Growth, habit formation, and catching-up with the Joneses

When habits are introduced multiplicatively in a capital accumulation model, the consumers’ objective function might fail to be concave. In this paper, we provide conditions aimed at guaranteeing the existence of interior solutions to the consumers’ problem. We also characterize the equilibrium path of two growth models with multiplicative habits: the internal habit formation model, where individual habits coincide with own past consumption, and the external habit formation (or catching-up with the Joneses) model, where habits arise from the average past consumption in the economy. We show that the introduction of external habits makes the equilibrium path inefficient. We characterize in this context the optimal tax policy.     

International tax arbitrage, tax evasion and interest parity conditions

Using a finite-horizon general equilibrium model with uncertainty and money, we characterize situations where tax arbitrage opportunities may arise for international portfolio investors in an economy with heterogeneous capital income taxation when there is some scope to evade taxes on foreign capital income. We derive tax-modified uncovered interest parity conditions and forward rates similar to the no-tax ones, but augmented by tax-induced “risk-premium” terms; covered interest parity conditions remain unaffected by the introduction of capital income taxes, a consequence of our approach of bounding tax-based arbitrage without restricting arbitrage per se.     

Household tax evasion

Household members share public goods and make intra-household transfers. We show how these features of the household interact with the tax evasion decision, and identify the dimensions in which household evasion differs from individual evasion. In the model we present two members of a household choose how much to contribute to a household public good and how much self-employment income to evade. We are interested in how different evasion possibilities interact with the contribution decisions to the household public good and the role of income transfers within the household. We show the household evasion decision differs from the individual decision because it affects the outcome of the household contribution game. When household members are taxed as individuals neutrality applies when choices are not constrained. If the evasion level of one household member is constrained then an income transfer can generate a Pareto improvement. When the household members are jointly taxed there is a couple constraint on strategies and corner solutions can emerge.     

Economic growth,corruption and tax evasion

In this paper, we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread corruption in a growth model. We develop a Ramsey model of economic growth with a rival but non-excludable public good which is financed by taxes which can be evaded via corrupt tax inspectors. We prove that the relationship between the tax rate and tax collection, in a dynamic framework, is not unique, but is different depending on the relevance of the “shame effect”. We show that in all three cases — “low, middle and high shame” countries, the growth rate increases as the tax rate increases up to a threshold value, after which the growth rate begins to decrease as the tax rate increases. But, for intermediate tax rates, the rate of growth for “low shame” countries is lower than that of “uniform shame” countries which is, in turn, lower than that of “high shame” countries. This happens because the growth rate is more sensitive to variations of t in an honest country rather than in a corrupt country.     

Indeterminacy in dynamic models: When Diamond meets Ramsey

We consider an aggregate two-periods overlapping generations model with endogenous labor, consumption in both periods of life, homothetic preferences and productive external effects coming from the average capital and labor. We show that under realistic calibrations of the parameters, in particular a large enough share of first period consumption over the wage income, local indeterminacy of equilibria cannot occur with capital externalities alone. It can nevertheless occur when there are only, even very small, vanishing labor externalities provided that the elasticity of capital-labor substitution and the wage elasticity of the labor supply are large enough. We also show that if labor externalities are slightly stronger, but still small enough to be plausible, and the elasticity of labor supply is larger, local indeterminacy occurs in a Cobb-Douglas economy. Finally, we show that a locally indeterminate steady state is generically characterized by an under-accumulation of capital. It follows therefore that while agents live over a finite number of periods, the conditions for the existence of locally indeterminate equilibria are very similar to those obtained within infinite horizon models and that from this point of view, Diamond meets Ramsey.     

Growth,unemployment and public capital

Abstract. Existing literature has studied the growth effects of fiscal policy in models with full-employment. The aim of this paper is to study these growth effects in an endogenous growth model with unemployment and compare them with the effects obtained when there is full-employment. To this end, we assume that unemployment arises due to the existence of unions. We also assume that the government finances, by means of income taxes, both public capital and an unemployment benefit. Public capital increases total factor productivity and modifies the elasticity of the labor demand. We show that the effects of fiscal policy on both employment and growth crucially depend on the relation between this elasticity and public capital. We would like to thank Jordi Caballé, Fernando Sánchez, Manuel Santos and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. Sorolla is grateful for financial support to Spanish Ministry of Education through DGICYT grant SEC2000-0684 and to Generalitat de Catalunya through grant SGR2001-164. Raurich is grateful to Universitat de Girona for financial support through grant 9100075.     

