Monetary policy and price level determinacy in a cash-in-advance economy

Summary The paper considers the determinacy of the equilibrium price level in the cash-in-advance monetary economy of Lucas and Stokey (1983, 1987), in the case of deterministic fundamentals. The possibilities both of a multiplicity of perfect foresight equilibria and of sunspot equilibria are considered. Two types of monetary policy regimes are considered and compared, one in which the money supply grows at a given exogenous rate (that may be positive or negative), and one in which the nominal interest rate on one-period government debt is pegged at a given non-negative level. In the case of constant money growth rate regimes, it is shown that one can easily have both indeterminacy of perfect foresight equilibrium and existence of sunspot equilibria; indeed, in the case of negative rates of money growth (as called for by Friedman (1969)), both types of indeterminacy necessarily occur. On the other hand, sufficient conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium (and non-existence of equilibria other than a deterministic steady state) are also given, and a class of cases is identified in which a sufficiently high rate of money growth guarantees this. Thus there may be a conflict between the aims of choosing a rate of money growth that results in a high level of welfare in the steady state equilibrium and choosing a rate that makes this steady state the unique equilibrium.) In the case of the interest rate pegging regimes, sufficient conditions are given for uniqueness of equilibrium (and impossibility of sunspot equilibria), and it is shown that these necessarily hold in the case of any low enough nominal interest rate. Thus the nominal interest rate peg allows simultaneous achievement of price level determinacy and a high level of welfare in the unique (steady state) equilibrium.In this paper I consider the consequences of alternative choices of the monetary policy regime for the determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium value of money, and in particular for the existence or not of sunspot equilibria, i.e., rational expectations equilibria in which fluctuations in the price level occur in response to random events that represent no change in economic fundamentals, simply due to self-fulfilling revisions of people's expectations. I am interested in particular in making the point that a consideration of the complete set of possible equilibria associated with a given policy regime may alter one's evaluation of the relative desirability of alternative policies, relative to the conclusion that one might reach if one considered only a single possible equilibrium associated with each policy regime (perhaps a unique equilibrium involving a minimum set of state variables). In view of this I give particular attention to policy regimes of types that have sometimes been advocated as ways of reducing the inefficiency associated with a rate of return differential between money and other financial assets, and show that policies that might otherwise be desirable (policies that make possible a more desirable equilibrium than would otherwise be possible) can have the unfortunate consequence of rendering equilibrium indeterminate and making possible equilibrium fluctuations in response to sunspot events.Two classes of policy regimes are considered in particular: on the one hand, alternative constant rates of growth or contraction of the money supply, financed through lump sum taxes or transfers, with zero net government assets at all times; and on the other, alternative constant nominal interest rate pegs, to be maintained through open market operations between money and interest-bearing debt, with an exogenously fixed level of net transfer payments. The first class of policies is considered because of Friedman's (1969) well-known proposal that a constant contraction of the money supply of this sort would be welfare improving. I find that while thestationary equilibrium associated with the Friedman regime achieves the maximum possible level of utility for the representative consumer, and while the level of utility associated with stationary equilibrium may be monotonically decreasing in the rate of money growth, lower rates of money growth (in particular, rates near that called for by Friedman) are associated with indeterminacy of equilibrium and the existence of sunspot equilibria, while these problems need not arise in the case of higher rates of money growth.The second class of policies is considered because they represent an obvious alternative approach to the elimination of the same rate of return differential with which Friedman is concerned. Achievement of permanently low nominal interest rates through a simple interest rate peg is not often advocated; one reason is that it is often asserted that such a policy must result in price level indeterminacy. In fact, I find that if the interest rate pegging regime is properly specified, it results in aunique rational expectations equilibrium, regardless of the level at which interest rates are to be pegged. Thus not only does the interest rate peg not result in price level indeterminacy but it allows nominal interest rates to be maintained permanently at a level lower than that which can be obtained through a policy regime of the first sort without creating price level indeterminacy. It would hence appear, at least in the case of the kind of economy modeled here, that interest rate pegging is a more reliable way of trying to reduce the inefficiency associated with consumers being forced to economize on liquidity.This paper represents a revision of Woodford (1988). I would like to thank Leonardo Auernheimer, Buz Brock, Willem Buiter, Peter Howitt, Teh-Ming Huo, David Laidler, David Levine, Bennett McCallum, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments, and the National Science Foundation for research support.     

