Optimal antitrust policy under different regimes of fines

This paper shows how antitrust laws against price-fixing can be enforced efficiently in the presence of asymmetric information between the authorities and the industry, and under different regimes of pecuniary punishment. We consider two regimes of fines that are often used in practice. The first involves a fine based on revenues of the industry while the second is related to the damage caused to consumers. The analysis shows that since investigation is costly, it is optimal from a welfare point of view to tolerate some degree of collusion in both cases. Comparing the deterrence levels, we show that no regime is a priori better than the other. In addition, we show that for industries where the possibilities of collusion are small, the first system dominates the second in terms of efficiency. Conversely, for high possibilities of collusion, the second system is better.     

寻找权利和义务的平衡点——关于企业罚款权与劳动用工管理的法律分析

企业动辄运用罚款权进行劳动用工管理的现象比较普遍,甚至存在权利滥用的现象,在客观上侵害了劳动者的合法权益并极易引发劳动争议。在《企业职工奖惩条例》废止后,有关企业是否拥有法律支持的罚款权问题一时成为理论界争论的焦点。本文从不同的视角对这一问题以及企业弃用罚款权的劳动用工管理进行了论述。     

Telecommunications companies: One meeting with any competitor is enough to violate the EU's competition laws and result in fines

This commentary's purpose is to review how Telfort, T-Mobile, Vodafone, and others discovered that one “meeting” of any type with any telecommunications competitor could result in fines up to 10 percent of total “turnover” under EU competition law Regulation no. 1/2003, Article 23(2)(a), and to provide planning tips on how to eliminate the potential for those adverse consequences. While competition laws do not apply solely to the telecommunications industry, they do seem to affect it disproportionately. Telecommunications companies have global reach, and some of the most stringent competition law exists in Europe. Thus, all should review the most recent telecommunications ruling from the European Court of Justice, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van der Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit C-8/08 (2009). ¹ The ruling deals with whether the one meeting was “concerted activity” in violation of Article 81(1) EC.     

小车“超人”再定位

尽管已经进入中国快20年,铃木的口碑仍只是在小型车领域传播,出于品牌向上的考虑,它终于推出了自己的B级车。     

Globalization, new ecologies, new zoologies, and the purported death of the eclectic paradigm

This paper provides a commentary to John Mathews' article in issue 23(1) of the Asia Pacific Journal of Management. I discuss how globalisation is fundamentally altering the milieu within which international business is conducted, and this new ‘ecology’ may indeed require scholars to consider a new ‘zoology’ of firms in the future. However, his specific suggestions are based on sparse evidence, and his alternative to the eclectic paradigm is founded on a misunderstanding of some fundamental concepts.     

Bureaucracy,economic regulation,and the incentive limits of the firm

This paper uses a transactions cost perspective to examine the development of organizational tendencies that plague the governance of unregulated subsidiaries by regulated parent companies. By focussing on what Williamson (1985) calls the ‘incentive limits’ of firms, conditions that should exacerbate the problems facing these firms as they diversify are identified. Empirical testing of hypotheses drawn from this discussion is conducted using a sample of nonutility, nonregulated subsidiaries of 54 electric utilities. The analysis, using both linear regression and event history methods, confirms the connection between the characteristics of the regulated parent company and subsidiary performance. The paper concludes with a discussion of how further research might extend the state of knowledge on the topic of the economic losses of bureaucracy.     

Envy,comparison costs,and the economic theory of the firm

An economic theory of the firm must explain both when firms supplant markets and when markets supplant firms. While theories of when markets fail are well developed, the extant literature provides a less than adequate explanation of why and when hierarchies fail and of actions managers take to mitigate such failure. In this article, we seek to develop a more complete theory of the firm by theorizing about the causes and consequences of organizational failure. Our theory focuses on the concept of social comparison costs that arise through social comparison processes and envy. While transaction costs in the market provide an impetus to move activities inside the boundaries of the firm, we argue that envy and resulting social comparison costs motivate moving activities outside the boundary of the firm. More specifically, our theory provides an explanation for ‘managerial’ diseconomies of both scale and scope—arguments that are independent from traditional measurement, rent seeking, and competency arguments—that provides new insights into the theory of the firm. In our theory, hierarchies fail as they expand in scale because social comparison costs imposed on firms escalate and hinder the capacity of managers to optimally structure incentives and production. Further, hierarchy fails as a firm expands in scope for the simple reason that the costs of differentially structuring compensation within the firm to match the increasing diversity of activities also rises with increasing scope. In addition, we explore how social comparison costs influence the design of the firm through selection of production technologies and compensation structures within the firm. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Antitrust,the Rule of Reason,and Democracy

Professor Barnes responds to William Curran's fictional dialogue between Senator John Sherman and philosopher John Rawls, with a fictional letter from Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. Professor Barnes discusses the importance of the anarcho-socialist movement of the late nineteenth century to the adoption of the Sherman Act, the historical and logical inevitability of adoption of a rule of reason in antitrust law, the relevance of efficiency to the rule of reason, and the relationship between competition and the promotion of democratic ideals.     

