Work Effort, Moderation in Expulsion, and Illegal Migration

Illegal migrants supply a valuable productive input: effort. But their status as illegals means that these migrants face a strictly positive probability of expulsion. A return to their country of origin entails reduced earnings when the wage at origin is lower than the wage at destination. This prospect induces illegal migrants to exert more work effort than comparable workers who face no such prospect. The lower the probable, alternative earnings, the harsher the penalty that illegal migrants will be subjected to upon their return, for a given probability of expulsion, and the higher the level of effort they will exert at destination. While the home‐country wage that awaits the illegal migrants upon their return is exogenous to the host country, the probability of their return is not. Given the home‐country wage, a higher probability of expulsion will induce illegal migrants to supply more effort. Hence, different combinations of probabilities of expulsion and home‐country wages yield the same level of effort. Thus, variation in the extent to which receiving countries undertake measures aimed at apprehending and expelling illegal migrants can be attributed not to characteristics of the illegal migrants themselves but to a feature that pertains to the illegal migrants’ country of origin.     

Temporary Migration and the Flow of Savings to the Source Country

The saving behavior of temporary migrants when the duration of their stay abroad is set by the immigration policy of the host country is studied in this paper. The focus is on the implied flow of savings back to the source country and how it depends on migration costs, duration of the work permit, and international wage, interest and price‐level differentials. The amount of time that migrants are allowed to work in the host country is shown to be a key policy variable that affects the flow of savings repatriated to the source country.     

International migration with capital constraints: interpreting migration from the Netherlands to Canada in the 1920s

Abstract An inability to borrow affected migration from Europe to North America. This capital constraint is formalized with a life‐cycle model, where agents jointly choose how much to save, the optimal period to finance migration, and whether to migrate. Using a life‐cycle model we show that preference for the home country, the period of adjustment after arrival, and the direct cost of migration affect the savings of migrants, age at migration, and who migrates. These results are discussed in light of wages in Canada and the Netherlands, and the characteristics of Dutch immigrants drawn from ship passenger manifests. Capital constraints delayed migration and help explain the large wage gap between the Netherlands and Canada. JEL classification: J61, N32, N34     

Literacy and the Migrant–Native Wage Gap

Being able to read and write is one of the most important skills in modern economies. Literacy frequently is a prerequisite for employment and its relevance for productivity and wages is magnified by the fact that it is only through literacy that many other skills become usable. More so than for natives, this argument applies to migrants: even those with high levels of human capital acquired in the country of origin often have it rendered worthless by the absence of literacy in the host‐country language. Using novel data from a large‐scale German adult literacy test (“leo.—Level‐One Studie”, or “LEO”), we investigate the determinants of literacy and show that migrants have systematically lower language skills than natives. We find that any observed raw employment and wage gaps between natives and migrants can be fully explained by these differences.     

Intentions to Return of Clandestine Migrants: Comment

We take issue with the reasoning of Coniglio et al. ( 2009 ) that whereas better‐skilled illegal migrants will prefer to return‐migrate, lower‐skilled illegal migrants will not. We argue that under asymmetric information, all the illegal migrants are initially paid a wage based on the average productivity of the group of illegal migrants. The better‐skilled illegal migrants thus face two “taxes:” being paid less than if they were legal, and being averaged down. Therefore, better‐skilled illegal migrants can be expected to expend more effort to become legal than lower‐skilled illegal migrants. And once legalized, there is no reason for the better‐skilled illegal migrants to want to return to their country of origin more than the lower‐skilled illegal migrants. Thus, it is the lower‐skilled illegal migrants that are likely to dominate the return migration flow. We argue that in other respects too, the model of Coniglio et al. is not based on reasonable assumptions, and that even under the postulated assumptions, the model suffers from several inconsistencies. In particular, when the rate of return to savings is an increasing function of skill level, we would expect there to be few better‐skilled individuals among illegal migrants in the first place. Also, an obvious distinction between savers and borrowers is ignored.     

Migration,self‐selection and income distributions

Self‐selection in rural–urban migration is examined using three datasets from rural and urban China in 2002. We construct a migrant sample including both migrants who converted their hukou status from rural to urban (permanent migrants) and those who did not (temporary migrants). We find a strong positive selection for permanent migrants, but the selection for temporary migrants is ambiguous. We reach these conclusions by comparing migrants' counterfactual wage densities, assuming they are paid as rural local workers, to actual wage densities of rural local workers. Our results imply that permanent migration has negative effects on rural human capital accumulation and income levels.     

