Coercion, compliance, and the collapse of the Soviet command economy

Are command systems that rest on coercion inherently unstable, and did the Soviet economy collapse for this reason? Until it collapsed, the Soviet economy did not appear unstable. Why, then, did it collapse? A game between a dictator and a producer shows that a high level of coercion may yield a stable high–output equilibrium, that stability may rest in part on the dictator's reputation, and that a collapse may be brought about by adverse trends in the dictator's costs and a loss of reputation. The facts of the Soviet case are consistent with a collapse that was triggered by the strike movement of 1989.     

基于STM32的智能小车四轮驱动控制系统设计

在传统智能小车驱动电路设计中,较多考虑使用直流电机还是步进电机,电机功率、能耗等性能参数。使用具有arm Cortex M4内核的STM32嵌入式平台控制四轮的4个直流电机。文章基于PWM技术及PID算法,对四轮进行精准地速度、转向及启停控制,实验表明此小车具有优越各种地形适应能力。     

The political economy of gambling in a neocolonial economy

Conclusion This study has attempted to show the entrenched character of parasitic capitalism in the form of gambling in the Jamaican economy on a scale that massively but painlessly redistributes income from the working class to the petite bourgeoisie. It speaks to a dimension of class exploitation that is often ignored in the focus on large multinational corporations and has parallels in the parasitic forms of capitalism that exploit the black community in the United States. Parasitic capitalism is seen as promoting a form of false class consciousness that seeks outlets to class frustrations in precapitalist illusions of luck and chance that feed the coffers of the grasping petite bourgeoisie with hard-earned working class wage incomes. The data and findings point clearly to the need to either eliminate parasitic capitalist activities such as gambling or alternatively remove it from the control of the petite bourgeoisie and convert the capital accumulated to community and mass-oriented development and social projects.     

Structural changes in a developing economy: The case of Israel

Conclusions We have shown that the structural changes in the economy of Israel are deeper and more significant than they might appear from superficial examination of the data.     

Autarky in Franco's Spain: The costs of a closed economy

Between the 1940s and 1970s, Spain used a variety of economic policies that hindered international trade. Because the mix of tariffs, quotas, administrative barriers, and exchange rate regimes varied greatly over time, the quantification of the effect of the various trade policies on international trade in this period is particularly elusive. In this paper, we use historical bilateral trade flows and a structural gravity model to quantify the evolution of Spain's border thickness, a summary measure of its barriers to international trade. We find that Spain's borders in the period 1948–75 were thicker than those of any other country in Western Europe, even after the liberalization of trade that started in 1959. These comparatively higher impediments to international trade implied substantial negative effects on consumer welfare. We estimate that accumulated welfare costs over the period 1948–75 exceed 20 per cent of a year's total consumption.     

Stabilization: The political economy of overkill

This paper considers whether national and international aspects of the IMF's stabilization programmes during the 1970s and early 1980s have resulted in a process of ‘overkill’ — or, in other words, a process of economic retrenchment which went much further than was strictly necessary in terms of what could have been regarded as reasonable objectives. In the international context, the author describes how the attack on inflation has become an end in itself, at the expense of other stated objectives of the IMF, thus creating a distortion of its priorities. The paper discusses errors of diagnosis which have led to this disorientation and explains why deflationary policies should not be regarded as a panacea. The paper then considers the nead for equity and efficiency in the distribution of the political and economic costs of adjustment.The next section of this paper discusses the assumptions underlying the IMF's treatment of Fund members and to what extent ‘even-handedness’ in the application of stabilization measures may result in inequality of burden-sharing among borrowers. Problems related to monetarist theories and the consequent policies are examined, followed by a consideration of the dangers involved in devising ‘straightforward’ performance criteria in the form of precise monetary targets that can readily be monitored by the IMF. This means of evaluating the national adjustment policies' success is seen to be unsatisfactory, viz. the frequency of stand-by arrangement breakdowns and mistakes in forecasting.The paper concludes that the concept of unilateral adjustment is not an acceptable basis for IMF supervision of the international monetary system. In addition, care should be taken to avoid overkill in determining the degree and character of adjustment needed in stabilization programmes. One possible solution to the extra burden imposed on the LDCs might be a liberalization of the compensatory financing facility with the objective of applying the same kind of regime to imports as to exports.     

From a labor-managed economy to a market economy: A contribution to economic transformation

Does transition of a labor-managed economy to a capitalist economy really lead to an efficient economy? Which transformation strategies can be established during the transition? Which type of capitalist economy can be predicted by such transition strategies? This paper answers these questions by using the economic models described and explained by the main principles of post-Keynesian economic theory. It is found that the transition process leads to replacing the investment function, instituting the labor market, and replacing the expectations of a personal income rate with a profit rate. To achieve these processes, privatization and institution building, or institutional restructuring, are crucial. They also remove problems that should be removed by stabilization and restructuring.     

