Rational expectations in the foreign exchange market? Some survey evidence

Although many papers have already proposed empirical models of currency crises, the timing of such crises has received relatively little attention so far. Most papers use indeed a static specification and impose the same lag structure across all explanatory variables. This, by construction, prevents from specifically timing the crisis signals sent by the leading indicators. The objective here is to fill this gap by considering a set of dynamic discrete choice models. The first contribution is to identify how early in advance each explanatory variable sends a warning signal. Some indicators are found to signal a crisis in the very short run while others signal a crisis at more distant horizons. The second contribution is to show that state dependence matters, albeit mostly in the short run. The results have important implications for crisis prevention in terms of the timeliness and usefulness of the envisaged policy response.     

The determinants of cross‐border bank flows to emerging markets

This paper studies the determinants of cross‐border bank lending on a panel dataset comprising 17 advanced and 28 emerging market economies from 1993 to 2008. The empirical framework is based on a gravity model of financial flows. Our main findings are that the decrease in cross‐border lending in the 2007–2008 crisis was mostly due to global rather than country‐specific risk factors, and that central and eastern Europe was less affected by this decrease than other emerging market regions because of its stronger financial and monetary ties with creditor countries, and its relatively sound banking systems. These results are fairly robust to several different specifications, sub‐samples and econometric methodologies.     

Domestic financial market frictions,unrestricted international capital flows,and crises in small open economies

Summary. We present an example of a small open economy where small increases in the world interest rate may induce a sharp decline in output and a precipitous depreciation of the exchange rate. Due to a costly state verification problem in domestic credit markets, combined with unrestricted international capital flows, our economy generates two long-run equilibria, one with low GDP and a relatively depreciated real exchange rate (RER), and one with high GDP and a relatively appreciated RER. The first is always a saddle, while the second may be a sink or a source, depending on the level of the world interest rate. A crisis is identified with the economy switching from an equilibrium path approaching the high-output steady state to the saddlepath approaching the low-output steady state. In Mexicos recent history, periods of growth associated with appreciation of the RER have alternated with periods of sharp contraction and depreciation of the RER. Our economy displays such behavior in response to changes in the world interest rate.Received: 9 April 2002, Revised: 20 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: E5, F4.G. Antinolfi, E. Huybens: We thank Steve Fazzari, Tim Kehoe, Todd Keister, Manuel Santos, Karl Shell and especially Bruce Smith for very helpful discussions. Jaime Calleja Alderete, Eduardo Camero Godínez, and Juan Vargas Hernández provided excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are ours. Huybens was an assistant professor in the Centro de Investigación Económica, ITAM, at the time this article was written, and part of this work was completed while Antinolfi was a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The views expressed herein are those of the authors, and do not reflect those of the World Bank or the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Correspondence to: G. Antinolfi     

Theorizing the Financial Statecraft of Emerging Powers

‘Financial statecraft’, or the intentional use of credit, investment and currency levers by the incumbent governments of creditor – and sometimes debtor – states for both international economic and political advantage, has a long history, ranging from money doctors to currency wars. A neorealist, zero-sum framing of international monetary relations is not inevitable, yet casts a persistent shadow especially during periods of prospective interstate power transitions when previously peripheral countries find themselves with unexpected new capabilities. This article seeks to understand and theorise the financial statecraft of emerging economies, moving beyond the traditional understanding that closely identifies the concept with financial sanctions imposed by a strong state on a weaker state. We propose that the aims of financial statecraft may be either ‘defensive' or ‘offensive’. Financial statecraft may be targeted either ‘bilaterally' or ‘systemically’. Finally such statecraft may employ instruments that are either ‘financial' or ‘monetary’. As emerging market economies have moved up in the ranks in the interstate distribution of capabilities, they have also expanded their financial statecraft strategies from narrowly defensive and bilateral to those involving offensive tactics and targeted at the global and systemic level. Historical and contemporary examples illustrate the analysis.     

