An Experimental Investigation of Alternative Going‐Concern Reporting Formats: A Canadian Experience*

This study questions whether the current or proposed Canadian standard of disclosing a going‐concern contingency is viewed as equivalent to the standard adopted in the United States by financial statement users. We examined loan officers' perceptions across three different formats ‐ namely, an integrated note with a clean auditor's report (the current Canadian standard), a stand‐alone note with referencing on the face of the balance sheet and income statement (the proposed and now rescinded standard), and a modified auditor's report with an explanatory paragraph in addition to a stand‐alone going concern note (the standard adopted in the United States and other countries). Bank loan officers were selected as the appropriate financial statement users for this study. The results of the test of the hypothesis suggest that once the going‐concern note is fully disclosed in the notes, the style of presentation within the notes (a stand‐alone note versus an integrated note) does not significantly influence the reactions and perceptions of risk if the auditor's report is unmodified (i.e., if no reference is made to a going‐concern contingency). However, when the auditor's report is modified with an explanatory paragraph detailing the uncertainty and referencing the going‐concern note in the footnotes, the format appeared to convey a stronger signal of financial distress to loan officers. These results appear to differ from prior research, which holds that once the information is released in the financial statements, the format has no additional effect. The finding of this study is that the proposed and withdrawn Canadian standard was not perceived differently by the bankers from the present Canadian standard, but the standard adopted in the United States and most other countries was. This makes a strong argument for moving all the way to that standard as opposed to the “halfway” approach of the now rescinded CICA exposure draft. Thus, the public interest in Canada may not be served by adopting a halfway approach.     

Management Going‐concern Disclosures: Impact of Corporate Governance and Auditor Reputation

The UK regulatory requirements relating to going‐concern disclosures require directors to report on the going‐concern status of their firms. Such directors have incentives not to report fairly in the case of financially‐distressed firms. We expect effective corporate governance mechanisms will encourage directors to report more truthfully in such situations. This paper tests this proposition explicitly using a large sample of going‐concern cases over the period 1994–2000. We find that whereas auditors' going‐concern opinions predict the subsequent resolution of going‐concern uncertainties directors' going‐concern statements convey arbitrary and unhelpful messages to users. However, robust corporate governance structures and high auditor reputation constrain directors to be more truthful in their going‐concern disclosures, bringing these more into line with the more credible auditor opinions.     

Corporate social responsibility and the assessment by auditors of the risk of material misstatement

This paper investigates whether, and how, firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance influences the auditor's assessment of the risk of material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, at the financial statement level by analysing their pricing decision (i.e., audit fees). Using a panel data set of 12,330 firms from 28 countries over the period 2003–2012 and different measures of CSR performance, we find a U‐shaped relationship between firms’ CSR performance and audit fees. This result suggests that there is an optimal level of CSR performance that minimizes the auditor's assessment of the risk of material misstatement, which in turn lowers the need for greater auditor effort; that is why auditors charge firms significantly less when their CSR performance is at the optimal level. Finally, we also show that the optimal level of CSR performance varies with the degree of environmental dynamism, ownership concentration and leverage.     

An Investigation of Framing and Firm Size on the Auditor's Going Concern Decision

This study investigated the effects of framed information and firm size on the auditor's going concern report modification decision. Framing has been shown to affect individual decision-making in a variety of contexts. Investigations of framing effects in an audit context have reported mixed results. The findings of this study indicate that auditors are susceptible to the effect of framed information. Previous research has reported that auditors from small firms may be less conservative in audit disclosure recommendations than auditors associated with larger firms. This study evaluated the going concern decisions of auditors from three firm sizes: local/regional, a large non-Big Six firm, and a Big Six audit firm. Results indicate that differences in the report issued do exist across firm size. Possible explanations for the reported results are discussed.     

