From Schumpeterian Democracy to Constitutional Democracy

A critical issue of a constitutional democracy is to determine an optimal limitation of citizens' political liberties. This problem is analysed here within the framework of a parliamentary system of government, and in the context of Rawls' principle of equal political participation. It is argued that optimal barriers to entry into political competition are a function of the legislative decision rules, the domain of collective choices, and the rules for selecting (and dismissing) the executive. Contrary to Schumpeter and Riker who rejected populism (the approach that public policy should be a result of citizens' preferences), we argue that it is possible to reconcile greater citizen participation and liberal democracy with an appropriate institutional design.     

Constitutional Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Many emerging democracies across the globe are scrambling to craft new constitutions. The modal constitution being chosen in this most recent wave of democratization is a rather unknown, and under-theorized, type: semi-presidentialism. This article brings semi-presidentialism back to comparative constitutional theory, distinguishing it from presidentialism and parliamentarism, and guarding against its hasty export to new democracies. This article details when, and why, semi-presidentialism can be problematic from the standpoints of democracy, constitutionalism, and the protection of fundamental rights; and the conditions under which it can be supportive of them. After establishing the analytical framework, this article compares developments in two important historical cases of regime change under semi-presidentialism, cases which have also been among the most influential countries for European politics in the twentieth century: the French Fifth Republic and Weimar Germany. The concluding section draws the evidence together.     

论中国政治市场开放进程中宪政民主与基层民主的协调发展

建构一个有效的政治市场,是中国民主政治发展固有之义,关系到社会主义体制改革的成败,中国最高决策层有意识地选择上下互动的民主政治发展路径,这同苏东原社会主义国家体制改革有别,但这条路径选择并没有消除民主政治发展战略中基层民主优先和宪政民主滞后的矛盾。当务之急是在民主政治实践中高度注重宪政民主与基层民主的协调发展。     

Dennis C. Rasmussen,The Infidel and the Professor: David Hume,Adam Smith,and the Friendship That Shaped Modern Thought

The Review of Austrian Economics -     

社会资本与草根民主——罗伯特·帕特南的《使民主运转起来》

文章回顾了历史以来关于民主理论的研究 ,认为帕特南于 1993年发表的《使民主运转起来 :现代意大利的公民传统》是近年来西方民主理论研究方面影响最大的著作之一。作者对《使民主运转起来》一书的宗旨、理论框架、主要观点及其创新之处进行了评论 ,指出“社会资本”是《使民主运转起来》引入的最重要的分析范畴 ,而《使民主运转起来》的出版无疑有力地推动了西方民主理论的发展。     

Credible Currency: A Constitutional Perspective

By contrast to private banks, public monetary authorities – central banks and currency boards – have limited credibility in making redemption or fixed-exchange-rate commitments. Their sovereign immunity obviates legal penalties for devaluing, and their monopoly status weakens reputational penalties. The softness of central bank promises invites speculative attack and currency crises. Privatization and decentralization of exchange-rate commitments provides a more credible currency by making redemption commitments legally enforceable and reputable. This contrast sheds light on (1) the breakdown of the classical gold standard and (2) the costs and benefits of dollarization. JEL Classification: E42, H42.     

Constitutional renegotiation: Impediments to consensual revision

In a post-constitutional context, restructuring of constitutional rights often fundamentally alters the role and scope of government. It is therefore important to assess the extent to which consensuality is likely to characterize the process of constitutional revision. This article provides theoretical and empirical grounds for concluding that nonconsensual constitutional revision is often the rule rather than the exception. The endogeneity of politically relevant transaction costs and their manipulation by self-interested political actors in a post-constitutional environment are central to the analysis. I wish to thank Robert Higgs and this journal's referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

Democracy and Growth: Alternative Approaches

This article focuses on two previously unexamined aspects of the relationship between economic growth and democracy. First, the growth experiences of countries that experience significant changes in democracy are examined directly. Countries that democratize are found to grow faster than a priori similar countries, while countries that become less democratic grow more slowly than comparable countries. These differences do not seem to be due to differences in education or investment levels. Second, regression tree analysis suggests that democracy, along with initial income and literacy, contributes to the identification of regimes of countries facing similar aggregate production functions.     

实践党内民主(上)

近年来,党内民主的思想受到了越来越多的关注。本文探讨了党内民主的优缺点,考察了政党在采用更具内部包容性的决策程序时可能遇到的一些具体问题。作者认为,由于政党所处环境及其政治观点的不同,党内治理并不存在惟一一套“最佳实践”方案。政党领导人应该根据各种党内民主程序的实际效果,理智地评估它们的优缺点。     

Constitutional protection of economic rights: The Swiss and U.S. experience in comparison

This paper analyzes the contribution of the Swiss and the U.S. Constitution to protect economic liberties, and compares the different strategies that both constitutions rely on to achieve this goal. Pertinent provisions in the Swiss Constitution are rather precise but relatively easy to change, whereas the U.S. Constitution is characterized by vaguely formulated constraints that are difficult to amend formally and that are interpreted by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the substantial constitutional changes that did occur in both countries seem to have followed strikingly similar patterns: Initially, regional integration through reciprocal market opening within both countries facilitated the constitutional protection of economic liberties. Subsequently, the constitutional protection of economic liberties eroded in both countries, especially against federal legislation, due to changes in the interpretation of the constitution through the courts, or by formal amendment. Lastly, both constitutions were not immune against sudden demands by special interest groups that were being raised during times of crisis or war. I wish to thank Beat Blankart, Ludger Schuknecht and Barry Weingast for helpful comments.     

Constitutional Choice and Prosperity: A Factor Analysis

Forempirical purposes most studies on the influence of freedom on prosperity across nations use either aggregate measuresof economic freedom combined with a measure of political liberty,or single components of these aggregates to describe the freedom-variable.For a scholar of constitutional economics, both these approachesdo not seem to be satisfactory. From his theoretical viewpointhe would favor an approach that focuses on properties of thepolitico-economic order that can be interpreted as appropriateconstraints for preferred outcomes. Factor analysis is the methodused in this paper to extract from a pool of components thatdescribe freedom two main factors, namely (1) the appropriatenessof the framework in which the market operates, and (2) the degreeof political interventions into the market process. It is shownthat these two factors have great influence on the prosperityof nations.     

Risk-Aversion in Constitutional Choice: Reply to Kyriacou

In his comment on my article on the possibility of discriminatory and non-consensual decsionmaking under Buchanan's veil of uncertainty (Müller 1998) Andreas Kyriacou proposes to take the players to be quasi-risk averse in order to secure fair and unanimous results at the constitutional level. As analytical tools of incorporating this premise into my model he not only suggests to assume that the individuals weigh losses higher than gains but also to take them as being rational maximiners. In this reply to his comment it is argued that both these points are inadequate to weaken my case against the veil's ability to guarantee unanimity and fairness of constitutional decisionmaking in view of a post-constitutional prisioners dilemma.