Paying Our Way in the World? Visible and Invisible Dangers of Brexit

The UK economy has long been associated with a weak balance of payments, reflecting an underlying growth model reliant on private household consumption. A deficit in goods trade, chiefly with the EU, has been offset by surpluses in services trade and foreign investment earnings. The Single Market provided wider markets for the UK, but did not fundamentally alter Britain's structural weaknesses. The Brexit vote took place against the background of Britain running its largest peacetime current account deficit. Financing Britain's external position represents a key challenge post-Brexit. Post-Brexit models for Britain partially address this. Any emergent model will critically depend on the nature of the Brexit deal with the EU, not least in terms of the impact on financial services and on supply chains. This paper sets out the recent evolution of the UK's current account position, particularly in relation to the EU. It then highlights particular areas of potential disruption from Brexit and sketches out scenarios of possible evolution of the Britain's external position in response to this.     

UK's stock market reaction to Brexit process: A tale of two halves

We examine the UK's stock market reaction to 27 events associated with the likelihood of Brexit. Though the overall market reactions to these events is negative, a dissection of these events into the pre and post Brexit referendum events unearth interesting facts. In particular, we find that the market reaction is negative and significant to the events leading up to and including the announcement of Brexit results. This negative reaction is not confined to the day of announcement of the outcome of Brexit referendum only rather it spans over the events that enhanced the likelihood of the Brexit in the pre-Brexit referendum period. However, our results show a positive market reaction to events that occurred after the Brexit referendum. These findings suggest that initially market reacted negatively to the Brexit; however, as the UK's future economic relations with EU started to take a shape, the market started to see the positive side of Brexit. Consistent with this notion, our cross-sectional analysis shows a positive market reaction for the firms that are engaged in foreign sales and that much of the negative market's reaction relates to the firms that openly stated the negative effect of Brexit on their operations. Finally, we do not find evidence of market reaction to UK firms depending on European labor force; however, we do find significantly positive stock market reaction to the firms involved more in international trade. An important caveat of our study is that our reported results are sensitive to the choice of market index.     

What's Left for ‘Social Europe’? Brexit and Transnational Labour Market Regulation in the UK-1 and the EU-27

The paper examines UK government positions on the regulation of transnational labour in the context of Brexit. Through an analysis of EU regulations on posted workers – the practice whereby a company based in one EU member state sends workers to carry out a service in another EU member state – the paper argues that the UK has consistently advocated further liberalisation of transnational labour markets in EU level decision-making, a position consistent with promoting increasingly ‘flexible’ labour markets at home. Brexit marks a turning point. Demands from British workers for stronger protection against liberalising pressure help explain the UK's recent shift towards relaxing its opposition to ‘market-correcting’ EU initiatives like the revised posted worker directive. Brexit provides a window of opportunity for the revitalisation of ‘Social Europe’ in the EU-27, without a longstanding veto player at the bargaining table, but one more likely focused more on upholding national labour protections than initiating new supranational policies.     

Making sense of Brexit losses: An in-depth review of macroeconomic studies

Almost all economic assessments of Brexit conclude that there would be significant losses for both the UK and the EU. This paper examines the driving forces behind these results. We consider the strong economic relationships between the UK and EU both at the sectoral and macroeconomic levels that are at risk from Brexit. We review fifteen studies that explore various Brexit scenarios (hard and soft) and explain why their different methodologies and assumptions yield different degrees of economic damage. Our review concludes that GDP losses for the UK from a hard Brexit range from 1.6% to 7.8%, while a soft Brexit would moderate the losses by roughly half. We also find that potential UK trade agreements with third countries could partially compensate for significant Brexit losses.     

The economic and trade effects of the UK–Korea free trade agreement on the United Kingdom,Korea, Japan,China, and the European Union

We explored a comparative static computable general equilibrium model with six regions and 12 sectors to estimate the impacts of the recent UK–Korea free trade agreement (FTA) along with the European Union (EU)–Korea FTA. The empirical results provide quantitative evidence of the impact on national GDP, national exports and imports by sector, and the changes in exports or imports among the United Kingdom, Korea, Japan, China, and the EU. The UK–Korea FTA, along with the EU–Korea FTA, increases GDP and welfare for the United Kingdom and Korea; moreover, there is a large increase in automobiles, transport equipment, and machinery exports between Korea and the United Kingdom. The GDP and welfare level of non-member countries such as Japan and China will slightly decline. Exports from the United Kingdom and Korea to non-member countries are also expected to decrease in most manufacturing sectors. The UK–Korea FTA will lead to increases in imports between the United Kingdom and Korea due to mutual trade creation effects and trade diversion effects. However, non-member countries such as Japan's exports are expected to experience a large decline in automobiles to the United Kingdom and in most manufacturing products to Korea due to the negative impact of the UK–Korea FTA.     

