incentives and their relation to regulation. Given its inherent discretion, risk reporting depends on disclosure incentives. To assess these incentives the analytical models consider risk reporting as an endogenous feature, thereby providing a benchmark to discuss regulatory attempts. Particularly, discretionary disclosure models refer to verified disclosure, e.g., on risk factors or risk management, whereas cheap talk models refer to unverified disclosure, like managerial forecasts on the impact of risk factors. This provides an analytically-based framework for discussion. Unlike prior literature, which focuses on disclosure cost, I argue that uncertainty of information endowment and issues of credible communication can explain restricted risk reporting observed empirically. Linking regulatory attempts to these restrictions implies that regulation may mitigate the incentives-driven restrictions to some extent, but can have adverse effects on risk reporting. I particularly discuss the link between effective risk monitoring and the precision of risk reporting; the ex post assessment and usefulness of managerial forecasts on impacts of risk factors; the claimed decreasing cost of capital by mandatory risk reporting; and the threat of self-fulfilling prophecies. While the discussion has implications for both specific risk reporting requirements and empirical research, overall results suggest that we should not overestimate the informativeness of risk reporting even in a regulated environment.     

Ambiguity intolerance and financial reporting alternatives

Authoritative accounting pronouncements almost always require more, rather than less, financial reporting disclosures and accountants rarely, if ever, act to overturn the required disclosures. Since the personality literature suggests that desire for more information is linked to an individual's intolerance for ambiguity, this study tested selected hypotheses about the relationship between accountants' intolerance for ambiguity and their desire for financial reporting alternatives. The findings of the study did not disclose a significant relationship between accountants' intolerance for ambiguity and their desire for financial reporting alternatives. However, the results did disclose a relationship between education level and two dependent variables: desire for disclosure and consistency of desired disclosures with generally accepted accounting principles. Therefore, additional research should pay more attention to the effects of demographic information, which may in fact be more informative than many previously tested variables such as personality characteristics.     

Opportunistic financial reporting around municipal bond issues

Understanding how government officials exercise discretion over financial reporting is essential for citizens, regulators, and researchers to interpret and monitor financial performance. I examine two measures of discretion in governmental financial statements: abnormal accruals in full accrual financial statements, and other financing sources and uses in modified accrual financial statements. Using a unique dataset of hand-collected financial data from California, I document empirically that municipal governments pursue a break-even income in both sets of financial statements, and that they focus particularly on avoiding deficits. Further, I find evidence that municipalities employ discretionary accruals but not other financing sources and uses to a greater extent before issuing bonds. Prior to bond issuance, officials facing deficits use less discretion. The results highlight the multidimensional and sometimes conflicting incentives government officials face, and the reporting strategies they use as they weigh the expected costs and benefits of using accounting gimmicks to report favorable bottom lines.     

Classificatory income smoothing: The impact of a change in regime of reporting financial performance

Financial Reporting Standard No. 3 (FRS3) regulated the reporting of financial performance by UK firms from 1993 until the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards in 2005. FRS3 outlawed extraordinary items, but allowed a clearer distinction between recurring and transitory income by giving firms discretion over the classifications of unusual (i.e. exceptional) items and the option to disclose alternative EPS. Through these provisions FRS3 increased the scope for classificatory choices as a means to highlight persistent profitability. We examine the impact of FRS3 on classificatory smoothing by UK firms and document a significant rise in this practice post-FRS3. We find that this increase is due mainly to deviations of net income from expected earnings inducing a significantly higher level of classificatory smoothing post-FRS3. Additional analysis shows that earnings are substantially more persistent at the pre-exceptional level post-FRS3. Overall, our results suggest greater use of classificatory choices to highlight sustainable profitability after the change in performance reporting regime.     

Performance reporting: a comparative study of British and Irish charities

The concept of accountability seems inextricably linked with the view that accounting should provide information to satisfy the information needs of users. The user-needs model is now well established as a useful basis for a conceptual framework for charity reporting, and annual reports are recognised as key documents in the discharge of accountability to external users. It has been suggested that both financial information and also performance information should be disclosed to aid the discharge of accountability. However, previous empirical work conducted in Britain found that while audited financial information was most frequently disclosed by charities, users viewed wider performance information as being of greater importance. No comparable work has been conducted in Ireland. This paper focuses on information outside the financial statements and seeks to identify the type and extent of the reporting of performance information by charities in both Britain and Ireland. The main findings of the research are: performance reporting by British charities, although limited, is considerably better than that of their Irish counterparts; performance reporting by British charities has increased over time; and large charities (both in Britain and Ireland) provide more extensive performance information than small charities. These findings are discussed in both the context of accountability and in terms of conceivable economic incentives for disclosure. In addition, possible reasons for lower disclosure rates by Irish charities are explored.     

