Quality and Quantity Competition in a Multiproduct Duopoly

This article proposes a Cournot model of two‐stage competition to examine the patterns of vertical product differentiation in a multiproduct duopoly. Firms simultaneously choose the number of products and their qualities at the first stage and compete in quantities at the second stage. We show that when the fixed setup cost of a product is high enough to result in a monopoly outcome, the monopolist always sells a single product. Moreover, in any equilibrium of a multiproduct duopoly, quality differentiation between them will develop into a nonsegmented pattern because each firm desires to avoid a strong effect of cannibalization. The set of equilibria reveals the properties of quality differentiation between multiproduct firms. In a multiproduct duopoly, the profit from a high‐quality product can be lower than that from a low‐quality product. This finding sharply contrasts with the literature on single‐product firms, which finds the high‐quality advantage.     

Corruption Via Media Capture: The Effect of Competition

In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures: monopoly versus duopoly. While there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly, it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co‐opts with the government. We find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former, media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption.     

The Differential Impact of Accurate Product Cost Information in Imperfectly Competitive Markets: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation*

Many researchers claim that costing systems that provide materially more accurate or precise cost reports have a strict value-enhancing effect on decisions (i.e., Cooper 1988, 1995; Cooper and Kaplan 1991; Christensen and Sharp 1994; Rogers. Comstock. and Pritz 1994; Swenson 1995; Gupta and King 1997). However, this study provides theoretical and empirical evidence that the value of more accurate cost information may be dependent upon the firm's competitive market structure, as well as the firm's product market strategy. We extend the theoretical work of Gal-Or 1986 to incorporate an endogenous imprecise cost signal in two imperfect market structures: Cournot competition and Bertrand competition with imperfectly substitutable products. In addition, we theoretically link market structure to product market strategy. To examine product market strategy, we employ a laboratory markets design that allows for strategic reaction by a rival firm in each of these markets, because the competitive position of a firm is determined by its capacity to produce at low cost, or to differentiate its product from other products (Porter 1985). Consistent with our theoretical work, we argue that firms that compete on the basis of cost leadership (which we demonstrate may be characterized as Cournot competition), benefit through increased profits from increased product cost accuracy, whereas firms that compete on the basis of product differentiation (which we demonstrate may be characterized as Benrand competition) do not benefit from such increased product cost accuracy. Our results are consistent with this contention. That is, profit is higher in the experimental cost leadership markets (operationalized as Cournot markets) when subjects know their true cost, while profit is higher in the experimental product differentiation markets (operationalized as Bertrand markets) when subjects receive uninformative cost reports and make their decisions based on expected costs. These results suggest that the value of more accurate cost reports may be dependent upon the firm's competitive market structure strategy and product market strategy.     

Entry deterrence when the potential entrant is your competitor in a different market

In this article, we present a two‐period model in which one firm operates in two markets: a monopoly and a duopoly. Assuming that this firm has private information on the cross‐price elasticity of demand between the products sold in both markets, it limits its quantity supplied in the monopoly market in order to make its rival in the other market believe that entry into the monopolized market is unprofitable. As a result of this strategy, the average prices observed in both markets increase. This result suggests that the detrimental effects of entry deterrence on consumers' welfare are stronger than those predicted by previous literature.     

An Experimental Investigation of the Effect of Cost Information and Feedback on Product Cost Decisions*

Abstract. In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the potential benefits of more accurate costing systems. Subjects in our experiment participated in one of four single-person decision making settings, which varied in terms of the accuracy of costing systems (less accurate versus more accurate cost reports) and in the complexity of the economic environment (less heterogeneous versus more heterogeneous products). The costing systems provided imperfect reports that subjects could use to select forecasts of future product costs. Forecast accuracy determined the resulting payoffs for subjects. In addition to having the cost reports when making forecasts, subjects also observed the association between forecasts and actual profits for previous periods and the rank ordering of the products' relative usage of resources at each of the production processes. The results from our experiment indicate that subjects did not select forecasts based only on reported costs. Rather they updated forecasts using profit feedback and the supplemental rank information about the products' relative usage of resources. We found that profits decreased as the complexity of economic environment increased but increased with the accuracy of cost reports. The profits associated with less accurate costing systems, however, were not as low as we would have predicted had the subjects used the cost reports as their forecasts. In fact, using profit feedback, subjects were able to converge toward optimal profits even with imperfect cost information.     

Mixed duopoly,location choice,and shadow cost of public funds

We examine the relationship between equilibrium and efficient levels of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly, where a welfare‐maximizing public enterprise competes with a profit‐maximizing private firm. We introduce shadow costs of public funding (i.e., the excess burden of taxation). The profits of public firms obtained by the government reduce these costs. We find that in a mixed duopoly, the level of product differentiation is too low for social welfare. This result is in sharp contrast to the private oligopoly, where the level of product differentiation is too high. Finally, we show that when the shadow cost is high, privatizing the public enterprise improves welfare.     

