How Much New Information Is There in Earnings?

We quantify the relative importance of earnings announcements in providing new information to the share market, using the R² in a regression of securities' calendar‐year returns on their four quarterly earnings‐announcement “window” returns. The R², which averages approximately 5% to 9%, measures the proportion of total information incorporated in share prices annually that is associated with earnings announcements. We conclude that the average quarterly announcement is associated with approximately 1% to 2% of total annual information, thus providing a modest but not overwhelming amount of incremental information to the market. The results are consistent with the view that the primary economic role of reported earnings is not to provide timely new information to the share market. By inference, that role lies elsewhere, for example, in settling debt and compensation contracts and in disciplining prior information, including more timely managerial disclosures of information originating in the firm's accounting system. The relative informativeness of earnings announcements is a concave function of size. Increased information during earnings‐announcement windows in recent years is due only in part to increased concurrent releases of management forecasts. There is no evidence of abnormal information arrival in the weeks surrounding earnings announcements. Substantial information is released in management forecasts and in analyst forecast revisions prior (but not subsequent) to earnings announcements.     

Management Compensation and Payback Method in Capital Budgeting: A Path Analysis

While discounted cash flow techniques, such as net present value, are the primary normative models of capital budgeting recommended by finance theory, our survey suggests that one of the so-called ‘naive methods’, the payback (PB) criterion, is widely used in practice. About 85% of the responding firms make some use of the payback criterion. Almost 50% of the responding firms indicate that the payback method plays a relatively important role in capital budgeting decisions, and the degree of the importance varies among firms. This study uses path analysis to empirically identify links between the use of payback and management compensation contracts. Controlling for uncertainty in estimating future cash flows and firm size, we find that the use of the payback method is positively related to the degree to which management compensation depends on accounting earnings. Furthermore, this study finds two indirect links between management compensation and the use of payback. The more management compensation depends on accounting earnings: the more important management perceives the earnings objective and, consequently, the greater the use of the payback method; and the less important management perceives the shareholder wealth objective and, consequently, the greater the use of the payback method. We conclude that owner-management conflict and management's self-interest behaviour induced by employment contracts are factors that promote the use of payback method.     

Initial Evidence on the Role of Accounting Earnings in the Bond Market

We document that: (1) the incidence of bond trade increases during the days surrounding earnings announcements, (2) there is a bond‐price reaction to the announcement of earnings, and (3) there is a positive association between annual bond returns and both annual changes in earnings and annual analysts' forecast errors. All of these effects are larger when earnings convey bad news or when the underlying bond is more risky. Taken together, our results suggest that the nonlinear payoff structure of bond securities affects the role of accounting earnings in the bond market.     

Equilibrium earnings management and managerial compensation in a multiperiod agency setting

To investigate how the possibility of earnings manipulation affects managerial compensation contracts, we study a two-period agency setting in which a firm’s manager can engage in window-dressing activities to manipulate reported accounting earnings. Earnings manipulation boosts the reported earnings in one period at the expense of the reported earnings in the other period. We find that the optimal pay-performance sensitivity may increase and expected managerial compensation may decrease as the manager’s cost of earnings management decreases. When the manager is privately informed about the payoff of an investment project to the firm, we identify plausible conditions under which prohibiting earnings management can result in a less efficient investment decision for the firm and more rents for the manager.     

The effect of owner versus management control on the choice of accounting methods

This paper examines the relationship between the ownership control status of firms and the accounting methods they adopt. The arguments of Watts and Zimmerman's positive theory are integrated with those of managerial economists to generate the prediction that management controlled firms are more likely than owner controlled firms to adopt accounting methods which increase reported earnings. This prediction is inconsistent with Fama's hypothesis that the market for managerial talent will prevent management controlled firms from acting differently than owner controlled firms. This paper compares the depreciation methods used by a sample of management and owner controlled firms for financial reporting purposes. The comparison considers and controls for the factors of firm size, leverage, and the depreciation method used for tax reporting purposes. The comparison reveals that there is a significant difference in the depreciation methods adopted by management controlled and owner controlled firms for financial reporting purposes.     

Earnings management,incentive contracts and private information acquisition

This paper analyzes the optimal design of compensation contracts in the presence of earnings management incentives, and its interplay with investors’ information acquisition decisions. We consider a setting in which compensation contract is based on both accounting earnings and stock price when an agent engages in predictable, pernicious earnings management and stock price is endogenously determined in a Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium (NREE) that reflects both the public information from reported earnings and a costly, noisy signal privately acquired by investors. We show that an increase in the precision of the firm’s financial reporting system could reduce the informativeness of stock price and exacerbate the agency problem by inducing lower productive effort and higher earnings management, implying that the firm may not choose a more precise financial reporting system.     

Does accounting conservatism pay?