The high wage economy and the industrial revolution: a restatement

This article responds to Humphries's critique of Allen's assessment of the high wage economy of eighteenth‐century Britain and its importance for explaining the industrial revolution. New evidence is presented to show that women and children participated in the high wage economy. It is also shown that the high wage economy provides a good explanation of why the industrial revolution happened in the eighteenth century by showing that increases of women's wages around 1700 greatly increased the profitability of using spinning machinery. The relationship between the high wage economy of the eighteenth century and the inequality and poverty in Britain in the nineteenth century is explored.     

Sectoral labor employment in a Caribbean economy: The case of Barbados

This study examines the demand for labor in five major sectors of the Caribbean economy of Barbados. While the demand for labor function in the nontradable sectors appears well-defined in terms of real wages and real aggregate output, the inclusion of a variable to capture the effects of capital-deepening appears important to the specification of labor demand in the tradable sectors—agriculture and manufacturing. Low estimates of real wage elasticities and real output elasticities in the vicinity of unity suggest that employers in the major sectors are more likely to alter their demand for labor based on expectations of the economy’s performance than in response to labor cost factors denominated in producer prices.     

The demand for money in a small open economy: The case of Switzerland

The paper uses cointegration analysis to investigate the demand for money in Switzerland in the context of an open economy. It considers the general process of financial asset substitution and tests for the relevance of an exchange rate and a foreign interest rate variable in a conventional money demand equation. The results show that the variables entering into the demand for either monetary base or narrow money equation may not form a cointegrated system unless the exchange rate or foreign interest rate variable is included. This provides support to both the currency substitution and capital mobility hypotheses.     

Spinning their wheels: a reply to Jane Humphries and Benjamin Schneider

Jane Humphries and Benjamin Schneider have assembled several large databases of spinners’ production and wages that they believe disprove my view that high wages led to mechanization in eighteenth-century England. This reply examines their data and shows that they have little value for understanding the incentives to mechanize. In addition, I present new evidence that substantiates my earlier estimates of productivity and earnings. The high wage hypothesis is unimpaired by the critique of Humphries and Schneider.     

The political economy of protectionism : The bureaucratic case

Zusammenfassung Die politische ?konomie des Protektionismus: Die Rolle der Bürokratie. — Dieser Aufsatz versucht zu analysieren, welche Rolle die Bürokratie auf dem politischen Markt der Protektion spielt. Bisher wurden in der Literatur ausschlieΒlich Politiker und W?hler als bestimmende Kr?fte behandelt. Alle Argumente, die in diesem Aufsatz vorgebracht werden, unterstützen die Ansicht, daΒ Bürokraten die Protektion st?rker befürworten als Politiker. Wenn man eine Beh?rde als einen partiellen Diktator ansieht, der eine bestimmte Industrie überwacht, dann wird sie notwendigerweise einen h?heren Protektionsgrad als den theoretisch optimalen w?hlen. Wenn die Bürokraten weniger als die Politiker Gelegenheit haben, einen Gewinn (Reichtum) aus den protektionistischen Aktivit?ten zu ziehen — und das kann erwartet werden-, dann werden sie für eine h?here Protektion sein als die Politiker. Diese Neigung zugunsten der Protektion wird noch verst?rkt, wenn man die Informationskosten in die Betrachtung einbezieht. Ein anderes Ergebnis dieses Aufsatzes ist, daΒ jede Rangordnung protektionistischer MaΒnahmen, welche die Angebotsseite des Marktes für Protektion nicht in vollem Umfang berücksichtigt, v?llig irreführend sein kann.

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Résumé L’économie politique du protectionnisme: Le cas bureaucratique. — Cet article essaie d’analyser le róle joué par les bureaucrates sur le marché politique de protectionnisme. Jusqu’à présent les agents publiques considérés dans la littérature étaient exclusivement des politiciens et des votants. Tous les arguments élaborés dans cet article supportent l’idée que les bureaucrates soutiennent le protectionnisme plus fortement que les politiciens. Si nous regardons un bureau comme dictateur partiel supervisant une industrie spécifique’un tel bureau nécessairement choisira un niveau de protection qui est plus haut que l’optimum de la théorie. Si les bureaucrates ont moins souvent l’opportunité de tirer des gains (richesse) des activités protectrices que les politiciens — comme on pourrait l’attendre — ils soutiendront une protection plus haute que les politiciens. Le biais en faveur de la protection augmente si nous considérons aussi les co?ts d’information. Un autre résultat de cet article est que chaque essai de classifier les mesures protectrices qui ne considère pas l’offre sur le marché de protection toute entière peut tromper totalement.

