云南白药混合所有制改革公司治理效果研究

党的十八大以来,我国国有企业混合所有制改革不断深化,取得了巨大成就."云南白药模式"作为我国混合所有制改革过程中的样板模式,对我国的混改具有重要的借鉴意义.本文通过对云南白药混改过程、动因以及混改后的公司治理效果进行分析和研究,从而得出相应的结论.     

云南白药混合所有制改革公司治理效果研究

党的十八大以来,我国国有企业混合所有制改革不断深化,取得了巨大成就."云南白药模式"作为我国混合所有制改革过程中的样板模式,对我国的混改具有重要的借鉴意义.本文通过对云南白药混改过程、动因以及混改后的公司治理效果进行分析和研究,从而得出相应的结论.     

关于所有制改革问题

一九八八年十二月中央宣传部、中央党校和中国社会科学院在京联合举行了“纪念党的十一届三中全会十周年理论讨论会”。现将讨论会有关所有制改革问题的主要论点简介如下: 所有制改革,一是所有制形式方面,核心是财产所有权的明晰化;二是所有制运行     

加大金融扶持力度 促进民营经济发展

改革开放以来，我省民营经济从无到有，从小到大，逐步发展壮大。特别是党的十五大作出调整和完善所有制结构的重大决定以后，彻底打破了长期以来在所有制问题上所形成的禁锢，为民营经济等非公有制经济的发展奠定了理论基础。１９９９年３月１５日九届人大二次会议通过的...     

北京个私经济发展缘何不如人意

调整所有制结构是市第八次党代会按照党的十五大精神提出的重要战略任务,党的十五届五中全会通过的关于“十五”计划的建议,再一次明确了大力发展非公有制经济的战略构想,提出了进一步调整所有制结构,使生产关系适应生产力发展要求,进一步解放和发展生产力的重要任务。发展非公有制经济是调整所有制结构的重要内容,积极发展个体私营经济是非公有制经济发展的重要方面和薄弱环节。按照市委要求,最近,市委研究室对我市个私经济发展情况作了一些调查。     

适应所有制结构变化 调整乡镇财政发展思路

党的十五大指出，继续调整和完善所有制结构是经济体制改革的重大任务。作为我国财政体系基础环节的乡镇财政，如何适应所有制结构变化调整发展思路，已是摆在我们面前的一个需要探讨和实践的课题。一、积极参与和推进乡镇企业改制。乡镇财政的发展是建立在乡镇企业发展基...     

重视资产重组 严格税收执法

党的十五大提出要建设的中国特色的社会主义经济,其基本特征是建设有中国特色的所有制结构,即社会主义公有制为主体,多种所有制经济共同发展的所有制结构。江泽民总书记提出加快国有企业改革的方针,要着眼于搞好整个国有经济,抓好大的,放活小的,对国有企业实施战略性重组,根据上述精神,我地区的国有经济布局已重新调整,股份制、合作使用制已全面推行：现在笔者就资产重级所带来的税收问题谈谈个人浅见。     

坚持国有企业改革的社会主义方向

坚持国有企业改革的社会主义方向周香兰周自宸邓小平建设有中国特色的社会主义理论告诉我们，我国社会主义市场经济的基础，必须是以公有制为主体的多种经济成份并存和共同发展的所有制结构，这是对马克思主义关于所有制关系理论的新发展。马克思主义认为生产资料所有制是...     

北京产权交易市场:抓住契机 创造辉煌

产权和产权的交易其实是由来已久的事情,虽然产权理论是在近代西方形成的,而我国对现代产权理论的认识和实践,是随着改革开放的逐步深入才出现的。党的十六届三中全会,要求加快调整国有经济布局和结构,完善国有资本有进有退、合理流动的机制,这对我国的产权交易将起到很好的促进作用。第一,它打破了过去人们对所有制狭隘的认识——所有权所涉及的不仅仅是实物形态的生活资料和生产资料,而     

北京市非公有制经济的现状与发展研究

改革开放以来,我市的国民经济结构发生了深刻变化,在所有制结构方面一个重要的特征就是改变了公有制经济一统天下的局面,初步形成了以公有制为主体,多种所有制经济共同发展的格局。非公有制经济的发展为整个国民经济注入了新的活力,促进了国民经济的发展,但从总体上看,目前我市非国有经济发展仍处于初级阶段。党的十五大明确提出非公有制经济是社会主义市场经济的重要组     

Does Shareholder Composition Matter? Evidence from the Market Reaction to Corporate Earnings Announcements

We examine whether institutional ownership composition is related to parameters of the market reaction to negative earnings announcements. When firms report earnings below analysts' expectations, the stock price response is more negative for firms with higher levels of ownership by momentum or aggressive growth investors. There is no evidence, however, that these institutions cause an “overreaction” to earnings news. Ownership structure is also related to trading volume and to stock price volatility on days around earnings announcements. Our findings are consistent with the idea that the composition of institutional shareholders effects stock price behavior around the release of corporate information.     

