LEARNING-BY-DOING AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN A MODEL OF MONOPOLY REGULATION*

This paper combines learning-by-doing and asymmetric information in a model of monopoly regulation with and without foreign competition. The principal source of the information asymmetry is unobservable firm effort in the learning process, although unobservable costs are also considered. The major result is that a post-learning all-or-nothing output-contingent lump-sum subsidy can achieve the regulator's complete information welfare maximum. With foreign competition this model can best be thought of as one involving infant industry regulation.     

EFFECTS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION WITHIN A FIRM ON OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET OUTCOMES

I analyze the implications of the Laffont–Tirole type agency problems on oligopolistic market outcomes. In the model, a firm's marginal cost is decreasing in managerial effort and is subject to an additive shock. Both managerial effort and the realization of the shock are a manager's private information. A firm first offers a menu of contract to its manager, and then competes in the product market. As in the model of single principal and single agent, the incentive contracts implement efforts that are distorted downward relative to full information. In this model, with multiple agency relationships, an additional source for upward distortion of effort emerges as a result of the interaction in the product market. The results are robust to whether firms compete in price or quantity.     

THE WEALTH DISTRIBUTION WITH DURABLE GOODS*

In the United States, the distribution of houses is less egalitarian than that of earnings for the total population, but these two distributions are remarkably similar for homeowners. Additionally, housing as a fraction of total wealth decreases with the level of wealth. In order to understand the different factors that account for these wealth composition patterns, we introduce illiquid houses and collateral credit in a general equilibrium model of heterogeneous agents with idiosyncratic uncertainty. A combination of very persistent shocks to earnings, frictions in the housing market, and a rental market is necessary to obtain numbers in line with the evidence.     

盈余信息披露、投资者行为与市场内幕交易

本文以2008—2017年的季报、半年报和年报盈余公告信息为研究对象,利用Fama MacBeth横截面回归方法考察了公司高管和机构投资者的内幕交易行为。研究发现：（1）我国股票市场的盈余漂移异象在盈余公告前后具有明显的非对称性,股价倾向于在盈余公告前（后）对“好（坏）消息”反应过度、对“坏（好）消息”反应不足;（2）盈余公告前,机构投资者的资金净流入（出）与公司的未预期盈余之间呈显著正相关关系;（3）盈余漂移异象在不同板块之间存在明显的分化效应,在盈余公告前,主板市场对“好消息”的反应程度弱于中小板和创业板,而在盈余公告后正好相反。     

STORABLE GOOD MARKET WITH INTERTEMPORAL COST VARIATIONS

We investigate a firm's dynamic pricing policy in a storable good market where the cost of production varies over time. In anticipation of a cost increase, the firm selects its prices to affect consumer storage. Price dynamics hinge upon the curvature of demand and the magnitude of the consumer storage cost. When demand is not too convex, the consumers' reluctance to store leads the firm to reduce prices to stimulate consumer storage. This shapes the firm's cost pass-through and the price commitment effects. Our analysis provides a novel explanation for the well-documented puzzling patterns of incomplete and negative cost pass-through.     

中国住房改革对家庭耐用品消费的影响

中国的住房改革对许多城市家庭形成正的财富冲击。利用CHNS数据,我们发现:同理论预期一致,受益于住房改革的家庭消费了更多的耐用品。特别是,在住房改革的随后几年,其影响更为显著。我们还发现,住房改革对耐用品消费的次序具有影响,经历住房改革的家庭倾向于首先消费生活最必需的耐用品,然后再消费其他耐用品。通过增加家庭的耐用品消费,住房改革对扩大内需和走出当时的通货紧缩产生了积极影响。     

DYNAMIC INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH UNCORRELATED PRIVATE INFORMATION AND HISTORY-DEPENDENT OUTCOMES*

In previous papers on dynamic incentive contracts, the dynamic structure of the principal-agent relationship arises exclusively from the ability of the principal to learn about the hidden information over time. In this paper we deal with a different source of dynamics, which is considered standard in all areas of economics other than the information literature: we study situations where current opportunities depend on past and current actions, notwithstanding any information conveyed by the actions. Standard examples include investment, "Learning by doing", and R&D. In order to focus on this neglected source of dynamics, we restrict our attention to situations involving asymmetric information in each period, but without any intertemporal informational correlation, so that no dynamic effect arises directly from informational asymmetrie. This makes comparisons with static results both easier and more interesting.     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION FLOWS IN CUSTOMER MARKETS

In customer markets an information asymmetry exists between a firm's current customers and prospective customers. When a firm changes its price, current customers are instantly aware of the price change, while potential customers are informed slowly of the change. The paper explicitly models this information imperfection and the associated asymmetry in firms' customer flows. The main result of the paper is that, because of the information asymmetry, there will be a range of marginal cost and demand over which the firm has no incentive to change price. It is also shown that prices will be more upwardly flexible than downwardly flexible. The size of the range, and the extent of downward price inflexibility, depends on the rate at which information is transmitted to customers.     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IMPACTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE AUSTRALIAN TREASURY-BOND FUTURES MARKET

Abstract.  The effect of information flows on the return volatility of Australian 3-year Treasury bond futures is examined using linear and non-linear GARCH models. Results show significant asymmetric information effects, where bad news has a greater impact on volatility than good news and a non-linear Threshold ARCH(1,1) in mean model provides the most accurate estimation of return volatility. Diagnostic tests confirm this finding and out of sample forecasting error statistics verify that the Threshold ARCH(1,1) in mean model yields the lowest forecasting error. The Threshold ARCH(1,1)-M model is best at capturing the asymmetric information impact on the Australian three-year T-Bond futures return volatility.     

