市场互联性、关系型合约与经济转型

本文通过将单一市场的关系型合约推广到互联的关系型合约,刻画了社会分工程度(市场范围)与微观治理机制(基于关系型合约的治理还是基于正式合约的治理)之间的互动关系:基于何种合约来治理受市场范围的影响,市场范围越小,关系型合约越重要,正式合约越不重要;反之则反是。特别地,从这个视角看,计划经济向市场经济转型的过程,是劳动分工不断深化和市场范围不断扩大的过程,在微观治理上是一个从互联的关系型合约不断向正式合约过渡的过程。中国的渐进式改革之所以成功,很大程度上是由于渐进式改革使原来自我实施的关系型合约没有受到很大程度的破坏,在正式合约缺位时,关系型合约仍然能够维持社会经济的运行;俄罗斯的激进式改革几乎在一夜之间破坏了自我实施的关系型合约的可维持性,而短期内又不可能建立依赖正式合约的治理模式,出现了微观治理失效。本文还解释了中国经济在缺乏正式的法律和产权体系下取得骄人绩效的“悖论”,即由于关系型合约的自我实施性,因而并不需要相应的正式制度安排。本文总体上支持“后华盛顿共识”的渐进改革路径,并为其提供了动态的微观机制。     

不完全契约理论:一个综述

标准的契约理论或委托-代理理论假定契约是完全的,然而现实中的契约是不完全的。契约的不完全会导致事前的最优契约失效,当事人在面临被“敲竹杠”的风险时会做出无效率的专用性投资。经济学家们在研究如何最大程度地减少由于契约不完全所导致的效率损失时,发展了一个新兴的不完全契约理论。本文以一个基本模型为基点,围绕专用性投资效率问题,从司法干预、赔偿、治理结构、产权以及履约等多个视角,全面地介绍了不完全契约理论的产生、发展、应用以及面临的挑战和未来的前景。     

领导企业治理下创新生态系统演进路径研究

关于创新生态系统参与主体风险冲突及治理的研究,目前只停留在风险产生原因及应对策略方面,主要侧重于静态视角,鲜有文献从创新生态系统演进过程动态视角,并结合创新生态系统驱动主体领导企业考察风险防范和治理问题,而后者对于创新生态系统可持续发展更为重要。构建了领导企业治理的创新生态系统由契约规则到关系规则演化路径分析框架,并以比亚迪新能源汽车创新生态系统为案例进行实证研究。从创新生态系统形成初期领导企业主导的契约治理到成熟阶段关系治理是一个连续不间断的演化过程,基于领导企业治理的创新生态系统演化路径,包含契约规则主导的协同创新到契约规则向关系规则转换的创新网络形成再到由关系规则主导的开放式创新3个阶段,该过程以领导企业借助创新生态系统规范化设计完成整个创新生态系统互动、协同为主要形式。治理重点从企业间契约治理向领导企业主导的对整个创新生态系统关系治理转移,契约治理则转化为由领导企业主导以网络化设计为基础的关系互动和协同治理。     

契约视角下的PPP项目承包商治理机制研究

本文从契约关系的视角研究了PPP项目承包商的治理机制问题,包括正式契约关系治理、剩余权利配置和关系契约治理,这3种治理机制分别对应着双方合作内容的不确定性程度。研究表明,正式契约适合对业主-承包商契约中确定性内容的治理,即利用明确的契约条款对双方合作关系中的行为风险或敲竹杠风险进行抑制。关系契约可以建立在事后双方可观察到的结果的基础上,适合对较不确定内容的治理。剩余权力的配置是一种弹性治理机制,适用于任何无法描述、无法判断或无法评价结果的不确定性内容,它通过对项目剩余索取权和剩余控制权的对称配置,提高承包商的主动合作性。     

公共建设项目中合同策略及其关系行为测量研究

公共建设项目合同策略的制定往往忽视了关系治理对承包人机会主义行为的抑制作用,造成合同策略侧重于单一的控制功能,不利于合同的事后履约。根据项目治理理论,项目缔约全过程中契约治理与关系治理存在交互作用,因而,合同策略必然包含两者间的互动关系。首先通过扎根分析,明确了公共建设项目合同策略是一个组合型构念,包括承包人选择、合同策略重点及防范问题方式3个维度;然后,利用关系行为量表,对合同策略中3个维度对应的关系行为进行测量,明确各参与方在合同缔约各阶段采取的具体关系行为;最后,结合访谈数据对关系行为测量结果进行分析。结果发现：在缔约全过程中,承包人对待关系行为始终处于积极状态,业主方采取关系行为则存在一定的障碍。研究结果为公共建设项目关系治理的使用提供了依据,同时也为各参与方采取合理的关系行为提供指导。     