Distribution of Ownership,Short Sale Constraints,and Market Efficiency: Evidence from Cross‐Listed Stocks

We investigate the interplay between the distribution of ownership, short sale constraints, and market efficiency. Using minute‐by‐minute data during the period surrounding the short sale ban of 2008, we demonstrate that short sale restrictions cause price disparities among cross‐listed stocks when ownership in the stocks is distributed unevenly across the two markets. The stocks tend to trade at a premium in the market where long sellers are relatively scarcer, which reduces the speed at which prices adjust to bad news. The premium is driven primarily by an increase on the ask side of the market where ownership is thinner, is only evident when prices are moving down, and disappears quickly.     

The influence of the degree of state ownership and the ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese companies

This study investigates the influence of the degree of state ownership and ownership concentration on firm performance using annual data for 1034 companies listed on China's two exchanges for the period from 2000 to 2004. We find that, on average, the firms’ performance is negatively influenced by the state ownership. However, such a negative relationship is significant only at high levels of government ownership. Moreover, we find that a balanced ownership structure enhances the firm performance and there are indications of detrimental effects of block ownership.     

Risk-Taking in the Texas S&L Industry: Charter and Ownership Effects

This paper attempts to identify some of the factors that help explain the losses experienced by S&Ls during the 1980s. Texas institutions are the focus of this study because they account for over half of the total failure costs incurred for the entire industry during the 1980s. Differences in risk-taking behavior by S&Ls according to both charter type and ownership type are examined. The empirical results suggest that deregulation was not the fundamental cause of the industry losses. Instead, the results indicate that the basic behavioral determinants are ownership structure and owner-contributed equity capital.     

Fundamental Investors Reduce the Distraction on Management from Random Market “Noise”: Evidence from France

The authors find that financial markets have real effects on corporate decisions but that, unfortunately, some temporary market enthusiasm, unrelated to firm intrinsic value, may cause management to make value‐destroying decisions as the result of random and uninformed stock market volatility. In particular, they are prone to making bad decisions after stock market overreactions to “surprise” earnings announcements. This study shows a positive effect of greater long‐term ownership on French listed firms. Fundamental investor ownership reduces the degree of market mispricing which serves long‐run shareholder value maximization. A fundamental investor is one that, on average, hold his shares for at least two years, is in the top quartile of a firm ownership, and has an active allocation strategy. They are about 8% of all investors. Compared to non‐fundamental investors, fundamental investors hold their positions on average three times longer and have positions 1.5 times larger. Fundamental investors are more present in firms which have more liquid stocks, which pay dividends, and which are relatively poorer performers and have relatively lower market‐to‐book than their industry peers.     

Executive Compensation and Agency Effects

The separation of ownership from control in large corporations can cause agency problems. This study analyzes the effects of the dispersion of corporate ownership on the compensation of the top executives of Fortune 500 companies. The effects are estimated across the executive hierarchy and for different components of the compensation package in contrast to more limited previous studies. The results indicate that there is a significant agency effect on executive pay, though the magnitude is small relative to company size. The effects are greatest for the most liquid form of remuneration, salaries, and are nonuniform across executive categories, with the strongest effect found for the Chairman of the Board.     

Institutional ownership stability and the cost of debt

This study documents that the stability of institutional ownership plays an important role in determining the cost of debt. After controlling for other determinants of the cost of debt, and correcting for the endogeneity of institutional ownership stability, three major results are uncovered. First, there is a robust negative relationship between the cost of debt and institutional ownership stability. Second, institutional ownership stability plays a bigger role in determining the cost of debt, than the institutional ownership level commonly used in the literature. Third, institutional ownership stability affects the cost of debt to a greater extent for firms that are subject to more severe information asymmetry and greater agency costs of debt.     

The ownership structure of UK firms and the informativeness of accounting earnings

This paper provides evidence that in the UK, a firm's ownership structure is related to the informativeness of its accounting earnings for price. Evidence is reported that concentrated outside ownership is negatively related to the contemporaneous price-earnings association. This is interpreted as indicative of more non-accounting information being collected and disseminated for firms whose ownership includes large outside (non-managerial) blocks and a consequential loss of informativeness of contemporaneous accounting earnings. Having controlled for the information environment, we provide evidence that the overall relation between return and earnings is attenuated for firms with diffuse outside ownership. This is interpreted as evidence of the market anticipating opportunistic managerial manipulation of earnings when outside ownership is diffuse.     

现代公司的控制权矛盾与会计控制目标实现

在公司制企业的基本制度中 ,会计控制系统起着重要的基础性作用 ,其控制目标的实现与企业治理目标具有内在的不可分割的辨证关系。本文将关于现代公司控制权结构问题的一些新的研究成果引入对公司会计控制问题的思考 ,指出公司控制权矛盾的变迁是引发公司会计控制目标偏离的基本原因 ,认为公司权利的和谐配置是会计控制目标实现基础条件 ,这一现实不仅要求我们反思会计控制理论 ,同时要求我们在具体分析公司控制权矛盾的基础上重新思考会计控制的目标及其实现问题。     

机构投资者交易行为特征研究

本文通过研究股票收益变化和机构持股变化之间的关系,发现对于高机构持股股票,过去表现较好的股票会吸引机构增加持仓,且机构增持的股票相对减持的股票的后续表现又更好,而低机构持股股票则不然。这表明机构投资者整体上是采用正反馈即惯性交易策略的,而个体投资者的行为则较为随机。对于缺乏投资经验的个体投资者而言,论文结果意味着他们应当委托机构进行理财如投资于基金。