Managerial Delegation Contracts under Centralized Unionization

This paper studies how alternative managerial delegation contracts in a duopoly product market interact with wage decisions taken by a central (industry‐wide) union in the labor market. Interestingly, results prove to be more varied with respect to findings by the managerial delegation literature with exogenous production costs. Most notably, it is pointed out that, in equilibrium, both firm profitability and welfare outcomes can be superior under both sales delegation and relative profit delegation, depending on various factors such as the degree of product differentiation and the competition regime. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A supply and demand model of co-worker,employer and customer discrimination

When racial wage differentials reflect customer, co-worker and employer discrimination, how can these sources of discrimination be theoretically and empirically distinguished? We develop a wage model fashioned around professional basketball that includes customer, employer and co-worker discrimination when there is racial integration. We find that the model is capable of: (1) predicting unexpected effects of the various types of discrimination on wages; (2) the three types of discrimination will interact nonlinearly; and (3) compensation attributable to co-worker prejudice is endogenous. Using data from the National Basketball Association, we find evidence consistent with co-worker discrimination by white players and customer discrimination by nonwhite fans.     

The distributive and welfare effects of product and labour market deregulation

This paper studies the effects of product and labour market deregulation on wage inequality and welfare. By constructing an analytically tractable model in which the level of product market competition and the wages are endogenously distributed among sectors, I show that deregulation in goods market has mixed effects on inequality: the wage variance and the Gini index are lower, but the ratio of the highest over the lowest wage paid in the economy increases. Moreover, deregulation in labour markets raises the aggregate level of employment and the average real wage but reduces the welfare of trade unions in sectors with a low level of competition.     

Labour market oligopsonistic competition: The effect of worker immobility on wages

We suggest that firms in a local labour market may be able to exploit worker mobility costs and offer immobile workers wages that are lower than their marginal product. If so, the ability of employers to exploit worker immobility in setting wages would decline in the competitiveness of the local labour market. We test this intuition using a measure of individual mobility costs and measures of local labour market competition. Our findings suggest that worker immobility causes substantial wage variation across workers in small, weakly competitive markets, and in occupations where wages are individually bargained.     

The relationship between product market competition and unemployment with profit sharing

We investigate the implications of product market imperfections on negotiated wages and equilibrium unemployment under profit sharing. We show that intensified product market competition reduces equilibrium unemployment in a strictly monotonic way when the trade union's bargaining power exceeds the profit share. If the profit share exceeds the trade union's bargaining power, the effect of product market competition is ambiguous: there is a threshold for the benefit–replacement ratio above (below) which intensified product market competition increases (decreases) equilibrium unemployment. The profit share and the union's bargaining power affect the wage mark-up, and thereby equilibrium unemployment, in different directions.     

Competition,Outside Directors and Executive Turnover: Implications for Corporate Governance in the EU

This study examines the relevance of non‐executive outside directors with multiple directorships for corporate governance building on a large panel of European listed firms in the period 2003 to 2011. Focusing on executive turnover as an indicator for effective monitoring, the findings reveal that multiple directorships and product market competition are substitutes. Outsiders increase executive turnover in underperforming firms exclusively if competition in the industry is weak. In environments with effective competition, outsiders do not significantly influence the decision to replace underperforming managers. In fiercely competitive industries, the market pressure seems to effectively limit managerial discretion for opportunistic behavior. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Panel data estimates of the production function and product and labor market imperfections

Consistent with two models of imperfect competition in the labor market—the efficient bargaining model and the monopsony model—we provide two extensions of a microeconomic version of Hall's framework for estimating price‐cost margins. We show that both product and labor market imperfections generate a wedge between factor elasticities in the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue, which can be characterized by a ‘joint market imperfections parameter’. Using an unbalanced panel of 10,646 French firms in 38 manufacturing industries over the period 1978–2001, we can classify these industries into six different regimes depending on the type of competition in the product and the labor market. By far the most predominant regime is one of imperfect competition in the product market and efficient bargaining in the labor market (IC‐EB), followed by a regime of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right‐to‐manage bargaining in the labor market (IC‐PR), and by a regime of perfect competition in the product market and monopsony in the labor market (PC‐MO). For each of these three predominant regimes, we assess within‐regime firm differences in the estimated average price‐cost mark‐up and rent sharing or labor supply elasticity parameters, following the Swamy methodology to determine the degree of true firm dispersion. To assess the plausibility of our findings in the case of the dominant regime (IC‐EB), we also relate our industry and firm‐level estimates of price‐cost mark‐up and extent of rent sharing to industry characteristics and firm‐specific variables respectively. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Price,wage and employment response to shocks: evidence from the WDN survey