Ex post adaptations and hybrid contracts in software development services

We follow the recent literature on ex post adaptations in procurement and argue that highly volatile specifications result in multiple variations of fixed price (FP) and time and materials (T&M) contracts. Specifically, placing a cap on specification change in FP contracts prevents specification volatility, similar to the way that placing a cap on the price in T&M contracts prevents price escalation. We argue that these hybrid mechanisms are particularly important in software development contracting, a new critical business capability involving frequent and costly ex post adaptations to specification change. The level of completeness in these contractual archetypes is hypothesized to be determined by contracting costs and benefits, where costs are related to project uncertainty and benefits are related to the likelihood of vendor opportunism. We test this hypothesis with a unique data set of 270 software development contracts entered into by a leading international bank. The analysis confirms the existence of multiple hybrid contracts that mitigate both price escalation and specification volatility. It also shows that contracting costs and benefits explain more variance in contract choice when these hybrids are included, uncovering the detailed mechanisms used to curb opportunism when the vendor is less familiar to the client.     

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF HOLD‐UP PROBLEM AND NON‐EXCLUSIVE FRANCHISE CONTRACT

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model that examines the emergence of non‐exclusive franchise contracts in the presence of the franchisor hold‐up problem. Our model of an endogenous franchising network underscores the trade‐off between the cost associated with specifying and enforcing the contractual terms and the cost associated with broadening the relationships with multiple franchisors. We show that when the contracting cost relative to the relational cost is high and when the economies of specialization is low, a non‐exclusive franchise contract is an optimal contractual arrangement to mitigate franchisor opportunism.     

治理机制何时有助于联盟成功——基于不确定性视角的研究

基于交易成本理论和关系交换理论，采用比较研究法，探讨契约治理与关系治理对联盟成功的差异化影响并识别边界条件。运用410家联盟企业调研数据进行实证研究，结果表明关系治理比契约治理更有助于企业实现联盟成功，且这种影响效应随着联盟情境不同而发生改变。当联盟外部环境不确定性程度加深时，企业会更加依赖于关系治理而非契约治理实现联盟成功；当联盟伙伴行为不确定性程度加深时，企业选择契约治理比依赖关系治理更容易实现联盟成功。研究结论可为联盟企业在不同情境条件下选择恰当治理机制并实现联盟成功提供理论指导。     

INPUT QUALITY,RELATIONAL CONTRACTS AND INTERNATIONAL OUTSOURCING

Abstract. This paper presents a Ricardian trade model in which the quality of intermediate inputs affects the productivity of labour at the final production stage. The role of contracting frictions is shown by comparing the chain of comparative advantage obtained with full information with that resulting when the quality of inputs is affected by actions that are not verifiable in court. Conditions are derived under which parties can use the potential for repeat business (relational contracts) to sustain efficient production choices. These results yield predictions for how country and industry characteristics will affect the level of contracting frictions.     

Governance Structures, Insider Status, and Boundary Maintenance

If legal enforcement of contracts were omnipresent, omniscient, and costless, the identity and history of one's partners would be irrelevant, since any problems caused by unreliable partners could be remedied effectively. However, when legal enforcement is localized, imperfect, and costly, different governance structures for contracts carry implications for the sets of acceptable contracting partners. When legal enforcement for contracts is based on national law, whose reach is coterminous with a state's territory, acceptable partners tend to be defined territorially. When state enforcement of contract law is weak or nonexistent or when a contract is so vulnerable to nonperformance that it requires auxiliary support, actors must devise an alternative or supplement to state enforcement. The most relevant contracting boundaries then will be ones defining groups that can efficaciously create and maintain intertemporal, inter-issue, and inter-actor linkages. We examine just three of many possibilities: family-based, function-based, and ethnicity- or religion-based groups. These different systems of governance affect which entities are recognized as members in the club of actors, as well as how actors define their contracting boundaries and distinguish between those with whom they contract relatively freely and those with whom their contracting is more circumscribed.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Contract Enforcement