We investigate whether or not there is a link between conservative accounting practices and the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance. Using several accrual‐based measures of accounting conservatism as well as alternative measures of accounting performance, we estimate an econometric model of CEO compensation that incorporates the interaction of accounting conservatism and accounting performance. Consistent with optimal contracting theory, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance is higher for firms that report conservative accounting earnings. These results support the hypothesis that accounting conservatism, by limiting earnings management opportunities and improving the reliability of accounting performance measures, allows firms to formulate contracts that tie executive compensation more closely to accounting performance.     

The effects of legal regime on the patterns of stock returns surrounding ADR earnings announcements

This study examines the effects of legal regime on the patterns of stock returns surrounding the earnings announcements of American Depositary Receipt (ADR) programs. My results indicate that the properties of accounting earnings associated with the local legal regime of an ADR program spill over to U.S. GAAP reconciled earnings. In particular, I find that the market reacts significantly to the earnings announcements of the ADR programs from common law countries whose accounting earnings are known to be more conservative and timely, but not to those of the ADR programs from code law countries where the earnings are known to be less conservative and timely.     

财务会计：基于价值还是基于交易

企业是一个契约的组合,契约达成的条件之一是具有可验证的变量,财务会计信息因基于过去的交易和复式簿记方法而区别于其他信息,成为可以验证的信息,会计政策因此成为契约的一个组成部分。企业战略面向未来,体现为契约或契约变更,战略是管理层向投资者承诺的重要内容,也是投资者和分析师估计企业未来业绩的重要因素,战略的恰当性以及战略的实施效果需要用过去已经发生的事实来验证,会计信息是履行契约的结果,因此,财务会计是一个验证战略恰当性的系统。盈余意外证明了财务会计信息的验证作用,投资者根据对企业未来现金流量的估计对股票进行估价,会计信息通过证实原来的估计向投资者传递管理层履行战略的能力,也传递分析师的专业能力。因此,基于交易的财务会计在市场上的作用是验证过去,而不是面向未来,尽管历史成本会计信息也可以用于估价。     

An Analysis of the Relation between the Stewardship and Valuation Roles of Earnings

In this paper, we seek a deeper understanding of how accounting information is used for valuation and incentive contracting purposes. We explore linkages between weights on earnings in compensation contracts and in stock price formation. A distinction between the valuation and incentive contracting roles of earnings in Paul [1992] produces the null hypothesis that valuation earnings coefficients (VECs) and compensation earnings coefficients (CECs) are unrelated. Our empirical analyses of the relations between earnings and both stock prices and executive compensation data at the firm and industry levels over the period 1971–2000 rejects Paul's [1992] hypothesis of no relation. We also document an increasing weight over time on other public performance information captured by stock returns in the determination of cash compensation. Specifically, we find that the incentive coefficient on returns is significantly higher in the second of two equal sample subperiods relative to the incentive coefficient on earnings.     

The options market response to accounting earnings announcements

We examine the reaction of the equity options market to accounting earnings announcements over the period 1996–2008 using changes in implied volatility to measure the options market response to earnings news. We find that positive earnings surprises and positive profit announcements produce a larger uncertainty resolution than negative earnings surprises and loss announcements. We demonstrate an inverse relation between the change in implied volatility and earnings news in a three-day window immediately after an earnings announcement. We refer to the magnitude of this relation as the ‘options market earnings response coefficient’. This ‘options market earnings response coefficient’ is stronger for both bad news announcements and positive profit announcements. We do not find any significant relation between changes in implied volatility and earnings news in the pre- or post-announcement periods. We conclude that the options market efficiently absorbs earnings information.     

Ex Ante Incentives for Earnings Management and the Informativeness of Earnings

This study examines the relation between ex ante incentives of insurance managers to engage in earnings management to meet regulatory standards and the informativeness of earnings. This study extends prior research by simultaneously examining the effects of earnings management and uncertainty about earnings as suggested by Collins and DeAngelo (1990) and Imhoff and Lobo (1992). Results from a sample of 375 quarterly earnings announcements of 41 property and liability insurers during the period 1989 to 1992 support the hypothesis that when managers' incentives for earnings management are high, earnings announcements are less informative to investors (even after controlling for uncertainty associated with exposure to large-scale catastrophes). Robustness tests suggest that our results are not attributable to firm size, time period effects, firm effects, accounting estimation error, or financial distress risk. These results are consistent with investors using publicly available information to predict P-L insurance managers' ex ante incentives to manage earnings to meet regulatory standards, and that they use this information in forming their beliefs about earnings quality.     

公允价值计量与管理层薪酬契约

本文以2007、2008年持有公允价值变动损益的A股上市公司为样本,分析了公允价值收益、公允价值损失与管理层薪酬之间的敏感系数。研究结果表明,A股上市公司存在着对公允价值变动损益的"重奖轻罚"现象。"重奖轻罚"现象表明我国上市公司激励有效而约束乏力的薪酬不对称特征也存在于盈余分项目层面,这将会助长管理层的机会主义行为,放大企业风险。本文还发现,公允价值"持有收益"并不必然增加股东财富,委托人不能辨别新增财富的可实现性与现实性的差异,也不能辨别市场优势地位与管理层努力程度对业绩的影响,常见的公司治理机制在该问题上并没有发挥应有的控制作用,表明中国的公司治理机制仍有待完善。     

Informed Trading in Corporate Bonds Prior to Earnings Announcements

This paper examines the information content of corporate bond trading prior to earnings announcements using data from both NAIC and TRACE. We find that the direction of pre‐announcement bond trading is closely related to earnings surprises. This link is most evident prior to negative news and in high‐yield bonds. Further, abnormal bond trading during the pre‐announcement period can help predict both earnings surprises and post‐announcement bond returns. Such predictive ability of bond trading largely originates from institutional‐sized trades and is concentrated in the issuer's most actively traded bond. Finally, even after accounting for transactions costs, informed bond trading can generate significant net profits, especially prior to the release of bad news.     