Foreign Money Shocks and the Welfare Performance of Alternative Monetary Policy Regimes*

The welfare properties of monetary policy regimes for a country subject to foreign money shocks are examined in a two‐country sticky‐price model. Money targeting is found to be welfare superior to a fixed exchange rate when the expenditure switching effect of exchange rate changes is relatively weak, but a fixed rate is superior when the expenditure switching effect is strong. However, price targeting is superior to both these regimes for all values of the expenditure switching effect. A welfare‐maximising monetary rule yields lower output and exchange rate volatility than price targeting for a wide range of parameter values.     

Are Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes more Volatile? Panel GARCH Evidence for the G7 and Latin America

This paper investigates empirically the relationship between exchange rate (ER) regimes and volatility of real exchange rate depreciation (RERD), comparing the G7 and 17 Latin American (LA17) countries, during 1970–2010. We estimate a panel autoregressive model with generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) errors and regime‐specific effects on both the conditional mean and conditional variance. For the G7, we find that, relative to the fixed ER regime, only the freely floating regime shows higher RERD volatility; under the managed floating regime the RERD is equally volatile and under the crawling peg it is actually less volatile. Instead, in the case of the LA17, more flexible ER regimes are associated with more volatile RERD rates, with higher volatility under the managed floating regime than under the crawling peg and with extremely high volatility under the “freely falling” ER regime.     

ENDOGENOUS TIME PREFERENCE,INTEREST‐RATE RULES,AND INDETERMINACY*

This paper extends the Benhabib et al. flexible‐price, money‐in‐the‐utility‐function model by considering endogenous time preference and re‐examines equilibrium indeterminacy in response to alternative interest‐rate rules. We show that either an active or a passive interest‐rate feedback rule can generate local indeterminacy even if consumption and real money balances are Edgeworth independent. This result is in sharp contrast to that in the related literature. We also find that in the presence of endogenous time preference, local indeterminacy may occur regardless of whether the monetary policy is based on the interest‐rate feedback rule or money growth‐rate targeting.     

A simple model for study of the determination of the price level and the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy

Summary A representative-agent model with money holdings motivated by transactions costs, a fiscal authority that taxes and issues debt, no production, and a convenient functional form for agents' utility is presented. The model can be solved analytically, and illustrates the dependence of price determination on fiscal policy, the possibility of indeterminacy, even stochastic explosion, of the price level in the face of a monetary policy that holdsM fixed, and the possibility of a unique, stable price level in the face of a monetary policy that simply pegs the nominal interest rate at an arbitrary level.In a rational expectations, market-clearing equilibrium model with a costlessly-produced fiat money that is useful in transactions, the following things are true under broad assumptions.- A monetary policy that fixes the money stock may (depending on the transactions technology) be consistent with indeterminacy of the price level—indeed with stochastically fluctuating, explosive inflation.- A monetary policy that fixes the nominal interest rate, even if it holds the interest rate constant regardless of the observed rate of inflation or money growth rate, may deliver a uniquely determined price level.- The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium price level cannot be determined from knowledge of monetary policy alone; fiscal policy plays an equally important role. Special case models with interest-bearing debt and no money are possible, just as are special cases with money and no interest-bearing debt. In each the price level may be uniquely determined.Determinacy of the price level under any policy depends on the public's beliefs about what the policy authority would do under conditions that are never observed in equilibrium.These points are not new. Eric Leeper [1991] has made most of them within a single coherent model. Woodford [1993], in a representative agent cash-in-advance model, has displayed the possibility of indeterminacy with a fixed quantity of money and the possibility of uniqueness with an interest-rate pegging policy. Aiyagari and Gertler [1985] use an overlapping generations model to make many of the points made in this paper, without discussing the possibility of stochastic sunspot equilibria. Sargent and Wallace [1981] and Obstfeld [1983] have also discussed related issues.This paper improves on Leeper by moving beyond his analysis of local linear approximations to the full model solution, as is essential if explosive sunspot equilibria are to be distinguished from explosive solutions to the Euler equations that can be ruled out as equilibria. It improves on the other cited work by pulling together into the context of one fairly transparent model discussion of phenomena previously discussed in isolation in very different models.We study a representative agent model in which there is no production or real savings, but transactions costs generate a demand for money. The government costlessly provides fiat money balances, imposes lump-sum taxes, and issues debt, but has no other role in the economy. We make restrictive assumptions about the form of the utility function and the form of a transactions cost term in the budget constraint.The model could be extended to include production, capital accumulation, non-neutral taxation, productive government expenditure, and a more general utility function without affecting the conclusions discussed in this paper. Indeed the model I informally matched to data in an earlier paper [1988] makes some such extensions. While such an extended model is more realistic, it is harder to solve. The version in my earlier paper [1988] was solved numerically and simulated. The bare-bones model of this paper allows an explicit analytic solution that may make its results easier to understand.This paper improved following comments from participants at seminars at Yale and the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank. Eric Leeper and James Robinson were particularly helpful. Comments from Michael Woodford led to important corrections and clarifications.     

