Equilibrium unemployment with outsourcing and wage solidarity under labour market imperfections

We evaluate the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation and equilibrium unemployment in a heterogeneous labour market, where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union. We find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the high- and low-skilled workers. When the labour union adopts a solidaristic wage policy, it will dampen this tendency. Further, higher outsourcing will increase equilibrium unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it will reduce it among the low-skilled workers. Overall, outsourcing will reduce economy-wide equilibrium unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high-skilled workers is sufficiently low.     

Wage bargaining and inflation

This paper investigates the issue of time inconsistency of monetary policy in a game with perfect information and infinite repetitions. The private sector is described by a wage negotiation process between a labour union and a firm. Unlike in the standard literature, the model has the feature that as the distortion of the economy gets larger, namely as the bargaining power of the union increases, the reputational equilibrium with low inflation becomes more likely to occur. This finding is consistent with the observation that higher levels of the labour cost are not typically associated with higher levels of inflation.     

Macroeconomic Performance and Wage Bargaining in a Monetary Union

Building on a micro-founded model of a two-region monetary union, this paperanalyses the macroeconomic impact of institutional reforms in labour marketsand central banking that may occur as a result of monetary unification. Thepaper shows that monopoly distortions in the labour market are a key factorin evaluating the effects of central bank's conservativeness and wagecentralisation on inflation and unemployment. Wage restraint is favoured ina highly decentralised wage bargaining setup as well as under a liberalcentral bank, provided competition is high in the labour market.     

Labour market segmentation and union wage gaps

Abstract

There has been a great deal of research regard the effects of unions on union – non-union wage gap. Most of the studies regarding the impact of unions on wages have assumed that apart from the division between union and non-union workers, the labour market is relatively homogeneous. A number of economists, however, have argued that the labour market is segmented, implying that there are distinct labour markets and that some workers employment opportunities are concentrated in “bad jobs” while other workers employment opportunities are concentrated in “good jobs” which are rationed.

This paper will explore whether the relative wage differential between union and non-union workers differs between the independent primary, subordinate primary and secondary labour markets. Labour market segments are defined using “job zones”. “Job zones” are distinct groups defined by the level of specific vocational preparation necessary for a particular occupation, allowing for the comparison of skill levels and training for each occupation. The data on “job zones” comes from the Occupational Information Network database (O?Net). We estimate separate equations for union and non-union workers in each segment using data from the Current Population Survey and calculate union non-union differentials for each labour market segment. The findings of this paper suggest that the greatest differentials are in secondary labour markets followed by differentials in the subordinate primary labour market and that the smallest wage differentials are in the independent primary labour market.     

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LABOUR MARKET IMPERFECTION

This paper will set up a general equilibrium model with a distorted labour market to explore the effects of an environmental tax and union bargaining power on formal employment and the informal competitive wage. We find that when the government raises the environmental tax, both formal employment and informal competitive wage would fall. In addition, we confirm that a policy of labour market reform would increase both formal employment and the informal competitive wage.     

Prices,Productivity and Wage Bargaining in Open Economies*

According to the standard union bargaining model, unemployment benefits should have big effects on wages, but product‐market prices and productivity should play no role in the wage bargain. We formulate an alternative strategic bargaining model, where labour and product‐market conditions together determine wages. A wage equation is derived and estimated on aggregate data for four Nordic countries. Wages are found to depend not only on unemployment and the replacement ratio, but also on productivity, international prices and exchange rates. There is evidence of considerable nominal wage rigidity. Exchange rate changes have large and persistent effects on competitiveness.     

Estimating the relationship between labour market tightness,unemployment insurance benefits and union election activity

Using detailed data from the US National Labor Relations Board, we find labour market tightness, defined as the ratio of job vacancies to the number of unemployed, has a positive relationship with the likelihood of voting in favour of union representation. Specifically, a 1 SD increase in labour market tightness increases Vote Share in favour and the likelihood of union certification by roughly 1.5% and 3%, respectively. We also find that length of unemployment insurance benefits has a positive relationship with Vote Share in favour. Taken together, these results suggest that workers are more comfortable engaging in pro-union election behaviours when exogenous conditions, like labour market tightness and unemployment insurance benefit duration, shift in a way that more favourably insulates them from unemployment and income risk.     