An assessment of the Europe agreements’ effects on bilateral trade, GDP, and welfare

The so-called Europe Agreements had been enacted in the 1990s to initiate the integration of goods markets between the 15 EU incumbent economies as of 1995 and 10 potential entrants located in Central and Eastern Europe. This paper evaluates the trade, GDP, and welfare effects of these agreements by means of structural analysis of a bilateral trade flow model. The results support three conclusions. First, the agreements exerted significant positive effects on goods trade between the EU15 incumbents and the CEEC and, at the same time, they induced trade redirection from other countries. Second, EU15 GDP responded by an increase of much less than 1% while that in the 10 CEEC increased by several percent in response to the agreements. Third, the effects on welfare were moderate in the EU15 but amounted to more double-digit percentage changes in the involved CEEC.     

Gains and losses from potential bilateral US–China trade retaliation

Two closely related numerical general equilibrium models of world trade are used to analyze the potential consequences of US–China bilateral retaliation on trade flows and welfare. One is a conventional Armington trade model with five regions, the US, China, EU, Japan and the Rest of the World, and calibrated to a global 2009 micro consistent data set. The other is a modified version of this model with monetary non-neutrals and including China's trade surplus as an endogenous variable.Who may gain or loss from global trade conflicts spawned by adjustment pressures in the post crisis world is much debated. In a US–China trade conflict, Europe and Japan would seem gainers from preferential access to US and Chinese markets. The loss of markets would hurt the US, but moving closer to an optimal tariff could be the source of terms of trade gains. And the ease of substitution across trading partners' practices would determine costs for China.Results from the conventional model suggest that retaliation between the two countries can be welfare improving for the US as it substitutes expenditures into own goods and improve its terms of trade with non-retaliatory regions, while China and non-retaliatory regions may be adversely affected. Results in the endogenous trade surplus model from the central case model specification, however, suggest that both the US and the EU (the deficit regions) have welfare losses in most cases, while the surplus region, China, and the ROW have welfare gains. In both models, when the bilateral tariff rates are very high, gains accrue to the EU and Japan from trade diversion if the substitutions elasticities of imports are high. Costs are borne by the US and China in lost exports, lowered terms of trade and adjustment costs at home.     

Costs of a missing FTA: the case of Turkey and Algeria

Turkey has been deeply integrated with the EU, its largest trading partner, particularly following the Customs Union agreement in 1996. However, the free trade agreements (FTAs) signed by the EU with third party countries may create some unfair competitive pressures, market share and welfare losses for Turkey. This study investigates the impact of the FTA signed by Algeria and the EU in 2005 on Turkey’s trade flows. Covering 181 countries, a difference-in-differences analysis embedded in an extended gravity framework is employed to quantify the trade effects of the EU-Algeria FTA for the period of 1996–2013. Our findings suggest that bilateral trade between Turkey and Algeria is affected adversely due to the FTA. The counterfactual analysis shows that Turkish exports and imports to/from Algeria could have been 12 and 17% higher, respectively, had there been no FTA between the EU and Algeria.     

Work and welfare take-up of enlargement migrants in the United Kingdom

The Brexit decision was affected by the false perception that European Union (EU) enlargement migration, in particular from Romania and Bulgaria (EU2), has been a burden to the UK. The article analyses the debated but largely underresearched EU2 migration to the UK after accession to the EU in 2007 using data of the British Labour Force Survey. The novel findings are that EU2 migrants are found to exhibit quite different characteristics and behaviour than the other European migrants while doing better concerning work, self-employment and welfare take-up.     

