Earnings Announcements and Market Depth*

Abstract. This paper investigates how strategic trading around the time of earnings announcements affects market liquidity (e.g., bid-ask spreads). We model an investor with private information in advance of an earnings announcement (e.g., inside information). The investor trades before and after the earnings announcement in a market populated by liquidity-motivated traders who have some discretion over the timing of their trades. The main result of the analysis is that an earnings announcement that reduces an insider's private information may lead to a less liquid market in the postannouncement period.     

Option Trading,Price Discovery,and Earnings News Dissemination*

Abstract. Option market activity increases by more than 10 percent in the four days before quarterly earnings announcements. We show that the direction of this preannouncement trading foreshadows subsequent earnings news. Specifically, we find option traders initiate a greater proportion of long (short) positions immediately before “good” (“bad”) earnings news. Midquote returns to active-side option trades are positive during nonannouncement periods and are significantly higher immediately prior to earnings announcements. Bid-ask spreads for options widen during the announcement period, but traders do not gravitate toward high delta contracts. Collectively, the evidence shows option traders participate generally in price discovery (the incorporation of private information in price), and more specifically in the dissemination of earnings news.     

Post-Earnings Announcement Drift and the Dissemination of Predictable Information*

Building on the work of Bernard and Thomas 1990, we develop a model to infer the degree to which the information in an earnings announcement is incorporated into investors' expectations for the subsequent earnings announcement at any point in time between the two announcements. We are unable to reject the null hypothesis that investors' earnings expectations are based on a seasonal random walk and reflect none of the implications of the immediately prior earnings announcement up to 15 trading days after that announcement. By mid-quarter, expectations are significantly more sophisticated than a seasonal random walk. Two trading days before the next earnings announcement, as much as one half of the information in the prior earnings announcement is reflected in earnings expectations. We also find that the dissemination of information, albeit predictable information, speeds the incorporation of prior earnings information into earnings expectations. Our results suggest that as information about future earnings that could have been discerned from the earlier announcements (because past earnings surprises predict future ones) is disseminated in a more transparent form, investors revise their earnings expectations to reflect this information. Thus, the investors' expectations appear to incorporate more and more of the serial correlation in earnings surprises as the quarter progresses, even though they do not consider per se the serial correlation in earnings surprises in forming their expectations.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Online Trading on Stock Price and Trading Volume Reactions to Earnings Announcements*

This study provides evidence regarding the effects of online trading on stock price and trading volume reactions to quarterly earnings announcements. We test for differences in stock price and volume reactions to quarterly earnings announcements between a period with a significant amount of online trading (1996‐99) and a period without online trading (1992‐95). We conjecture that online trading has increased the proportion of naive investors in the market. We predict that this will result in (1) a decrease in the average precision of investor information prior to earnings announcements leading to higher earnings response coefficients (ERCs), (2) an increase in differential interpretation of earnings leading to higher trading volume reactions that are unrelated to price change, and (3) a decrease in differential prior precision leading to a decrease in the association between trading volume and absolute price change. We find evidence consistent with all three predictions. Our findings are relevant for assessing the validity of concerns about online trading expressed by regulators and the validity of theoretical models of trade with asymmetrically informed investors.     

Intra‐Industry Information Transfers and the Post‐Earnings Announcement Drift

This study examines the role of intra‐industry information transfers in the analyst forecast‐based post‐earnings announcement drift. I find that subsequent same‐industry‐peer earnings announcements influence a firm's post‐earnings announcement drift if these subsequent announcements confirm the firm's initial earnings surprise and the firm's industry exhibits ex ante positive (common effect) intra‐industry information transfers. The results suggest that underreaction to industry‐specific information contributes to analyst forecast‐based post‐earnings announcement drift.     

Abnormal Accruals and Managerial Intent: Evidence from the Timing of Merger Announcements and Completions

We examine acquiring managers' opportunistic reporting behavior around stock‐for‐stock acquisitions. Using the timing of merger announcements and completions to infer managerial intent, we show that acquirers with the most inflated earnings tend to announce mergers on Fridays, and that they manage earnings several quarters before the merger announcement date. Friday announcers exhibit a stronger negative association between pre‐merger announcement abnormal accruals and post‐merger announcement market performance than non‐Friday announcers. This effect is driven mainly by mergers that are completed relatively quickly after they are announced. Overall, the evidence supports the notion that some acquiring managers inflate earnings prior to announcing the mergers, and time the merger announcements to exploit investor inattention.     