Regular Dividend Announcements and Future Unexpected Earnings: An Empirical Analysis

Previous studies have interpreted stock price reaction to dividend announcements as being consistent with the hypothesis that any changes are forecasts of future corporate profits. Recent studies seem to provide evidence to this effect. This study provides additional empirical evidence pertaining to the issue of whether quarterly cash dividend announcements convey useful information about a firm's future profitability, beyond that contained in contemporaneous quarterly earnings announcements. The association between unexpected changes in quarterly dividends and unexpected accounting earnings in subsequent quarters is examined, after controlling for information contained in past and current earnings series. The results, based on a large sample of regular quarterly cash dividend changes, indicate that firms that increased (decreased) their dividends realized, on average, greater (smaller) unexpected accounting earnings in subsequent periods than firms that did not change their dividends.     

高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究

本文在对国内外文献进行综评的基础上,立足于中国资本市场的特殊制度背景,分别选择会计绩效指标(ROA、ROE)、市场指标(Tobinq)以及股东财富指标(OF)构建模型,对我国上市公司高层管理当局的薪酬激励、特别是现金薪酬与上市公司业绩之间的相关性进行了经验研究,并减弱了相关的多重共线性现象。我们发现,高层管理当局薪酬与公司以及股东财富前后两期的变化,均成正相关关系;而与本期Tobinq的变化成负相关关系,与上期Tobinq的变化成正相关关系。公司的董事会或薪酬委员会在决定高层管理当局薪酬时青睐于会计盈余指标的变化更甚于信任股东财富指标。     

Evidence on the Usefulness of Capital Expenditures as an Alternative Measure of Depreciation

Investment professionals often suggest that accounting earnings is a more useful indicator of share value if adjusted by substituting current capital expenditures for reported depreciation. We investigate the usefulness of this alternative depreciation measure by comparing the ability of reported earnings and adjusted earnings to explain the cross-sectional distribution of stock prices for a large sample of manufacturing firms. We find that adjusted earnings explains a much smaller fraction of the variation in share prices than earnings based on reported depreciation, and provide evidence on the reasons for this difference.     

Performance Measures in Earnings‐Based Financial Covenants in Debt Contracts

This paper examines how performance measures are defined in major earnings‐based financial covenants in loan contracts to shed light on the economic rationales underlying the contractual use of performance measures. I find an earnings‐based covenant is typically based on a performance measure close to earnings before interest, tax, amortization, and depreciation expenses (EBITDA). However, my empirical analyses show that EBITDA is less useful in explaining credit risk than earnings before interest and tax expenses (EBIT) and even the bottom‐line net income. Thus, measuring credit risk cannot fully explain the choice of accounting performance measures in earnings‐based covenants. I conjecture that contracting parties choose an EBITDA‐related measure, instead of a measure calculated after depreciation and amortization expenses (e.g., EBIT), to make the performance measure less sensitive to investment activities, which can be controlled through other contractual terms, such as a restriction on capital expenditure, and provide empirical evidence consistent with this conjecture.     

Accruals quality and the incentive contracting role of earnings

This paper investigates the association between accruals quality and the usefulness of accounting earnings in incentive contracting. Accruals quality, which measures the precision with which accruals predict future cash flows, has two potential opposing effects on the noise in earnings as a measure of managerial performance. Specifically, higher quality accruals should decrease the deviations of earnings from future cash flows and increase the sensitivity of earnings to cash flows that are not attributable to managerial actions. My evidence indicates that better accruals quality is associated with a higher weight on earnings in compensation contracts, which suggests that accruals quality overall reduces the noise in earnings. I also find that the positive association between accruals quality and the weight on earnings is mainly driven by innate accruals quality rather than discretionary accruals quality. Therefore, accrual errors resulting from the volatility of the operating environment are a primary source of noise in earnings considered by compensation committees.     

场外市场会计盈余的信息含量

以万德数据库提供的新三板企业为样本,检验场外主体市场的会计盈余信息含量。混合样本检验显示,盈余信息披露对投资者超额收益有显著影响。分期检验中,2009年披露的盈余信息还不具备有效的信息含量;2010年披露的盈余信息具有信息含量,可能预示着场外市场的完善和成熟。此外,样本检验结果没有找到场外市场具有半强势有效的证据,但可以推断该市场处于弱势有效状态。