Financial market development and trade openness: evidence from emerging economies

International trade is said to be the engine of economic growth. Despite an enormous effort to explain this phenomenon, the relationship between financial market development and trade openness and integration into the world economy is still an enigma. This article investigates the relationship between financial market development and trade openness. To do this, we develop a long-run and short-run model (a bounds testing approach to cointegration) for 18 emerging economies over the period 1980 to 2011. Estimates from all models show that financial market development, including both the stock market and the banking sector, has significant effect on trade openness in both short-run and long-run phenomena in the majority of countries. Despite many similarities among emerging economies, additional evidence suggests that the link between either stock market development or banking sector development with trade openness works via each country’s specific structure.     

国际金融危机对中国外商直接投资的影响机理与对策

基于1998年1月至2008年10月的月度数据,通过对中国实际利用外资的影响因素进行经验分析后发现,中国股市成交量、对外出口量是影响中国FDI流入的显著内在因素,但经验分析没有发现中国股市规模、人民币汇率和经济增长率会显著影响中国FDI流入的证据。另外,研究还发现,在其他条件不变的情况下,美国长期资产收益率的上升和OECD国家广义货币供给量的增加,会使中国的实际利用外资数量下降。因此,历史数据并不能说明中国FDI流入受到了跨国公司融资能力的制约。中国必须采取措施降低国际金融危机对FDI流入的负面影响,以保证中国经济的稳定增长。第一,可以采取稳定股市的政策,保持股市活跃交易,以吸引跨国并购资金的流入;第二,可以考虑对人民币进行适度贬值,或至少保持人民币币值稳定,避免因西方国家货币贬值对中国出口的不利影响;第三,可以采用诸如提高出口退税率等非汇率政策,保持中国出口的良好前景。     

The relative importance of capital inflows: some evidence from emerging market economies

This article examines the relative importance of the main components of capital inflows for a sample of emerging market economies. Does composition matter? Is there a nexus between capital inflow components? We assess, firstly, how each capital inflow component reacts to important macro and policy variables, and secondly, how the components themselves interact. We find that bank inflows appear the most sensitive to macro factors, institutions matter more for Latin America and external financial factors matter more for Asia. Further, for Latin America, capital inflows interact largely as complements, while for Asia, any expansion of bank inflows might crowd out FDI and portfolio flows.     

Why peg? The role of capital mobility and financial intermediation

Many economists argue that the growth of international capital mobility has made the maintenance of pegged exchange rates more costly, forcing developing states to choose alternative arrangements. But some states do not simply abandon pegged exchange rates as their exposure to capital mobility rises. Some states abandon pegs long before a crisis can erupt, while others maintain pegs until the speculative pressures became unbearable. Why, in an environment of growing capital mobility, do some states maintain pegs longer than others do? One reason is that the more that bank lending dominates investment in a country, the more likely that state is to hold on to a pegged exchange rate. When banks have accumulated significant amounts of foreign debt they lobby for exchange rate stability. In a bank‐dominated financial system, a concentrated banking sector can organize easily and use its crucial role in the economy to exert influence over economic policy. This article presents new evidence from statistical tests on 61 developing countries that confirm that states with deeper banking systems are more likely to peg their exchange rates, in spite of growing capital mobility.     

A Minskyan account of emerging currencies dynamics

Abstract

The currencies of a few emerging market economies (EMEs) have been following a specific dynamic since the early 2000s: They are strongly subordinated to international financial conditions, appreciating in moments of tranquility and presenting sharp depreciations in peaks of uncertainty. What is the mechanism behind it? To answer this question, this article applies the Minskyan framework to the context of money managers and their portfolio allocation decisions. The approach provides a detailed account of the mechanisms of the appreciation phase, thus complementing the emerging currencies’ literature that is focused on crisis episodes. The result is a dynamic characterized by deviation-amplifying systems—the opposite of the mainstream view where fundamentals lead to an equilibrium-seeking mechanism. Apart from these contributions to the exchange rate literature, it enriches the Minskyan literature for providing a broader reading of the original framework that allows it to be transposed to a larger set of contexts and for identifying the main elements to be translated in an analysis of a different context.     