The Legitimation of Post-crisis Capitalism in the United Kingdom: Real Wage Decline,Finance-led Growth and the State

Since the 2008 financial crisis, capitalist development in the UK has been marked by both continuity and change. Whilst the Coalition government effectively re-established the UK's ‘finance-led’ growth model, it simultaneously broke with the legitimation strategy which New Labour had advanced in the pre-crisis conjuncture. The Coalition advanced a distinctive ‘two nations’ strategy which sought to secure a limited but durable base of support in a context of fiscal consolidation. This strategy was conditional upon the deep and unprecedented period of real wage decline which took hold in the post-crisis conjuncture. However, the Coalition successfully transformed this potential liability into a political asset, constructing a series of ‘moralised antagonisms’ between wage earners and welfare recipients, on the one hand, and private and public sector workers, on the other. Whilst this strategy secured a limited base of popular support, it also re-embedded a series of structural weaknesses within post-crisis UK capitalism. These imbalances are likely to undermine the stability of the UK’s finance-led growth model in the future and will condition British politics as the country embarks upon the process of leaving of the EU.     

Political support for trade policy in the European Union

We adopt the Stigler–Peltzman model of policy-making as developed by Hillman for application to the politics of international trade, in which the government is represented by a political support function trading-off the industry rents stemming from protection against the losses accruing to the general population. As a starting point, we examine the economic impact of actual government action as revealed by the structure of protection, backing out the weights implied by the marginal welfare effects of the set of EU import tariffs across sectors. We build on Tyers' application of methods to international trade employing a numerical general equilibrium model of the EU. This captures direct marginal effects of sector-level protection on protected industries, indirect effects on upstream and downstream industries, and the effect on overall welfare. We then deconstruct the revealed weighting pattern along the lines of industry nationality and related industry characteristics.     

Bound by Gravity or Living in a ‘Post Geography Trading World’?* Expert Knowledge and Affective Spatial Imaginaries in the Construction of the UK’s Post-Brexit Trade Policy

A key battle has been fought within the UK cabinet on the direction of post-Brexit trade policy. The opposing sides have favoured either continued alignment or a ‘hard’ break with the European Union’s (EU’s) regulatory and customs regime, in the latter case to allow the UK to pursue an independent and ambitious trade policy agenda. Contrary to much commentary on ‘post-truth’ politics, both sides have relied on rival forms of expertise to support their claims. I argue for the need to not only re-emphasise the malleability and political nature of expert knowledge, but also appreciate its emotional bases. The Treasury has led the charge in favour of a softer Brexit by drawing on econometric (‘gravity’) models that emphasise the economic costs of looser association with the EU. In contrast to this attempt at technocratic legitimation, the specific legal expertise drawn upon by cabinet advocates of ‘hard’ Brexit has appealed to an emotive political economy of bringing the UK, and its (in this imaginary) overly regulated economy, closer to its ‘kith and kin’ in the Anglosphere, deepening the UK ‘national business model’. I conclude by calling for more explicitly emotive and values-based argumentation in the public debate on the UK’s future trade policy to improve the quality of democratic deliberation.     

Who voted for Brexit? Individual and regional data combined

Previous analyses of the 2016 Brexit referendum used region-level data or small samples based on polling data. The former might be subject to ecological fallacy and the latter might suffer from small-sample bias. We use individual-level data on thousands of respondents in Understanding Society, the UK's largest household survey, which includes the EU referendum question. We find that voting Leave is associated with older age, white ethnicity, low educational attainment, infrequent use of smartphones and the internet, receiving benefits, adverse health and low life satisfaction. These results coincide with corresponding patterns at the aggregate level of voting areas. We therefore do not find evidence of ecological fallacy. In addition, we show that prediction accuracy is geographically heterogeneous across UK regions, with strongly pro-Leave and strongly pro-Remain areas easier to predict. We also show that among individuals with similar socio-economic characteristics, Labour supporters are more likely to support Remain while Conservative supporters are more likely to support Leave.     

Endogenous property rights regimes, common-pool resources and trade

A model is developed where opening to trade affects a dynamic common-pool resource stock and welfare through a community's voting decision to institute a property rights regime regulating the stock. The model finds that resource stock levels can decline even when a Markov perfect equilibrium path for labor and property rights regimes are chosen to maximize welfare. Thus, opening to trade can be welfare maximizing even when resource stock declines. Experimental results show that under certain conditions, subjects briefly follow a Markov perfect equilibrium path for property rights regime choice but labor allocations are myopically chosen indicating that some resource dynamics may be considered by subjects.     