Audit Committee Members’ Reputation Incentives and Their Effectiveness in Monitoring the Financial Reporting Process

We examine whether the reputation incentives of audit committee members are associated with their effectiveness in monitoring the financial reporting process. Prior research assumes that audit committee members allocate their effort proportionately across all memberships on which they serve. However, our findings suggest that audit committee members with multiple audit committee memberships tend to focus their attention on the memberships that provide them with the greatest reputation incentives. Specifically, firms with a larger proportion of audit committee members where the membership is the most prominent are associated with higher financial reporting quality and more effective monitoring of internal control. Additional tests reveal that audit committee members’ reputation incentives are driving our results rather than independent non-audit committee members’ reputation incentives. We conclude that reputation is a strong incentive for audit committee members, such that it influences their monitoring effectiveness over the financial reporting process.     

The effect of a potential borrower's reporting reputation and financial condition on commercial loan officers' estimates of forecast bias and subsequent loan recommendations

This paper investigates whether a potential borrower's reporting reputation and financial condition affect commercial loan officers' loan judgments and recommendations after receiving an earnings forecast that predicts improved financial performance. The results suggest that the earnings forecast is perceived as more credible in the presence of (1) a reputation for objective reporting, and (2) strong financial condition. Also, a reputation for objective reporting allowed the borrower to more credibly convey the expected improvement in performance when financial condition was weak. However, while financial condition predictably affects loan recommendations (likelihood of granting the loan, interest rate), reporting reputation does not. While we find that commercial loan officers discount forecasts under similar circumstances as stock analysts, results suggest that the consequences of developing a reputation for aggressive reporting (e.g., aggressive selection of accounting methods and estimates within GAAP) may be greater in a stock valuation setting (prior research documents lower stock prices) than in a loan setting.     

Financial reporting and corporate political connections: An analytical model of interactions

We analyze the interactions between accounting institutions and corporate political connections (CPCs). We present a model where a costly policy depends on the perceived economic condition of a firm. This policy and the valuation of the firm by capital market participants create incentives for the firm to manipulate its financial reports. A politician has some discretion over the policy and can use it to favor a connected firm. Our analysis reveals that the firm’s financial reporting is determined by the interplay of an accounting standard, enforcement strictness, and the salience of the policy for the firm. The possibility to manipulate the financial reports imposes an upper boundary on the value of political connectedness which does not exist if only truthful reporting is possible. The reason is that a low credibility of reported figures leads only to a weak revision of the policy. In general, the value of CPCs is highest when the financial reporting regime evenly splits between firms in good and bad economic condition. Our analysis further suggests that while connected firms generally report being in good condition more often than non-connected firms do, the effect of CPCs on absolute reporting manipulation depends on policy salience. If policy salience is low, connected firms exhibit a higher absolute degree of manipulation than non-connected firms do; the opposite holds if policy salience is high.     

Discourses of transparency in the intellectual capital reporting debate: Moving from generic reporting models to management defined information

In the last decade, transparency has become a necessary mantra for both publicly listed companies and government institutions. Intellectual capital reporting is often related to this goal of enhancing the transparency of business and public institutions. In this paper we emphasize that a movement is seen in the intellectual capital reporting debate, which we argue can be approached as two different discourses of transparency, namely one discourse based on generic reporting versus a second discourse based on management driven information. In other words, one discourse highlights as much information to stakeholders as possible, but seems to be in the process of being substituted by another, which emphasizes reporting what is seen from the perspective of management, namely the “right” information, and only that. The argument for the latter discourse is that it will make intellectual capital reporting more transparent, because of users’ bounded rationality and other constraints such as time. This, however, has the implication that users of intellectual capital reporting may become victims of management's selected “right” information, by [Strathern, M. The tyranny of transparency. British Educational Research Journal 2000;26:310–32] designated as the “tyranny of transparency”. Also, we emphasize the problems of perceiving transparency as a goal and not a means.     

Bridging the divides of online reporting

This paper looks at the possibilities of improving online reporting by closing the ‘digital divide’ through a ‘digitalised revolution’ and by narrowing the ‘accounting divide’ through the sharing of power and the expansion of membership in the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Paradoxically, whilst the IASB may have contributed to the ‘accounting divide’ it may very well possess the potential to close it and thus improve online reporting. The potential to bridge the ‘accounting divide’ rests with the greater participation by developing country members to exert influence and ownership of the accounting standards setting process.     

Hometown advantage: The effects of monitoring institution location on financial reporting discretion

We examine the impact of institutional ownership on financial reporting discretion, focusing on whether the impact varies with institutions' cost of acquiring monitoring information. Using geographic distance between the firm and the institutional investor as a proxy for the cost of acquiring monitoring information, we find that corporate managers are less likely to use financial reporting discretion in the presence of local monitoring institutions than distant monitoring institutions. We also find that the impact of monitoring institutions on financial reporting discretion varies with the costs and benefits of financial reporting discretion.     