International Financial Contagion: Why are Eastern Europe's banks not failing when everybody else's are?

While the Asian financial crisis spread to Russia and Brazil, the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) are largely unaffected by international financial contagion. This is the more surprising considering that most economies have experienced severe banking sector problems in the past, that large bad loan ratios are still prevalent, that banking regulation and supervision are only slowly improving, and that stabilizing policies have slowly been eliminated. What insulated the CEECs from the recent wave of financial instability? To consider the counterfactual, we first provide a framework that links banking crises to financial deregulation. We then focus on a number of macro- and microeconomic factors, using data compiled from the IMF's International Financial Statistics, from the World Bank's World Debt Tables, and from the BIS's Consolidated International Banking Statistics. We first compare past experiences in CEECs with those in other emerging economies as a cross-sectional reference point. We then consider whether the situation in CEECs has changed since the last banking sector problems, in order to establish a reference point across time. Our results indicate that the factors leading up to past banking crises are generally different in CEECs from those in other emerging economies. However, in recent years, the characteristics of CEECs have become more similar to those of other emerging economies.     

关于货币危机后经济衰退的经验分析

文章以1990年以来的近200次货币危机为样本,对货币危机后的经济衰退进行了经验分析.研究发现,危机前的经常账户状况、外债余额占GDP比例、国际流动性指标等经济变量以及危机后的汇率制度都不会显著影响到危机后的经济衰退.另外,危机后的经济衰退与危机国政府在危机中是否抛售外汇储备、是否采取汇率贬值都没有明显关系.但是经济分析的结果表明,危机前的失业率和汇率制度以及危机中是否提高利率等因素对危机后的经济衰退有显著作用.     

COMMON FACTORS OF THE EXCHANGE RISK PREMIUM IN EMERGING EUROPEAN MARKETS

Existing empirical evidence suggests that the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity condition may not hold due to an exchange risk premium. For a panel dataset of eleven emerging European economies we decompose this exchange risk premium into an idiosyncratic (country‐specific) element and a common factor using a principal components approach. We present evidence of stationary idiosyncratic and common factors. This result leads to the conclusion of a stationary risk premium for these countries, which is consistent with previous studies often documenting a stationary premium in advanced countries. Furthermore, we report that the variation in the premium is largely attributable to a common factor influenced by economic developments in the United States.     

新兴市场国家(地区)本币升值影响因素的国际经验比较

通过对经历或正在面临本币升值压力的主要新兴市场国家(地区)影响本币升值的因素进行国际经验比较分析,我们可以发现,在众多的影响因素中,贸易收支顺差、金融账户顺差和GDP增长率成为引发上述国家(地区)本币升值的主要因素。基于样本国家(地区)面板资料的实证研究为国际经验比较分析提供了证据。以上结论显然对于同样作为新兴市场国家,同时面临人民币升值压力的我国具有重要的借鉴意义。在我国应对人民币升值的政策中,应该优先考虑可能导致上述因素积极变化的政策的制定和实施。     

The new exchange rate policy in the Asian emerging economies – goodbye trouble,hello comfort?

In this paper, we discuss new aspects of exchange rate policy that can be observed in the Asian emerging economies. In the first place, we show the alternative regimes they may choose and their respective pros and cons. Secondly, we concentrate on the recent strategy of systematic undervaluation of one's currency – figuring prominently among ‘big’ Asian players such as China and India – and the most likely implications of such a strategy for domestic allocation, distribution and stabilization goals. With the background of Germany's experiences in 1969, almost on the eve of the Bretton Woods' system collapse, we model a speculative attack on an undervalued currency in the vein of the Flood–Garber seminal paper from 1984. Now, however, the country in concern (just like India and China) possesses strong rather than weak fundamentals. The continuous accumulation of international reserves, in addition, leads to the question of an ‘optimal management’ of foreign exchange reserves in Asian emerging economies with regard to size and composition. We finally propose a sequence of reforms/policies that should be implemented in those Asian emerging economies on their still long journey to a regime featured by autonomous monetary policy, flexible exchange rate and capital mobility. A brief summary and an outlook for future research close the paper.     

