长期股权投资会计与税法的差异分析

一、会计与税法的相关规定新《长期股权投资》准则与原《投资》准则相比有5个新变化:(一)缩小了规范的范围;(二)取消了长期股权投资差额的核算;(三)长期股权投资的减值不得转回;(四)对子公司的长期股权投资由权     

企业会计准则第2号——长期股权投资

第一章总则第一条为了规范长期股权投资的确认、计量和相关信息的披露,根据《企业会计准则——基本准则》,制定本准则。第二条下列各项适用其他相关会计准则:(一)外币长期股权投资的折算,适用《企业会计准则第19号——外币折算》。(二)本准则未予规范的长期股权投资,适用《企业会计准则第22号——金融工具确认和计量》。第二章初始计量第三条企业合并形成的长期股权投资,应当按照下列规定确定其初始投资成本:(一)同一控制下的企业合并,合并方以支付现金、转让非现金资产或承担债务方式作为合并对价的,应当在合并日按照取得被合并方所有者权…     

海峡两岸长期股权投资会计准则的比较研究

财政部于 1998年 6月 24日发布了《企业会计准则——投资》 (以下简称《投资准则》 )，并要求上市公司从 1999年 1月 1日起执行。也在差不多时候我国台湾省的财团法人会计研究基金会财务会计准则委员会也对《财务会计准则公报第 5号——长期股权投资会计处理准则》 (以下简称《第 5号准则公报》 )进行了第二次修订。长期股权投资会计涉及到投资成本的确定、股权投资的会计处理、投资减值准备的计提、投资的划转和处置，以及投资在财务报告中的披露等方面。以下分别就这几方面对海峡两岸长期股权投资会计准则进行比较分析，以供学术研究交流…     

短期股权投资的会计核算与税务处理差异分析

财政部发布的《企业会计制度》、《企业会计准则——投资》与国家税务总局发布的《企业所得税税前扣除办法》(国税发[2000]B4号)，《关于企业股权投资若干所得税问题的通知》(国税发[2000]B18号)，从不同角度对企业股权投资具体操作作了规定，由于两存在许多差异，依照会计制度进行的股权投资的会计处理与依照税法进行的税务处理有     

新企业所得税申报表:长期股权投资所得(损失)明细表填报解析

长期股权投资所得是企业应税所得的重要内容。由于长期股权投资的会计处理与所得税处理不一致,导致企业的长期股权投资收益与应纳税所得额之间存在一定的差异,该差异通过《长期股权投资所得(损失)明细表》进行反映。本文依据《长期股权投资所得(损失)明细表》的设计原理,结合会计和税法的规定,对该表的填报方法进行了解析,明确了应当注意的问题。     

《小企业会计准则》对长期投资的财税处理

《小企业会计准则》对投资的处理,主要是根据小企业经济业务的特点设计,同时又注意与《企业会计准则》相衔接,符合我国小企业实际以及我国会计准则体系的现状。一、长期股权投资的特点1、长期投资的分类。《小企业会计准则》基本沿用《小企业会计制度》的分类方法,即将长期投资分为长期股权投资和长期债券投资。这一点有别于《企业会计准则》,将投资分为长期股权投资和金融工具(交易性金融资产、持有至到期投资、贷款和应收账款和可供出售的金融资产四种)两部分。     

对股权投资差额和合并价差的探讨

财政部颁布的《企业会计准则———投资》（以下简称《投资准则》）和《合并会计报表暂行规定》（以下简称《暂行规定》） ,对企业投资的会计核算和企业集团合并报表的编制起到了规范作用。本文拟就《投资准则》中股权投资差额和《暂行规定》中合并价差的处理作以下探讨。一、股权投资差额的分析根据财政部颁布的《企业会计准则———投资》指南（以下简称《投资准则指南》） ,“股权投资差额 ,是指采用权益法核算长期股权投资时 ,投资成本与享有被投资单位所有者权益份额的差额。”股权投资差额在“长期股权投资”科目下的明细科目“股权投…     

投资快讯

一周投资信息股权转让深振业A(000006):公司与深圳市特皓投资发展有限公司签订《股权转让合同》,约定以6707.53万元将公司所持的深圳市特皓股份有限公司13.89%股权(998.62万股)转让给特皓投资发展公司。此     

PE备案重启

在当下如火如荼发展中的中国私募股权投资领域,任何新颁布的关于该领域的法律法规都会引发巨大关注。暂停一年的PE备案制重新开闸,期待完成备案的股权投资基金盼来了新的曙光。日前,国家发改委在其网站上正式刊登《国家发展改革委办公厅关于进一步规范试点地区股权投资企业发展和备案管理工作的通知》(以下简称为《通知》)。《通知》要求股权投资企业资本规模达到5亿元以上须到发改委备案,并对     

股权转让损益与应纳税所得额

一、 股权转让损益与所得税的相关规定1. 按照国家税务总局《企业改组中若干所得税业务问题的暂行规定》(国税发[1998]97号,以下简称《规定》):(1)企业转让股权(指转让股票或其他股权,作者注)的收益,应按规定计算缴纳企业所得税;转让股权的损失,可在当期应纳税所得额中扣除。(2)股权转让收益或损失=股权转让价-股权成本价。(3)如被投资单位有已征税的未分配利润或税后提存等留存收益的,随转让股权一并转让该留存收益的金额(以不超过出让方对被投资单位账面留存收益应享有的份额为限),属于该股权出让人的投资收益额,不计为股权转让价。(4)股…     