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Resumen La politica econ?mica del proteccionismo: El caso burocrático. — Este articulo trata de analizar el roi jugado por los bur?eratas en el mercado politico de la protection. Hasta aqui, los agentes püblicos considerados en lu literatura fueron exclusivamente politicos y votantes. Todos los argumentes propuestos en este trabajo dan fuerte apoyo a la idea que los bur?eratas están más a favor de la proteeei?n que los polfticos. Si se mira una oficina püblica como un dictador parcial que supervisa una industria determinada, esta elegirá necesariamente un nivel de proteeei?n más alto que el te?ricamente Optimo. Si los bur?eratas tienen menos oportunidades para captura ganancias (riqueza) de las actividades protegidas que los politicos, como es de esperar, entonces ellos van a favorecer una proteeei?n más alta que los politicos. Este sesgo hacia la proteeei?n se incrementará si, además, se consideran los costos de information. Otro resultado de este articulo es que cualquier clasificaei?n entre dispositivos protectivos que no toma completamente en cuenta el lado de la oferta del mercado por proteeei?n puede ser bastante enga?oso.

     

秘密调查“中国黑室”重庆破译日本密电遗址探秘

2010年,以谍战电视连续剧《暗算》、《风声》、《风语》走红的著名作家麦家,听说“中国黑室”就在重庆,便专程来渝。在重庆南山黄桷垭重庆中药研究所里,麦家看到了“中国黑室”旧址,并在黄桷垭的人头山,     

The response of a small open economy to a disturbance

Zusammenfassung Die Reaktion einer kleinen offenen Volkswirtschaft auf eine St?rung. — Die moderne Au\enhandelstheorie besteht im wesentlichen aus zwei voneinander unabh?ngigen Teilen : die Tauschtheorie besch?ftigt sich mit den langfristigen Handels- und Investitionsstr?men, die monet?re Theorie mit den kurzfristigen Ver?nderungen in der Zahlungsbilanz. Es fehlt eine Theorie, in der reale und monet?re Faktoren wirklich miteinander verknüpft sind. In dieser Arbeit wird versucht, diesem Ziel ein wenig n?her zu kommen. Wir betrachten eine kleine offene Volkswirtschaft, ursprünglich in einem langfristigen Gleichgewicht, die einer einmaligen und unerwarteten St?rung unterworfen ist. Die daraus sich ergebenden ?nderungen der Faktorallokation und des Realeinkommens werden als gegeben angesehen, und es wird untersucht, welche induzierten Anpassungen in der Zahlungsbilanz oder dem Wechselkurs erfolgen. Unter anderem werden hinreichende Bedingungen für monotone Anpassungspfade und für ein “überschie\en” abgeleitet.

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Résumé La réponse d’une petite économie ouverte à une perturbation. — La théorie du commerce international moderne comprend deux parties essentiellement indépendantes: une partie de troc qui s’occupe avec les structures de commerce et d’investissement à long terme, et une partie monétaire qui s’occupe avec la conduitea à court terme de la balance des paiements. Ce qui manque est une théorie par laquelle les facteurs réels et monétaires sont véritablement entremêlés. Cet article prend un petit pas envers ce but. Nous analysons une petite économie ouverte, d’abord en équilibre à long terme, qui est touchée par une perturbation abrupte, unique et imprévue d’une sorte quelconque. Nous regardons la conséquente réallocation des facteurs et la variation du revenu réel comme donnée et analysons l’ajustement induit de la balance des paiements ou du taux de change. Inter alia, nous dérivons les conditions suffisantes pour les voies d’ajustement monotones et pour les phénomènes ?d ’overshooting?.

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Resumen Reacción a un ?shock? en una economía peque?a y abierta. — La teoría moderna del comercio internacional está compuesta de dos partes esencialmente diferentes: un componente de intercambio real que se ocupa de la estructura a largo plazo del comercio y de la inversión y un componente monetario que trata de la conducta a corto plazo de la balanza de pagos. Lo que falta, es una teoría en la que se encuentre una genuina fusión de factures reales y monetarios. Con este objetivo se estudia una pequefia economia abierta, inicialmente en equilibrio a largo plazo y que se ve de repente sometida a un ?shock? inesperado de cualquier tipo. Considerando como dados la consecuente realocación de recursos y los cambios en la renta real, se estudia el ajuste inducido de la balanza de pagos y del tipo de cambio. Entre otros aspectos, se derivan condiciones suficientes para la existencia de funciones monótonas de ajuste y de ?overshooting?.