Consumption externalities, production externalities, and efficient capital accumulation under time non-separable preferences

The effects of consumption and production externalities on economic performance under time non-separable preferences are examined both theoretically and numerically. We show that a consumption externality alone has long-run distortionary effects if and only if labor is supplied elastically. With fixed labor supply, it has only transitional distortionary effects. Production externalities always generate long-run distortions, irrespective of labor supply. The optimal tax structure to correct for the distortions is characterized. We compare the implications of this model with those obtained when the consumption externality is contemporaneous. While some of the long-run effects are robust, there are also important qualitative and quantitative differences, particularly along transitional paths.     

Merchant internalization and tax evasion

Merchant internalization has been used to explain why merchants may accept high fees to accept card payments. However, merchants seem to be more resistant in some economic activities or countries; in particular, when the shadow economy is sizeable. Cash payments are usually associated with tax evasion, and therefore the analysis of card industry should take it in to consideration. This paper explores the role of tax evasion in the merchant internalization condition; first, considering it as exogenous, and then, as a strategic reason.     

Economic growth, labor market and demographic patterns

This study addresses the dynamic interaction between income growth, patterns of demographic variables, and characteristics of the labor market. We attempt to provide an endogenous explanation for the origin and nature of long-run sustained oscillations in the population and in economic variables. First, we develop an economic growth model containing unemployment. The resulting dynamics reveal that the emergence of irregular sustained oscillations is related to the lack of sensitivity in wage growth to changes in the employment rate. Next, labor force growth is endogenized in the basic model through micro-founded fertility choices of individuals. By introducing the endogenous fertility rate into the basic model, we generate a demographic transition. Next, consistent with Malthusian cycle literature, the inevitable time lag between individual reproductive decisions and subsequent market needs, in conjunction with a highly specialized labor force, appear to be the primary source of such long-run oscillations. Finally, the model predicts that raising the age of entry into the labor force increases economic growth.     

Corporate taxes, growth and welfare in a Schumpeterian economy

I take a new look at the long-run implications of taxation through the lens of modern Schumpeterian growth theory. I focus on the latest vintage of models that sterilize the scale effect through a process of product proliferation that fragments the aggregate market into submarkets whose size does not increase with the size of the workforce. I show that the following interventions raise welfare: (a) granting full expensibility of R&D to incorporated firms; (b) eliminating the corporate income tax and/or the capital gains tax; (c) reducing taxes on labor and/or consumption. What makes these results remarkable is that in all three cases the endogenous increase in the tax on dividends necessary to balance the budget has a positive effect on growth. A general implication of my analysis is that corporate taxation plays a special role in Schumpeterian economies and provides novel insights on how to design welfare-enhancing tax reforms.     

Resource abundance, growth and welfare: A Schumpeterian perspective

This paper takes a new look at the long-run implications of resource abundance. It develops a Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth that incorporates an upstream resource-intensive sector and yields an analytical solution for the transition path. It then derives conditions under which, as the economy's endowment of a natural resource rises, (i) growth accelerates and welfare rises, (ii) growth decelerates but welfare rises nevertheless, and (iii) growth decelerates and welfare falls. Which of these scenarios prevails depends on the response of the natural resource price to an increase in the resource endowment. The price response determines the change in income earned by the owners of the resource (the households) and thereby the change in their expenditure on manufacturing goods. Since manufacturing is the economy's innovative sector, this income-to-expenditure effect links resource abundance to the size of the market for manufacturing goods and drives how re-source abundance affects incentives to undertake innovative activity.     

Indeterminacy and directed search

The directed search approach assumes each seller posts a fixed price and, ex post, randomly allocates the good should more than one buyer desire the good. This paper assumes sellers can post prices which are contingent on ex post realized demand; e.g. an advertisement might state the Bertrand price should there be more than one buyer, which corresponds to an auction outcome. Competition in fixed prices and ex post rationing describes equilibrium behavior. There is also real market indeterminacy: a continuum of equilibria exists which are not payoff equivalent. Sellers prefer the equilibrium in auctions.     