社会网络层次与农民工工资水平——基于身份定位模型的分析

本文在身份定位模型框架下研究社会网络层次对农民工工资水平的影响。基于2009年北京市农民工调查数据的计量结果,支持了高层次社会网络影响归属该网络的农民工、使得后者工资水平提高的假设;支持了高层次社会网络除了帮助农民工找工作之外,也可以在就业后通过影响行为模式和生产率来提高工资水平的假设。本文用倾向得分匹配的平均处置效应处理可能的内生性偏误,结论通过了较为严格的稳健性检验。政府鼓励农民工构建基于城市就业和生活的新型社会关系以及高质量的社会网络,不仅可能提高农民工的劳动生产率和相应的工资水平,而且可能提高整个国家人力资本投资的回报水平和劳动生产率水平。     

Equilibrium migration with invested remittances: The EECA evidence

This paper analyzes international migration when migrants invest part of their income in their country of origin. We show that a non-total migratory equilibrium exists. Exogenous shocks, such as an increase in migrant income, lead to an increase in optimal invested remittances per migrant, and a higher wage in the country of origin. Yet the net effect on the equilibrium number of migrants is positive. Hence, in equilibrium, emigrants' optimal invested remittances and number of migrants are positively related. We use data from twenty five countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in 2000 to test for this implication of our model. OLS and bootstrap estimates reveal a positive elasticity of the number of migrants with respect to estimated invested remittances per migrant in the range of [0.3; 0.7].     

The selection of migrants and returnees in Romania

This paper uses census and survey data to identify the wage earning ability and the selection of recent Romanian migrants and returnees on observable characteristics. We construct measures of selection across skill groups and estimate the average and the skill‐specific premium for migration and return for three typical destinations of Romanian migrants after 1990. Once we account for migration costs, we find evidence that the selection and sorting of migrants are driven by different returns to skills in countries of destination. Our identification strategy for the effects of work experience abroad permits a cautious causal interpretation of the premium to return migration. This premium increases with migrants' skills and drives the positive selection of returnees relative to non‐migrants. Based on the compatibility of the results with rationality in the migration decisions, we simulate a rational‐agent model of education, migration and return. Our results suggest that for a source country like Romania relatively high rates of temporary migration might have positive long‐run effects on average skills and wages.     

City Size and Wage Disparity in Segmented Labour Market in China

The relation between city size and wage inequality is well established for Western countries. This paper finds that city size–wage premium exists across Chinese cities to a lower extent than the Western world. Further, using a simplified model on the Chinese Household Income Project survey data, we find that the city size–wage premium varies with difference in skills among urban citizens. The variation amounts to 50% more for the high‐skill workers compared with their low‐skill counterparts. Moreover, owing to the presence of segmented labour market, the patterns of city size–wage premium and city size–wage inequality premium are notably different for the migrants, who receive a much lesser wage than the citizens and do not experience wage variation owing to their skill heterogeneity.     

GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF WORLD MIGRATION

Using a two‐bloc endogenous growth model calibrated to two generic sending and receiving countries of equal size, we assess the growth and welfare impact of world migration flows of different skill compositions. The sending country (East) has a lower total factor productivity and a lower endowment of skilled labour. Migration can induce two growth‐enhancing effects: an efficiency effect from the more efficient use of labour in the receiving country (West) and a sectoral reallocation effect from a fall in the host country skilled–unskilled wage rates. Despite growth gains, there are both winners (migrants, the representative Western non‐migrant household) and losers (the representative Eastern household remaining). Remittances can see the latter group joining the winners.     

The Distributional and Allocative Impacts of Virtual Labor Mobility across Time Zones through Communication Networks

Using a specific‐factors' model, with two goods (a shift‐working good and a non‐shift‐working good), three factors (capital specific to shift‐working, land specific to non‐shift‐working and labor) and two countries (Home and Foreign), which are located in different time zones, we highlight the impact of trade in labor services via communication networks on factor prices and production patterns. If two countries are identical in size, then under free trade in labor services, all workers work only in their local daytime, and night shift in each country is performed by imported labor services supplied by residents of the other country in their local daytime. Night‐time wage becomes the same as daytime wage (a wage equalization result). Other factor prices are also equalized. In both countries, capital rental rate increases, while land rent decreases. However, if two countries are different in size, trade in labor services does not equalize wages: in the large country, wages for night‐shift workers are higher than daytime wages and some residents work at night; in the small country, daytime wages become higher than night‐time wages and no one works at night, and night‐shift work is done by imported labor services from the large country. Land rent in the small country decreases. Land rent in the large country may or may not decrease, but it is always higher than in the small country. Capital rental rates in both countries are equalized and increase.     

Tax Policies,Regional Trade Agreements and Foreign Direct Investment: A Welfare Analysis

In this paper, we develop a partial equilibrium three‐country model to examine the relationship between regional trade agreements (RTAs) and foreign direct investment (FDI) in an environment with double taxation. Our analysis shows that FDI is welfare‐improving for at least one or both of the two regional countries if wage asymmetry is significantly large. FDI and an RTA are also welfare‐improving for the high‐wage country and the region if the wage differential is not small. We also examine the role of repatriation taxes in affecting the determination of firm location under an RTA. Our results suggest that the signing of an RTA may induce relocation from the high‐wage country to the low‐wage country unless an increase in the repatriation tax rate also occurs.     