Which commercial partners are important for the most recently admitted EU countries?

This paper describes the degree of trade integration inside the European Union (EU) after the fifth enlargement in 2004. To achieve this goal, we build a database of information on trade flows between the new EU countries (EU‐10) and 180 commercial partners in six different sectors from 1999 to 2011. Using the standard gravity model and estimating a difference‐in‐differences specification, we analyze how joining the EU affected the intensity and direction of the EU‐10's trade flows. Our results show that though trade exchanges between the EU‐10 and EU‐15 intensified after 2004, the impact of integration was much more significant to the EU‐10 group.     

Trade and Global Pollution in Dynamic Oligopoly with Corporate Environmentalism

This paper examines the effects of international trade in the presence of dynamic oligopolistic competition where the stock of global pollution has a negative welfare effect and the oligopolists' objectives may include society's pollution damage as well as private profits. In a symmetric case where the number of firms, emission coefficient, and firms' environmental consciousness are the same in two countries, an opening of trade unambiguously improves each country's welfare in the short run. In the long run, however, trade increases the stock of global pollution and hence, whether opening of trade is beneficial depends on the parameters of the economy. If there are asymmetries between countries, the short‐run gains from trade in both countries are not necessarily guaranteed, because trade liberalization may increase output in one country and reduce it in the other. Moreover, free trade may result in lower pollution stock than under autarky.     

Internal trade,productivity and interconnected industries: A quantitative analysis

Does trade within a country affect welfare and productivity? What are the magnitude and consequences of costs to such trade? To answer these questions, we exploit unique Canadian data to measure internal trade costs in a variety of ways—they are large and vary across sectors and provinces. To quantify their consequences for welfare and productivity, we use a recent multi‐sector trade model featuring rich input–output relationships. We find interprovincial trade is an important contributor to Canada's GDP and welfare, though there are significant costs to such trade. Reducing interprovincial trade costs by 10% yields aggregate gains of 0.9%; eliminating our preferred estimates of costs, gains average between 3% and 7%—equivalent to real GDP gains between $50 billion and $130 billion. Finally, as policy reforms are often sector specific, we liberalize sectors one at a time and find gains are largest in highly interconnected industries.     

PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS AND FALLING TRADE COSTS: BOON OR BANE?*

This article looks at two features of globalization, namely, productivity improvements and falling trade costs, and explores their effect on welfare in a monopolistic competition model with heterogenous firms and technological asymmetries. Contrary to received wisdom, and for reasons different from adverse terms of trade effects, it is shown that improvements in a partner's productivity must hurt us. Moreover, falling trade costs can raise welfare in the technologically advanced country while reducing it in the backward one, if technological asymmetries are large enough.     

A spatial equilibrium analysis of trade policy reforms on the world wheat market

Since a few countries produce most of the world's wheat, and consumption is widespread across the world, wheat is one of the most commonly traded agricultural commodities. In recent years, the wheat market has been going through difficult phases as wheat prices are depressed. The fall in wheat prices is attributed to a supply glut and restrictive trade barriers. This study develops a large-scale spatial equilibrium trade model for wheat to analyse the effects of removing trade barriers (tariffs and subsidies) on each country's/region's price, supply, demand, trade, welfare, and bilateral trade flows. The results show that trade liberalization leads to an increase (decrease) in prices in the exporting (importing) countries. Production and exports increase in the exporting country, and consumption and imports increase in the importing country. Consequently, the volume of trade also increases. The welfare of most countries rises, and thus, world welfare also rises.     

Welfare effects of competition for FDI between technologically asymmetric countries with varying trade costs

Given the traditional argument that host countries' excessive competition for FDI (foreign direct investment) deteriorates the host countries' welfare, this paper examines the impact of policy competition for FDI on social welfare considering varying trade costs. Based on a model where two technologically asymmetric countries compete for FDI, we determine an equilibrium where a multinational firm relocates to a less efficient country. Moreover, we demonstrate that the policy competition for FDI between less integrated economies might improve social welfare when the multinational firm relocates to a country with a lower technology and a less competitive market. Nonetheless, we show that the traditional argument can be true when the policy competition for FDI between highly integrated economies deteriorates host countries' welfare, as supported by the empirical evidences of moderated competition for FDI within EU member countries.