存款人的市场约束对银行成本效率的影响

本文基于我国2008—2015年65家商业银行的面板数据,从银行效率的独特视角对银行存款人市场约束的有效性进行经验研究.研究结果表明﹕ 存款价格约束和个人定期存款数量约束能够促进银行成本效率的提高;公司存款没有发挥有效的市场约束效应;未保险存款对银行效率有一定影响,但没有发挥正向积极约束效应;隐性存款保险制度不利于存款人市场约束效应的发挥;信息披露有助于存款人市场约束作用的发挥;银行成本效率存在显著的规模经济效应.     

DO DEPOSITORS RESPOND RATIONALLY TO BANK RISKS? EVIDENCE FROM JAPANESE BANKS DURING CRISES

This paper empirically examines depositors' ability to distinguish healthy banks from problematic banks, a necessary condition for depositors to impose discipline on banking institutions. We analyzed a large panel of 784 deposit‐taking institutions in Japan during the period from the 1992 financial year to the 2002 financial year. Our estimates indicate that depositors rightly appreciated the difference between healthy banks and risky banks, and that depositors of larger institutions are more sensitive to the bank risks than those of smaller institutions. We further argue that the estimated risk sensitivities of depositors are large enough to discipline the deposit‐taking institutions.     

The Effects of Competition on Banks’ Risk Taking

We consider the joint effect of competition and deposit insurance on risk taking by banks when bank risk is unobservable to depositors. It turns out that the magnitude of risk taking depends on the structure and side of the market in which competition takes place. If the bank is a monopoly or banks are competing only in the loan market, deposit insurance has no effect on risk taking. Banks in this situation tend to take risk, although extreme risk taking is avoided. In contrast, introducing deposit insurance increases risk taking if banks are competing for deposits. Then, deposit rates become excessively high, thereby forcing banks to take extreme risks.     

Demand deposit contracts,suspension of convertibility,and optimal financial intermediation

Summary This paper establishes that an optical contract, combining features of the well-known Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Townsend (1979, 1983) models, resembles banking. The contract and the associated allocations are derived from a social planner's problem which contains the Diamond and Dybvig and Townsend models as sub-problems. The analysis accomplishes the following. It unites the liquidity preference and cost minimization literatures in a simple way; resolves the demand deposit/demand equity problem in the Diamond and Dybvig model; introduces a notion of efficient bankruptcies into the liquidity preference literature; and raises some questions about the government regulation vs. laissez faire banking debate.I wish to thank John Boyd, Joseph Haubrich, Jeffrey Lacker, Ramon Marimon, Edward C. Prescott, two anonymous referees, and especially Neil Wallace for useful comments. I also wish to thank the National Science Foundation for financial support from grant number 89-09242.     

储蓄卡征收年费的法律问题初探

一直以来,各银行发放的储蓄卡以其免收年费、存取便利成为居民手中持有率大大高于信用卡的银行卡。但近几年来,多家银行纷纷作出对储蓄卡征收年费的方案,引起了社会各界的普遍关注。针对现实生活中存在的不同类型的储蓄卡,银行应采取不同的措施使这一行为合理、合法化。     

Religiosity versus rationality: Depositor behavior in Islamic and conventional banks

This study investigates the behavioral aspects of Islamic bank depositors in a dual banking system. By categorizing depositors into groups based on the amount of their deposited funds, we estimate the responses of these groups to interest rate changes. We take the findings of conventional banks as a comparative baseline and investigate the extent to which the changes in different Islamic depositor groups differ from conventional depositor groups. The findings show that depositors in both Islamic and conventional banks respond to interest rate changes. The analysis indicates that Islamic bank depositors are more responsive when their deposit sizes are larger. When Islamic bank depositors’ opportunity costs rise due to a rise in the interest rate, they do not hesitate to withdraw deposits. The relation between interest rate changes and deposits is more robust in Islamic banks than in conventional banks.     

Consumer perception of deposit insurance: little awareness,limited effectiveness?