Co-movement in Stock Prices in Emerging Economies: The Case of the Caricom Region

The Grand Anse Declaration of 1989 recognised the need for financial integration within the emerging economies that comprise the CARICOM region, as a way of furthering the wider process of economic integration and, indeed, economic development in that region. Using co-movement as a measure of financial integration, this paper investigates the co-movement in stock prices among the Barbados, the Jamaica and the Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchanges, the three major exchanges within the CARICOM region. It also examines how integrated these exchanges are with the New York Stock Exchange. The GARCH-Copula methodology and, to a lesser extent, estimated correlation coefficients, are used to attain this objective. There appears to be co-movement in stock prices and returns within the CARICOM stock markets and significant dependence structures between the returns of the three CARICOM stock markets. However, there is considerably less evidence of integration between the CARICOM markets and the New York Stock Exchange.     

Understanding the politics of bailout policies in non-Western countries: The use of sovereign wealth funds

This article examines bailout policies in non-Western states through selected case studies of financial bailouts in Hong Kong and Singapore between the 1960s and 1990s. Given their structural similarities and extreme openness, standard explanations would expect to find similar policy responses over this period. However, between the 1960s and 1990s, bailout policies differed greatly between the two countries, particularly with respect to the use of their sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). This article also shows that the differing uses of SWFs reflected the respective regulatory environments. In line with an emerging stream of studies in comparative politics, the present article finds that these differences take root in the institutional settings of the respective countries and vary across state-business relations.     

A Simple Model to Teach Business Cycle Macroeconomics for Emerging Market and Developing Economies

The canonical neoclassical model is insufficient to understand business cycle fluctuations in emerging market and developing economies. The author reformulates the model proposed by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007 Ahumada, I., and F. Butler. 2009. La enseñanza de la economía en México. Working Paper 672. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Google Scholar]) in a simple setting that can be used to teach business cycle macroeconomics for emerging market and developing economies at the undergraduate level. The simplified model is employed for qualitatively explaining facts such as the highly countercyclicality of the trade balance and the higher volatility of output and consumption compared with those observed in advanced countries.     

The impact of news,oil prices,and global market developments on Russian financial markets1

This paper analyses the impact of news, oil prices, and international financial market developments on daily returns on Russian bond and stock markets. First, regarding returns, energy news affects returns, while news from the war in Chechnya is not significant. Market volatility does not appear to be sensitive to either type of news. Second, a significant effect of the growth in oil prices on Russian stock returns is detected. Third, the international influence on Russian financial markets depends upon the degree of financial liberalization. The higher the degree of financial liberalization, the stronger is the impact of US stock returns on Russian financial markets. In addition, banking reform and interest rate liberalization efforts seem to dictate the globalization of Russian stock markets, while it is the progress in liberalizing securities markets and non‐bank financial institutions that matters more for the globalization of Russian bond markets.     

Banking,currency, stock market and debt crises in Spain, 1850–1995

What type of crisis is generated when debt increases? We extend the literature by framework by introducing currency and stock market crises in the analysis. We apply our proposal to the case of Spain, since this is a country that has experienced a very important amount of financial crises from the nineteenth century onwards. We find the same results as the previous literature for the determinants of banking and debt crises but substituting external and public debt with perpetual debt and where perpetual debt has a less important role than crises in the private sector. Moreover, we find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that currency crises depend strongly and positively on financial centre crises and negatively and mildly on perpetual debt. We justify the negative relalionship due to an inflation tax. We also find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that stock market crises depend only positively and strongly on financial centre crises.     

Real exchange rates in emerging economies

We analyse the role of various investment margins in explaining the real exchange rate appreciation recorded in European transition countries. We present a model that introduces a quality investment margin and show that the margin is needed for replicating the observed pace of real exchange rate appreciation.