Liquidity and Twin Crises

This paper proposes a simple analytical framework for understanding 'twin crises'– i.e. crises where a currency crisis and banking crisis occur simultaneously and reinforce each other. The distinguishing feature of such crises is the spill‐over effects across financial institutions through collateral constraints, declines in market values of assets, currency mismatches on the balance sheet and the endogenous amplification of financial distress through asset sales. We explore the role of liquidity and the role of monetary policy in such crises. In particular, a central question is whether raising interest rates in the face of a twin crisis is the appropriate policy response. Raising interest rates has two countervailing effects. Holding the domestic currency becomes more attractive (other things being equal), but the value of the domestic banking system falls due to the fall in asset prices. When assets are marked to market, there is a potential for endogenously generated financial distress that leads to a collapse of asset prices, as well as the exchange rate. It is thus possible that raising interest rates can have the perverse effect of exacerbating both the currency crisis and the banking crisis.     

US Credit Crisis and Spillovers to Asia

We review key highlights of the global credit crisis. We then consider how financial turmoil in the largest advanced economies might be transmitted to East Asia. The focus is on foreign trade links, international capital flows, currency market pressures and mismatches, financial sector fragilities, and countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy actions. We introduce a set of vulnerability indicators and explore whether an ordinal ranking of East Asian economies according to these vulnerability indicators seems to be related to the cross-country differences in estimated slowdowns of economic growth during the crisis. Finally, we discuss how Asian economies might encourage the adoption of a stronger regulatory and supervisory framework in the USA and whether some Asian economies and the USA might pursue a more “balanced” growth strategy after the crisis.     

State of confidence,overborrowing and macroeconomic stabilization in out-of-equilibrium dynamics

We model macroeconomic instability as the outcome of the dynamic interaction between debt accumulation and the “state of confidence” in a small open economy with a super-fixed exchange-rate arrangement. We use a system dynamic approach and show that instability is a likely feature when macroeconomic behaviour is characterized by out-of-equilibrium dynamics with balance-sheet effects and deviation amplifying expectation formation rules that interact endogenously. We address the issue of the macroeconomic stabilization puzzle and carry out a quantitative evaluation based on sensitivity analysis with reference to Argentina, during the currency-board arrangement. We find that a tight fiscal policy is likely to be destabilizing inasmuch as it adds to the fall in expenditure, output and the “state of confidence”. On the other side, a traditional monetary policy can fail in switching off macroeconomic instability if the reduction in interest rates does not compensate for the fall in the “state of confidence”, whilst a direct stimulus to aggregate expenditure is required to avoid an economic collapse.     

Endogenous supply of fiat money

We consider whether reputation concerns can discipline the behavior of a long-lived self-interested agent who has a monopoly over the provision of fiat money. We obtain that when this agent can commit to a choice of money supply, there is a monetary equilibrium where it never overissues. We show, however, that monetary equilibria with no overissue do not exist when there is no commitment. This happens because the incentives this agent has to maintain a reputation for providing valuable currency disappear once its reputation is high enough. More generally, we prove that in the absence of commitment overissue happens infinitely often in any monetary equilibrium. We conclude by showing that imperfect memory can restore the positive result obtained with commitment.     

Monetary and macroprudential policy with foreign currency loans

In a number of countries a substantial proportion of mortgage loans is denominated in foreign currency. In this paper we demonstrate how their presence affects economic policy and agents’ welfare. To this end we construct a small open economy model with financial frictions, where housing loans can be denominated in domestic or foreign currency. The model is calibrated for Poland - a typical small open economy with a large share of foreign currency loans (FCL). We show that the presence of FCLs negatively affects the transmission of monetary policy and deteriorates the output-inflation volatility trade-off it faces. The trade-off can be improved with macroprudential policy but the outcomes are still worse than under this same policy mix applied to an economy with domestic currency debt. We also demonstrate that a high share of FCLs is harmful for social welfare, even if financial stability considerations are not taken into account. Finally, we show that regulatory policies that discriminate against FCLs may have a negative impact on economic activity and discuss the redistributive consequences of forced currency conversion of household debt.     

Credit risk and sustainable debt: a model and estimations of why the Euro is stable in the long-run

Sustainable debt has become the key issue in rating of private as well as sovereign debtors. The problem of how to estimate sustainable debt has also been at the center of the debate over the Asian 1997–1998 financial crisis. If the external value of the currency depends on the external debt of a country, it is necessary to estimate the creditworthiness of the country. This paper studies credit risk and sustainable debt in the context of a dynamic model. For a dynamic growth model with an additional equation for the evolution of debt, we demonstrate of how to compute sustainable debt and creditworthiness. The model is estimated by employing time series data for the core countries of the Euro-area. The computations show that the Euro-area has large external assets. Using time series methods, the sustainability of external debt (assets) is estimated for those core countries of the Euro-area. Those estimations show that the Euro will be a stable currency in the long-run.     