An Equilibrium Selection Theory of Monopolization

We develop a duopoly model in which firms compete for the market (e.g., investing in process innovation or product development) as well as in the market (e.g., setting quantities or prices). Competition for the market generates multiple equilibria that differ in the firms’ investment levels, relative size, and profitability. We show that monopolization that affects competition in the market can act as an equilibrium selection device in competition for the market. In particular, it eliminates equilibria that are undesirable for the monopolizing firm, while not generating new equilibria. This result complicates the task of determining whether a firm's dominance in a given market is the result of fair competition or unlawful monopolization. We discuss a number of implications for antitrust policy and litigation, and illustrate these by means of two well‐known antitrust cases.     

State‐Owned Enterprises,Competition, and Disclosure

We develop a mixed‐duopoly model in which a private firm competes against a state‐owned enterprise (SOE) who cares about social welfare and is privately informed about market demand. When the SOE's social concerns are sufficiently important and when the market competitiveness is sufficiently low, the SOE commits to fully disclose its private information. Otherwise, the SOE commits to withhold its private information. When the disclosure equilibrium prevails, the private firm can be more profitable competing against an SOE than against another private firm. In this mixed‐duopoly setting, the equilibrium social welfare is maximized when the SOE puts a positive weight on both social welfare and its own profit. Our analysis has further implications for both mandatory disclosure and market entry.     

互联网平台垄断与低质量陷阱

坚定不移地走高质量发展道路,已经成为各领域发展的共识。然而,随着互联网平台经济的飞速发展,线上市场中的低质量问题也变得愈加突出,相比线下市场,线上市场同类产品不合格率、不达标率、投诉量更高。文章认为平台垄断是低质量陷阱产生的主要原因,超级互联网平台的价格垄断、流量垄断和渠道垄断行为,一方面形成了对低成本实体经济需求的"扩张效应",即低价垄断迫使实体企业降低产品质量成本;另一方面形成了对高质量产品的"挤出效应",即流量垄断带来的高额流量费用,迫使实体企业将大部分资金用于线上市场产品营销,挤出了质量创新投入和渠道垄断形成的巨大规模效应,迫使实体企业将低质低价产品打造成为爆款,保障线上市场销量优势。为此,政府部门需要加大对互联网平台恶性价格竞争的监管和处罚力度,督促互联网平台降低实体企业经营成本,强化互联网平台对实体企业的质量赋能作用。     

First mover advantage by product proliferation in multiproduct duopoly

This study aims to show that the product proliferation strategy in multi‐product duopoly is first‐mover advantage. We consider simultaneous and Stackelberg variety competitions. A firm producing more varieties charges a higher price, produces larger total quantities, and earns higher total revenue. When firms sequentially choose the masses of varieties and then simultaneously decide prices, the leader produces more varieties and enjoys first‐mover advantage. The masses of varieties can be regarded as strategic substitutes in the same way that quantities are. Finally, the market is likely to provide too few varieties relative to the social optimum.     

外生单向溢出效应下纵向差异化产品Cournot和Bertrand竞争均衡的比较研究

研究价格(Bertrand)和数量(Cournot)竞争模式下,单向溢出对企业质量选择、利润的影响。以纵向差异化市场结构为例,建立了基于单向质量溢出的不对称寡头竞争模型,运用赋值计算对模型的均衡解进行了比较分析,结论是:1给定溢出因子和学习效应的合理取值范围,领先和跟随企业的质量与利润在价格竞争下都小于数量竞争;2质量间的单向溢出效应、跟随者的学习努力都会导致领先者初始质量的下降,但在价格竞争时,这种"逆向选择"效应的程度较低;3跟随者的学习激励随着溢出效应的提高而降低,并不受竞争策略变化的影响。这些发现可以解释中国轿车产业竞争模式对合资和自主创新企业关系变化的影响。     

Endogenous Price Leadership and the Strategic Acquisition of Information

We model a differentiated Bertrand duopoly in which a firm's earlier knowledge of market demand than its competitor results in endogenous price leadership with the information advantaged firm leading. In such a setting with second‐mover advantage, we then study the firms’ incentives to acquire information and analyze an information acquisition game. Both (i) neither firm acquiring information and (ii) one firm acquiring information can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium, but both firms acquiring information is never an equilibrium outcome, even if information is free. Information may have a negative value if it causes a change in the timing of price competition.     