The empirical findings on bank runs and market discipline are at odds with the theoretical predictions from the literature, at least in emerging markets. Using unique survey data from the Netherlands, we explore two possible explanations: deposit holders may have limited knowledge of deposit insurance (DI)-schemes or they may not fully trust these schemes to be executed faithfully. We find that knowledge on the eligibility for DI is limited, particularly when it concerns minor banks. Nevertheless, households with more deposits have better knowledge of the DI-scheme and show higher levels of trust. In addition, deposit holders generally expect an associated payback time that well exceeds the time it has taken to pay back depositors in the past. Moreover, consumers believe repayment is more likely and faster for large, systemic banks. These results confirm that both households’ awareness of the coverage and trust in the operations of the DI-scheme are suboptimal.     

Run theorems for low returns and large banks

In this paper, we revisit the issue of bank fragility in the Diamond and Dybvig (J Polit Econ 91:401–419, 1983) model with sequential service and finite traders. We provide a precise condition under which banks are susceptible to a run when the return on investment is low, and we show that sufficiently large banks are always susceptible to a run. One interpretation of the condition is that exposure to runs occurs when desire for consumption smoothing or predictability of preference profiles are relatively high.     

Banking,incentive constraints,and demand deposit contracts with nonlinear returns

Summary This paper presents two results regarding banking theory: (1) demand deposit contracts are essential in providing insurance against preferences shocks, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), if and only if the incentive compatibility conditions bind at the social optimum; and (2) for additively separable preferences with random discount factors, demand deposit contracts have the realistic feature that the interest rate paid is an increasing function of deposit balance.This paper is based on Chapter 2 of my Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of The University of Minnesota. I am indebted to Neil Wallace for his advice and guidance. I thank an anonymous refree for comments on a previous version of the paper. The comments from Edward Green, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Antonio Merlo, and Arijit Mukherji are appreciated.     

对建立银行存款保险制度的分析研究

金融中介机构在现代市场经济中起着至关重要的作用,但是伴随着中国银行业市场化步伐的加快,金融领域的平静日益被打破,“优胜劣汰”的改革会使一些金融机构退出金融市场。为了保护这一退出过程中的存款者利益,构建良好的改革氛围,迫切要求我国尽快建立起存款保险制度。本文主要分析建立存款保险制度的时机选择,并结合我国实际情况,提出中国建立存款保险制度的构想。     

基于Merton模型的存款保险定价研究

存款保险制度的核心是存款保险费率的厘定。本文以Merton存款保险定价的看跌期权模型为基础,引入监管宽容和未保险存款的利率两个参数,给出了商业银行存款保险定价公式。选择不同的银行对其保险费率进行估算,所得的保险费率之间有一定的差距,表明不同银行的存款保险费率是不同的,中国不适合单一费率,而适合风险费率。本文对我国正在酝酿出台的存款保险制度具有一定的指导意义。     

Banks and financial crises: contributions of Ben Bernanke,Douglas Diamond,and Philip Dybvig*

The 2022 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel was awarded to Ben S. Bernanke, Douglas W. Diamond, and Philip H. Dybvig “for research on banks and financial crises”. This article surveys the contributions of the three laureates and discusses how their insights have changed the way that academics and policymakers understand banks and their roles in financial crises.     

Exploiting old customers and attracting new ones: The case of bank deposit pricing

Recent theoretical contributions suggest that deposit interest rates should be higher in geographic areas characterized by greater in-migration and lower for depositors at banks with greater shares of existing (or so-called “locked-in”) depositors. These hypotheses are tested using a rich data set obtained for the Spanish banking industry. Results confirm that, all else equal, banks offer higher deposit rates in territories characterized by greater in-migration, and also that they tend to offer lower rates, the larger the number of their locked-in depositors. These findings confirm the existence of the trade-off between exploiting old customers and attracting new ones.     

Deposit insurance and moral hazard problem: the case of Turkish banking system

We investigate the effect of full deposit insurance introduced in 1994 on the financial performance of Turkish commercial banks. We construct a model, under reasonable assumptions, with deposit insurance where banks undertake excessive risk –?moral hazard risk. Empirical investigation using experimental design approach supports our moral hazard hypothesis. Our findings indicate that banks subject to the moral hazard behaviour show significant increases in foreign exchange position risk and deterioration in capital adequacy relative to their benchmark after introduction of full deposit insurance system. We relate this excessive risk-taking to the moral hazard behaviour by commercial banks. The research results indicate that complete deposit insurance system distorts the incentive structure of commercial banks and thus, prevents proper functioning of market discipline mechanism and leads to the taking excessive risk-taking.     