We analyse the relative intensity and character of price vs. cost and wage vs. employment firm-level adjustment to cost-push shocks in the European System of Central Banks Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) survey data set. The results document several statistically significant and theoretically sensible relationships: price increases are less likely when product market competition is more intense, and more likely when collective wage agreements or employment protection legislation constrain firm-level reactions. We discuss how changes of such structural and institutional features of firms and of their environment may underlie the evolution of macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms in Europe.     

Stereotypes, Asian Americans, and Wages: An Empirical Strategy Applied to Computer Use at Work

This article examines the effect on wages of the Asian-American stereotype as mathematically and technically adept, and the role this stereotype may play in explaining racial wage differences. We propose an empirical strategy to examine the influence of stereotypes on labor market outcomes, with a specific application to the wage premium associated with computer use at work. Using Current Population Survey data, ordinary least squares estimates do not provide compelling evidence that a positive stereotype affects wages for Asian Americans.     

Adjusting to the national minimum wage: constraints and incentives to change in six low‐paying sectors

Interest in the national minimum wage (NMW) includes not only its direct impact on employment and wages, but also its indirect impact on organisational performance resulting from a reorientation of employer behaviour with regard to employment practices and product market competition. Drawing on data from small firms in six low‐paying sectors, this article identifies three key constraints that have undermined the possible effect of the NMW in generating a virtuous cycle between employment practices and product market approach. These constraints relate to product market conditions, employer norms and labour market institutions (especially training).     

Monopsonistic discrimination, worker turnover, and the gender wage gap

Motivated by models of worker flows, we argue in this paper that monopsonistic discrimination may be a substantial factor behind the overall gender wage gap. Using matched employer–employee data from Norway, we estimate establishment-specific wage premiums separately for men and women, conditioning on fixed individual effects. Regressions of worker turnover on the wage premium identify less wage elastic labour supply facing each establishment of women than that of men. Workforce gender composition is strongly related to employers' wage policies. The results suggest that 70–90% of the gender wage gap for low-educated workers may be attributed to differences in labour market frictions between men and women, while the similar figures for high-educated workers ranges from 20 to 70%.     

Monopoly, Monopsony, and Union Strength and Local Market Wage Differentials

A bstract . The study of the influence of product market monopoly, local labor market monopsony , and union strength on market wage differentials is the purpose of this paper. Accordingly, the related theoretical propositions are examined, synthesized and extended to explain more fully observed variations in local labor market wages. In contrast to previous investigations, this study considers several varied occupations at once, encompasses nineteen different two digit SIC industries , and computes market wage data using observations on individuals from the 1970 census. The results indicate that the extent of unionism and employer monopsony contribute significantly to the explanation of market wage differentials, while the product market concentration , and its interaction with unionism does not.     

Convergent and divergent country trends in coordinated wage setting and collective bargaining in the public hospitals sector

Drawing on the findings of research in the public hospitals sector in five European countries 1 —France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK—this article assesses the character of change in wage setting and collective bargaining. It demonstrates the diversity of national arrangements by comparing key characteristics: (i) the bodies of collective representation (unions, professional associations and employer bodies); (ii) the degree of integration with the wider public sector framework; (iii) coordination (or competition) with the private hospitals sector; and (iv) the practice of à la carte provisions within individual hospitals. Despite national varieties of wage setting and collective bargaining, each country sector faces similar tensions—most notably the opposition between public (labour market) rules and health (product market) rules, and pressures to segment or integrate employment conditions by labour force group. By examining the nature of change in institutions for wage setting and collective bargaining in each country, the article contributes to our understanding of the extent of coordination and change of public sector wage setting and describes three scenarios: fragmentation (Germany); continuity (France and the Netherlands); and reconstruction (the UK and Norway).     