股权激励、管理者过度自信与权益资本成本

基于行为金融的视角,从管理者过度自信角度解释了我国股权激励计划实施效果不佳的困惑。实证结果表明,我国实施股权激励计划会在高管过度自信的条件下对上市公司权益资本成本产生影响：股权激励计划的实施提高了上市公司高管过度自信水平;股权激励与高管过度自信的相互作用使得上市公司权益资本成本显著升高。这意味着从管理者过度自信的角度考察股权激励对企业权益资本成本造成的影响,可能会更好地解释股权激励的价值效应。     

基于区域股权市场的股权众筹模式研究

本文分析齐鲁股权交易中心发展股权众筹的案例以及台湾地区场外交易市场参与股权众筹发展的先进经验后认为:我国当前发展股权众筹的根本问题是缺乏股权众筹发展的法律土壤,同时传统的债权思想也成为制约股权众筹发展的重要因素;区域股权市场在开展股权众筹业务时具有资源、风险控制、股权退出等方面的优势,依托区域股权市场开展股权众筹试点可以成为我国发展股权众筹的路径选择。     

Outside Equity

Equity financing is modeled when cash flows and asset values are not verifiable. Investors have enforceable property rights to the firm's assets, but cannot prevent insiders (managers or entrepreneurs) from capturing cash flow. Insiders must coinvest and pay in each period a dividend sufficient to ensure outside investors' participation for at least one more period. Intervention by the investors must be limited by an agreement with insiders or by costs of collective action. Basic models are extended to show why firms go public and why agency costs necessarily arise when the act of investment is not immediately verifiable.     

Equity yields

We study a new data set of dividend futures with maturities up to ten years across three world regions: the US, Europe, and Japan. We use these asset prices to construct equity yields, analogous to bond yields. We decompose the equity yields to obtain a term structure of expected dividend growth rates and a term structure of risk premia, which decomposes the equity risk premium by maturity. We find that the slope of the term structure of risk premia is pro-cyclical, whereas the slope of the term structure of expected dividend growth rates is counter-cyclical. The comovement of yields across regions is, on average, higher for long-maturity yields than for short-maturity yields, whereas the variation in this comovement is much higher for short-maturity yields.     

Luxury Goods and the Equity Premium

This paper evaluates the equity premium using novel data on the consumption of luxury goods. Specifying utility as a nonhomothetic function of both luxury and basic consumption goods, we derive pricing equations and evaluate the risk of holding equity. Household survey and national accounts data mostly reflect basic consumption, and therefore overstate the risk aversion necessary to match the observed equity premium. The risk aversion implied by the consumption of luxury goods is more than an order of magnitude less than that implied by national accounts data. For the very rich, the equity premium is much less of a puzzle.     

Deciphering the Motives for Equity Carve-Outs

I analyze 181 equity carve‐outs to determine whether the transactions are motivated by potential efficiency improvements or by an opportunity to sell overvalued equity. Carve‐out operating performance peaks at issue, declining significantly thereafter. Parents sell a greater percentage of shares when subsequent performance is poor. A negative relation also exists between long‐term excess returns and the percentage of shares sold. If subsequent performance is correlated with the degree to which parent managers believe carve‐out subsidiaries are over‐ or undervalued, results imply that many carve‐outs are conducted, not to improve efficiency, but to sell potentially overvalued equity.     

Liquidity of the CBOE Equity Options

We examine the CBOE option market depth and bid-ask spreads. Absence of price effects surrounding large option trades suggests excellent market depth. However, bid-ask spreads for the CBOE options and the NYSE stocks are nearly equal, even though an average option is equivalent to less than half a stock plus borrowing. We explain this tradeoff between market depth and bid-ask spreads on the CBOE and the NYSE by differences in market mechanisms. We also show that the adverse-selection component of the option spread, which measures the extent of information-related trading on the CBOE, is very small.     

Accruals and the Conditional Equity Premium

Accruals correlate closely with the determinants of the conditional equity premium at both the firm and the aggregate levels. The common component of firm‐level accruals, which cannot be diversified away by aggregation, explains the positive relation between aggregate accruals and future stock market returns. The residual component, which accounts for most variation in firm‐level accruals, is responsible for the negative cross‐sectional relation between firm‐level accruals and future stock returns. Consistent with the risk‐based explanation, aggregate accruals, as a proxy for the conditional equity premium, forecast changes in aggregate economic activity. Moreover, we document a similar comovement of earnings with the conditional equity premium at both the firm and the aggregate levels, which helps explain the negative relation between changes in aggregate earnings and contemporaneous market returns.     

The Equity Premium

We estimate the equity premium using dividend and earnings growth rates to measure the expected rate of capital gain. Our estimates for 1951 to 2000, 2.55 percent and 4.32 percent, are much lower than the equity premium produced by the average stock return, 7.43 percent. Our evidence suggests that the high average return for 1951 to 2000 is due to a decline in discount rates that produces a large unexpected capital gain. Our main conclusion is that the average stock return of the last half-century is a lot higher than expected.