Price limits,margin requirements,and default risk

This article investigates whether price limits can reduce the default risk and lower the effective margin requirement for a self‐enforcing futures contract by considering one more period beyond Brennan’s (1986) model to take into account the spillover of unrealized residual shocks due to price limits. The results show that, when traders receive no additional information, price limits can reduce the margin requirement and eliminate the default probability at the expense of a higher liquidity cost due to trading interruptions. Consequently, the total contract cost is higher than of that without price limits. When traders receive additional signals about the equilibrium price, we find that the optimal margin remains unchanged with or without the imposition of price limits, a result that is in conflict with Brennan’s assertion. Hence, we conclude that price limits may not be effective in improving the performance of a futures contract. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 20:573–602, 2000     

Forecasting futures returns in the presence of price limits

In a futures market with a daily price‐limit rule, trading occurs only at prices within limits determined by the previous day's settlement price. Price limits are set in dollars but can be expressed as return limits. When the daily return limit is triggered, the true equilibrium futures return (and price) is unobservable. In such a market, investors may suffer from information loss if the return “moves the limit.” Assuming normally distributed futures returns with unknown means but known volatilities, we develop a Bayesian forecasting model in the presence of return limits and provide some numerical predictions. Our innovation is the derivation of the predictive density for futures returns in the presence of return limits. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 25:199–210, 2005     

Long‐term information,short‐lived securities

The authors explore strategic trade in short‐lived securities by agents who have private information that is potentially long‐term, but do not know how long their information will remain private. Trading short‐lived securities is profitable only if enough of the private information becomes public prior to contract expiration; otherwise the security will worthlessly expire. How this results in trading behavior fundamentally different from that observed in standard models of informed trading in equity is highlighted. Specifically, it is shown that informed speculators are more reluctant to trade shorter‐term securities too far in advance of when their information will necessarily be made public, and that existing positions in a shorter‐term security make future purchases more attractive. Because informed speculators prefer longer‐term securities, this can make trading shorter‐term contracts more attractive for liquidity traders. The conditions are characterized under which liquidity traders choose to incur extra costs to roll over short‐term positions rather than trade in distant contracts, providing an explanation for why most longer‐term derivative security markets have little liquidity and large bid‐ask spreads. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:465–502, 2006     

When is informed trading more prevalent?—An examination of options trading around Indian M&A announcements

This study examines the prevalence of informed trading around proximate-date versus far-date mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Further, different options strategies pursued by informed traders in proximate-date M&As are identified. The results highlight that proximate-date M&As are associated with a significantly higher level of informed trading vis-à-vis far-date M&As. Results on the choice of options strategies highlight that risk-averse, informed traders may pursue a straddle strategy to profit from their private information, while risk-seeking, informed traders may use a vertical call spread strategy. Informed traders desirous of hedging their existing positions may employ a protective put strategy.     

The effect of net positions by type of trader on volatility in foreign currency futures markets

We investigate the effect of net positions by type of trader on return volatility in six foreign currency futures markets using the weekly Commitments of Traders (COT) data. When net positions are decomposed into expected and unexpected components, we find that expected net positions by type of trader generally do not co‐vary with volatility. However, volatility is positively associated with shocks (in either direction) in net positions of speculators and small traders, and negatively related to shocks (in either direction) in net positions of hedgers. This evidence suggests that changes in speculative positions destabilize the market. Consistent with dispersion of beliefs models and noise trading theories, hedgers appear to possess private information, whereas speculators and small traders are less informed in these markets. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 22:427–450, 2002     

Risk premia in forward exchange rates: systematic or unsystematic?

International traders frequently use forward exchange transactions to hedge their cash flows in foreign currencies. A key issue is whether the forward rates are efficiently priced. There is evidence of time-varying risk premia in forward exchange rates. Are these risk premia systematic or unsystematic? This article uses a market model to explain risk, implying that the risk premium in the forward rate varies pari passu with the beta of the return to speculative forward positions. Assuming the unobserved risk premium is proportional to the forward premium allows testing the predicted relations; the data reject the joint hypotheses of the model and systematic risk. In terms of a simple factor model explaining the covariation of the forward premium, the risk premium, and the expected percentage rate of change of the spot exchange rate, the assumption that the forward premium and the risk premium are proportional can be relaxed without changing the empirical results.     

