Earnings,Book Values,and Dividends in Equity Valuation: An Empirical Perspective*

This paper revisits Ohlson 1995 to make a number of points not generally appreciated in the literature. First, the residual income valuation (RIV) model does not serve as a crucial centerpiece in the analysis. Instead, RIV plays the role of condensing and streamlining the analysis, but without any effect on the substantive empirical conclusions. Second, the concept of “other information” in the model can be given concrete empirical content if one presumes that next‐period expected earnings are observable.     

Aggregation,Dividend Irrelevancy,and Earnings‐Value Relations*

In this paper I show that the aggregation of operating and financial income imposes three conditions on earnings‐based value functions. These three conditions provide a shortcut way to identify dividend irrelevant value functions. For example, consider any value function V_t of book value b_t, earnings x_t, and dividends d_t. The aggregation conditions imply that V_t must be of the form V_t = (1 ? k)bt + k [f xt ? dt]. f is the permanent earnings capitalization factor and undetermined weight k may be any function of Δ_t ≡[φx_t ? d_t] ? b_t. The Ohlson 1995 model is the special case when k is constant. But generally k does not have to be constant to maintain dividend irrelevancy. Whenk varies with Δ_t, V_t is nonlinear in earnings. Hence, this result specifies how V_t may be nonlinear in earnings in settings with limited liability or production or abandonment options and still be dividend‐irrelevant. An even more remarkable feature of this result is that it holds whether accounting is clean surplus or not. One must conclude that accounting‐based valuation properly builds from accounting aggregation and Δ_t, and not from the clean surplus relation and abnormal earnings as many now believe.     

Horizon‐Dependent Underreaction in Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

This paper provides empirical evidence that underreaction in financial analysts' earnings forecasts increases with the forecast horizon, and offers a rational economic explanation for this result. The empirical portion of the paper evaluates analysts' responses to earnings‐surprise and other earnings‐related information. Our empirical evidence suggests that analysts' earnings forecasts underreact to both types of information, and the underreaction increases with the forecast horizon. The paper also develops a theoretical model that explains this horizon‐dependent analyst underreaction as a rational response to an asymmetric loss function. The model assumes that, for a given level of inaccuracy, analysts' reputations suffer more (less) when subsequent information causes a revision in investor expectations in the opposite (same) direction as the analyst's prior earnings‐forecast revision. Given this asymmetric loss function, underreaction increases with the risk of subsequent disconfirming information and with the disproportionate cost associated with revision reversal. Assuming that market frictions prevent prices from immediately unraveling these analyst underreac‐tion tactics, investors buying (selling) stock on the basis of analysts' positive (negative) earnings‐forecast revisions also benefit from analyst underreaction. Therefore, the asymmetric cost of forecast inaccuracy could arise from rational investor incentives consistent with a preference for analyst underreaction. Our incentives‐based explanation for underreaction provides an alternative to psychology‐based explanations and suggests avenues for further research.     

Analyst Following and Market Liquidity*

This paper investigates the relation between analyst characteristics (number of analysts following a firm and their forecast dispersion) and market liquidity characteristics (bid‐ask spreads and depths and the adverse‐selection component of the spread). Prior research has found contradictory results on the relation between analyst following and market liquidity and has offered differing theories on how analysts affect liquidity. While prior research has posited analysts as proxies for privately informed trade or as signals of information asymmetry, I hypothesize that analysts provide public information, implying that analyst following (forecast dispersion) should have a positive (negative) association with liquidity. Cross‐sectional simultaneous estimations provide support for this hypothesis. The results are both statistically significant and economically important. Granger causality tests indicate that analyst characteristics lead market liquidity characteristics. These results clarify the role of analysts in providing information to financial markets and highlight benefits of increased analyst following.     

Earnings Management to Avoid Losses and Earnings Decreases: Are Analysts Fooled?*

This paper explores whether analyst forecasts impound the earnings management to avoid losses and small earnings decreases documented in Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, whether analysts are able to identify which specific firms engage in such earnings management, and the implications for significant forecast error anomalies at zero earnings and zero forecast earnings. We use data from Zacks Investment Research 1999 and find that analysts anticipate earnings management to avoid small losses and small earnings decreases. Further, analysts are much more likely to forecast zero earnings than firms are to realize zero earnings, and analysts are unable to consistently identify the specific firms that engage in earnings management to avoid small losses. This latter inability contributes to significant forecast pessimism associated with zero reported earnings and significant forecast optimism associated with zero earnings forecasts.     