The Long‐Term Effect of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act on Cross‐Listing Premia

This paper uses a triple difference approach to assess whether the adoption of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act predicts long‐term changes in cross‐listing premia of affected foreign firms. I measure cross‐listing premia as the difference between the Tobin's q of a cross‐listed company and a non‐cross‐listed company from the same country matched on propensity to cross‐list (first difference). I find that average premia for firms cross‐listed on levels 2 or 3 (subject to SOX) declined in the year of SOX adoption (2002) and remained significantly below their pre‐SOX level through year‐end 2005 (second difference). Firms listed on levels 2 or 3, which are subject to SOX, experienced larger declines in premia than firms listed on levels 1 or 4, which are not subject to SOX (third difference). The estimated decline is 0.15–0.20 depending on specification. Riskier firms and firms from high‐disclosing and high‐GDP countries suffered larger post‐SOX declines. Firm size predicts smaller declines in premia in well‐governed countries. Faster‐growing firms in poorly‐governed countries experienced smaller declines in premia. The results are robust to the use of different before‐and‐after periods; the use of annual, quarterly, or monthly data; the use of individual companies' Tobin's q's instead of matched pairs, and different regression specifications. The overall evidence is consistent with the view that SOX negatively affected cross‐listed premia, and particularly hurt riskier firms and firms from well‐governed countries, while perhaps helping high‐growth firms from poorly‐governed countries. At the same time, after‐SOX, level‐23 firms continue to enjoy a substantial premium, estimated at about 0.32.     

Are Auditors Professionally Skeptical? Evidence from Auditors’ Going‐Concern Opinions and Management Earnings Forecasts

We examine whether auditors exercise professional skepticism about management earnings forecasts when making going‐concern decisions. Using publicly issued management earnings forecasts as a proxy for earnings forecasts provided by managers to auditors, we find that management earnings forecasts are negatively associated with both auditors’ going‐concern opinions and subsequent bankruptcy. The weight auditors put on management forecasts in the going‐concern decision is not significantly different from the weight implied in the bankruptcy prediction model. Moreover, compared with the bankruptcy model, auditors assign a lower weight to management forecasts they perceive as being less credible, including those (1) issued by managers who issued optimistic forecasts in the previous two years, and (2) predicting high earnings increases or high earnings. Taken together, our evidence is consistent with auditors being professionally skeptical about management earnings forecasts when making going‐concern decisions.     

Determinants of going concern opinions and audit fees for development stage enterprises

Startup entities have been the focus of much political and academic interest recently. Development stage enterprises (DSEs), as defined by SFAS 7, are startup entities for which some publicly available information exists. New accounting standards have removed the DSE designation and related extra reporting requirements, and placed more responsibility on owners and managers to assess the ability of entities to continue as a going concern. We examined information from financial statements and audit reports of companies previously reporting as DSEs to investigate what increases the likelihood of receiving a going concern modification in auditors' opinions (GCO) and what affects audit fees. Our overall analyses indicate that the asset size of DSEs, negative working capital, and prior-year going concern modifications consistently influence going concern modifications to auditors' opinions. Managers should clearly consider these conditions when making their assessment of their companies' future going concern status. Our results indicate that the size of the audit firm did not influence the going concern modification decision, but Big4 auditors charge significantly higher fees than other auditors. Thus, managers/owners of DSEs should weigh the benefits of having a Big4 firm audit on their financial statements against the higher fees charged by those firms.     

A neural network approach to the prediction of going concern status

The assessment of a firm's going concern status is not an easy task. To assist auditors, going concern prediction models based on statistical methods such as multiple discriminant analysis and logit/probit analysis have been explored with some success. This study attempts to look at a different and more recent approach—neural networks. In particular, a neural network model of the feedforward, backpropagation type was constructed to predict a firm's going concern status from six financial ratios, using a data set containing 165 non-going concerns and 165 matched going concerns. On an evenly distributed hold-out sample, the trained network model correctly predicted all 30 test cases. The results suggest that neural networks can be a promising avenue of research and application in the going concern area.     

ISA 570: Italian Auditors’ and Academics’ Perceptions of the Going Concern Opinion

This study aims to identify which of the indicators used to assess whether an entity may not be able to continue as a going concern are regarded by Italian partners in auditing firms and Italian accounting and finance academics as being the most important. The indicators and ratios are those pursuant to auditing standard ISA 570 Going Concern, the literature and professional practice. ISA 570 does not suggest a hierarchy of these indicators, because they are only examples of events or conditions that, individually or collectively, may cast significant doubt on the entity's ability to continue as a going concern (GC), nor does it suggest specific ratios. To this end, an online survey was administered to partners in auditing firms and to the university faculty of Accounting and Finance. The paper contributes to enriching previous literature by providing insights into how Italian auditors and Italian financial reporting scholars prioritise GC indicators suggested by ISA 570. The results have the potential to help auditors and directors focus on the most relevant indicators in a GC assessment.     

