共享资源治理制度转型中个体认知状态的实证研究

基于对认知行为与制度演化的认识,在偏好分层理论框架下,本文针对“既非家庭私有又非社会公有的被一定范围内私人共享”的共享资源治理制度转型,通过对南京市两次截面数据(2003年878个、2005年865个样本)的统计分析,考察了共享资源治理制度转型中个体认知状态:面临转型期复合场景信号作用,个体外层偏好关系和认知状态发生冲突———趋于支配共享资源决策权利、同时回避与之对应、对等的供给责任。对两次截面数据所做的方差分析显示,存在认知冲突的个体比例未发生显著变化,但各变量特征变化表明,新场景下治理关系的认知状态调整将有利于共享资源治理转型。     

城市物业小区治理国内研究述评

本文梳理了2001—2010年6月期间国内有关共享资源理论及其在物业小区治理领域的研究进展。本文从物业小区共享资源的内涵界定、共享资源理论的研究进展、物业小区共享资源的研究进展以及物业小区共享资源治理研究方法四个方面进行了梳理。研究指出:物业小区CPR的不同治理模式、CPR资源的资本化、物业纠纷的第三方参与以及物业小区不同阶段是否存在可选的较优的治理模式等方面,都存在很大的研究空间。     

社群合作与共享资源的自发治理

社群合作问题是由共享资源的存在所引发的集体行动需求和自我组织治理的问题。由于共享资源组成成分的多样性造成集体行动实现和维持的复杂化,不同性质的共享资源要求不同的治理方式,因而具体的规则或制度安排就不同。但其共同点就是都需要小区居民之间的合作和自觉参与,以实现共享资源的自发治理收益。     

论利益相关者公司治理模式

公司治理模式是一套治理公司交易关系的制度安排。传统的公司治理理论遵循“股东至上”的逻辑。随着公司的发展演变,“股东至上”的治理模式开始受到人们的诘责,“利益相关者”治理模式开始为人们所青睐。“利益相关者”治理模式的理论基础在于对传统“股东至上”逻辑的质疑;其实践常见于德国与日本的公司治理中;“利益相关者”治理模式是公司长期发展演变的产物,它有其存在的合理性,也面临着进一步演变的挑战。     

异质性与共享资源的自发治理——关于群体性合作的现实路径研究

共享资源在人类的经济社会中普遍存在。共享资源治理的收益引发了群体内部的信任与合作问题。传统理论的个体假设是狭隘、过度抽象的完全理性,忽视了个体基于现实场景中的决策和行为选择,因而无法获得符合现实的理论解释。一个群体能够依靠规则、组织机构等正式制度以及群体规范等非正式制度实现治理过程中的投入与产出分享、对合作行为给予激励以及机会主义行为的惩罚,从而通过群体性合作实现共享资源的治理。因而问题就转为分析每个个体在追求自身利益的决策和行为选择中能否通过策略互动实现自我实施的规则与群体规范,实现共享资源自发治理的群体秩序,通过两阶段模型说明了异质性个体在实现正式的制度供给和内生的群体规范方面的作用机制,对于我们理解现实世界的群体性合作问题提供了新视角。     

企业间合作治理模式选择的实证研究

根据交易成本经济学中“交易特征-治理模式”的分析框架,对北京市156家企业进行了问卷调查,并基于调查数据对企业间合作治理模式选择机制进行了实证研究。研究结果表明：随着企业间资源的结构依赖性、过程依赖性以及环境不确定性程度的提高,企业更倾向于采用股权式合作治理模式;而合作经验对企业闯合作治理模式同时存在直接和间接影响,其中间接影响主要通过资源依赖性的中介效应来实现。这一研究结果证实了交易成本逻辑的合理性。     

常态社会与运动式治理——中国社会治安治理中的“严打”政策研究

本文以转型中国社会治安治理中的“严打”政策为研究对象,具体考察了1983年、1996年和2001年全国范围内三次“严打”斗争的发动背景、打击对象、主要做法和治理绩效。本文认为集中有限的国家治理资源解决突出的社会治安问题是执政党与政府在“实用理性”主导下、面临资源瓶颈问题的理性选择。通过运动式治理实现国家权力的再生产与再扩充,确保政治秩序合法性的延续与维系是国家治理资源贫弱的转型中国国家治理的内在逻辑。     

