Competition for exclusive customers: comparing equilibrium and welfare under one-part and two-part pricing

Abstract.  This paper compares one-part and two-part pricing in a discrete-continuous choice model, providing more extensive welfare results than prior literature. Under two-part pricing, firms may set fixed fees with or without 'unit-price commitment,' where the lack of unit-price commitment is consistent with 'after-market monopolization.' We find that two-part pricing with unit-price commitment is firms' dominant unilateral and joint pricing policy. Two-part pricing without unit-price commitment is the least desirable policy from a welfare standpoint. Under appropriate conditions, one-part pricing produces the highest consumer and social welfare, but the lowest profits.     

What’s the aim for competition policy: optimizing market structure or encouraging innovative behaviors?

Innovation is usually thought of as a change in the fundamentals of an economy, which can require adjustments by policy-makers. The latter are usually thought as in regard to a dominant vision, which is to restore an optimal market structure, and leads to a competition policy mainly aimed at controlling for antitrust practices and limiting market power. In this paper, we favor another vision of innovation, as a discovery process that cannot allow ex ante a definition of best practices. Dealing with information issues in two different and alternative perspectives, we argue that antitrust authorities confront a market imperfection–market failure dilemma (MI–MF dilemma) which leads them to favor the existence of appreciative and discretionary policy rather than encouraging the existence of any market structure thought of as optimal as regards the current state of information. We conclude with policy implications, contrasting the EU with the US. This paper was presented at the 10th International J.A. Schumpeter Society Conference on Innovation, Industrial Dynamics and Structural Transformation: Schumpeterian Legacies, Milan 2004. It owes very much to the collaboration of J-L Gaffard with M. Amendola in the recent years. However he is not responsible for the way we have taken advantage of it.     

Industry equilibrium with outside financing and moral hazard: Implications for market integration

In this paper, we study industry equilibrium under the assumptions that (1) firms need outside financing and (2) they have a moral hazard problem in taking potentially excessive risks. We characterize an industry equilibrium with credit rationing, where firms choose not to take risks, and compare this to the industry equilibrium in the absence of credit rationing. In both cases, we show that competition increases and prices decline as markets integrate. However, in markets with credit rationing there is typically more exit, a smaller decline in prices and, most strikingly, the market value of the industry increases rather than decreases.     

Modelling price competition across many markets (An application to the Spanish loans market)

The purpose of this work is the structural modelling of price competition in a product-differentiated industry in which many firms of varying size compete across many independent small markets, with the target of identifying price behaviour. We apply it to model competition among the more than 79 banks that were active in the Spanish loans market during the period 1983-1991, using micropanel data. A model in which national banks (as opposed to regional and local banks) fully internalize their cross-rate effects in pricing is selected as the model that best fits the data. Our framework allows us to estimate the dead-weight loss due to market power, and to decompose it assessing the part attributable to price coordination.     

Health insurer market power and primary care consolidation

This paper analyzes how health insurance market concentration impacts the market structure of primary care physicians. In more concentrated insurance markets, physicians are found to work in larger practices and their practices are more likely to have a hospital with an ownership interest. Physicians are also less likely to report being in a competitive physician market, consistent with practice consolidation. Our results suggest that consolidation in insurance markets impacts the competitive structure of physician markets.     

Competition and waiting times in hospital markets

This paper studies the impact of hospital competition on waiting times. We use a Salop-type model, with hospitals that differ in (geographical) location and, potentially, waiting time, and two types of patients: high-benefit patients who choose between neighbouring hospitals (competitive segment), and low-benefit patients who decide whether or not to demand treatment from the closest hospital (monopoly segment). Compared with a benchmark case of monopoly, we find that hospital competition leads to longer waiting times in equilibrium if the competitive segment is sufficiently large. Given a policy regime of hospital competition, the effect of increased competition depends on the parameter of measurement: Lower travelling costs increase waiting times, higher hospital density reduces waiting times, while the effect of a larger competitive segment is ambiguous. We also show that, if the competitive segment is large, hospital competition is socially preferable to monopoly only if the (regulated) treatment price is sufficiently high.     

Passive partial ownership,sneaky takeovers,and merger control

We analyze the impact of passive partial ownership (PPO) on horizontal mergers. We show that antitrust authorities ignoring the effects of previous PPO acquisitions invite sneaky takeovers: a PPO is strategically used prior to a full takeover to get a merger approved which is in fact detrimental to consumers.     

Democratic institutions and regulatory reforms

We use a sample of 144 countries over the period 2003–2013 to investigate the link between democratic institutions and regulatory reforms. Democracy may be conducive to reform, as politicians embrace growth-enhancing reforms to win elections. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes may not worry as much about public opinion and could undertake reforms that are painful in the short run but bring long-term benefits. We test these alternative hypotheses, using data on regulatory reforms from the World Bank’s Doing Business database. The results provide mixed support for the hypothesis that democracy is good for regulatory reforms. We also show that regulatory reforms are more likely just after parliamentary elections in poor and middle-income countries.     

Return policies, market outcomes, and consumer welfare

Abstract.  The effect of return policies on market outcomes is studied in a model where consumers differ in their valuations of time. Product reliability is identified with defect rates. Producers first choose reliability levels and then compete in prices. For given defect rates, allowing returns makes products closer substitutes, enhancing competition and reducing prices. Being closer substitutes makes higher reliability less worthwhile, which reduces reliability. While the decrease in reliability reduces consumer welfare, the decrease in prices raises it. The latter dominates, so that aggregate consumer welfare increases with return policy.     