Financial crises and dynamic linkages across international stock and currency markets

This paper investigates contagion across stock and currency markets of China, Eurozone, India, Japan and US during global financial crisis and Eurozone crisis. The crisis periods are selected using Markov-switching models for US and Eurozone markets. We, then, utilize the DCC-GARCH model to estimate conditional correlation among the assets and test for contagion/flight to quality effects during the crises. The results show significant contagion as well as flight to quality effects both across and within asset classes. We examine the impact of financial stress index on the correlation across markets and find that portfolio diversification benefits for equity markets may be non-existent.     

Credit in Times of Stress: Lessons from Latin America during the Global Financial Crisis

The 2008–2009 global financial crisis disrupted the provision of credit in Latin America less than in previous crises. This paper tests whether specific characteristics at both the bank and country levels at the onset of the global crisis contributed to the behavior of real credit growth in this region during the crisis. As shown, financial soundness characteristics of Latin American banks, such as capitalization, liquidity, and bank efficiency in the pre‐crisis period, played a role in explaining the dynamics of real credit during the crisis. We also found that foreign banks and banks that had expanded credit growth more before the crisis were also those that cut credit the most. Among country‐specific characteristics, we found evidence that balance sheet measures such as the economy's overall currency mismatches and external debt ratios (measuring either total debt or short‐term debt) were key variables in explaining credit growth resilience.     

Interdependence or contagion: A model switching approach with a focus on Latin America

Empirical research analysing contagion has become increasingly fragmented. Different definitions of contagion have resulted in different methods being deployed to analyse financial transmission channels. This paper devises a novel econometric strategy where the nature of interdependencies, magnitude of interdependencies and transmission channels selected for inclusion can change over time. We thus appeal to multiple definitions of contagion, distinguishing between: interdependence, contagion through interdependence and abrupt contagion through changing linkages. Using our approach we analyse different crisis episodes in Latin America. Results generally indicate interdependence not contagion during the currency crises of the 1990s and Argentine crisis of 1998–2002. During the global financial crisis, results indicate abrupt contagion from the US to Argentina and Brazil. Mexico, however, experiences contagion through existing interdependencies with the US. Results also show that macroeconomic and uncertainty channels play a role during different crises not just financial channels. By establishing whether or not different interdependencies and transmission channels are present during different crises our model switching approach provides new insights.     

论我国货币政策效应

本文基于VECM模型对我国货币政策效应做实证分析.结果表明,我国货币政策效应主要体现为促进经济增长,经济系统对货币需求和物价水平缺乏显著的抑制作用.我国中央银行为应对国际金融危机而实施的一系列宽松的货币政策,一方面有效地推动了GDP的止跌回升,另一方面也产生了通货膨胀的预期,助长了股票市场和房地产市场价格的高涨.因此在后金融危机时期要逐步调整货币政策,注意通货膨胀的风险,防范股票市场和房地产市场的泡沫.     

Self-fulfilling Currency Crises and Central Bank Independence

We develop a model of a fixed exchange rate peg arrangement derived from the Barro–Gordon model of rules versus discretion. It is shown that the fixed peg is vulnerable to self-fulfilling currency crises in which the unemployment rate increases, the credibility of the rule decreases, but, paradoxically, the reputation of the policy-maker improves. Delegating monetary policy to an independent central banker does not prevent this type of crisis from arising, and can even make it more costly.
JEL Classification: F 3; F 4     

中心国金融危机与国际货币体系更替之间的联系

中心国金融危机与国际货币体系更替之间存在密切联系,当国际货币体系的中心国霸权地位开始逐步下降后,会带来外围国家对其货币作为储备货币的信心下降并诱发中心国储备货币信心危机的发生。从历史来看,中心国出现储备货币信心危机通常还不是货币体系更替的标志性事件,只有当中心国出现主权债务危机时,旧的国际货币体系才会到达终点。当前中国作为外围国家,应重点关注中心国美国的国债市场变化趋势,从而选择正确的应对措施。     

The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone

When entering a monetary union, member countries change the nature of their sovereign debt in a fundamental way; that is, they cease to have control over the currency in which their debt is issued. As a result, financial markets can force these countries’ sovereigns into defaulting. This makes the monetary union fragile and vulnerable to changing market sentiments. It also makes it possible that self‐fulfilling multiple equilibria arise. I analyse the implications of this fragility for the governance of the Eurozone. I argue that the role of the European Central Bank as a lender of last resort is crucial in reducing the fragility of the Eurozone. In addition, steps towards a budgetary union are key in structurally strengthening the union.     