The Walk‐down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives*

It has been alleged that firms and analysts engage in an "earnings‐guidance game" where analysts first issue optimistic earnings forecasts and then "walk down" their estimates to a level that firms can beat at the official earnings announcement. We examine whether the walk‐down to beatable targets is associated with managerial incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (through new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (through option exercises and stock sales). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the walk‐down to beatable targets is most pronounced when firms or insiders are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on the impact of capital‐market incentives on communications between managers and analysts.     

Disclosure Policy and Market Liquidity: Impact of Depth Quotes and Order Sizes*

This paper investigates the relation between disclosure policy and market liquidity. Our tests examine two key aspects of market liquidity, the effective bid‐ask spread and quoted depth, and how they relate to financial analysts' ratings of firms' disclosure policies. We introduce a method of combining order sizes and depth quotes to yield more precise estimates of effective spreads on trades likely constrained by quoted depth. We find that while firms with higher rated disclosures are charged lower effective spreads, they are also quoted lower depth, consistent with the notion that better disclosures reduce information asymmetry but also cause some liquidity suppliers to exit the market. Therefore, a simple examination of spreads and depths yields ambiguous inferences on the relation between disclosure policy and market liquidity. We resolve this ambiguity by estimating depth‐adjusted effective spreads, and find that firms with higher rated disclosures have lower depth‐adjusted effective spreads across all trade sizes. Consequently, our results reveal a robust inverse relation between disclosure ratings and effective trading costs. This implies that a policy of enhanced financial disclosure is related to improved market liquidity.     

Trading Behavior Prior to Public Release of Analyst Reports: Evidence from Korea

This paper investigates information leakage from analyst reports prior to their public release. Previous studies document abnormal trading by institutions or short selling before announcement of recommendation changes. Such prerelease abnormal trading is interpreted as evidence of information leakage from analyst reports. However, if sophisticated investors obtain information similar to what analysts have from other sources, abnormal prerelease trading patterns would be observed even if there were no information leakage from analyst reports. This paper, using a unique data set from Korea, aims to determine whether a direct causal link between recommendation changes and prerelease trading exists, by comparing trading behavior of client investors with non‐client investors. We find that abnormal prerelease trading by client investors, especially client institutions, is earlier in timing and greater in magnitude than that of other investor groups, supporting the information leakage hypothesis. We further find that net buying by client institutions and client large individuals is positively associated with firm, analyst, and earnings forecast change variables that influence formulation of recommendation changes and their impacts.     

The Effect of Short Selling on Market Reactions to Earnings Announcements*

This paper examines the effect of the inherent demand implied by short interest by studying how stock price reactions to earnings announcements depend on the level of short interest. We find that, for extreme good and bad news events, the inherent demand increases stock prices around the earnings announcement date, with the effect being stronger for good news relative to bad news. Specifically, the initial market reaction to an extreme positive earnings surprise is larger for firms with high levels of short interest. On the other hand, for an extreme negative earnings surprise event, the initial market reaction is less negative for heavily shorted firms. Furthermore, we find that the post‐earnings‐announcement drift is smaller (larger) in magnitude for extreme positive (negative) earnings surprises for the heavily shorted firms.     

The Timeliness of the Bond Market Reaction to Bad Earnings News

We find that bond price quotes impound bad earnings news on a more timely basis than good earnings news and that the bond market impounds bad news on a more timely basis than the stock market. We also find that the timeliness of the bond market reaction to bad news is concentrated primarily among speculative‐grade bonds, consistent with earnings news having a larger effect on bond price quotes when default risk is high. In addition, we find that a portion of the bad news impounded by the bond market reverses following the earnings announcement. Overall, our findings are consistent with bondholders’ asymmetric payoff function having important implications for the valuation role of accounting information in the bond market. Specifically, our findings indicate that bond quotes impound bad earnings news much earlier in the pre‐earnings announcement period than stock prices. In addition, bondholders appear to overreact to the bad earnings news initially and correct this overreaction subsequent to the earnings announcement.     