Reconciling Value Estimates from the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Residual Income Model*

This paper examines why practitioners and researchers get different estimates of equity value when they use a discounted cash flow (CF) model versus a residual income (RI) model. Both models are derived from the same underlying assumption — that price is the present value of expected future net dividends discounted at the cost of equity capital — but in practice and in research they frequently yield different estimates. We argue that the research literature devoted to comparing the accuracy of these two models is misguided; properly implemented, both models yield identical valuations for all firms in all years. We identify how prior research has applied inconsistent assumptions to the two models and show how these seemingly small errors cause surprisingly large differences in the value estimates.     

Equity Valuation Employing the Ideal versus Ad Hoc Terminal Value Expressions*

Recently, Penman and Sougiannis (1998) and Francis, Olsson, and Oswald (2000) compared the bias and accuracy of the discounted cash flow model (DCF) and Edwards‐Bell‐Ohlson residual income model (RIM) in explaining the relation between value estimates and observed stock prices. Both studies report that, with non‐price‐based terminal values, RIM outperforms DCF. Our first research objective is to explore the question whether, over a five‐year valuation horizon, DCF and RIM are empirically equivalent when Penman's (1997) theoretically “ideal” terminal value expressions are employed in each model. Using Value Line terminal stock price forecasts at the horizon to proxy for such values, we find empirical support for the prediction of equivalence between these valuation models. Thus, the apparent superiority of RIM does not hold in a level playing field comparison. Our second research objective is to demonstrate that, within each class of the DCF and RIM valuation models, the model that employs Value Line forecasted price in the terminal value expression generates the lowest prediction errors, compared with models that employ non‐price‐based terminal values under arbitrary growth assumptions. The results indicate that, for both DCF and RIM, price‐based valuation models outperform the corresponding non‐price‐based models by a wide margin. These results imply that researchers should exercise care in interpreting findings from models using ad hoc terminal value expressions.     

The Association between Changes in Interest Rates,Earnings, and Equity Values*

Numerous studies have documented that stock returns are negatively related to changes in interest rates, but there has been little corroborating research on the information in interest‐rate changes about the fundamentals that the stock market prices. The negative correlation is often attributed to changes in the discount rate, a denominator effect in a valuation model. However, there may also be a numerator effect on the expected payoffs that are discounted. This paper shows that changes in interest rates are positively related to subsequent earnings, but the change in earnings is typically not large enough to cover the change in the required return. Hence, the net (numerator and denominator) effect on equity value is negative, consistent with the results of the research on interest rates and stock returns.     

The Interdependent Use of Earnings and Dividends in Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