TEMPORARY EMIGRATION AND WELFARE: THE CASE OF LOW‐SKILLED LABOR

This article studies the implications of temporary emigration for the welfare of a source country. The framework is one of general equilibrium, where the economy's stocks of both capital and labor are endogenously determined by the saving and migration decisions of optimizing agents. Simulations of the model suggest that for realistic values of the parameters, welfare of nonmigrants of the source country is maximized when the migrants are employed abroad for a period in the range of roughly 8–12 years. The ideal duration is found to be an increasing function of the international wage differential, migration costs, and the degree to which the rights of migrants are protected in the host country.     

The gender wage gap among China’s rural–urban migrants

In this study, we present new empirical evidence on gender wage differences among rural–urban migrants in China. We use a data set that includes migrants residing in urban communities and those living at their workplaces—the latter were not included in the previous studies. We find that the gender wage gap among migrants is 16%–18% and does not differ between migrants living at workplaces and those living in urban communities. However, gender differences in industry sorting play a more important role for migrants living at their workplaces, whereas differences in education and experience are of importance for those living in urban communities. Overall, differences in the returns to characteristics are the main driver of the gender wage gap, especially for migrants living in urban communities.     

Income maximization and the selection and sorting of international migrants

Two prominent features of international labor movements are that the more educated are more likely to emigrate (positive selection) and more educated migrants are more likely to settle in destination countries with high rewards to skill (positive sorting). Using data on emigrant stocks by schooling level and source country in OECD destinations, we find that a simple model of income maximization can account for both phenomena. Results on selection show that migrants for a source-destination pair are more educated relative to non-migrants the larger is the absolute skill-related difference in earnings between the destination country and the source. Results on sorting indicate that the relative stock of more educated migrants in a destination is increasing in the absolute earnings difference between high and low-skilled workers. We use our framework to compare alternative specifications of international migration, estimate the magnitude of migration costs by source-destination pair, and assess the contribution of wage differences to how migrants sort themselves across destination countries.     

刘易斯模型适用性考察

文章考察刘易斯经典模型的适用性,主要结论是:(1)刘易斯经典模型具有简单而又精巧的博弈结构,它大致适用于地主所有制且劳动力过剩的经济.(2)刘易斯经典模型不适用于自耕农制度且劳动力过剩的经济.在流动者与家庭脱离经济关系情形下(刘易斯曾考虑过),两部门工资大于或等于生存工资并在此基础上上升;在流动者与家庭不脱离经济关系情形下,农业部门工资上升而资本主义部门工资波动.(3)在多种农业土地制度并存情形下,经济发展不具备刘易斯经典模型的特征.由于劳动力流动次序由保留工资决定,其结果就是:在劳动力过剩阶段,资本主义部门工资先维持在生存水平上,此后逐步上升.(4)市场化改革以来,中国农业土地制度类似于自耕农制度,城乡分割的户籍制度使非农工作者与家庭很少脱离经济关系,劳动力流动特征与刘易斯经典模型结论也不一致.     

The composition of wage differentials between migrants and natives

We consider the role of unobservables, such as differences in search frictions, reservation wages, and productivities for the explanation of wage differentials between migrants and natives. We disentangle these by estimating an empirical general equilibrium search model with on-the-job search due to Bontemps et al. (1999) on segments of the labour market defined by occupation, age, and nationality using a large scale German administrative dataset.The native-migrant wage differential is then decomposed into several parts, and we focus especially on the component that we label “migrant effect”, being the difference in wage offers between natives and migrants in the same occupation-age segment in firms of the same productivity. Counterfactual decompositions of wage differentials allow us to identify and quantify their drivers, thus explaining within a common framework what is often labelled the unexplained wage gap.     

WHY FOREIGN OWNERSHIP MAY BE GOOD FOR YOU*

We develop a two‐country model with heterogeneous producers and rent‐sharing at the firm level. We identify two sources of a multinational wage premium: A composition effect because multinational firms are more productive, make higher profits, and pay higher wages, and a firm‐level wage effect, because a firm makes higher global profits and thus pays higher wages in its home market when becoming multinational. With two identical countries, the wage premium is fully explained by firm characteristics. Allowing for technology differences between countries, a residual wage premium exists in the technologically backward country but not in the advanced country.     

Comparing earnings profiles in urban areas of an LDC: rural-to-urban migrants vs. native workers

"We use Tanzanian data to test a recently proposed hypothesis that rural-to-urban migrants have an incentive to supply greater work effort than native urban workers, because of the migrants' positive probability of returning to the low-wage rural areas. We treat the choice between public- and private-sector employment as endogenous and, for theoretical and empirical reasons, distinguish migrants with access to rural land from those without access. Our results show that migrants in both sectors face lower initial wage offers than native urban workers. But, the wage gap is eliminated within a decade or less, and thereafter, migrants surpass the wage offers of native workers."