A MARKET WITH A SOCIAL CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITY*

We model a spatial market in which the utility of each consumer is affected by the consumers who buy precisely the same product. The marginal contribution of consumers x's purchase on consumer y depends on |x–y|, which declines as |x–y| increases. Such modelling of preferences fits goods that signal a consumer's place in society—clothing styles, automobiles and jewellry are examples. For 2n + 1 firms we find the unique symmetric equilibrium and derive comparative statics on the optimal number of firms, the largest number of firms the market can support, and the behaviour of profits per firm as n increases.     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE LACK OF PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION*

There is pervasive evidence that individuals invest primarily in local stocks and thus hold poorly diversified portfolios. The present article develops a theoretical model in which the presence of informational asymmetries introduces home equity bias. The main departure from previous theoretical work is the assumption that local investors outperform nonlocal investors in identifying the correct ranking of local investment opportunities, instead of possessing superior information about the aggregate performance of the local stock market. The second key assumption is based on the evidence that short‐selling is a costly activity.     

SECTORAL AND MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS IN A TWO GOOD OPEN ECONOMY WITH AN INTERMEDIATE INPUT*

A model of an open economy, in which two goods, a tradeable and a non-tradeable, are distinguished, is constructed. There is also an intermediate input (oil) which is both produced domestically and traded, and which is used as an input in the traded sector. There are two assets, money and internationally traded bonds. In the model the effects of various changes, including an increase in the money supply, and increases in both the world price of, and the domestic output of, oil, are analysed.     

A MARKET WITH FRICTIONS IN THE MATCHING PROCESS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY*

We construct a laboratory market in which there is a friction in the matching between buyers and sellers. Sellers simultaneously post prices and then buyers simultaneously choose a seller. If more than one buyer chooses the same seller, the seller's single unit is randomly sold to one of them. Our results show a broad consistency with theoretical predictions, although price dispersion exists and is slow to decay. Prices also exceed the equilibrium level when there are only two sellers, and buyers' purchase probabilities are insufficiently responsive to price differences when there are two sellers.     

WAGE SIGNALING: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTRAFIRM BARGAINING AND ASYMMETRIC LEARNING*

The article analyzes the effect of employer–worker bargaining on wage dynamics in the presence of asymmetric information between current and potential employers. A failure to reach an agreement leads to output loss. Because the disagreement points depend upon the worker's productivity, productive workers separate themselves from less productive workers and signal their ability through wages. In existing models of asymmetric learning, wages are attached to publicly observable characteristics and wage growth occurs only when there is a change in observable characteristics. This model, in contrast, generates an increase in earnings dispersion in cohorts of workers with similar observable characteristics.     

PRIVATIZATION AND EFFICIENCY GAIN IN AN INTERNATIONAL MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS*

This paper examines two policy instruments, privatization of the domestic public firm and imposition of a tariff on foreign private firms in an international mixed oligopolistic model with asymmetric costs. It first demonstrates that different orders of moves of firms will imply different government decisions on optimal tariff and on privatization policy. Following Hamilton and Slutsky (1990 ), this paper then uses an extended game to discuss endogenous roles. It indicates that the efficiency gain that highlights the importance of foreign competition is crucial in determining the welfare improving privatization policy. Moreover, the endogenous equilibria are associated with different government decisions on privatization.     

ENDOGENOUS PUNISHMENTS IN AGENCY WITH VERIFIABLE EX POST INFORMATION*

The article studies an adverse selection model in which a contractible, imperfect signal on the agent's type is revealed ex post. The agent is wealth constrained, which implies that the maximum penalty depends on the contracted transaction (e.g., the volume of trade). First, we show that the qualitative effects of the signal can be unambiguously tied to the nature of the problem (e.g., whether the agent is in a “buyer” or a “seller” position). Second, the distortions caused by informational asymmetries may become more severe although more information is now available. Finally, the signal can actually serve to increase the agent's informational rents.     

MIXED OLIGOPOLY IN A SINGLE INTERNATIONAL MARKET*

This paper departs from previous literature by considering a mixed oligopoly with two countries each with public and private firms competing in a single market. This differs from the traditional framework of examining a single domestic market in which foreign and domestic firms compete and is motivated, in part, by international airline markets but serves to characterise many markets. The resulting equilibrium emphasises that the strategic interaction of the two public firms usually serves to reduce welfare. Thus, the usual reason to imagine a public firm in a mixed oligopoly, to enhance welfare, is lost when such firms compete in the interest of their respective countries.     

MANAGED TRADE WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION*

This article illustrates the importance of imperfect information in self‐enforcing trade agreements. It shows that expected welfare is higher with current period uncertainty, and a high level of uncertainty may even undermine the need for a safeguard clause. These results were derived by extending the seminal paper by Bagwell and Staiger (The American Economic Review 80 (1990), 779–95) to account for current period uncertainty.