Pre‐packin' in the UK

A pre‐pack administration is one where a deal has already been agreed prior to the company entering administration. The company's business will commonly be sold to the incumbent management team immediately the company is placed into administration. The business survives relatively intact but will have managed to jettison its unsecured debt. The business is saved and jobs are saved. The pre‐pack will usually require the support of the company's bankers. Recent research suggests that pre‐packs may constitute between 50% and 80% of all insolvent going concern sales. The UK version of a pre‐packaged administration appears to have been rare until the administration process under the Insolvency Act 1986 was significantly amended in 2002, permitting a company to be placed into administration without a court order. The UK version of pre‐packaged administration does not involve any plan being approved by different classes of creditor nor for the court to be involved in approving activities of the administrator before or after the plan is put into effect. The paper considers whether or not pre‐pack administrations fit into the statutory framework of the Insolvency Act, the professional ethics requirements of being an insolvency practitioner and the equitable rules governing fiduciaries. Some aspects of the policy underpinning pre‐packs are also considered in particular the decision to allow insolvency practitioners to claim pre‐appointment fees as an expense of the administration. This decision appears to herald a change in government policy. This policy change is also considered. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate performance and firm perception: The British experience

Previous academic research has presented a theoretical basis for a relationship between attributes of a firm's reputation and its financial performance. For the United States, researchers have analysed the correspondence between market and accounting based measures of US firm performance and external evaluators' perceptions of the qualitative attributes of US firms. In this study, expert surveys on the qualitative performance of British firms conducted by the British publication, the Economist, which are similar in content to surveys conducted by Fortune magazine for US firms, are used to determine the correspondence between qualitative and quantitative measures of British firms' performance. Results indicate that differences may exist between US and Britain in the use of qualitative survey data on a firm's strategic attributes as a forecast of a firm's future quantitative performance measures. Results also indicate that for small firms, certain qualitative factors (e.g. capacity to innovate) may be of greater importance in forecasting accounting and security market returns.     

Auditor economic incentives and going-concern opinions in a limited litigious Continental European business environment: empirical evidence from Belgium

Theory predicts that auditor reporting behaviour may be influenced by the perceived consequences of disclosing going-concern uncertainty in the audit report (DeAngelo 1981, Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Krishnan and Krishnan (1996) and Louwers (1998) have addressed this issue empirically in a US context. The results of Krishnan and Krishnan (1996) suggested that one of the important factors in the auditor's opinion decision is the risk of litigation. The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between auditor economic incentives and the propensity to issue going-concern opinions in a limited litigious business environment, Belgium. In spite of the low risk of litigation and the fact that most Belgian companies are privately held, various regulations have been put into effect to safeguard audit quality in Belgium. However, the results suggest that the auditor's going-concern opinion decision in Belgium is associated with factors relating to the perceived consequences of disclosing a going-concern opinion. Specifically, the results suggest that auditors in Belgium are significantly less likely to issue going-concern opinions to clients that pay higher audit fees, and when the audit firm has lost a relatively high proportion of its clients in the preceding year. The auditor's going-concern opinion does not appear to be significantly influenced by the length of the auditor-client relationship, year of the auditor engagement period, and auditor type. The results of this study are to some extent different from the study by Louwers (1998), in which none of the incentive variables related to the auditor's loss function was significant.     

Auditors’ going‐concern‐modified opinions after 2001: measuring reporting accuracy

An important change in auditors’ reporting behaviour in the period after the high‐profile corporate collapses in 2001 is that auditors were more likely to issue going‐concern (GC)‐modified audit opinions. Comparing company failure rates subsequent to receiving a first‐time going‐concern (FTGC)‐modified audit opinion in the pre‐ and post‐2001 periods, we find a consistent type 1 error (misclassification) rate (the rate of survival among companies issued an FTGC opinion). Results are indicative of auditors maintaining GC reporting accuracy when comparing the 1995–1996 and 2004–2005 periods. This conclusion is supported after considering the impact of mitigating circumstances surrounding companies that received an FTGC‐modified audit report and survived.     