The reaction of Canadian securities to revisions of earnings forecasts*

Abstract. This first study of Canadian securities' earnings forecasts published by Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) focuses on changes in the mean earnings per share forecasts of 159 to 188 companies from 1985 to 1987. Cumulative average residuals are used to detect the announcement effects of large earnings forecast revisions. The main results of this study are the following. First, an investor with access to changes of earnings per share forecasts at the beginning of the month of publication could realize abnormal excess returns. Second, trading strategies based on earnings forecasts revisions can also yield abnormal returns, but the magnitude of the revision, the sector of the company, and the month in which the revision is realized must be considered. Third, when financial analysts' forecasts are published, the informational content of large revisions in forecasts has already been discounted by the market. This result is similar to findings of U.S.– and U.K.–based studies. Finally, large forecasts revisions coincide with a period of abnormal returns. However, the information content of the announcement of forecasts changes cannot be established. The gains are larger if the trade is undertaken before the diffusion of the forecast revision to the IBES subscribers. These results do not vary with the model chosen to predict company returns. This does not necessarily indicate the existence of a market inefficiency because information acquisition and analysis costs, as well as transaction costs, may diminish considerably these abnormal trading gains.     

The Effects of a Change in Market Abuse Regulation on Abnormal Returns and Volumes: Evidence from the Amsterdam Stock Market

The Market Abuse Directive came into effect on 1 October 2005. One of its purposes is to reduce illegal insider trading and leakage of information prior to official releases by increasing penalties. Applying an event study approach to a dataset of almost 5,000 corporate news announcements, the analysis reveals that the information value of announcements, measured by the announcement day abnormal return and abnormal volume, is not significantly different after the new regulation than it was before although the number of releases has increased significantly. Trading suspicious of illegal insider trading and leakage of information, measured in terms of cumulative average abnormal returns and volumes for the 30 days prior to the news announcement, has significantly declined for small capitalization firms, for announcements containing information about alliances and mergers and acquisitions and for firms in the technology sector.     

Last‐Chance Earnings Management: Using the Tax Expense to Meet Analysts' Forecasts*

We assert that the tax expense is a powerful context in which to study earnings management, because it is one of the last accounts closed prior to earnings announcements. Although many pre‐tax accruals must be posted in the year‐end general ledger, managers estimate and negotiate tax expense with their auditors immediately prior to earnings announcements. We hypothesize that changes from third‐ to fourth‐quarter effective tax rates (ETRs) are negatively related to whether and how much a firm's earnings absent tax expense management miss analysts' consensus forecast, a proxy for target earnings. We measure earnings absent tax expense management as actual pre‐tax earnings adjusted for the annual ETR reported at the third quarter. We provide robust evidence that firms lower their projected ETRs when they miss the consensus forecast, which is consistent with firms decreasing their tax expense if non‐tax sources of earnings management are insufficient to achieve targets. We also find that firms that exceed earnings targets increase their ETR, but this effect is less significant. By studying the tax expense in total, rather than narrow components of deferred tax expense, our results provide general evidence that reported taxes are used to manage earnings.     

Investor Overreaction to Earnings Surprises and Post‐Earnings‐Announcement Reversals

Prior literature suggests that the market underreacts to the positive correlation in a typical firm's seasonal earnings changes, which leads to a post‐earnings‐announcement drift (PEAD) in prices. We examine the market reaction for a distinct set of firms whose seasonal earnings changes are uncorrelated and show that the market incorrectly assumes that the earnings changes of these firms are positively correlated. We also document that positive (negative) seasonal earnings changes in the current quarter are associated with negative (positive) abnormal returns in the next quarter. Thus, we observe a reversal of abnormal returns, consistent with a systematic overreaction to earnings, rather than the previously documented PEAD. Additional analysis indicates that financial analysts similarly overestimate the autocorrelation of these firms, although to a lesser extent. We also find that the magnitude of overestimation and the subsequent price reversal are inversely related to the richness of the information environment. Our results challenge the notion that investors recognize but consistently underestimate earnings correlation and provide a new perspective on the inability of prices to fully reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings. That is, we show that investors predictably overestimate correlation when it is lacking, but underestimate it when it is present.     