Abstract. This paper examines how analysts combine earnings and dividend information when they predict future earnings. Because both earnings and dividends are noisy indications of future earnings, we posit that analysts use the two corroboratively, to confirm the information reflected in each, and that analysts will substitute away from earnings when it is noisy and toward dividends. Using regressions of analysts' earnings forecast revisions on unexpected earnings, unexpected dividends, and five variables that reflect whether the signs of unexpected earnings and dividends confirm or contradict each other, we find evidence of both corroboration and substitution. Analysts' earnings forecast revisions are significantly related to the five corroborative variables, and this relation has statistically significant explanatory power beyond that in the magnitudes of unexpected earnings and unexpected dividends. Consistent with expectations, we find that the evidence of corroboration varies across the noisiness of earnings information; there is more evidence of corroboration when earnings are more variable. We also find evidence consistent with analysts substituting away from earnings, toward dividend information for firms with noisy earnings information (high variance). Overall, the results imply that analysts use earnings and dividend information interdependently, with some interdependency determined by the noisiness of earnings announcements. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent comment les analystes combinent l'information relative aux bénéfices et aux dividendes pour prévoir les bénéfices futurs. Les bénéfices et les dividendes étant tous deux des indicateurs imparfaits des bénéfices futurs, les auteurs posent l'hypothèse que les analystes utilisent les deux, à titre corroboratif, pour confirmer l'information que livre chacun de ces indicateurs et qu'ils préféreront les dividendes aux bénéfices, si ces derniers se révèlent un indicateur imparfait. En procédant à la régression des révisions des prévisions de bénéfices des analystes sur les bénéfices imprévus, sur les dividendes imprévus et sur cinq variables indiquant si les pronostics de bénéfices et de dividendes imprévus se confirment ou s'infirment les uns les autres, les auteurs enregistrent des données qui vont à la fois dans le sens de la corroboration et de la substitution. Les révisions des prévisions de bénéfices des analystes présentent une relation significative avec les cinq variables de corroboration, relation qui affiche un pouvoir d'explication statistiquement significatif, au-delà de celui de l'ampleur des bénéfices imprévus et des dividendes imprévus. Conformément aux prévisions, les auteurs constatent que la preuve de corroboration varie selon le degré d'imperfection de l'information relative aux bénéfices; les preuves de corroboration sont plus fortes lorsque les bénéfices varient davantage. Les auteurs font également état de constatations conformes à l'hypothèse selon laquelle les ana lystes écartent l'information relative aux bénéfices pour y substituer l'information relative aux dividendes dans le cas d'entreprises dont l'information relative aux bénéfices est imparfaite (variance élevée). Dans l'ensemble, les résultats invitent à la conclusion que les analystes utilisent l'information relative aux bénéfices et aux dividendes de manière interdépendante, une partie de cette interdépendance étant déterminée par l'imperfection de l'information communiquée en ce qui a trait aux bénéfices.     

The Relation between Analysts' Forecasts of Long‐Term Earnings Growth and Stock Price Performance Following Equity Offerings*

In this paper we evaluate the role of sell‐side analysts' long‐term earnings growth forecasts in the pricing of common equity offerings. We find that, in general, sell‐side analysts' long‐term growth forecasts are systematically overly optimistic around equity offerings and that analysts employed by the lead managers of the offerings make the most optimistic growth forecasts. In additional, we find a positive relation between the fees paid to the affiliated analysts' employers and the level of the affiliated analysts' growth forecasts. We also document that the post‐offering underperformance is most pronounced for firms with the highest growth forecasts made by affiliated analysts. Finally, we demonstrate that the post‐offering underperformance disappears once we control for the overoptimism in earnings growth expectations. Thus, the evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the “equity issue puzzle” arising from overly optimistic earnings growth expectations held at the time of the offerings.     

The Relation Between Security Returns,Firm Earnings,and Industry Earnings*

Abstract. In this paper we examine the relation between a firm's stock return and the earnings of other firms in the same industry, controlling for the firm's own earnings. We present a model in which the sign of this relation depends on the relative uncertainty there is about the size of the total industry value versus the division of that value between firms. We document considerable cross-industry variation in the relation between a firm's return and other firms' earnings, and demonstrate empirically that the sign of the relation depends on information provided prior to the industry earnings announcement period. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent la relation entre le rendement de l'action d'une société et les bénéfices des entreprises appartenant au même secteur d'activité, en veillant à contrôler les bénéfices de la société en question. Dans le modèle qu'ils proposent, le sens (positif ou négatif) de cette relation dépend de l'incertitude relative qui caractérise l'importance de la valeur globale du secteur d'activité par rapport au partage de cette valeur entre les entreprises qui le constituent. Les auteurs ont recueilli quantité d'information confirmant l'existence d'une forte variation dans la relation entre le rendement des actions d'une entreprise et les bénéfices des autres entreprises d'un même secteur; ils démontrent aussi empiriquement que le sens de la relation dépend de l'information produite avant la période où les bénéfices du secteur sont communiqués.     

