LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION: WAGE DIFFERENTIALS AND HYSTERESIS EFFECTS*

Competitive labour market analysis proposes that an individual's human capital endowment is the main mechanism for pay determination. This study develops a model to highlight hysteresis effects on either investment in physical capital for firms or investment in human capital for workers on wage differentials.     

KEYNES ON WAGE FLEXIBILITY AND THE AUSTRALIAN WAGES SYSTEM*

Keynes' General Theory briefly discusses the Australian wages system, as an example of a system in which an attempt was made to fix real wages by law. Keynes argues that such a system, strictly enforced, generates an unstable unemployment equilibrium or highly volatile money wages and prices. This paper clarifies Keynes' views on the Australian system, with a view to their wider relevance for the significance of real and money wage flexibility and inflexibility in Keynes' economics. The most striking finding is that money wage stickiness is a conclusion, not an assumption, of Keynes' theory of employment.     

SKILL BIAS AND EMPLOYMENT FRICTIONS IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 1970–1990*

This article studies simultaneous changes in four labor market variables: the unemployment rates for college and high‐school graduates, the education wage premium, and the level of college participation. It develops an equilibrium search and matching model of the labor market where education is endogenously determined. Then the model is used to investigate quantitatively whether the change in the above labor market variables from 1970 to 1990 in the United States can be traced to changes in the environment. A skill‐biased change in technology together with an increase in employment frictions can explain much of the observed variation in these variables.     

CARTEL STABILITY AND THE CURVATURE OF MARKET DEMAND*

The stability of collusion is analysed for a family of demand functions whose curvature is determined by a parameter varying between zero and infinity. When the number of firms is low, firms may prefer to act as quantity setters in order to increase cartel stability if demand is sufficiently convex. Otherwise, price-setting behaviour enhances their ability to collude. As the number of firms tends to infinity, Cournot behaviour is preferable to Bertrand behaviour in order to stabilize collusion, independently of the characteristics of market demand.     

UNEMPLOYMENT,LABOR MARKET TRANSITIONS,AND RESIDUAL WAGE DISPERSION

It is commonplace in the debate on Germany's labor market problems to argue that low wage dispersion is a major reason for the high unemployment rate. This paper analyzes the relationship between unemployment and residual wage dispersion for individuals with comparable attributes. In the conventional neoclassical point of view, wages are determined by the marginal product of the workers. Accordingly, increases in union minimum wages result in a decline of residual wage dispersion and higher unemployment. A competing view regards wage dispersion as the outcome of search frictions and the associated monopsony power of the firms. Accordingly, an increase in search frictions causes both higher unemployment and higher wage dispersion. The empirical analysis attempts to discriminate between the two hypotheses for West Germany analyzing the relationship between wage dispersion and both the level of unemployment as well as the transition rates between different labor market states. The findings are not completely consistent with either theory. However, as predicted by search theory, one robust result is that unemployment by cells is not negatively correlated with the within‐cell wage dispersion.     

THE MINIMUM WAGE, WAGE SUBSIDIES, AND POVERTY

In an attempt to augment the lowest wages, the United States and several other countries utilize legal minimum wages. However, the minimum wage has potentially adverse employment effects. The analysis here suggests that an alternative policy that combines a minimum wage and a wage subsidy is superior to either by itself. Such a combination can assist the low wage worker, avoid disemployment effects, and maximize market efficiency.     

LABOUR‐MARKET ATTACHMENT AND TRAINING PARTICIPATION*

This paper examines how expected attachment to the labour market and expected tenure at a specific firm affect training participation. The results, based on cross‐sectional data from Japan, indicate that expected attachment to the labour market affects participation in both employer‐ and worker‐initiated training, while expected tenure at a specific firm mainly explains participation in employer‐initiated training. These two attachment indices explain more than two‐thirds of the sex gap in training participation. Employers in less‐competitive labour markets are more likely to offer employer‐initiated training to their workers.     

ITALIAN STATE-OWNED HOLDINGS,PRIVATIZATION AND THE SINGLE MARKET*

ABSTRACT ** ** Résumé en fin d'article; Zusammenfassung am Ende des Artikels; resúmen al fin del artículo.
: Italy's state industry is in a strategic transition, the result of which was not foreseen in the reforms approved by Parliament in the 1990s. Privatization pressures and opposite trends aimed at rejuvenating the state-owned holdings (the major ones being Iri and Eni) coexist in the Italian mixed economy. However, in the absence of a clear strategic intent, the functions of Iri and Eni are destined to whither away, in spite of the success achieved by them in both national and international markets. New pressures are menacing public enterprises. The attitudes of the European Commission, the trends of the European Union's industrial policy, and the drive towards the construction of a single market challenge the competitive skills of Iri and Eni, which in 1992 became joint stock companies.     

ON THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF WAGE OFFERS*

This article investigates signaling and screening roles of wage offers in a single‐play matching model with two‐sided unobservable characteristics. It generates the following predictions as matching equilibrium outcomes: (i) “good” jobs offer premia if “high‐quality” worker population is large; (ii) “bad” jobs pay compensating differentials if the proportion of “good” jobs to “low‐quality” workers is large; (iii) all firms may offer a pooling wage in markets dominated by “high‐quality” workers and firms; or (iv) Gresham's Law prevails: “good” types withdraw if “bad” types dominate the population. The screening/signaling motive thus has the potential of explaining a variety of wage patterns.     

EXPANDING IMPUTED VALUES IN THE NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS*

After defining economic activity the author lists the chief types of non–market economic activities for which he has prepared estimates for the United States 1929–1973, and briefly describes his methodology and data sources. Some major findings are: (1) As of 1973 GNP adjusted to include the additional imputations was 63.5 percent larger than the official estimate. (2) At least since 1929 imputed values have grown faster than official GNP, especially when both are measured in terms of real factor costs. (3) The personal sector comprises a far larger portion of the national economy-almost one-third—when account is taken of imputed labor and property compensation, and its relative importance has grown. (4) Gross government product is more than 60 percent higher when the imputed rental value of public property is added to the compensation of general government employees. (5) Reflecting the relative growth of non-business wealth, imputed property income has risen much faster than monetized property income. This has mitigated the decline in the property share of expanded gross national income compared with its share in the official estimates.     

A NOTE ON PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN A LINEAR CITY AND WAGE BARGAINING

Economides (Economics Letters, 1986, 21, pp. 67–71) has shown that within a linear city an equilibrium exists in a two‐stage location–price game when the curvature of the transportation cost function is sufficiently high. One important point is that not all of these equilibria are at maximal differentiation. In this paper, we include an additional stage with decentralized wage bargaining. This intensifies price competition resulting in locations that are nearer to the extremes of the city. The magnitude of this effect depends on the bargaining power of the unions. Contrary to the model with exogenously given costs, if unions are sufficient strong all price equilibria in pure strategies are at maximal differentiation. With a low parameter for the curvature of the transportation cost function unions can improve the location decision from a social viewpoint.