中国特色金融发展道路的新探索——基于国家治理逻辑的金融大分流新假说

本文通过考察中西方千年金融发展，从国家治理逻辑角度提出了中西方金融大分流的新假说。该假说认为金融大分流的本质在于能否建立起可持续的公共信用体系，根源则在于中西方政治目标与治理模式的分野以及由此带来的公共信用供求的差异。该假说强调“目标函数”决定“行为方程”,揭示了政治目标以及与之相契合的治理模式选择在各国金融制度长期演进中所起的关键性作用，为分析金融大分流提供了更为完整的逻辑链条和更有说服力的理论机制。基于大历史视域下的国家治理逻辑假说，以及近代以来中国为现代化融资所进行的艰难探索和成功实践，本文认为，超越金融大分流所暗含的“从分流到合流”的逻辑，走中国特色金融发展道路，是金融助力现代化的必然之选：既要深刻总结各国金融发展所呈现的规律性认识，又要找准并坚持中国特色，真正做到“以我为主，博采众长”;归根到底，中国特色金融发展的逻辑内嵌于中国式现代化发展的逻辑。     

跳出历史周期率“两个答案”的生成逻辑与协同路径

跳出治乱兴衰的历史周期率既是历史之问，也是时代之问。“人民民主”和“自我革命”是中国共产党跨越70余年历史所给出的答案。“两个答案”的形成具有深厚的理论基础、独特的历史条件以及迫切的现实要求。“两个答案”一脉相承，前后相继，要推动“两个答案”有机统一，互促互进，实现人民民主与党内民主、人民监督与党内监督协调共进，为建设什么样的长期执政的马克思主义政党、怎样建设长期执政的马克思主义政党贡献中国共产党独有的实践答案以及经验智慧。     

国有公司内部治理结构模式的重塑

现行公司制国有企业治理结构失衡、效率低下的深层次症结在于“股东至上”逻辑下国企单边治理结构模式存在着内生缺陷。因此，克服缺陷、矫正失衡的思路设计必须是：引入共同治理机制，以替代单边治理模式，变“股东至上”逻辑为‘‘利益相关者合作”逻辑，使企业利益相关者尤其是人力资本所有者拥有企业所有权及相应的剩余索取权，形成多元产权主体共同治理的新格局。     

Individual and Collective Choice and Voting in Common Pool Resource Problem with Heterogeneous Actors

In this paper we investigate the effects of heterogeneity in common pool resource (CPR) problems. We examine whether heterogeneity impedes or facilitates coordination on an efficient use of a CPR by proposing and voting on allocation schemes. In a full information design we compare extractions and voting behavior in heterogeneous and homogeneous groups. If the CPR is extracted individually, we find no difference in efficiency between heterogeneous and homogeneous groups. However, when groups can vote on allocation schemes, homogeneous groups are more likely to reach an efficient agreement than heterogeneous groups.     

Modeling Effort and Lobbying in a Heterogeneous Common Pool Resource Setting

Extraction from a common pool resource (CPR), such as a fishery, can lead to socially inefficient and undesirable outcomes as a result of appropriation problems. Through regulation of the CPR, users may achieve a more profitable and socially efficient outcome. Feeny et al. (Land Econ 72(2):187–205, 1996) delve into some of the assumptions made by traditional CPR models and how use of those assumptions provides an incomplete framework to guide fishery policy. In the theoretical models we develop, we relax two of those assumptions: CPR users are homogeneous and are unable to create, or influence, management of the resource. We note a case where regulation of the individual user can induce others to harvest more, and relate this to the slippage effect concept. Regarding resource sustainability, we document situations where incentives exist for CPR users to lobby for tighter regulations and thus increase profits by limiting the tragedy of the commons influence.     

Dissertation abstract: The experimental analysis of the political economics of fisheries governance

This dissertation focuses on the political economy of fisheries governance. The study develops a formal model of fisheries governance by combining the features of the common pool fishery and the political institution of lobbying; designs a laboratory fishery governance institution and conducts economic experiments to test the hypotheses derived from the formal model. Specifically, the study analyzes how fishing firms invest in efforts to influence fishery regulation and management through voluntary contribution lobbying. The study also analyses and compares contribution and effort behavior in the lobbying and the CPR using data from economic experiments. The results indicate that lobbying to change suboptimal fishery regulations was significantly below the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction and contributions to raise the cap were significantly different than contributions to lower the cap toward the social optimum. Study results show that subjects successfully lobbied to raise inefficiently low fishing quotas, but were unable to lobby to reduce inefficiently high fishing quotas. Detailed analysis of subjects’ contribution and effort behavior suggest that despite the interesting benefit-cost duality between pure public goods and CPRs, the pattern of cooperative behavior in these two social dilemma situations was different and the level of cooperation in the voluntary contribution lobbying experiment was lower than those reported in other public goods experiments. To provide external validity to these experimental findings, the study further analyzes and compares lobbying expenditures in the fishery sector with those in other natural resource industries using field data from the United States. A comparison of actual lobbying expenditures as percentage of valued added shows that lobbying effort in the U.S fishery sector is not significantly different than those in other natural resource industries such as mining and electric utility industries, but the pattern of lobbying is different. Whereas fishing firms lobby through associations or pressure groups, firms in other natural resource industries lobby unilaterally. This observation suggests that differences in industrial structure and incentives influence the pattern of lobbying and the lobbying behavior of firms across industries. The theoretical predictions derived from the formal model of fisheries governance are consistent with our experimental findings and with the field data on lobbying in the US fisheries sector. These findings suggest that heterogeneity drives rent-seeking activities in the US fisheries sector and that fishing firms attempt to circumvent political collective action problems by forming and lobbying through associations of stakeholders with relatively homogenous policy preferences. JEL Classification D22, D72, D78, H41 Advisor: Prof. Jon G. Sutinen     