Useful Government Spending and Macroeconomic (In)stability under Balanced-Budget Rules

It has been shown that an otherwise standard one‐sector real business cycle model may exhibit indeterminacy and sunspots under a balanced‐budget rule that consists of fixed and “wasteful” government spending and proportional income taxation. However, the economy always displays saddle‐path stability and equilibrium uniqueness if the government finances endogenous public expenditures with a constant income tax rate. In this paper, we allow for productive or utility‐generating government purchases in either of these specifications. It turns out that the previous indeterminacy results remain unchanged by the inclusion of useful government spending. By contrast, the earlier determinacy results are overturned when public expenditures generate sufficiently strong production or consumption externalities. Our analysis thus illustrates that a balanced‐budget policy recommendation which limits the government's ability to change tax rates does not necessarily stabilize the economy against belief‐driven business cycle fluctuations.     

The Bernanke and Blinder Model in an Open Economy: The Italian Case

Abstract. This paper analyzes the functioning of monetary policy transmission mechanisms in Italy from 1984 to 1998, highlighting the role performed by the credit system. We extend the Bernanke and Blinder model (1988) to the case of an open economy under a quasi‐fixed exchange rate regime, deriving analytically the conditions for the functioning of the three monetary policy channels generally identified in the literature (‘money’, ‘exchange rate’ and ‘credit’). These conditions explain the partial effectiveness of monetary policy in achieving price and income targets, while maintaining external equilibrium. By means of a structural VECM analysis, we evaluate the effectiveness of the transmission of monetary policy through the three channels.     

HONG KONG'S INDETERMINACY PUZZLE: INSTITUTIONALIST AND ECONOMETRIC APPROACHES*

During the free-issue regime (1974–1983), Hong Kong's money supply, price level and exchange rates were wholly governed by market forces. The system did not seem to have any nominal anchor. Theoretically its price level was indeterminate, engendering what is called an indeterminacy puzzle. The paper elaborates on the concept of price level indeterminacy and undertakes the question of empirical determination of the price level indeterminacy during the free-issue regime. The empirical investigation employs two distinct approaches - institutionalist and econometric. The results of the two approaches indicate the necessity of a broader approach to historical analyses. The paper also informs us about the relationship among money supply, price level and exchange rate in a regime of fiat money without a central bank.     

Inflation targeting and the need for a new central banking framework

This article critically analyzes inflation targeting (IT) both theoretically and empirically. IT came into prominence in the 1990s and 1 central bank after another adopted this regime in the 1990s and 2000s. Proponents of IT mainly argued that IT regime was successful on the grounds that it resulted in lower inflation rates and hence better economic performances. However, inflation rates in the world were in a downward trend from the 1980s well into the 2000s, and both IT and non-IT regimes managed to decrease their inflation rates. In addition, focusing too much on price stability through IT paved the way for permanently higher than necessary interest rates and disinflationary “tight” monetary policy periods when inflation rate was above an arbitrarily targeted level. Tight monetary policy can and do affect the real economy negatively and overemphasizing price stability may hurt the economy in terms of lower potential output, decreasing investment and more unequal income distribution. Post Keynesians offer valuable alternatives within the framework of parking-it approach to the existing monetary policy paradigm. Our main conclusion is that central banks should set the policy interest rate as low as possible and keep it there, in line with Keynesian “cheap money” policy.     

