转型经济条件下的创业精神——“机会拉动”与“贫穷推动”解释的扩展研究

简单地把企业家个人划分为企业家与食利者,或者是机会拉动与贫穷推动的企业家,都不足以认识企业家在变动的外部条件下的学习能力和适应能力。企业家在理性和有限理性所决定的心理动机的激励下,从事创业活动。     

创业者社会资本与新企业融资工具选择

以社会资本理论为基础,构建模型分析在存在双重道德风险的情况下,创业者社会资本对债务融资与风险资本股权融资两种融资工具选择的影响。研究发现,当创业者有能力选择债务融资或者风险资本两种融资工具时,同时当创业者的社会资本拥有度较高或者较低时,创业者倾向于选择债务融资;而当创业者社会资本拥有度在中等水平时,倾向于选择风险资本股权融资。研究的主要贡献在于,将创业者社会资本纳入到新企业融资工具选择的研究框架之中,深化了新企业融资的研究成果。     

On Human Capital Characters of the Party and Government Leaders

In the era of knowledge-based economy, human capital has become the primary resource in our society. The party and government leaders are key human capital in economic development. However, what is the value of the party and government leaders in economic development? Are they as important as or even more important than the entrepreneurs? Very few studies have covered these points. This paper aims at providing answers to the above questions by analyzing the human capital of the party and government leaders. This paper mainly illustrates nine features of the human capital in the party and government: the high level, the measurement by public effect, “entrepreneurs” in managing public resources, the key of human capital, the logical precondition of other human capital, the scarcity, the irreversibility, the asymmetry, and the diversification. It concludes that party and government leaders are a special human capital, which differs from both the ordinary human capital and the entrepreneurs in the private sectors. Therefore, more attention should be paid to the selection of the party and government leaders and the rewards corresponding to their contributions to public benefits.     

农业龙头企业家人力资本投资的二维研究

农业龙头企业家在城乡统筹发展中扮演着重要角色,农业龙头企业家的技术层面及制度层面的人力资本表明,决定龙头企业家人力资本投资可分为技术维度与关系维度两个维度,企业家人力资本投资的二维组合构成了不同的企业家人力资本模式,提高龙头企业家人力资本要求从营造技术环境与制度环境入手探寻出路.     

A coalition proof equilibrium for a private information credit economy

Summary This paper examines an economy in which agents with private information about their own productive capabilities seek to raise capital to fund their investment projects. We employ an equilibrium concept which is closely related to Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium. In equilibrium, all agents who succeed in raising capital (entrepreneurs) are pooled; they all receive the same contract or consumption schedule. Entrepreneurs, however, are separated from those who fail to raise capital. This separation results in productive efficiency for the economy. If the economy has no viable alternative investment opportunity (other than agents' projects) then equilibrium allocations can be supported by a (non-intermediated) securities market. If there is a viable alternative, the equilibrium allocations cannot be supported by a securities market equilibrium. We interpret this case as suggesting the emergence of financial intermedary coalitions.     

The capital-based view of the firm

We offer here a capital-based view (CBV) that incorporates, and goes further than related views, (like the resource- and the knowledge-based view) of the firm. This general approach uses ideas about capital and its structure to examine the nature of heterogeneous resources and their attributes and how they are organized by entrepreneurs (individually and in teams). These entrepreneurs exercise judgment in valuing these heterogeneous resources in productive combinations that they attempt to create. This article uses insights gained from this understanding of the nature and function of capital to draw further propositions about the role of knowledge, management, and economic organization. We survey the main components of the CBV of the firm and examine management and organizational topics looking through the lens of the CBV. The capital dimension adds new insights and provides a powerful unifying framework.     

企业家社会资本对文化企业财政支持可获性的影响——基于江苏省文化企业调研数据的实证研究

财政支持是影响文化企业发展的重要政策因素.文章首先将企业家社会资本分为企业家政治关系资本和企业家商业关系资本 ,在此基础上使用178家江苏地区文化企业实地调研数据 ,构建计量经济模型实证检验了企业家社会资本对文化企业财政支持可获性的影响.研究结果发现:企业家政治关系资本对文化企业财政支持可获性具有正向影响 ,但在统计上不显著;企业家商业关系资本对文化企业财政支持可获性具有显著正向影响 ,且企业家商业关系资本的作用明显大于企业家政治关系资本 ,这表明地方政府在决定是否对文化企业给予财政支持时 ,明显淡化了以往侧重于通过行政权力主导补贴资金的传统做法 ,而更多地遵循了通过市场机制来配置公共财政资源的原则.     