Partial monitoring,adverse selection,and the internal efficiency of the firm

The paper investigates an adverse selection model with monitoring of managerial effort. In contrast to the literature, we assume that the manager can be punished only if his effort is below a certain level that is monitored by the principal. Surprisingly, the optimal labor contract may induce an equilibrium effort which is lower than in the standard model without monitoring. This result holds for any discrete distribution of managerial types. In the continuous type case, the optimal contracts for high-quality (low-quality) managers are purely output-dependent (effort-dependent).     

Leaders,laggards, and the pursuit of foreign knowledge

This paper analyzes how firms in different technological and market share positions use foreign R&D to augment their technological capabilities. Technology transfer issues and absorptive capacity arguments are examined to analyze the different technological capabilities of leading and lagging firms. In addition, a new strategic rationale (in terms of non‐dominant market share firms) that has not been considered in prior studies analyzing knowledge‐seeking FDI is offered. From a panel dataset which includes information on all foreign R&D investments made by publicly traded Japanese manufacturing firms (from 1974 to 1994), I show that Japanese firms investing in foreign R&D tend to be the non‐dominant market share firms, but also the technologically leading firms across fairly diverse industries. By considering both the technological and market share positions of firms, this study reveals important characteristics that influence when firms use foreign R&D as part of a strategy to augment their technological capabilities. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Growth,Industrialization, and the Intergenerational Correlation of Advantage

The shift from feudalism to industrial capitalism was generally accompanied by an increase in social mobility. We ask whether such an increase has occurred in a developing nation currently undergoing rapid industrialization, Indonesia. It has, at least as measured by a declining intergenerational correlation of education. To highlight the effects of economic growth on intergenerational mobility, we contrast Indonesia's experience with that of Bangladesh, where industrialization has proceeded more slowly and the correlation between parents’ and children's education has been roughly stable. We also examine potential causal channels for the rising educational mobility we find in Indonesia, but cannot identify specific pathways related to above‐average school building or rapid industrialization in a region.     

Knowledge, internationalization of the firm, and inward-outward connections

Even though outward operations such as exports and foreign investment have received most of the attention so far, the internationalization of businesses also includes activities that are inwardly oriented. Inward activities like purchases of machinery, the procurement of raw materials and semifinished goods provide opportunities for building relations with foreign actors. They also offer opportunities to learn about foreign trade techniques and ways of using various operation modes, and by active use of such knowledge companies should be in a better position to start or extend outward foreign operations. This paper presents a case study of the Norwegian company Moelven Industrier ASA and its operations in the Russian market. It shows that the creation and utilization of knowledge through inward-outward connections face many obstacles and that, in Moelven's case, the full potential of such connections was seldom realized.     

Teams,Autonomy, and the Financial Performance of Firms

I estimate a structural model of teams, autonomy, and financial performance, using a cross section of British establishments. My findings suggest that team production improves financial performance for the typical establishment but that autonomous teams do no better than closely supervised or nonautonomous teams. I find that unobserved factors increasing the propensity to adopt teams are positively correlated with unobserved determinants of financial performance, and that unobserved factors increasing the propensity to grant teams autonomy are negatively correlated with unobserved determinants of financial performance when teams are adopted.     

Opportunism,knowledge, and the performance of franchise chains

An important feature of most franchise chains is that they simultaneously use franchised and company‐owned outlets. In this study, I show that the relationship between the resources provided to outlet managers and the financial performance of franchise chains is contingent on their governance structure. Specifically, opportunism and knowledge considerations seem to prevent chains with a large proportion of franchised outlets from fully leveraging resources such as a valuable brand name and tacit business practices. On the other hand, brand name value and business practices tacitness are not directly related to the proportion of franchised outlets in chains. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mergers,acquisitions, and the pruning of managerial deadwood

This research investigates the role that mergers and acquisitions may play in the disciplining of entrenched and inefficient managers. The relationship between a company's performance history and its subsequent top management turnover is assessed for a sample of target companies, their parents, and a control group of companies not involved in merger and acquisition activity. The results reveal that target company top management turnover is higher than ‘normal’ in the 2 years immediately following a merger or acquisition, but there is no relationship between previous target company performance and its subsequent top management turnover. Further analyses indicate that first-year target company turnover rates are associated with a history of relatively poor parent company performance, while second-year turnover rates are associated with a history of relatively good parent company performance.     

Services, products, and the institutional structure of production

This paper revisits the product-service distinction from an institutional perspective. Much of the literature in marketing and management has focused on the intrinsic characteristics of services with a view to derive implications for the management of service-based firms. Our key argument is that the quest for foundational differences between products and services is misguided. What counts as a product or a service is dependent on the nature of producer-user interactions and the institutional structure of production rather than on any essentialist feature of products or services. Furthermore, we develop the argument that services play an increasingly important role in manufacturing firms and we explore the reasons that underpin this trend.