Scenarios of technology and innovation policies in Europe: Investigating future governance

In Europe, public research, technology and innovation policies are no longer exclusively in the hands of national authorities: increasingly, national initiatives are supplemented by, or even competing with, regional innovation policies or transnational programmes, in particular the activities of the European Union. At the same time, industrial innovation increasingly occurs within international networks. Are we witnessing a change of governance in European innovation policy? Based on some theoretical assumptions concerning the relationship between the “political systems” and “innovation systems” in Europe, the paper speculates about the future governance of innovation policies, trying to pave ways for empirical analyses. It sketches three scenarios stretching from (1) the idea of an increasingly centralised and dominating European innovation policy arena to (2) the opposite, i.e., a progressive decentralisation and open competition between partly strengthened, partly weakened national or regional innovation systems and finally to (3) the vision of a centrally “mediated” mixture of competition and cooperation between diverse regional innovation cultures and a related governance structure.     

Time and uncertainty in resource dilemmas: equilibrium solutions and experimental results

Most common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas share two features: they evolve over time and they are managed under environmental uncertainties. We propose a stylized dynamic model that integrates these two dimensions. A distinguishing feature of our model is that the duration of the game is determined endogenously by the users’ collective decisions. In the proposed model, if the resource stock level below which the irreversible event occurs is known in advance, then the optimal resource use coincides with a unique symmetric equilibrium that guarantees survival of the resource. As the uncertainty about the threshold level increases, resource use increases if users adopt decision strategies that quickly deplete the resource stock, but decreases if they adopt path strategies guaranteeing that the unknown threshold level is never exceeded. We show that under relatively high uncertainty about resource size, CPR users frequently implement decision strategies that terminate the game immediately. When this uncertainty is reduced, they maintain a positive resource level for longer durations.     

中国流域环境管理体制研究

水是人类生存之本,也是保障社会可持续发展的基础性资源。但是由于我国目前的流域管理体制存在各方面的不足,从而导致流域环境恶化、水资源短缺等危及社会发展的重大问题。因此,建立一套科学合理的流域综合管理体制是保护流域环境质量的关键所在。文章通过对比我国与发达国家在流域管理体制方面存在的差距,从机构设置、执法、监督等方面分析了我国流域管理体制存在的问题,并结合对黄河、长江流域管理典型案例的剖析,提出了改善流域管理体制的政策建议。     

The Differential Impact of Public and Private Governance Institutions on the Different Modes of Foreign Investment

This paper examines the respective impacts of public and private governance institutions on foreign direct and foreign portfolio investment inflows. We present two hypotheses: (1) there is a strong correlation between the quality of a country’s public governance institutions and the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) received while the quality of its private governance institutions has no further discernible impact on this correlation; (2) there is a strong correlation between the quality of a country’s public governance institutions and the amount of foreign portfolio investment (FPI) received while the quality of its private governance institutions has a further positive impact on this correlation. Our findings, which are based on panel data analysis, show both hypotheses to be valid.     

大学科研治理：冲突与变革——基于大学科研人员治理主体

建设创新型国家和“双一流”大学是国家重大战略决策。近年来，大学科研人员创新积极性受诸多因素掣制，难以充分激发，引起广泛关注。借鉴现代冲突理论，探讨大学科研治理中，科研人员因所处弱势地位而可能面临的冲突；阐述冲突的表现，包括群际冲突、群内冲突、学科冲突和个体冲突；分析冲突的生成，主要有政府信任假设与期待冲突、科技制度供给与需求冲突及治理方式对立与合作冲突；阐发大学科研治理变革的理论逻辑，主要有互动互信是大学科研治理的前提、科技制度是大学科研治理的保障、协同共治是大学科研治理的目标；提出变革的实践路径，包括诚信建设常态化、科技制度体系化、制度创新多元化、治理方式柔性化、科研服务精细化和治理手段智能化。