Macroeconomic tail risk,currency crises and the inter-war gold standard

We introduce macroeconomic tail risk into the canonical global game model of currency crises. The exchange rate peg is attacked if fundamentals reach a critical threshold, or if there is a sufficiently large public shock. Large shocks generate doubt amongst investors about both the state of the world and about what others know, giving rise to multiple equilibria. We find a non-monotonic relationship between tail risk and the probability of (a fundamentals-based) crisis and show how this effect depends on the magnitude and direction of public shocks. We consider the implications of policy intervention and identify conditions under which active intervention produces doubt about the level of fundamentals and, hence, how others will respond. Our analysis clarifies how financial contagion in Europe precipitated the sterling crisis of 1931.     

Balance Sheet Effects, Growth, and Crises

This paper addresses two questions: are currency crises predicted by increases in a central bank’s external and contingent liabilities relative to assets, and do these “balance sheet effects” generate persistent output losses following a crisis? I find empirical evidence that the answer to both questions is yes. I use data on stocks of gross external assets and liabilities for 167 countries over 1973–2003, in an unbalanced panel probit regression to obtain robust estimates of the probability and determinants of a post‐crisis recession. Several single and simultaneous equation specifications support the idea that the output cost of a currency crisis depends on its transmission mechanism. Specifically, a recession is likely to be severe if it is preceded by a crisis that works its way through the financial sector. In addition, the results show that measures of contingent liabilities, capital flight, and lack of financial depth are significant predictors of costly crises.     

Currency Crises, Monetary Policy and Corporate Balance Sheets

Abstract. This paper studies how the exposure of a country's corporate sector to interest rate and exchange rate changes affects the probability of a currency crisis. To analyze this question, we present a model that defines currency crises as situations in which the costs of maintaining a fixed exchange rate exceed the costs of abandonment. The results show that a higher exposure to interest rate changes increases the probability of crisis through an increased need for output loss compensation and an increased efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output. A higher exposure to exchange rate changes also increases the need for output loss compensation. However, it lowers the efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output through the adverse balance sheet effects of exchange rate depreciation. As a result, its effect on the probability of crisis is ambiguous.     

Neoliberal growth models,monetary union and the Euro crisis. A post-Keynesian perspective

The paper offers an account of the Euro crisis based on post-Keynesian monetary theory and its typology of demand regimes. Neoliberalism has transformed social and financial relations in Europe but it has not given rise to a sustained profit-led growth process. Instead, growth has relied either on financial bubbles and rising household debt (‘debt-driven growth’) or on net exports (‘export-driven growth’). In Europe the financial crisis has been amplified by an economic policy architecture (the Stability and Growth Pact) that aimed at restricting the role of fiscal policy and monetary policy. This neoliberal economic policy regime in conjunction with the separation of monetary and fiscal spheres has turned the financial crisis of 2007 into a sovereign debt crisis in southern Europe.     

Banknotes And Economic Growth

Modern paper currency contributes little to productive investment. This shortcoming is not inherent to paper money. It stems from the fact that currency today is monopolistically supplied by public monetary authorities that are poor intermediaries. Commercial banknotes may, in contrast, support efficient intermediation, just as private bank deposits do. We demonstrate this advantage in an endogenous growth model, and use the model to simulate, for a sample of developing countries, steady‐state growth‐rate gains from various degrees of banknote deregulation. The simulated gains are generally large compared with those from conventional forms of financial liberalization.     

A corporate balance-sheet approach to currency crises

This paper presents a general equilibrium currency crisis model of the ‘third generation’, in which the possibility of currency crises is driven by the interplay between private firms’ credit-constraints and nominal price rigidities. Despite our emphasis on microfoundations, the model remains sufficiently simple that the policy analysis can be conducted graphically. The analysis hinges on four main features (i) ex post deviations from purchasing power parity; (ii) credit constraints a la Bernanke-Gertler; (iii) foreign currency borrowing by domestic firms; (iv) a competitive banking sector lending to firms and holding reserves and a monetary policy conducted either through open market operations or short-term lending facilities. We derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a sunspot equilibrium with currency crises. We show that an interest rate increase intended to support the currency in a crisis may not be effective, but that a relaxation of short-term lending facilities can make this policy effective by attenuating the rise in interest rates relevant to firms.