心理资本对创业坚持的影响——内在动机与创业榜样的调节作用

创业坚持是创业成功的重要前提。作为复杂的决策行为,创业坚持受到多方面因素的共同作用。基于社会认知理论,探讨乐观、韧性、自我效能感和希望等心理资本对创业坚持的影响,以及内在动机和创业榜样发挥的情境效应。通过对我国202名创业者进行问卷调查发现：创业者的乐观、韧性、自我效能感和希望均能够显著促进其坚持创业;内在动机正向调节乐观、韧性、自我效能感各自与创业坚持的关系;创业榜样对乐观、韧性、自我效能感各自与创业坚持的关系发挥正向调节作用。将个体因素(心理资本和内在动机)与环境因素(创业榜样)纳入同一理论框架,讨论其对创业坚持的影响,以期为创业坚持研究提供新颖和全面的视角。     

Endogenous Persistent Occupations and Inequality

The paper argues that human capital is the leading force determining inequality persistence. We show that, in a context of a perfect capital market where agents inherit human capital and wealth, it is the inherited human capital level that determines agents' occupational choice and investment. The critical assumption is that the entrepreneurial activity is of increasing returns to scale. This creates a higher profile of revenue for entrepreneurs. Although every agent can choose to become an entrepreneur, and although there is no barrier of entry in entrepreneurship, only those who receive a relatively higher human capital will do so. Agents whose inherited human capital is lower than the human capital threshold, endogenously determined, are better off becoming workers. Even in the context of a perfect capital market, which allows less endowed agents to borrow and invest in education, it turns out that the agents who inherit a low level of human capital bear a greater utility cost in their education investment. So they are better off investing less in education, lending their savings, and working as workers. As a result, agents' occupational choice depends on the intergenerational transmission of human capital. In the long run, the population is polarized into the rich entrepreneurs and the poor workers, magnifying inequality persistence in human capital level and revenue.     

Property rights as a complex adaptive system: how entrepreneurship transforms intellectual property structures

This article aims to provide some elements of an evolutionary theory of property rights. It applies a systems-based capital-theoretic perspective to explain the formation and transformation of property rights structures. The approach emphasizes how entrepreneurs create capital combinations by connecting capital goods—defined widely to include property rights, such as patents—in their production plans. Their actions change complementarity relations between property rights as used in production. We treat the property rights structure as a complex adaptive system that exhibits increasing structural complexity as it evolves. Entrepreneurs discover gaps in the property rights system. As they organize production to exploit profit opportunities, entrepreneurs regroup existing intellectual property rights (IPR) into new modules, such as patent pools, that encapsulate more complex combinations of basic building blocks of intellectual property. A patent pool constitutes an interpolation of a new meso level within the macro IPR structure. We apply our framework to the first of the patent pools for digital video compression technology used in digital television and DVDs.     

The role of human and social capital in growth: extending our understanding

Human capital, institutions and social capital are now all recognisedas significant factors of growth. They have largely been studiedseparately, and although they present sufficient common characteristicsto be conceptualised as one main category distinct from physicalcapital, it may still be more important to focus on the linksbetween their specific sub-categories. Direct links with incomemay be spurious, as there appears to be a ‘web of associations’between the sub-categories, which would benefit from furtherempirical investigation. This paper reviews the literature onhuman capital, institutions and social capital, extracting threesub-categories of human capital (human skills capital, stock-of-knowledgeand entrepreneurship) and two of social capital (low- and high-rationalisation).Specific areas are then suggested for further empirical study.     

Endogenous growth cycles with financial intermediaries and entrepreneurial innovation

This study analyzes the effects of financial intermediaries’ activities on economic fluctuations in a model of endogenous innovation cycles. In the model, I consider an economy in which entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries engage in their respective innovative activities. Entrepreneurs can invent new products and raise funds for their invention from financial intermediaries and if their invention is successful, they can produce new products. Only financial intermediaries can evaluate entrepreneurial ideas regarding their new products. Moreover, they can invest their capital to improve information about the entrepreneurial ideas and thus, meet successful entrepreneurs with a higher probability. I show that when an economy does not accumulate enough capital, and the level of financial innovation is not sufficiently high, the economy is trapped in a no-entrepreneurial innovation regime. I also show that when the financial innovation slightly develops, the economy fluctuates between the no-entrepreneurial innovation and entrepreneurial innovation regimes.     

大学生创业融资的困境及对策研究

资金是创业战略实施的基础,是决定创业成败的核心要素.大学生创业者缺乏创业技能、管理经验和社会声誉,在创业资金识别、吸引和整合方面面临着诸多困难和挑战,导致创业融资中出现融资渠道狭窄、融资数量不足和筹资风险大等诸多缺陷,对其生存和发展造成了极大的损害.针对这些“瓶颈”问题,在对其成因进行分析的基础上,从实施创业项目创新以提高创业项目吸引力和融资能力,改善项目融资环境;完善金融体制,发展金融信贷、风险投资、天使投资和融资租赁以拓展融资渠道和筹资方式,完善企业资金结构,降低融资风险;合理规划资金需求,整合创业资源,构建创业团队和创业导师来提升企业自身融资能力,提高资金使用效率等方面进行了研究和探讨,为大学生创业者和政策制定部门提供参考和借鉴.     