Firms’ money demand and monetary policy

Standard New Keynesian models for monetary policy analysis are ‘cashless’. When the nominal interest rate is the central bank's operating instrument, the LM equation is endogenous and, it is argued, can be ignored. The modern theoretical and quantitative debate on the importance of money for monetary policy conduct, however, overlooks firms’ money demand. Working in an otherwise canonical New Keynesian setup, we show that macroeconomic dynamics are critically affected by the firms’ money demand choice. Under the conventional Taylor‐rule framework, we prove that equilibrium determinacy may require either an active interest rate policy, overreacting to inflation, or a passive interest rate policy, underreacting to inflation, depending on the elasticity of production with respect to cash balances. We then develop a numerical analysis to evaluate our theoretical results. We find that macroeconomic stability is more likely to occur under an active, but not overly aggressive, monetary policy stance. We also examine the dynamic effects of forward‐looking feedback rules. We show that, in this policy regime, indeterminacy is likely to be induced by both active and passive rules, even for relatively low productivity effects of money.     

Asymmetric responses of money demand to oil price shocks in Saudi Arabia: a non-linear ARDL approach

Saudi Arabia is an open oil-based economy with fixed exchange rates; therefore, it has limited monetary policy autonomy. Using non-linear autoregressive distributed lag approach, this article investigates the asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on the demand of money in Saudi Arabia over the period 1990:Q1–2014:Q4. The empirical results show evidence of positive long run but asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on the money demand. In particular, we find that the positive oil price shocks are more important than negative shocks. Therefore, two policy responses can be considered: either sustaining the fixed exchange rate regime and following an economic diversification policy or switching towards a flexible exchange rate regime to achieve price stability. In that case, the existence of a stable money demand function in Saudi Arabia is a necessary precondition for adopting a monetary policy strategy targeted to price stability using instruments like money targeting.     

Does money have a role in the inflation process? Evidence from Australia

Inflation, defined as a sustained increase in the price level, is considered a monetary phenomenon, as it can be explained within the framework of money‐demand and money‐supply relationships. In the extant literature, money growth is shown to remain causally related to inflation across countries and over time, irrespective of the exchange rate regime and stability of the money‐demand function. Nevertheless, emerging literature suggests a diminishing role of money in the conduct of monetary policy for price stability, especially under inflation targeting. Monetary policy in Australia under inflation targeting since 1993 is an example of policy that denies a relationship between money growth and inflation. The proposition that money does not matter insofar as inflation is concerned seems odd in both theory and the best‐practice monetary policy for price stability. This paper uses annual data for the period 1970–2017 and quarterly data for the period 1970Q1–2015Q1. It deploys both the Johansen cointegration approach and the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) cointegration approach to investigate for Australia whether money, real output, prices and the exchange rate (non‐stationary variables) maintain the long‐run price‐level relationship that the classical monetary theory suggests in the presence of such stationary variables as the domestic and foreign interest rates. As expected, the empirical findings for Australia are consistent with the classical long‐run price‐level relationship between money, real output, prices and the exchange rate. The error‐correction model of inflation confirms the presence of a cointegral relationship among these variables; it also provides strong evidence of a short‐run causal relationship between money supply growth and inflation. On the basis of a priori theoretical predictions and empirical findings, the paper draws the conclusion that the monetary aggregate and its growth rate matter insofar as inflation is concerned, irrespective of the strategy of monetary policy for price stability.     

Monetary policy regimes and beliefs*

This article investigates the role of beliefs over monetary policy in propagating the effects of monetary policy shocks within the context of a dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model. In our model, monetary policy periodically switches between low and high money growth regimes. When individuals are unable to observe the regime directly, they form inferences over regime‐type based on historical money growth rates. For an empirically plausible money growth process, beliefs evolve slowly in the wake of a regime change. As a result, our model is able to capture some of the observed persistence of real and nominal variables following such a regime change.     

Terms‐of‐Trade Shocks and Exchange Rate Regimes in a Small Open Economy*

We examine the impact of terms‐of‐trade shocks on key macroeconomic variables by numerically solving a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy. The model considers nominal price rigidity under different exchange rate regimes. The numerical solutions obtained are consistent with the empirical regularities documented by Broda (2004), in which output responses to shocks are smoother in floats than in pegs; in moving from pegs to floats, the rise in nominal exchange rate volatility is coupled by the rise in real exchange rate volatility; and in both exchange rate regimes, net foreign assets is the most volatile variable.     