Auditor Independence,Non‐Audit Services,and Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right?*

Do fees for non‐audit services compromise auditor's independence and result in reduced quality of financial reporting? The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 presumes that some fees do and bans these services for audit clients. Also, some registrants voluntarily restrict their audit firms from providing legally permitted non‐audit services. Assuming that restatements of previously issued financial statements reflect low‐quality financial reporting, we investigate detailed fees for restating registrants for 1995 to 2000 and for similar nonrestating registrants. We do not find a statistically significant positive association between fees for either financial information systems design and implementation or internal audit services and restatements, but we do find some such association for unspecified non‐audit services and restatements. We find a significant negative association between tax services fees and restatements, consistent with net benefits from acquiring tax services from a registrant's audit firm. The significant associations are driven primarily by larger registrants.     

Investment Irreversibility,Cash Flow Risk,and Value‐Growth Stock Return Effects

We simulate results from a simple real options model to provide insight into the value‐growth stock return anomaly. In our model, firms possess either single (“value” firm) or multiple (“growth” firm) investment opportunities. Our model predicts that growth firms: (1) invest sooner, (2) exhibit greater continuity in capital expenditure over time, (3) have lower book‐to‐market ratios, and (4) generate lower rates of return than value firms.     

National and Office‐Specific Measures of Auditor Industry Expertise and Effects on Audit Quality

Our paper examines whether audit quality is higher for industry audit specialists at the national and city‐office levels using the framework developed in Ferguson et al. [2003] and Francis et al. [2005] . We find that auditors who are both national and city‐specific industry specialists have clients with the lowest abnormal accruals, suggesting that joint national and city‐specific industry specialists have the highest audit quality. In addition, we find some evidence that abnormal accruals of firms audited by city‐industry specialists alone (without also being national specific industry specialists) are lower than those audited by nonindustry specialists. Using alternative measures of audit quality, we find that when the auditor is both a national and a city‐specific industry specialist, its clients are less likely to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts by one penny per share and more likely to be issued a going‐concern audit opinion. Together these results provide consistent evidence that audit quality is higher when the auditor is both a national and city‐specific industry specialist, suggesting that auditors' national positive network synergies and the individual auditors' deep industry knowledge at the office level are jointly important factors in delivering higher audit quality.     

The Dempster‐Shafer Theory: An Introduction and Fraud Risk Assessment Illustration

This article introduces the Dempster‐Shafer theory (DS theory) of belief functions for managing uncertainties, specifically in the auditing and information systems domains. The use of DS theory is illustrated by deriving a fraud risk assessment formula for a simplified version of a model developed by Srivastava et al. (2007). In this formulation, fraud risk is the normalised product of four risks: risk that management has incentives to commit fraud; risk that management has opportunities to commit fraud; risk that management has an attitude to rationalise committing fraud; and risk that an auditor's special procedures will fail to detect fraud. The article demonstrates how to use such a model to plan for a financial audit where management fraud risk is assessed to be high. In addition, it discusses whether audit planning is better served by an integrated audit/fraud risk assessment as now suggested in SAS 107 (AICPA 2006a, see also ASA 200 in AUASB 2007) or by the approach illustrated here where a parallel, but separate, assessment is made of audit risk and fraud risk.     

Spin‐outs: knowledge diffusion through employee mobility

In many industries, one important method of diffusion is through employee mobility: many of the entering firms are started by employees from incumbent firms using some of their former employer's technological know‐how. This article explores the effect of incorporating this mechanism in a general industry framework by allowing employees to imitate their employers' know‐how. The equilibrium is Pareto optimal because the employees “pay” for the possibility of learning their employers' know‐how. The model's implications are consistent with data from the rigid disk drive industry. These implications concern the effects of know‐how on firm formation and survival.     

The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs,Earnings Quality,and Stock Prices

This paper exploits a natural quasi‐experiment to isolate the effects that were uniquely due to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX): U.S. firms with a public float under $75 million could delay Section 404 compliance, and foreign firms under $700 million could delay the auditor's attestation requirement. As designed, Section 404 led to conservative reported earnings, but also imposed real costs. On net, SOX compliance reduced the market value of small firms.