Self-insurance vs. self-financing: A welfare analysis of the persistence of shocks

We study the welfare cost of market incompleteness in a generalized Bewley model where idiosyncratic risk takes the form of entrepreneurial productivity shocks. Market incompleteness in our framework has two dimensions. First, in the Bewley tradition, only a limited set of instruments for consumption smoothing is available. Second, entrepreneurs? capital rental is subject to collateral constraints. As is well known, it is harder to self-insure against more persistent shocks, and the welfare cost of missing consumption insurance increases with shock persistence. On the other hand, with collateral constraints, an increase in shock persistence leads to better allocation of production factors through entrepreneurs? self-financing, and the welfare cost of imperfect capital rental markets decreases with shock persistence. The overall welfare cost of market incompleteness can be increasing, decreasing, or even non-monotone in shock persistence, depending on the relative strengths of its two components—the cost of missing insurance and the cost of imperfect capital markets.     

Dynamic entrepreneurship and technology-based innovation

This paper seeks to distinguish between dynamic and static entrepreneurship. We define the construct of dynamic entrepreneurship in terms of Schumpeterian innovativeness and then develop a hypothesis suggesting that human capital is conducive to such action. In contrast, a paucity of human capital is more conducive to static entrepreneurship (defined in terms of organizational or ownership status). Based on a rich data set of entrepreneurs receiving research funding through the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, our empirical evidence suggests that academic-based human capital is positively correlated with dynamic behavior, whereas as business-based human capital and prior business experience is not.     

Market states and disposition effect: evidence from Taiwan mutual fund investors

We study the disposition effect across market states in the context of mutual fund investors in Taiwan. Using mutual fund data at the fund and individual levels during July 2001 to October 2008, we find that the disposition effect varies across market states. Our results suggest that investors redeem their mutual fund units more under a bear market than a bull market when they have extreme capital losses. When investors have moderate capital gains, they are less active in redeeming their mutual fund units under a bull market relative to a bear market. Under a neutral market, investors actively redeem mutual fund units in both winner and loser mutual funds except when they have extreme capital losses. Thus, disposition effect is not uniform; it varies by market condition. In addition, the disposition effect phenomenon also exists for Taiwan mutual fund investors as well. Our findings are robust to aggregate and individual investor levels.     

委托人风险与企业家行为

随着中国经济改革的深化,企业家的行为成为关注的焦点.企业的兴衰在很大程度上取决于企业家,一个国家的经济发展取决于整个企业家群体的发展.委托人对待风险的态度是影响企业家发展的重要因素,风险规避的委托人和风险中性的委托人会给企业家带来不同的影响结果.委托人风险规避由风险中性转变,可以影响到激励合同的设计,从而实现"激励相容".     

The dynamics of firms in a micro-to-macro model: The role of training, learning and innovation

We analyze the co-evolution of the performances of firms and of the economy in an evolutionary micro-to-macro model of the Swedish economy. The model emphasizes the interactions between human capital (or competences) and technological change at the firm level and their effects on aggregate growth, taking into account the micro-macro feedbacks. The model features learning-by-doing, incremental and radical innovations, user-producer learning at the firm level, and a change in the techno-economic paradigm. We find that there is an optimal sequence for the firm to allocate their resources: (1) build a general human capital stock before the change in the techno-economic paradigm, (2) spend on R&D, and (3) invest in specific human capital. Innovators fare better than imitators on average, not only because they innovate, but also because they build a competence base, which supports the learning from other firms.     

International Trade Union Organizations

An attempt is made in this article to demonstrate that Alfred Marshall and John Maynard Keynes erected a number of signposts that point in the direction of a normative, institutional and policy-oriented social economics of labor. They opined that dysfunctioning institutions had thrown most members of the working class into an abyss of poverty. According to Marshall, poverty was caused by institutional neglect of education for the masses. Hence he recommended a drastic overhaul of those institutions that impinged on education. Keynes argued that the rentiers were the villains because they had intentionally reduced their funding of entrepreneurial investments. Consequently, investments dwindled and unemployment caused working-class poverty to rise above its customary levels. Keynes's solution was public investment in private enterprises, which he called socialization of investment. This would cause euthanasia of the anti-social rentiers. Because of their recommendations, Marshall and Keynes called themselves socialists.     

Credit crunch in a model of financial intermediation and occupational choice

In this paper, we introduce a dynamic general equilibrium model with numerous and heterogeneous investment projects and endogenous occupational choice to study a credit crunch. Asset accumulation of assets by households as they face various employment and return risks over a long lifetime determines whether they are entrepreneurs or workers. The origin of a credit crunch may be found in the conservative lending by banks during periods of financial duress and reduced profitability because of capital requirements. Using an example from Canada, monetary policy is shown to be largely ineffective in alleviating the credit crunch, while flexible loan regulation can erase it.