A realistic model of market liquidity and depth

A model that realistically defines market liquidity and depth is introduced. Liquidity is the expected rate of order execution in shares per minute. Depth is the average density of the limit order book in shares per dollar. Illiquid markets tend to exhibit longer execution delays and indirectly higher risk related to price impact. Markets with low depth are characterized by high price sensitivity and larger risks. Deviations from fundamental value exist because arbitraging them away carries liquidity cost, entails impact risk, and generates negatively skewed profits. Premia include liquidity and transparency components. In order to avoid excessive frontrunning and liquidity withholding around their block trade, traders break their block orders into smaller orders. In anonymous markets, the trader discriminates against early liquidity providers, and is only compensated for liquidity. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 25:443–464, 2005     

虚假业绩美化手段比较研究

通过对现金流操控与盈余管理、会计策选择以及财务舞弊的概念比较,发现会计政策选择和盈余管理行是公司在法律法规允许范围内选择能够有利于美化当期业绩的会计方法;会计舞弊是在惩罚成本小于获得收益时,公司萌生舞弊之念,提供虚假信息蒙蔽误导投资者;现金流操控行为既有在法律法规允许范围内的调整手段,又有违法的虚造手法,花样和手段之多令投资者难辨真假,危害更大。     

Where are the fundamental traders? A model application based on the Shanghai Stock Exchange

This study develops a model to disaggregate traders into categories based on their strategic approach to (fundamental versus technical) and perception about future price trends. Testing the model with data from the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), the study finds a minimal presence of fundamental traders. However, model estimation reveals that the SSE is weak-form efficient as technical traders do not earn abnormal profits.     

Traders' strategic behavior in an index options market

We analyze traders' strategic behavior in an index options market, examining the relationships among expected duration, frequency of trades, trade size, and time to maturity using a modified ACD model. Using intraday data at‐the‐money put and call options, we obtain the following results: (1) Frequency of trades contains more information about future option price volatility than does trade size. This may result from institutional or large traders who have issued naked options using the delta‐neutral strategy to hedge those options. This also suggests that informed traders use their informational advantage little by little, rather than all at once. (2) Option volatility increases as the maturity date approaches, contradicting the prediction of the Black‐Scholes model. (3) The duration of the previous interval has a persistent effect on expected duration of the current interval. (4) For the estimation of the modified ACD model, the standardized distribution of duration is Weibull with γ < 1, not exponential. (5) The duration in the options market exhibits an inverse U‐shaped diurnal pattern, much like that of the U.S. stock market. However, unlike in the U.S. stock market, the index options duration becomes much shorter right before lunch hour (12:00 pm). © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 25:105–133, 2005     

Trader Survival: Evidence from the Energy Futures Markets

This study analyzes the adaptation of traders and the determinants of trader survival during a period of changing market structures. Our unique sample of transactions level data covers the introduction of electronic trading in the NYMEX energy futures market. The results show that most floor traders adapted to the side‐by‐side electronic and open outcry trading, although trader attrition increased and the profitability of surviving traders declined dramatically. It is also found that trading profits, trader experience and sophistication, and dual trading have a positive effect on the probability of trader survival. Scalpers are less likely to exit trading in pure open outcry trading, but are more likely to fail than traders who hold open positions longer in side‐by‐side trading. Finally, traders trading in multiple energy futures markets and those who use both the exchange floor and electronic trading appear to have a survival advantage in side‐by‐side trading. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 32:809–836, 2012     

Execution quality in open‐outcry futures markets

This study examines the composition of customer order .flow and the execution quality for different types of customer orders in six futures pits of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). It is shown that off‐exchange customers frequently provide liquidity to other traders by submitting limit orders. The determinants of customers' choice between limit and market orders are examined, and it is found that higher bid—ask spreads increase the limit‐order submission frequency, and increased price volatility makes limit‐order submission less likely. Effective spreads, trading revenues, and turnaround times for customer liquidity‐demanding and limit orders are also documented. Consistent with evidence from equity markets, the results show that limit‐order traders receive better executions than traders using liquidity‐demanding orders, but incur adverse selection costs. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 25:1067–1092, 2005     

Trading and information in futures markets

This paper studies the trading behavior of different types of traders (customer type indicators [CTI's]) in corn futures. Nonmembers (CTI4) consume most of the intraday liquidity while local traders (CTI1) as market makers are its main provider. Both groups combine most of the intraday trading volume. Interday trading comes mainly from proprietary accounts (CTI2) and other local traders' trades (CTI3), reflecting their longer-term needs for hedging and speculation. Changes in the overnight positions of the general public (CTI4) and clearing members (CTI2) contribute mostly to daily price discovery, while the positions of CTI3 group reflect possible information advantage about future price movements.     

What Influences Trader Choice of Electronic versus Intermediated Execution?