我国银行存款保险制度的路径选择研究

明确存款保险制度应当作为我国金融安全的重要组成部分。基于风险定价的存款保险费应当由政府和银行共同承担。政府提供的隐性存款保险随着存款保险制度完善逐步减少,为银行积累资本赢得时间。银行应当通过充实资本,降低存款保险费,为实施明确存款保险创造条件。我国最终应当建立信息透明、市场机制主导、政府严格监管、风险处置及时的明确存款保险制度。     

Deposit insurance and depositor discipline: direct evidence on bank switching behaviour in Japan

As Japan's financial system becomes more market oriented, depositor discipline is playing a larger role in the monitoring of banks. Matching household survey data with banks’ financial data, we examine households’ response to bank risk and different deposit insurance schemes. We find that bank switching in response to risk increased between 1996 and 2001 and households’ choice of bank adequately reflects banks’ financial health. We also examine the determinants of households’ knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme and how this affects switching behaviour. The results suggest that depositor discipline works and could play an important supplementary role in bank monitoring.     

FDIC Coverage on bank failures: Cointegration analysis using annual data, 1942–91

The present study empirically investigates whether in the U.S. federal government-provided deposit insurance, which was intended to prevent runs on banks and to protect depositors of modest means, has acted to induce increased bank failures. This issue has been investigated earlier, but only with regression analysis, and it remains unresolved since results vary sharply from one study to the next. By contrast, the present study uses cointegration techniques to investigate this problem. The cointegration analysis finds strong evidence of a cointegrating relationship between the bank failure rate and the extent of central government-provided deposit insurance, as well as other variables. Maximum eigenvalue and trace test results, along with normalized cointegrating vectors and likelihood ratio test results, are provided for examination.     

Preventing bank panics: The role of the regulator's preferences

How do the preferences of a banking authority affect its decision making in periods of distress and thus financial stability? We study this question in a version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with a monopolistic bank and a time-consistent policy response by a banking authority. We show that limited commitment on the part of the banking authority may induce fragility but the banking authority's incentives are also an important determining factor in the degree of financial stability. In particular, under a simple suspension scheme, delegating a banking authority who places sufficient weight on a banker's welfare acts as a commitment device and prevents runs, in analogy with how a Rogoff (1985) “conservative” central banker helps reduce inflation bias. In contrast, once interventions take the form of payment rescheduling, the scope for the bank's susceptibility to a panic increases should the banking authority put more weight on monopoly rents. Identifying such an aspect of vulnerability suggests that appointing a banking authority whose objective function deviates from that of depositors may have unintended consequences.     

信息披露、存款保险制度与银行系统性风险

文章基于不完全信息动态博弈模型,对信息披露、存款保险制度与系统性风险之间的作用机制进行了理论分析,并使用2006-2014年24个国家137家上市商业银行的面板数据进行了实证考察。研究发现,提高银行的信息披露程度,有助于降低融资成本和存款保险缴费费率,引导其减小银行间资产的相关性,从而降低系统性风险;存款保险的金融稳定效应不明显,提高信息披露程度有效缓解了存款保险制度的道德风险,两者在降低银行系统性风险方面存在协同效应。设计合理的存款保险制度、经验丰富的监管当局和严格的监管体系有助于发挥市场约束作用,限制存款保险的道德风险,从而维护金融体系的稳定。因此,在我国正式实施存款保险制度的背景下,监管部门应加强银行信息披露和优化存款保险设计,以更好地防范我国金融体系的系统性风险。     

A bank runs model with a continuum of types

We consider a bank runs model à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) [3] with a continuum of agent types, indexed by the degree of patience. Much of our understanding based on the two-type model must be modified. The endogenous determination of a cutoff type is central to the analysis. In the case where the bank can credibly commit to a contract, the optimal contract results in socially excessive early withdrawals in every equilibrium of the post-deposit subgame. Thus, even at the best equilibrium the socially efficient outcome is not achieved, and agents? behavior exhibits features of a bank run. In the case where commitment is not possible, there are strictly more early withdrawals and strictly lower welfare than the full-commitment equilibrium.