A long-standing deterrent to foreign direct investment in developing countries is weak enforcement of binding contracts. A local firm may learn business skills from a cooperating multinational firm and subsequently do business on its own based on the acquired skills. In a two-period, double-moral-hazard model, non-binding contracts are shown to be preferred by all parties, implying that contract enforcement is unnecessary. Our results shed light on the puzzling phenomenon that substantial FDI has been carried out under contractual arrangements in developing countries in which contract enforcement is problematic. They can also explain some interesting stylized facts on contractual joint ventures between multinationals and local firms in the early stage of an economic transition.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1998, 26(4), pp. 761–782. School of Business, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong; and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong.     

Commitment and discretion in contracts: theory and evidence from retirement plans*

We consider a firm's problem of incentivizing its workforce through relational contracts, when workers effectively face a shorter time horizon due to possible separation shocks. Commitment issues then generate a trade-off between efficiency and distribution, which affects both performance and profits. Profits under relational contracting can exceed those under formal contracting, despite lower performance, when discounting is moderate, firm bargaining power is weak, and shocks are likely. Using a matched employer–retirement plan dataset, and interpreting discretionary profit-sharing plans and employee stock ownership plans as relational and formal contracting, respectively, we find some support for our predictions.     

惯例多元性：研发联盟何以提升治理绩效

网络组织内部结构优化与运行效率提升离不开惯例这一重要的知识资源,作为描述联盟组织行为方式的一般术语,联盟惯例表现为稳定的做事方式、标准化的作业程序和统一的行为准则等多种形式,并且在协调主体之间合作关系、增强组织内部稳定程度以及提升经验信息交流效率等方面发挥着重要作用。基于上海、南京和杭州地区261家企业调研数据,从惯例多元性视角出发,将联盟惯例解构为行动逻辑、内隐规范和交互共识,研究不同治理机制下联盟企业提升合作绩效的问题,同时揭示多元联盟惯例在研发联盟治理过程中的作用机理。研究结果表明：契约治理机制与研发联盟绩效之间存在倒U型关系,关系治理机制与研发联盟绩效之间存在正向关系;联盟惯例的3个维度对其调节效应不同,其中,行动逻辑和内隐规范对契约治理机制与联盟绩效之间的关系均有显著正向调节效应,而交互共识对契约治理机制与联盟绩效之间的关系有显著负向调节效应,同时,交互共识对关系治理机制与联盟绩效之间的关系有显著正向调节效应。     

Putting all one's eggs in one basket: Relational contracts and the management of local public services

French municipalities often contract out the provision of local public services to private companies, and regularly choose the same private operator for a range of different services. We develop a model of relational contracts that shows how this strategy may lead to better performance at lower cost for public authorities. We test the implication of our model using an original database of the contractual choices made by 5000 French local public authorities in the years 2001, 2004 and 2008.     

惯例多元性：研发联盟何以提升治理绩效

网络组织内部结构优化与运行效率提升离不开惯例这一重要的知识资源，作为描述联盟组织行为方式的一般术语，联盟惯例表现为稳定的做事方式、标准化的作业程序和统一的行为准则等多种形式，并且在协调主体之间合作关系、增强组织内部稳定程度以及提升经验信息交流效率等方面发挥着重要作用。基于上海、南京和杭州地区261家企业调研数据，从惯例多元性视角出发，将联盟惯例解构为行动逻辑、内隐规范和交互共识，研究不同治理机制下联盟企业提升合作绩效的问题，同时揭示多元联盟惯例在研发联盟治理过程中的作用机理。研究结果表明：契约治理机制与研发联盟绩效之间存在倒U型关系，关系治理机制与研发联盟绩效之间存在正向关系；联盟惯例的3个维度对其调节效应不同，其中，行动逻辑和内隐规范对契约治理机制与联盟绩效之间的关系均有显著正向调节效应，而交互共识对契约治理机制与联盟绩效之间的关系有显著负向调节效应，同时，交互共识对关系治理机制与联盟绩效之间的关系有显著正向调节效应。     

NONSTATIONARY RELATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION*

I develop a model of nonstationary relational contracts in order to study internal wage dynamics. Workers are heterogeneous, and each worker’s ability is both private information and fixed for all time. Learning therefore occurs within employment relationships. The inferences, however, are confounded by moral hazard. Incentive provision is restricted by an inability to commit to long‐term contracts. Relational contracts, which must be self‐enforcing, must therefore be used. The wage dynamics in the optimal contract, which are pinned down by the tension between incentive provision and contractual enforcement, are intimately related to the learning effect.     