Tariffs, licensing and market structure

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing against another firm. Competition against a less-efficient firm weakens the power that a host country can exert on the incumbent in the form of its tariff policy. We show that this gives a motive for a monopolist to license its technology to another foreign firm. A host country gains more from increased competition if it can induce the foreign incumbent to transfer technology to the host country firm. We show that the host country can do so by tariff commitment. We also discuss the implications of bargaining under licensing and Bertrand competition in the product market. Hence, this paper qualifies and extends the recent work of Kabiraj and Marjit [Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer. European Economic Review 47, 113-124].     

竞争、不确定性与企业间技术创新合作

新古典经济学认为企业间结网合作与利己短视的理性经济人假设不相一致。对此 ,目前经济理论已有所突破。较早的博弈论无名氏定理指出 ,只要有足够的耐心重复进行博弈就可能达到合作的效果。近来提出的网络形成理论则认为网络的形成及稳定完全依赖于结网的直接间接收益与成本的权衡。但是 ,它们都还不能反映企业所面临的不确定性和市场竞争环境对企业策略行为的影响 ,从而无法解释合作分享为什么会发生在硅谷那样竞争空前激烈、流动异常频繁的地方而在另一些得到政府扶持保护的地方却难现其踪。本文以硅谷为代表的自组织创新网络为研究原型 ,构造了一个基于企业复合实物期权创新合作行为的创新网络模型 ,从中得到了两点新的重要发现 :①与无名氏定理的要求相反 ,体现竞争压力和不确定性的急切感是企业间结网合作的必要条件 ;②能够实现最大增值的创新网络是不断更新的概率暂存网络。     

Product market competition and boundaries of the firm

Abstract .  This paper studies the effects of product market competition on firm boundaries. In a duopoly setting, each retailer is associated with a manufacturer who must decide how to allocate property rights over a retail asset. Delegating property rights over the retail asset to an indepedent retailer ('disintegration') transfers incentives from the manufacturer to the retailer and has the benefit of increasing product quality and profits, owing to the retailer's superior efficiency. However, it also forces the manufacturer to forfeit part of the profits. Competition increases the net benefit from delegation and leads to more efficient, vertically disintegrated structures.     

Competition and monopoly of Chinese rural groundwater market：structure and determinants

China is facing severe problem of water scarcity.Agricultural sector,the main consumer of water resource,has remarkably changed its institutions on water resource deployment,due to heavy environmental pressure.As a new and spontaneous institution,groundwater market has developed rapidly in northern China,and has impacts on waterusing behaviors and benefits of farmers.Using household survey data from Hebei and Henan in 2007,this paper attempts to pin down the development and operating of groundwater market in rural China.We focus on the monopoly and competition in the market.Empirical analysis reveals that Chinese farmers are trying to make rational decision when they compete with others in groundwater market.In general,monopoly is not fierce in Chinese rural groundwater market,with great variations among different villages and even different tubewells within one village.Tubewell costs,regulation and the density of tubewells are the main determinants that affect monopoly level of groundwater market.To make water market benefit more and more farmers of low income,corresponding policies are needed to modify its development in the future.     

市场竞争、东道国引资政策与跨国公司的技术转移

在一个两阶段古诺竞争模型基础上,本文研究了东道国引资政策对跨国公司技术转移的影响,结果显示,跨国公司对东道国的技术转移取决于东道国市场竞争程度、本地企业的模仿能力与跨国公司的技术转移成本。在东道国企业模仿能力有限的情况下,跨国公司低技术的直接投资将损害东道国企业,从而降低东道国的国民福利水平;文章同时研究了市场竞争对跨国公司技术转移的影响,结果表明,对东道国来说,维持一个适度有序竞争的国内市场,同时对跨国公司的直接投资进行有选择地甄别与吸收,比单纯的竞争战略更有利于跨国公司的技术转移与技术扩散。     

Endogenous market structure and the cooperative firm

When the threat of entry by followers includes cooperative firms, the maximum fixed cost that a profit maximizing leader can endure is endogenous. The aggressive strategy required for entry-deterrence curtails the leader’s expected profit and can discourage its initial entry. In such circumstances a cooperative firm may yet be viable, despite having a cost handicap and no first-mover advantage.     

Monopolistic competition and income dispersion

We develop a model of monopolistic competition that accounts for consumers’ heterogeneity in both incomes and preferences. This model makes it possible to study the implications of income redistribution on the toughness of competition. We show how the market outcome depends on the joint distribution of consumers’ tastes and incomes and obtain a closed-form solution for a symmetric equilibrium. Competition toughness is measured by the weighted average elasticity of substitution. Income redistribution generically affects the market outcome, even when incomes are redistributed across consumers with different tastes in a way such that the overall income distribution remains the same.     

On the Relationship Between Innovation and Product Market Competition

This paper considers a theoretical model where firms reduce their initial unit costs by spending on R&D activities in a collusive market and where firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels other than that of the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. We show that, in our model, the degree of collusion (captured by the discount factor) reduces the incentive to innovate when innovation is made non‐cooperatively. The reason is that non‐cooperative R&D introduces a negative externality where firms overinvest beyond the effort required to minimize the cost in order to extract profits from the rival firm, and a reduction in product competition helps internalize the externality. In a research joint venture the absence of R&D rivalry leads to contrary results. The main implication is that the validity of the Schumpeterian hypotheses depends on the extent of cooperation at the R&D stage.