We examine the determinants of US equity trader choice of electronic versus intermediated execution. While traders exhibit a strong overall preference for automation, when the market is less liquid at order submission time, traders seek market maker automated and human order‐matching services more often. Traders' overall tendency to choose intermediaries is highly correlated with their demand for liquidity. Market maker participation rates are higher for more active and larger size traders. Traders who choose intermediaries more often trade more stocks, execute orders quicker, price orders more aggressively, and disperse their trading over longer periods of time. Although US stock intermediaries continue to lose market share, our results highlight the important role these firms can play in an increasingly automated, electronically driven marketplace.     

Market volatility and the demand for hedging in stock index futures

This study examines the relation between stock market volatility and the demand for hedging in S&P 500 stock index futures contracts. Open interest is used as a proxy for hedging demand. The analysis employs unique data that identify separately the open interest of large hedgers, large speculators, and smaller traders. Volatility estimates are decomposed into expected and unexpected components, to assess whether traders’ reactions to volatility depend upon its predictability. Results indicate that daily open interest for hedgers increases when unexpected volatility increases. Increases in unexpected volatility may cause hedgers to raise their estimates of future expected volatility, and hence increase their demand for hedging. Open interest of speculators is not related to expected volatility, and is only weakly related to unexpected volatility. The increase in the participation of hedgers in periods of higher volatility is significantly larger than the increase in the participation of speculators. The results suggest that increases in stock market volatility increase the demand for hedging. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 20: 105–125, 2000     

Event Study Analysis in Cases with Multiple Brand-Generic Reverse-Payment Settlements

Abstract

Event studies of stock price movements have been used to assess the anticompetitive impact of ‘reverse-payment’ settlement of patent disputes in the drug industry. Evidence for an anticompetitive effect is found when financial markets reward a brand manufacturer with larger stock market capitalization – signaling the agreed upon generic entry date was more profitable (i.e. later) than investors’ expectations. In practice, reverse-payment cases can involve multiple generic competitors and settlements. This paper considers how event-study methodology applies in such cases, with a study of the stock price movements of Cephalon, manufacturer of the drug Provigil. Cephalon entered into four patent litigation settlements with potential generic competitors over a two-month period beginning in December 2005. Event study methods can readily be applied to such a case. Cephalon’s total increase in stock value across four narrow windows around each settlement totaled over $1.0 billion, indicating the agreements delayed generic entry beyond the market's expectation.     

Interdealer inference and price discovery

Futures floor dealers are investigated in terms of their joint product of price discovery. A vector error correction model is estimated using floor trader proprietary prices, examining the resulting information shares and common factor components. More active dealers are significant price leaders, with only one fifth of the traders responsible for a significantly higher degree of price discovery. Price leadership is more significant in both volatile and falling markets, when information is perhaps more valuable. It is also found that the most active floor traders generally trade at the same time and in the same direction. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 28: 131–154, 2008     

Game-theoretic properties of Final-Offer Arbitration

Final-Offer Arbitration (FOA) is a dispute settlement procedure in which an arbitrator chooses one side's final position as the resolution. Game-theoretic models of FOA in two-sided interest disputes are reviewed, especially models of the disputants' final offer choices under uncertainty about the arbitrator's preferences. The extent to which the Brams-Merrill Theorem (1986) reveals optimal strategic behavior under FOA, and the implications for efficiency and equity, are assessed. Analysis of a model not satisfying the hypotheses of the Theorem suggests that, for some arbitrators, FOA can have an undesirable tendency. Another game model is used to address the question of how disputants' differential risk-aversion is reflected in their strategic behavior, and in the fairness of FOA outcomes. This calculation clarifies some apparently contradictory empirical evidence about FOA.     

Is it Efficient to Impose Costs on Small-Volume Equity Traders?

A securities market that imposes higher trading costs on small-volume traders may reduce free-riding on information generated by large-volume traders. The reduction in free-riding increases the probability that large-volume traders will invest in socially beneficial information and engage in costly monitoring of managers of firms in their portfolio.V arious mechanisms can be used to impose costs on small-volume traders.We argue that Nasdaq's former treatment of limit orders was one such mechanism. Depending on the market's structure and the nature of the securities traded in the market, a reduction in freeriding activity may improve overall market efficiency despite a potentially negative impact on information dissemination.     

Futures price limit moves as options

This note demonstrates that an asset's price in an environment with price limit rules can be replicated by the price of a portfolio consisting of a riskless asset and two synthetic options. A procedure is developed to unbundle the unobservable option values imbedded in the actual futures price and impute a theoretical true futures price. Using this framework, evidence from the Treasury Bond futures market suggests that theoretical true futures prices diverge from actual futures prices, on average, 3 h prior to the activation of price limit rules, indicating that price limit moves might be predictable. The reversal of both the actual futures prices and the theoretical futures prices back within the limit range after a limit move provides support for the possibility that traders tend to overreact when market prices are near price limits. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 22:901–913, 2002