It’s all about audit quality: Perspectives on strategic-systems auditing

We discuss the antecedents of and rationale for what has become known as Strategic-Systems Auditing (SSA). We also describe the conceptual foundation and key elements of SSA. We observe that the auditor employing SSA conceives the audit as a process of evidence-driven, belief-based, risk assessment. We also illustrate facets of this process, including how the auditor, by acquiring a rich understanding of how and how well management is executing its business-model, develops rich (e.g., distributional) expectations of future financial-statement amounts and disclosures. These expectations form a benchmark against which the auditor later compares and investigates management’s asserted financial-statement amounts and disclosures. Finally, we pose and respond to some of the more common questions about elements of SSA and complete the paper by suggesting some educational innovations and high-value targets for research.One salient message is that SSA first emerged in the 1990s as an attempt to enhance audit quality in response to changes in the audit environment. Another salient message is that SSA continues to equilibrate, adapting to more recent environmental changes, especially society’s demand for greater protection from financial-statement fraud. Such adaptation requires ongoing, significant intellectual investments by audit practitioners and audit scholars/educators.     

The influence of director stock ownership and board discussion transparency on financial reporting quality

Seventy-two active corporate directors participate in an experiment where management insists on aggressive recognition of revenue, but the chief audit executive proposes a more conservative approach. Results indicate interactive effects of director stock ownership and the transparency of director decisions. Stock-owning directors are more likely to oppose management’s attempts to manage earnings when transparency increases. For non-stock owning directors, however, increasing transparency does not affect the likelihood that directors oppose management’s attempts to manage earnings. The current study challenges suppositions that equate director stock ownership with improved financial reporting and higher corporate governance quality, and it provides evidence that increased transparency is beneficial when director compensation plans threaten director independence.     

Quarterly reporting in a voluntary disclosure environment: Its benefits, drawbacks and determinants

We primarily examine three issues pertaining to quarterly reporting; its benefits, drawbacks and determinants. This study is conducted in a voluntary-disclosure environment with respect to reporting quarterly earnings. On the benefits side, we find that quarterly reporting is associated with higher analyst following, and on the drawbacks side we find it is associated with high price volatility. If left to its own discretion, we find that a firm with high growth prospects, large size and a technology orientation is likely to disclose earnings on a quarterly basis.     

Evidence on the effect of bond covenants and management compensation contracts on the choice of accounting techniques: The case of the depreciation switch-back

Provisions of bond indenture agreements and management compensation contracts are examined to derive testable implications concerning management's incentives to choose among alternative accounting techniques. The hypotheses are subjected to empirical examination by investigating the voluntary change from accelerated to straight-line depreciation for financial reporting purposes only. The methodology utilized incorporates an expectations model of accounting earnings in an attempt to separate out of the effects of earnings announcements from accounting change announcements which are often concurrent. The evidence from both price and non-price data is not consistent with the general hypothesis that bond covenants and management compensation contracts are important determinants of the decision to change depreciation techniques. Five potential explanations for the results are offered.     

The relation between aggressive financial reporting and aggressive tax reporting: Evidence from ex-Arthur Andersen clients

We investigate the economic trade-offs managers face due to conflicting incentives to report high financial statement book income and, at the same time, report low taxable income. Our setting involves Houston clients of Arthur Andersen (AA), who have been shown to exhibit a culture of aggressive financial reporting. Using our sample of AA Houston clients, we test two competing theories: (1) firms which have a culture of aggressive financial reporting are also aggressive in their tax reporting, versus (2) firms which are willing to pay real dollars (taxes) to report higher financial statement earnings. We do not find support for either theory. Instead, our findings suggest a middle-ground: firms may exhibit a culture of aggressive financial reporting without impacting their relative tax reporting. Our findings not only shed light on the intersection of financial and tax reporting, but they also add to the extant literature involving the culture of AA. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate the tax ramifications of AA’s culture of aggressive financial reporting.     

Regulatory incentives and financial reporting quality in public healthcare organisations

English National Health Service Foundation Trusts are subject to a regulatory regime in which the level of monitoring and intervention is determined by performance against two key performance metrics: a ‘financial risk rating’, based on a number of performance metrics, such as the reported surplus margin and return on assets, and a ‘prudential borrowing limit’. In this paper, we investigate the variation in financial reporting quality, proxied by discretionary accruals, with the incentives introduced by this regime. We find: first, that discretionary accruals are managed to report small surpluses; second, that, consistent with the avoidance of regulatory intervention in both the short and medium term, discretionary accruals are more positive when pre-managed performance is below intervention triggering thresholds and more negative when well above threshold; third, that, despite a move away from financial breakeven as the primary performance objective, there remains an aversion to small loss reporting. We further find that the level of discretionary accruals is driven by two metrics of strategic significance: the surplus margin (a measure of retained earnings) and the prudential borrowing limit (a measure of borrowing capacity).