The Relation between Aggregate Earnings and Security Returns over Long Intervals*

This paper provides a theoretical explanation and consistent empirical evidence for the increase in the contemporaneous correlation between returns and aggregate earnings as the return interval is lengthened. Consistent with intuition and with Easton, Harris, and Ohlson 1992, the analysis shows that aggregation over time renders the lag in accounting recognition relatively less important and thus improves the returns‐earnings R². Interestingly, the analysis also reveals that aggregating earnings over longer periods increases the positive covariance between aggregate earnings and the accounting lag, which may further increase the R². This positive covariance can lead to an earnings coefficient greater than one over some range of aggregation, which is consistent with the findings of Easton et al. that over the 10‐year interval the returns‐earnings regression slope coefficient is greater than one (1.7). The empirical results highlight the fact that the slope coefficient, which is greater than one and increasing with the interval, accounts for much of the increment to the returns‐earnings R². In fact, constraining the slope coefficient to be one results in an R² of 11 percent for the 10‐year interval, which is considerably lower than the R² of 47 percent when the regression is unconstrained. Hence, the positive covariance between current earnings and the accounting lag, rather than the diminishing effect of the accounting lag, appears to be the dominant explanation for the observed high R² over long intervals.     

Audit Committees,Boards, and the Quality of Reported Earnings*

I use data on 252 U.S. firms between 1994 and 2000 to study the relationship between audit committees and boards of directors with financial reporting quality. I initially document several changes in committee and board profile during the sample period. Results from logistic regressions suggest that measures of audit committee and board structure are related to earnings quality in a manner that is generally consistent with the predictions of agency theory. This study contributes to extant knowledge by employing different earnings quality measures from prior studies, and by expanding the range of audit committee attributes deemed important in determining audit committee performance.     

Auditor Quality and the Accuracy of Management Earnings Forecasts*

In this study, we appeal to insights and results from Davidson and Neu 1993 and McConomy 1998 to motivate empirical analyses designed to gain a better understanding of the relationship between auditor quality and forecast accuracy. We extend and refine Davidson and Neu's analysis of this relationship by introducing additional controls for business risk and by considering data from two distinct time periods: one in which the audit firm's responsibility respecting the earnings forecast was to provide review‐level assurance, and one in which its responsibility was to provide audit‐level assurance. Our sample data consist of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) initial public offerings (IPOs). The earnings forecast we consider is the one‐year‐ahead management earnings forecast included in the IPO offering prospectus. The results suggest that after the additional controls for business risk are introduced, the relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality for the review‐level assurance period is no longer significant. The results also indicate that the shift in regimes alters the fundamental nature of the relationship. Using data from the audit‐level assurance regime, we find a negative and significant relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality (i.e., we find Big 6 auditors to be associated with smaller absolute forecast errors than non‐Big 6 auditors), and further, that the difference in the relationship between the two regimes is statistically significant.     

Shareholder Income Taxes and the Relation between Earnings and Returns*

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether and how shareholder‐level taxes affect earnings response coefficients (ERCs). Our tests indicate that when the tax rate on dividends increases, ERCs decrease for firms with high levels of dividend yield and whose marginal investor is likely to be an individual. For firms with high levels of share repurchase yield and whose marginal investor is likely to be an individual, an increase in dividend tax rate has no discernible effect on ERCs. These results are consistent with the notion that the tax penalty on dividends, relative to capital gains, reduces the earnings‐return relation.     

Earnings,Book Values,and Dividends in Equity Valuation*

Abstract. The paper develops and analyzes a model of a firm's market value as it relates to contemporaneous and future earnings, book values, and dividends. Two owners' equity accounting constructs provide the underpinnings of the model: the clean surplus relation applies, and dividends reduce current book value but do not affect current earnings. The model satisfies many appealing properties, and it provides a useful benchmark when one conceptualizes how market value relates to accounting data and other information. Résumé. L'auteur élabore et analyse un modèle dans lequel il conceptualise la relation entre la valeur marchande d'une entreprise et ses bénéfices, ses valeurs comptables et ses dividendes actuels et futurs. Deux postulats de la comptabilisation des capitaux propres servent de charpente au modèle: a) la relation du résultat global s'applique et b) les dividendes réduisent la valeur comptable actuelle sans influer, cependant, sur les bénéfices actuels. Le modèle présente de nombreuses propriétés intéressantes et il peut, fort utilement, servir de repère dans la conceptualisation de la relation entre la valeur marchande et les données comptables et autres renseignements.     