Norm-Based Trade Union Membership: Evidence for Germany

Abstract. In the absence of closed shops and discriminatory wage policies, union membership can be explained by the existence of social norms. We describe a model, incorporating institutional features of the German labour market, which explicitly allows for social custom effects in the determination of union membership. Using panel data for Germany, we find evidence for according effects which restrict free‐riding. The impact of social norms tends to increase with net union density. Hence, observed reductions in the demand for union membership can weaken the impact of a norm and accentuate the free‐rider problem.     

LSM: A DSGE model for Luxembourg

Luxembourg is a small open economy with a set of particular features, including rather limited competition in the domestic goods market, strong union power, and a segmented labor market for resident and non-resident workers. In this paper we develop a medium scale DSGE model that captures these features, calibrate it to mimic the actual behavior of the key macroeconomic aggregates, and use it to conduct policy experiments aimed at relaxing some of the existing rigidities in the goods and labor market.     

Entry Deterrence in a Unionized Oligopoly

We investigate wage determination between an incumbent firm and its labour union under threat from another firm entering its product market. In equilibrium, it may be optimal for a labour union of the incumbent firm to lower its wage demand. This may make it possible for the incumbent firm to maintain a higher employment level, in that the lower wages can help the firm deter the entry of a rival firm. This will yield a higher profit for the incumbent firm and a lower utility level for the labour union compared with those in an equilibrium with no threat of entry.
JEL Classification Numbers: J51, L10     

Dynamic Behaviour of a Unionized Solow-Swan Economy*

The impact of union behaviour on the economy has received fresh theoretical attention lately, but virtually all the work to date has been conducted in a comparative static context The research reported in this paper seeks to break new ground in this field by placing the unionized labour market squarely in the framework of a dynamic (Solow-Swan) growth model The analysis works from first principles, relating the microeconomic decision-making procedure of an interventionist trade union to the growth of the capital stock, and the intertemporal flavour of the model is enriched by the presence of two-period-lived individuals. The precise dynamics of the interaction between union optimization and capital accumulation are unfolded     

Bounded rationality,expectations, and child labour

This paper develops a model with overlapping generations, where the household's optimal fertility, child labour, and education decisions depend on the parents’ expectations or beliefs about the return to education. It is shown that there exists a range of parental income where the fertility rate is high and children participate in the labour market and receive an incomplete education if a parent believes the return to education is low. The act of participating in the labour market reduces the child's ability to accumulate human capital; thus, the action of sending a child into the labour market is sufficient to ensure that the parents’ initially pessimistic expectations are fulfilled. It is then shown that a one‐time policy intervention, such as banning child labour and mandatory education, can be enough to move a country from the positive child labour equilibrium to an equilibrium with no child labour.     

On the Effects of Wage Pressure on the Unemployment Rate and Capital Share

Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to understand the behaviour of the capital share and the unemployment rate in Europe over the past quarter of a century. We consider a model with monopolistic competition, increasing returns and an imperfect labour market, assuming that the elasticity between capital and labour is less than unity. Previous works have generally assumed constant returns to scale. Our results offer an important conclusion, namely that increased wage pressure will increase the unemployment rate and the capital share even though the latter initially decreases, which fits the stylized facts about the studied economies.     

A DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL UNDER BILATERAL MONOPOLY*

The paper points out a crucial difference between the conventional disequilibrium macro model and partial equilibrium models of wage bargaining, In the former the real wage is constrained to be less than or equal to the marginal product, whereas in the latter the real wage is frequently constrained to be greater than or equal to the marginal product. The paper builds a disequilibrium model under bilateral monopoly, paying explicit attention to the labour market. The well-known union model of McDonald and Solow forms the basis of the labour market analysis. Just as the three regions of Keynesian Unemployment, Classical Unemployment and Repressed Inflation are configured in the conventional case, an equivalent exercise is undertaken but with the addition of a collectively negotiated wage. The particular wage agreement used is the Nash bargain. The framework is then used to account for the unusual events that occurred in the UK labour market 1979–81, particularly the unprecedented rise in unemployment with no diminution of the inflation rate. It suggests that there was a shift in bargaining advantage in favour of employers, which resulted in an increased share of profits in national income. This regime change exacerbated the unfavourable circumstances for labour, which existed at that time.     

