DOUBLE‐SIDED ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE PRODUCT MARKET AND THE ROLE OF THE INSURANCE MARKET*

I investigate the interrelation between a product market and an insurance market when adverse‐selection problems exist both in consumers and in firms. Firms offer warranties for product failures. Consumers may further purchase first‐party insurance for the residual risks of product failures. Given that the insurance market exists, two types of equilibria are possible: (a) Different firm types offer different pooling warranties attracting both good and bad consumer types or (b) good firms attract only bad consumers and bad firms attract both types of consumers. I discuss the existence and the efficiency implication of the insurance market.     

LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION: WAGE DIFFERENTIALS AND HYSTERESIS EFFECTS*

Competitive labour market analysis proposes that an individual's human capital endowment is the main mechanism for pay determination. This study develops a model to highlight hysteresis effects on either investment in physical capital for firms or investment in human capital for workers on wage differentials.     

PRODUCT QUALITY,REPUTATION, AND MARKET STRUCTURE*

In a repeated game in which firms simultaneously choose price and product quality, but quality is observed only after consumption takes place, equilibria exhibiting high quality may exist in oligopoly markets even when the low‐quality one is a unique equilibrium outcome in monopoly and competitive markets. Oligopolists can sustain high quality through the threat of both a loss of reputation and a breakdown in tacit collusion. While we abstract from other reasons that market structure might affect product quality, we show that the inverted‐U shaped relationship between feasible quality and market structure is robust to several generalizations of the model.     

DIRECTED SEARCH ON THE JOB AND THE WAGE LADDER*

We model a labor market where employed workers search on the job and firms direct workers' search using wage offers and employment probabilities. Applicants observe all offers and face a trade‐off between wage and employment probability. There is wage dispersion among workers, even though all workers and jobs are homogeneous. Equilibrium wages form a ladder, as workers optimally choose to climb the ladder one rung at a time. This is because low‐wage applicants are relatively more sensitive to employment probability than to wage and thus forgo the opportunity to apply for a high wage, with a lower chance of success.     

SPINOFFS AND THE MARKET FOR IDEAS*

We present a theory of entry through spinoffs where workers generate ideas and possess private information concerning their quality. Because quality is privately observed, adverse selection implies that the market can only offer a price that reflects the average quality of ideas sold. Only workers with good ideas decide to spin off, whereas workers with mediocre ideas sell them. Existing firms pay a price for ideas sold in the market that implies zero expected profits. Hence, firms’ project selection is independent of firm size, which can lead to scale‐independent growth. This mechanism results in invariant firm‐size distributions that resemble the data.     

MINIMUM WAGE HIKES AND THE WAGE GROWTH OF LOW‐WAGE WORKERS

This paper presents difference‐in‐differences estimates of the impact of the British minimum wage on the wage growth of low‐wage employees. Estimates of the probability of low‐wage employees receiving positive wage growth have been significantly increased by the minimum wage upratings or hikes. However, whether the actual wage growth of these workers has been significantly raised or not depends crucially on the magnitude of the minimum wage hike considered. Findings are consistent with employers complying with the legally binding minimum wage but holding down or offsetting the wage growth that they might have awarded in periods of relatively low minimum wage hikes.     

KEYNES ON WAGE FLEXIBILITY AND THE AUSTRALIAN WAGES SYSTEM*

Keynes' General Theory briefly discusses the Australian wages system, as an example of a system in which an attempt was made to fix real wages by law. Keynes argues that such a system, strictly enforced, generates an unstable unemployment equilibrium or highly volatile money wages and prices. This paper clarifies Keynes' views on the Australian system, with a view to their wider relevance for the significance of real and money wage flexibility and inflexibility in Keynes' economics. The most striking finding is that money wage stickiness is a conclusion, not an assumption, of Keynes' theory of employment.     