Insider Trading Restrictions and Insiders’ Supply of Information: Evidence from Earnings Smoothing

We exploit the setting of first‐time enforcement of insider trading laws to investigate the relationship between insider trading opportunities and insiders’ supply of information. Insider trading opportunities motivate insiders to reduce their supply of information by concealing firm performance, thereby increasing their information advantage over outsiders, resulting in higher insider trading profits. Using data from 40 countries over the 1988–2004 period, we find that reporting opacity, as captured by earnings smoothness, decreases significantly after the initial enforcement of insider trading laws in countries with strong legal institutions. The decrease in earnings smoothness is positively related to the strictness of insider trading laws. The decrease in earnings smoothness is also more pronounced for countries that have more persistent insider trading law enforcement and for countries that impose more severe penalties on insider trading cases. Further analyses show that the decrease in earnings smoothness following insider trading enforcement is concentrated among firms that are not closely held and among high‐growth firms. In addition to uncovering a channel through which insider trading restrictions affect the information environment, our evidence highlights the importance of country‐ and firm‐level governance structures in determining the consequences of insider trading restrictions.     

Forecasting Risk in Earnings

Conventional measures of risk in earnings based on historical standard deviation require long time‐series data and are inadequate when the distribution of earnings deviates from normality. We introduce a methodology based on current fundamentals and quantile regression to forecast risk reflected in the shape of the distribution of future earnings. We derive measures of dispersion, asymmetry, and tail risk in future earnings using quantile forecasts as inputs. Our analysis shows that a parsimonious model based on accruals, cash flows, special items, and a loss indicator can predict the shape of the distribution of earnings with reasonable power. We provide evidence that out‐of‐sample quantile‐based risk forecasts explain incrementally analysts' equity and credit risk ratings, future return volatility, corporate bond spreads, and analyst‐based measures of future earnings uncertainty. Our study provides insights into the relations between earnings components and risk in future earnings. It also introduces risk measures that will be useful for participants in both the equity and credit markets.     

Earnings Non‐Synchronicity and Voluntary Disclosure

Earnings non‐synchronicity reflects the extent to which firm‐specific factors determine a firm's earnings. Prior research suggests that high earnings non‐synchronicity impedes corporate outsiders' ability to process information. This study examines the impact of earnings non‐synchronicity on managers' decisions to provide earnings forecasts. We propose that high earnings non‐synchronicity motivates managers to issue earnings forecasts to reduce information asymmetry between managers and investors and to preempt costly information acquisition by outsiders. Consistently, we find a positive relation between earnings non‐synchronicity and managers' propensity to issue earnings forecasts, particularly long‐horizon forecasts. This positive relation is weaker when earnings are easier to predict based on the firm's earnings history and is stronger when the firm has higher institutional ownership and greater analyst following. We also find that the market's reaction to management forecasts increases with earnings non‐synchronicity. Overall, the evidence suggests that managers voluntarily provide earnings forecasts to alleviate the adverse consequences of earnings non‐synchronicity. These findings provide a more complete picture about the impact of earnings non‐synchronicity on a firm's information environment, and highlight the effect of the nature of information asymmetry on voluntary disclosures.     

Market Response to Earnings Surprises Conditional on Reasons for an Auditor Change*

Our interest in this study is the relative informativeness of earnings announcements reported before and after Form 8‐K disclosures of the reason for an auditor change. We appeal to several models that predict that the market's response to an earnings surprise is positively related to the perceived precision of the earnings report. We predict that the Form 8‐K reason disclosures aid investors in updating their expectations of earnings precision by providing useful information about the financial reporting process that produces the earnings report. For 802 auditor changes from late 1991 through late 1997, the average price response per unit of earnings surprise is lower subsequent to an auditor change for companies that switched for disagreement‐related or fee‐related reasons and higher for those that switched for service‐related reasons. This paper provides further evidence on the effects of differential earnings quality on differences in the returns‐earnings relation across companies and over time as well as the efficacy of Form 8‐K disclosures of reasons for auditor changes.     

The Determinants and Consequences of Information Acquisition via EDGAR

Using a novel data set that tracks all web traffic on the SEC's EDGAR servers from 2008 to 2011, we examine the determinants and capital market consequences of investor information acquisition of SEC filings. The average user employs the database very few times per quarter and most users target specific filing types such as periodic accounting reports; a small subset of users employ EDGAR almost daily and access many filings. EDGAR activity is positively related with corporate events (particularly restatements, earnings announcements, and acquisition announcements), poor stock performance, and the strength of a firm's information environment. EDGAR activity is related to, but distinct from, other proxies of investor interest such as trading volume, business press articles, and Google searches. Finally, information acquisition via EDGAR, both to obtain earnings news and to provide context for it, has a positive influence on market efficiency with respect to earnings news. Overall, our results are important because they provide a unique, user‐based perspective on investor access of mandatory disclosures and its impact on price formation.