Export and Strategic Currency Hedging

This paper examines an international Cournot duopoly wherein a home firm and a foreign firm compete in the home market under exchange rate uncertainty. The foreign exporting firm, being risk averse, has incentives to hedge its exchange rate risk exposure. In a two-stage setting, we show that hedging via an unbiased currency futures market acts as a strategic device. In particular, under either constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion, an increase in the hedging volume of the foreign firm promotes its exports and deters the home firm’s output. In contrast to the well-known full-hedging result in a perfectly competitive environment, we find that the foreign firm over-hedges for strategic reasons. Furthermore, the separation result from the hedging literature under perfect competition no longer holds in our duopoly framework, i.e., equilibrium output levels depend on the risk attitude of the foreign firm as well as the probability distribution of the spot exchange rate.     

Fixed Cost Magnitude,Fixed Cost Reporting Format,and Competitive Pricing Decisions: Some Experimental Evidence*

Although neoclassical economic theory predicts that fixed cost magnitude and fixed cost reporting format will not influence short‐term pricing decisions, these factors systematically affected pricing decisions in a duopoly experiment. Increasing fixed cost magnitude (a pure sunk cost in this study) across experimental conditions caused participants to first lower, then raise, competitive prices. Consistent with the psychological phenomenon of loss aversion, this change in pricing behavior reduced the frequency of reported losses. This study further reveals that the accounting format for reporting fixed costs influenced pricing behavior. Specifically, participants receiving capacity costing feedback reports established increasingly lower selling prices relative to the prices established by participants receiving contribution margin feedback reports. Given that a very simple cosmetic reporting manipulation produced increasingly significant competitive pricing differences in a market setting, this study provides evidence that functional fixation is not necessarily eliminated by market forces.     

EQUIVALENCE OF COMPETITION MODE IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY WITH DELEGATION

This paper aims to examine the equivalence of competition mode in a vertically differentiated product market with the relative performance delegation. It demonstrates the equivalence of product quality and social welfare in this delegation game, irrespective of modes of product competition. In addition, in a three‐stage game of quality‐delegation‐quantity (or price), it shows that the delegation coefficient is different between high‐quality and low‐quality firms in an asymmetric vertical differentiated model, and a high‐quality firm makes better use of the delegation than a low‐quality firm.     

重构我国公路产品生产环节的市场结构

文章首先描述了我国公路产品生产环节市场的现状,并指出其具有行政垄断性市场结构的特征;进而运用福利经济学对公路产品生产环节的行政垄断性市场结构进行了深入的经济效率分析,并指出其中存在的巨大福利损失;最后运用有效竞争理论提出了重构我国公路产品生产环节市场结构的若干构想。     

基于霍特林模型的双寡头银行贷款竞价博弈

文章以银行利润最大化为目标,通过建立霍特林博弈模型研究了在我国利率市场化进程中,在线性市场情况以及完全信息情况下,不同规模、不同成本结构的双寡头银行各自的最优贷款定价与贷款风险水平选择。研究发现,当两银行贷款成本相差不大时,规模越大的商业银行的最优贷款定价越高,贷款平均风险水平也越高;此外,加强存款人对商业银行的市场约束力,可以有效降低所有银行的贷款定价水平和贷款风险水平。     

Spatial Monopoly with Product Differentiation

Most theoretical work on the behavior of spatial monopoly focuses on the single-product case, while, in reality, a firm usually produces (or sells) many differentiated products. In this paper, 1 introduce a new model of spatial monopoly with a multiple-product firm where the firm chooses both the measure of product varieties and the price of each variety to maximize its profit. I also examine the monopolist's optimal decision and its economic effects on the spatial economy with a fixed and variable market fringe, respectively. For a class of preferences to product differentiation, I find that both the quantities produced and the consumer surpluses vary across three different spatial pricing policies. This finding is in contrast to the literature on a single-product spatial monopoly where those results are invariant across different pricing policies.     

Business reforms and total factor productivity in Vietnamese manufacturing

Vietnam implemented reforms in the 2000s to ease start-up of new businesses with dramatic effect on firm entry and market competition. This study examines firm level data for the period 2000–2010 to analyze total factor productivity (TFP) in connection with the reforms, adopting a semi-parametric technique developed by Wooldridge (2009) and Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) to measure TFP. Intensified competition is hypothesized to have driven convergence of TFP within industrial sectors as technologies best suited to Vietnamese market conditions became more widely implemented. The evidence strongly supports this hypothesis with convergence found for 16 of the 17 sectors analyzed. Further, comparison of TFP growth rates between the first and second half of the decade shows mixed results by sector and region. More often than not, TFP growth is seen to have slowed over time. This suggests that competition acted not only to push low TFP firms to exit the market or raise productivity, it also discouraged use of technologies that may have been overly advanced and not cost efficient for Vietnam.     

Economic consequences of VIE when consumers are constrained

This paper, using a Bertrand model of duopoly competition, shows that voluntary import expansion (VIE) forced on consumers, instead of on a producer, is also significantly anticompetitive. VIE causes a higher price as well as higher average cost of supply. When firms can use non-linear pricing, VIE forces marginal cost pricing by the disadvantaged firm, so that it loses incentive for cost-reduction.