A note on income tax evasion,labor supply,and nonlinear tax schedules

The existing literature on income tax evasion lays claim to two important implications: one is that higher tax rates induce greater income declarations and the other is that increases in gross income induce a fall in the fraction of income declared. The purpose of this paper is to examine the robustness of these results with respect to three modifications of the standard model. The first involves relaxing the assumption of linear income tax schedules. The second modification is to consider an alternative form for the penalty function. Thirdly, we consider the consequences of the tax payer making a joint hours of work-income declaration decision.     

Unemployment, tax evasion and the slippery slope framework

The proposed theoretical work introduces the basic insights of the ??slippery slope?? framework into the benchmark macroeconomic model of the labour market in order to study the relation between tax compliance, tax evasion and unemployment. This paper shows that the firm??s decision to evade taxes also depends on trust in tax authorities and affects one of the most important macroeconomic variables: the unemployment rate. Also, the model is able to mimic the crucial interaction between trust and power and its effects on tax compliance. The main result is that with the ??right mix?? of policy tools of deterrence, trust in tax authorities is maximised, tax compliance increases and a reduction of tax evasion may decrease unemployment.     

Tax morale and tax evasion reports

The study proposes a new measure of tax morale for Italy based on voluntary tax evasion reports. Using this measure, I detected a positive relationship between tax morale and social capital, political participation, and immigration, but a negative relationship between tax morale and the dissatisfaction with public services and unemployment.     

Vintage capital and the dynamics of the AK model

This paper analyzes the equilibrium dynamics of an AK-type endogenous growth model with vintage capital. The inclusion of vintage capital leads to oscillatory dynamics governed by replacement echoes, which additionally influence the intercept of the balanced growth path. These features, which are in sharp contrast to those from the standard AK model, can contribute to explaining the short-run deviations observed between investment and growth rates time series. To characterize the optimal solutions of the model we develop analytical and numerical methods that should be of interest for the general resolution of endogenous growth models with vintage capital.     

Local interaction in tax evasion

When individuals underreport their incomes, they take into account their private gains and moral losses, the latter depending on the acquaintances’ previous underreports. We prove that under quite natural assumptions the process globally converges to the symmetric steady state.     

On the Dynamics of Basic Growth Models: Ratio Stability vs. Convergence and Divergence in State Space

Abstract. We show for a class of basic growth models that convergence in ratios does not imply the pathwise convergence to the corresponding balanced growth path in the state space. We derive conditions on parameters and on the elasticity of the savings function for convergence or divergence and apply our results to the Solow model, an augmented Solow model as well as to an optimal growth model. An implication for the convergence debate is that two economies that differ only in the initial capital stock and converge in per capita terms might diverge to infinity in absolute terms.     

Financial development, liberalization and technological deepening

This paper focuses on examining the effects of financial development and liberalization on knowledge accumulation. The results consistently show that while financial development facilitates the accumulation of new ideas, the implementation of financial reform policies is negatively associated with it. The undesirable effects of financial liberalization are found to operate through the triggering of crises and volatility in the financial system. There is also evidence supporting the hypothesis that financial liberalization reallocates talent from the innovative sector to the financial system, thus retarding technological deepening. Moreover, the findings also suggest that increased R&D activity and the presence of a stronger intellectual property rights protection framework tend to have beneficial effects on knowledge accumulation.     

International capital tax evasion and the foreign tax credit puzzle

In this paper we examine how the presence of international tax evasion affects the choice of a foreign tax credit by a capital exporting region. Since the credit raises the opportunity cost of concealing foreign source income, it can be employed to discourage evasion activity. International tax evasion can thus help to rationalize the adoption of a tax credit in excess of a deduction-equivalent rate. JEL Classification: H21, H26
Evasion fiscale pour le capital international et le problème du crédit d'impôt pour le fardeau fiscal à l'étranger. Ce mémoire examine comment la présence d'évasion fiscale pour le capital international affecte le choix du crédit d'impôt pour le fardeau fiscal à l'étranger par une région qui exporte du capital. Puisque le crédit d'impôt accroît le coût d'opportunité du camouflage de la source étrangère de revenus, c'est une technique qui peut être employée pour décourager l'évasion fiscale. Voilà qui peut expliquer qu'on adopte un crédit d'impôt qui est plus généreux que ce qui constituerait la déduction dans un système où le fardeau fiscal à l'étranger est simplement déduit du revenu imposable.