Productivity and long-term growth potential in the UK economy 1924–1968

This paper examines the long-term structural determinants of labour productivity for the UK economy using a panel data set from 1924 to 1968. Trade union, product market competition and human capital explanations are embedded within the model and compared. Labour quality, or human capital, is found to be the most important of the explanations considered.     

Compatibility between monetary and fiscal policy under EMU

The debate over the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as a part of European Monetary Union, has highlighted the need to assess the extent to which fiscal policies of union members should be constrained as a pre-requisite for price stability within the union. In this paper, we develop a two country open economy model, where each country has overlapping generations of finitely lived consumers who supply labour to imperfectly competitive firms which can only change their prices infrequently. We examine the case where the two countries have formed a monetary union, but where the fiscal authorities remain independent. We show that the fiscal response required to ensure stability of the real debt stock is greater when consumers are not infinitely lived. In principle, this allows for some compensating behaviour between governments, but we show that the scope for compensation is limited. The monetary authority can abandon its active targeting of inflation to stabilise the debt of at most one fiscal authority, and any other combination of policies will either result in price level indeterminacy and/or indefinite transfers of wealth between the two economies. Finally, in a series of simulations we show that fiscal shocks have limited impact on output and inflation provided the fiscal authorities meet the (weak) requirements of fiscal solvency. However, when monetary policy is forced to abandon its active targeting of inflation, then fiscal shocks have a much greater impact on both output and inflation.     

Cross‐Country Differences in Unemployment: Fiscal Policy,Unions, and Household Preferences in General Equilibrium

We develop a five‐period overlapping generations model with individuals who differ by ability and with an imperfect labour market (union wage setting) for individuals of lower ability. The model explains human capital formation, hours worked, and unemployment within one coherent framework. Its predictions match the differences in the unemployment rate across 12 OECD countries remarkably well. A Shapley decomposition of these differences reveals an almost equal role for fiscal policy variables and union preferences. As to fiscal policy, differences in unemployment benefits play a much more important role than tax differences. Differences in households’ taste for leisure are unimportant.     

DOES A TRADE UNION SET A LOWER EFFORT LEVEL THAN WOULD BE DETERMINED IN A COMPETITIVE LABOUR MARKET?

The level of effort which would be set by a firm hiring in a competitive labour market is contrasted with the effort level which would be chosen by a utilitarian trade union.     

Growth,Employment and Taxation with Distortions in the Goods and Labour Market

Abstract. This paper analyses taxation in the presence of distortions in goods and labour markets in an endogenous growth model. The government disposes of capital, labour and consumption taxes. It is shown that the market solution leads to suboptimally low levels of growth and employment. However, available tax instruments are sufficient to attain the first‐best growth path in this economy. The paper further explores the relative distortion of capital and labour taxes. For plausible parametrisations of the model, lowering capital taxes dominate reductions in labour taxes in welfare terms.     

Efficient bargaining versus right to manage: A stability analysis in a Cournot duopoly with trade unions

The present study considers a unionised (nonlinear) duopoly with two different labour market institutions, i.e. efficient bargaining (EB) and right to manage (RTM), to analyse product market stability under quantity competition with trade unions. We show that when the preference of unions towards wages is small, (i) the parametric stability region under RTM is higher than under EB, and (ii) a rise in the union power in the Nash bargaining played between firms and unions monotonically increases (resp. reduces) the parametric stability region under RTM (resp. EB). In contrast, when the preference of unions becomes larger, an increase in the union's bargaining power acts: (1) as an economic stabiliser when the union power is small; (2) as an economic de-stabiliser when the union power is high. In addition to established results with regard to equilibrium outcomes, our findings shed some light on the effects of how the labour market regulation affects out-of-equilibrium behaviours in a Cournot duopoly.