NORTH–SOUTH TRADE WITH MULTINATIONAL FIRMS AND INCREASING PRODUCT VARIETY*

We present a model of North–South trade with multinational firms and increasing product variety. Firms engage in innovative R&D to develop new product varieties in the North, and foreign affiliates of multinational firms engage in adaptive R&D to learn how to produce product varieties in the South. We find that a shift to stronger protection of intellectual property rights in the South induces foreign affiliates of multinational firms to increase their R&D expenditures, results in a faster rate of technology transfer within multinational firms, and increases long‐run consumer welfare in both regions.     

THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT AND THE REAL WAGE*

We study the transmission of fiscal shocks in the labor market. We employ a structural VAR and base identification on the restrictions that shocks to government consumption, investment, and employment must raise output and deficits. These restrictions hold in both prototype Real Business Cycle (RBC) and New Keynesian models. Shocks to government consumption and investment increase real wages and employment contemporaneously, both at state level and in the aggregate. The dynamics in response to employment shocks are mixed: Increases in government employment raise the real wage and total employment in the aggregate. However, in one third of the states they reduce total employment.     

SEARCH DIRECTION AND WAGE DISPERSION*

In a directed search model, we allow the unemployed and the vacancies to choose whether to send or receive wage offers. This determines the market structure. There are several equilibria but a unique evolutionary stable one. Wage offers are made under incomplete information about the number of offers, and the equilibrium strategies involve mixing. This results in wage dispersion. We show that if the unemployment–vacancy ratio is close to unity, the stable equilibrium consists of two submarkets with opposite search directions. Otherwise, the long side of the market sends offers. The stable equilibrium is efficient, given the frictions.     

RELIABILITY OF THE QUARTERLY NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1947–1971*

The reliability of the quarterly national income and product (NIP) accounts of the United States is examined from several standpoints. First, possible sources of error in the quarterly NIP accounts are explored, the most important being the lack of appropriate data, seasonal adjustment errors, sampling errors and biases, and the nature of the U.S. statistical system. Next, four ways of assessing the reliability of the accounts are considered. The most weight is given to measures of revisions in early estimates of the quarterly NIP aggregates. Results of previous studies of revisions are reviewed, and a summary of a major study of revisions for the period 1947–71 is given. The other ways of assessing reliability which are examined are the effect of errors on economic policy making, analysis of the statistical discrepancy, and expert judgment on sources and methodology. The degree of accuracy is judged to be generally sufficient for the policy decisions for which the NIP estimates are used. The early estimates of a quarter's change in GNP almost always distinguish whether the ultimate estimate will be large or small and will usually distinguish whether the ultimate estimate will be larger or smaller than the preceding quarter. While the accuracy of the estimates has generally been sufficient, the accuracy for 1965 was judged insufficient by policymakers. There is some evidence that errors have been reduced over time.     

RESIDUAL WAGE DISPARITY AND COORDINATION UNEMPLOYMENT*

How much of residual wage dispersion can be explained by an absence of coordination among firms? To answer, we construct a dynamic directed search model with identical workers where firms can create high‐ or low‐productivity jobs and are uncoordinated in their offers to workers, calibrated to the U.S. economy. Workers can exploit ex post opportunities once approached by firms, and can conduct on‐the‐job search. The stationary equilibrium wage distribution is hump‐shaped, skewed significantly to the right, and, with baseline parameters, generates residual dispersion statistics 75–90% of those found empirically. However, the model underestimates the average duration of unemployment.     

TAXES,REGULATIONS AND THE CORPORATE DEBT MARKET*

Outstanding credit market debt in the U.S. corporate sector increased dramatically over the second half of the 20th century. During this period, tax rates on dividend distributions and corporate income decreased. This article argues that the observed decline in dividend and corporate income tax rates generated an improvement in the collateral value of corporate assets and led to an increase in U.S. corporate debt. To analyze this conjecture, we build a general equilibrium model with enforcement constraints that induce endogenous limits on debt financing. We find that the model can account for the time‐series features of U.S. corporate debt data.