Spillover effects of human service facilities in a racially segmented housing market

Previous studies of human service facility spillovers on residential property values have been inconclusive, and have failed to take into account the effects of racial segmentation of housing markets. Likewise, studies of racial discrimination in urban housing markets and price differentials between white and nonwhite areas of the city have failed to consider the impacts of service facilities on prices. This study develops an hedonic price model of housing services in a racially segmented housing market, which considers a variety of human service facilities and their spillover effects. Model results for Oakland, California in 1976 indicate that facilities significantly affect housing prices both positively and negatively, and that these effects vary by racial submarket. Implications of these findings for the interpretation of past discrimination studies, facility impact studies, and social policy are considered.     

Are Reports of Discrimination Valid? Considering the Moral Hazard Effect

A bstract .   Antidiscrimination laws are designed to prompt employers to stop excluding black workers from jobs they offer and from treating them unequally with respect to promotion and salaries once on the job. However, a moral hazard effect can arise if the existence of the laws leads black employees to bring unjustified claims of discrimination against employers. It has been argued that employers may become more reluctant to hire black workers for fear of being subjected to frivolous lawsuits.
Using the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), we find that male and female black workers are far more likely than whites to report racial discrimination at work. This is the case even when a host of human capital and labor market factors are controlled for. Further, nearly all black workers who report they have been discriminated against on the job in the MCSUI Surveys also show statistical evidence of wage discrimination. This is not the case for white males or females. We find little evidence to support a moral hazard effect.     

The effect of trade and FDI on inter-industry wage differentials: The case of Mexico

Taking advantage of the liberalization process under NAFTA, this paper assesses the relative importance of the degree of trade openness and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in explaining inter-industry wage differentials for the case of Mexico. Using INEGI's National Survey of Urban Employment for the period 1994–2004, the empirical analysis is conducted on two stages. In the first stage, individual wages are regressed on worker characteristics, job and firm attributes, informality and a set of federal entity and industry indicators. In the second stage, inter-industry wage differentials (derived from the coefficient estimates of the industry indicators) are regressed on trade and FDI variables. The main findings show that trade openness does not have a statistically significant effect on inter-industry wage differentials, whereas for the case of FDI, a positive nonlinear relationship is found to exist.     

产品市场竞争与现金持有动态调整

本文采用中国上市公司2005～2008年812家公司3248个样本的平衡面板数据,对产品市场竞争及其变化与企业现金持有动态调整之间的关系进行研究。实证研究的结果表明,从静态角度看,产品市场竞争对现金持有调整速度的影响不显著;但是从动态角度看,企业的现金持有水平将随着产品市场竞争的动态变化做出调整,产品市场竞争越趋向激烈,企业现金持有调整的速度越快。进一步研究发现,产品市场竞争的动态变化与现金持有调整速度之间的上述关系在非国有企业和高成长企业更为明显。     

Refusals to Deal, Price Discrimination, and Independent Service Organizations

A number of recent Canadian and U.S. antitrust cases have involved allegations that manufacturers of durable products have refused to supply parts to independent service organizations, apparently to monopolize the market for repairs of their products. This paper provides a theory of these strategies and considers the welfare implications of judicial orders to supply. The refusals here are seen as necessary to protect manufacturers' program of price discrimination: Expensive repairs represent a way to select high-intensity, high-value users and charge them more. In addition to the usual ambiguity associated with the welfare effects of prohibitions of price discrimination, forcing competition in repairs can have the further damaging effect of reducing social welfare by inducing manufacturers to lower product quality.     

Capital structure,product market competition and firm performance: Evidence from South Africa

This paper investigates the relationship between capital structure and firm performance, paying particular attention to the degree of industry competition. The paper applies a novel measure of competition, the Boone indicator, to the leverage-performance relationship. Using panel data consisting of 257 South African firms over the period 1998–2009, this paper examines the effect of capital structure on firm performance and investigates the extent to which the relationship depends on the level of product market competition. The results suggest that financial leverage has a positive and significant effect on firm performance. It is also found that product market competition enhances the performance effect of leverage. The results are robust to alternative measures of competition and leverage.     

Industry Dynamics and Competition from Low‐Wage Countries: Evidence on Italy

This article analyses the effect of competition from low‐wage countries on domestic activity, using data on 230 Italian manufacturing sectors between 1995 and 2007. It finds that low‐wage import penetration is negatively related to employment and other measures of activity. The effect is significantly smaller in more skill, capital and R&D‐intensive sectors and in more vertically differentiated sectors. There is also evidence of significant effects of low‐wage competition through inter‐industry linkages: employment is negatively related to low‐wage import penetration in downstream sectors but positively related to low‐wage import penetration in upstream sectors.