Information Uncertainty and Analyst Forecast Behavior*

Prior literature observes that information uncertainty exacerbates investor underreaction behavior. In this paper, I investigate whether, as professional investment intermediaries, sell‐side analysts suffer more behavioral biases in cases of greater information uncertainty. I show that greater information uncertainty predicts more positive (negative) forecast errors and subsequent forecast revisions following good (bad) news, which corroborates previous findings on the post‐analyst‐revision drift. The opposite effects of information uncertainty on forecast errors and subsequent forecast revisions following good versus bad news support the analyst underreaction hypothesis and are inconsistent with analyst forecast rationality or optimism suggested in prior literature.     

The Effect of Investment Banking Relationships on Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts and Investment Recommendations*

Abstract. This study shows that financial analysts of brokerage firms that provide investment banking services to a company (investment banker analysts) are optimistic, relative to other (noninvestment banker) analysts, in their earnings forecasts and investment recommendations. Returns earned by following the investment recommendations of investment banker analysts, however, are not significantly different from those of non-investment banker analysts. Given that information regarding the investment banking relationships of brokerage firms is publicly available, we find evidence that capital market participants rely relatively less on the investment banker analysts in forming their earnings expectations. Although we find a significant capital market reaction around the noninvestment banker analysts' research report dates and not around the investment banker analysts' research report dates, the difference between the two market reactions is not statistically significant. Finally, we find that investment banker analysts' earnings forecasts are, on average, as accurate as those of noninvestment banker analysts. Résumé. Les auteurs mettent en évidence le fait que les analystes financiers des maisons de courtage qui offrent des services de prise ferme aux entreprises (les analystes de courtiers preneurs ferme) sont optimistes dans leurs prévisions de bénéfices et leurs recommandations de placements, par comparaison aux autres analystes (c'est-à-dire aux analystes de courtiers qui ne sont pas preneurs ferme). Les rendements obtenus par les investisseurs qui observent les recommandations de placements des analystes de courtiers preneurs ferme ne sont cependant pas sensiblement différents de ceux qu'obtiennent les investisseurs qui se fient aux analystes des courtiers qui ne sont pas preneurs ferme. Compte tenu du fait que l'information relative aux relations qu'entretiennent les maisons de courtage en matière de prise ferme est du domaine public, les constatations des auteurs confirment que les participants au marché financier s'appuient relativement moins sur le verdict des analystes des courtiers preneurs ferme dans le calcul de leur espérance de gains. Bien que les auteurs observent une réaction marquée du marché financier à proximité des dates de publication des rapports de recherche des analystes des courtiers qui ne sont pas preneurs ferme, ce qui n'est pas le cas à proximité des dates de publication des rapports de recherche des analystes des courtiers preneurs ferme, la différence entre ces deux réactions n'est pas statistiquement significative. Enfin, les auteurs constatent que les prévisions de bénéfices des analystes des courtiers preneurs ferme sont, en moyenne, aussi exactes que celles des analystes des courtiers qui ne sont pas preneurs ferme.     

Determinants of Managerial Earnings Guidance Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure and Bias in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”), some management privately guided analyst earnings estimates, often through detailed reviews of analysts' earnings models. In this paper I use proprietary survey data from the National Investor Relations Institute to identify firms that reviewed analysts' earnings models prior to Reg FD and those that did not. Under the maintained assumption that firms conducting reviews guided analysts' earnings forecasts, I document firm characteristics associated with the decision to provide private earnings guidance. Then I document the characteristics of “guided” versus “unguided” analyst earnings forecasts. Findings demonstrate an association between several firm characteristics and guidance practices: managers are more likely to review analyst earnings models when the firm's stock is highly followed by analysts and largely held by institutions, when the firm's market‐to‐book ratio is high, and its earnings are important to valuation but hard to predict because its business is complex. A comparison of guided and unguided quarterly forecasts indicates that guided analyst estimates are more accurate, but also more frequently pessimistic. An examination of analysts' annual earnings forecasts over the fiscal year does not distinguish between guidance and no‐guidance firms; both experience a “walk‐down” in annual estimates. To distinguish between guidance and no‐guidance firms, one must examine quarterly earnings news: unguided analysts walk down their annual estimates when the majority of the quarterly earnings news is negative; guided analysts walk down their annual estimates even though the majority of the quarterly earnings news is positive.