治理机制对顾客参与价值共创行为的影响——虚拟品牌社区的实证研究

虚拟品牌社区是企业与顾客进行价值共创的重要平台,顾客参与价值共创行为对企业长远发展具有十分重要的作用。现有研究多是基于不同的理论从顾客视角出发探索顾客参与价值共创行为受到的心理动机和个人特征等因素的影响,鲜有从企业视角出发,探索治理机制对虚拟品牌社区中顾客参与价值共创行为的影响。本文立足交易成本理论与社会交换理论,从企业视角切入,引入关系质量作为中介变量,构建虚拟品牌社区治理机制、关系质量与顾客参与价值共创行为的关系整合模型。采用问卷调查法对模型进行验证,研究结果显示:(1)契约治理机制只对知识贡献行为产生显著正向影响,对顾客公民行为的影响不显著,而关系治理机制对知识贡献行为与顾客公民行为均具有显著正向影响。(2)关系质量在契约治理机制与顾客公民行为的关系中起完全中介作用,在契约治理机制与知识贡献行为、关系治理机制与知识贡献行为以及关系治理机制与顾客公民行为的关系中起部分中介作用。由研究结论可知,虚拟品牌社区一方面应综合运用契约治理机制与关系治理机制来有效地促进顾客参与价值共创行为,以弥补单独运用某一种治理机制存在的不足;另一方面也应注重关系质量在虚拟品牌社区中促进顾客参与价值共创行为的重要作用。这些研究发现为促进虚拟品牌社区的可持续发展提供了有价值的启示。     

环境不确定下企业孵化网络治理机制对治理绩效影响研究

从企业孵化网络本身以及环境视角分析了企业孵化网络治理绩效的影响因素,通过企业孵化网络治理机制对治理绩效关系的实证分析,验证了环境不确定下企业孵化网络的契约治理机制、管理治理机制对治理绩效的影响。结果表明:企业孵化网络治理机制中的契约治理机制、关系治理机制对治理绩效具有正向调节作用;环境不确定性会扩大或缩小治理机制对治理绩效的作用强度。企业孵化网络在高市场不确定性环境下,采用关系治理机制的绩效较好;在高技术不确定性环境下,采用契约治理机制的绩效较好。     

An empirical study on contractual heterogeneity within the firm: the ‘vertical integration–franchise contracts’ mix

This paper tests a discrete choice model on the mix of franchised and company owned outlets (contractual heterogeneity) within the firm. This is often explained by the existing literature as due to heterogeneous characteristics of the outlets. However, correspondence between outlets and contracts characteristics is not often observed in reality. An explanation is proposed which suggests that contract mixing is driven by the contractual choice of both principal and agents, and that heterogeneous agents will choose contracts that match their characteristics. This hypothesis is supported by econometric results, based on outlet level microdata collected by means of a survey of UK firms.     

Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism,Chinese style

Aligning the interests of local governments with market development is an important issue for developing and transition economies. Using a panel data set from China, we investigate the relationship between provincial government's fiscal incentives and provincial market development. We report three empirical findings. First, we find that during the period of “fiscal contracting system” the discrepancy between ex ante contracts and ex post implementation was relatively small, suggesting that the fiscal contracts were credible. Second, we find a much higher correlation, about four times, between the provincial government's budgetary revenue and its expenditure during 1980s and 1990s as compared to 1970s, demonstrating that provincial governments faced much stronger ex post fiscal incentives after reform. Third, we find that stronger ex ante fiscal incentives, measured by the contractual marginal retention rate of the provincial government in its budgetary revenue, are associated with faster development of the non-state sector as well as more reforms in the state sector in the provincial economy. This holds even when we control for the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization. Finally, we compare federalism, Chinese style, to federalism, Russian style.