Adjustment to monetary policy and devaluation under two-tier and fixed exchange rate regimes

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether a two-tier exchange rate regime is more effective than a fixed rate regime in increasing a country's ability to pursue an independent monetary policy. The analysis compares adjustment to a monetary policy and to a devaluation in the two exchange rate regimes in a portfolio model under imperfect assets substitutability. It is shown that a two-tier exchange rate regime is capable of reducing the current account effects of monetary injection or devaluation only in the long run. In the short run, however, we can get a larger current account response under a two-tier regime. These results reflect the trade-off between quantity and price adjustment.     

Capital Flows and Exchange Rate Volatility in India: How Crucial Are Reserves?

This paper tests if the adequacy of reserves helps reduce exchange rate volatility in an environment of financial globalization, market‐determined exchange rate and macroeconomic imbalances. It exploits the difference in the period after 2010 when India did not accumulate reserves but faced higher capital flow pressures, relative to a previous managed‐float period marked by significant absorption of surplus capital flows. Along with other determinants, the sensitivity of rupee volatility is examined. The paper finds that adequate reserve holdings significantly reduce exchange rate volatility irrespective of the exchange rate regime; the effect is more through influence upon market sentiment and confidence than actual intervention. It contributes to existing evidence on the role of reserves in mitigating exchange rate volatility amid capital flow swings and offers insights into the policy environment depicted in the trilemma.     

Exchange Rate Regimes and Currency Crises: an Evaluation using Extreme Value Theory*

We test whether the exchange regime in place has an impact on the vulnerability of countries to currency crises. Our paper is distinguishable from others (i) in its use of extreme value theory to identify currency crisis periods and (ii) in using two separate designations for the exchange regime in place. The first is the self‐reported or announced exchange rate system. The second classification scheme, by Levy‐Yeyati and Sturzenegger, is based on the relative movements of international reserves and exchange rates. The Levy‐Yeyati and Sturzenegger procedure is intended to reveal the actual as distinct from the “legal” exchange arrangement. We find, interestingly, that the announced exchange regime has an impact on the likelihood of currency crises, while the “true” or observed regime does not. Announced pegged exchange regimes increase the risk of currency crisis even if, in reality, the exchange rate system in place is not pegged.     

On Functionally Distributed Quotas

We consider “functionally distributed” quotas, where trade is restricted to a function of another economic activity, paying special attention to the ratio constraint and its relation to “proportionally distributed” quotas. We propose a simple principle defining the optimal policy under a functionally defined restriction, extend the analysis of ratio import/production constraints to general equilibrium, introduce export constraints, and constraints defined in proportion to factor use. We develop the general‐equilibrium geometry of functional trade constraints and the concomitant optimal policies, deriving a “quota locus” that depicts the consumption possibilities under various regimes.     

MONETARY POLICY REGIME SWITCHES AND MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS*

This article considers the determinacy and distributional consequences of regime switching in monetary policy. Although switching in the inflation target does not affect determinacy, switches in the inflation response can cause indeterminacy. Satisfying the Taylor principle period by period is neither necessary nor sufficient for determinacy when inflation responses switch; indeterminacy can arise if monetary policy responds too aggressively to inflation in the active regime. Inflation target switches primarily impact the level of inflation, whereas inflation response switches primarily impact the volatility. Expecting an inflation target switch has minor effects on volatility, whereas expecting an inflation response switch raises volatility more substantially.     

Dynamic Analysis of the Exchange Rate Regime: Policy Implications for Emerging Countries in East Asia

This paper discusses exchange rate policies in East Asia. In particular, we explore whether actual policies that have been implemented by East Asian countries after the Asian Financial Crisis follow or deviate from theoretically “desirable” policies over the medium and long terms. On theoretical analysis, we show the relative superiority of a basket‐peg regime with the basket weight rule when compared with a floating regime implementing the interest rate rule or money supply rule. For countries that currently adopt a fixed exchange rate regime, they would be better off shifting toward either a basket‐peg or a floating regime over the medium term. A shift to a basket peg is more preferred when compared with a shift to a floating regime when the exchange rate fluctuations are large.