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1.
We study how the efficient choice of contract enforcement interacts with the efficient allocation of capital in a simple production economy. Contract enforcement makes trade possible but requires an aggregate investment of capital that is no longer available for production. In such an economy, more dispersion in ex-ante marginal products makes it optimal to invest more resources in enforcement. Furthermore, implementing the optimal allocation requires a specific distribution of the cost for enforcement across agents that is not monotonic and results in a redistribution of endowments. At the efficient solution, agents at the bottom of the endowment distribution benefit the most from investment in enforcement and these investments lead to a reduction in consumption and income inequality. 相似文献
2.
《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2018,120(3):859-893
We study antitrust enforcement that aims to channel price‐fixing incentives of cartels through setting fine schedules and detection levels. Fines obey legal principles, such as the punishment should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. Bankruptcy considerations limit maximum fines, ensure abnormal cartel profits, and impose a challenge for optimal antitrust enforcement. We derive the fine schedule and detection level that are constrained‐optimal under legal principles and sustainability of cartel prices. This fine schedule lies below the maximum fine, makes collusion on lower prices more attractive than on higher prices, and, hence, relates to the body of literature on marginal deterrence. 相似文献
3.
We examine the tradeoff between the number and average size of nature reserves. When the costs of enforcing reserve boundaries
are negligible, we find analytically that the relative price of biodiversity has a positive impact on the optimal total reserved
area but an ambiguous impact on the optimal number of reserves. Simulation modeling of floral diversity in a tropical timber
concession reveals that the resolution of this ambiguity depends on spatial distributions of the populations of tree species:
whether or not they are spatially aggregated (clumped). The impact of biodiversity price on optimal reserve number remains
analytically ambiguous when enforcement costs are not negligible. Multiple reserves being economically superior to a single
reserve now requires, in addition to aggregation, a biodiversity price that is sufficiently high to offset the effects of
enforcement costs. Most of our simulation scenarios generate threshold biodiversity prices that do not exceed a leading estimate
of the marginal value of a higher plant species in the bioprospecting literature. Several smaller reserves evidently can be
economically superior to a single larger one even in the presence of enforcement costs.
相似文献
4.
J. C. BALDRY 《The Economic record》1984,60(2):156-159
Complete enforcement of income tax laws, designed to reduce income tax evasion to zero, is shown to be inefficient. Starting from a 'full compliance' policy, it is shown that a marginal reduction in enforcement will always allow for tax reductions, hence increases in the ex-ante utility levels of taxpayers. Only if the tax structure is rigid can full compliance be optimal. 相似文献
5.
Rögnvaldur Hannesson 《Journal of Bioeconomics》2011,13(2):139-160
Many fish stocks are controlled by fish quotas divided among individual firms. Such quota regimes need an enforcement mechanism
in order to be effective. Whether or not quota management regimes are worth while depends on whether the rents generated by
such regimes cover their costs. Cost-efficient quota regimes would attain an optimal deterrence through minimal control and
high fines, but in practice there are likely to be socially determined limits on how high fines could be set. We analyze these
questions for the Northeast Arctic cod stock, using data on enforcement of Norwegian fish quotas. 相似文献
6.
Enforcement of international environmental quantity regulations (e.g. tradable pollution permits) is often expected to be stricter than that of price regulations (e.g. emission taxes). While both instruments provide opportunities for misrepresenting actual pollution, enforcement of international price-based instruments is additionally hampered by potential fiscal cushioning, i.e. an adjustment of domestic fiscal policies offsetting the tax incentive to reduce emission reductions. The present paper extends the formal debate on Prices vs. Quantities by including the risk of fiscal cushioning. We find the level of the marginal benefit curve and the variance of costs become key elements for instrument choice and can render quantity regulations strictly preferable. Remarkably, in the latter case, the slopes of the marginal curves do not affect optimal instrument choice. Numerical calculations, using data taken from the international climate policy context, support the potential dominance of quantity regulations found in our formal analysis. 相似文献
7.
Self-Regulation and Government Oversight 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Peter M. DeMarzo Michael J. Fishman Kathleen M. Hagerty 《The Review of economic studies》2005,72(3):687-706
Self-regulation is a feature of a number of professions. For example, in the U.S. the government delegates aspects of financial market regulation to self-regulatory organizations (SROs) like the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers. We analyse one regulatory task of an SRO, enforcing antifraud rules so agents will not cheat customers. Specifically, we model contracting/enforcement as a two-tier problem. An SRO chooses its enforcement policy: the likelihood that an agent is investigated for fraud and a penalty schedule. Given an enforcement policy, agents compete by offering contracts that maximize customers' expected utility. We assume that the SRO's objective is to maximize the welfare of its members, the agents. We show that the SRO chooses a more lax enforcement policy—meaning less frequent investigations—than what customers would choose. A general conclusion is that control of the enforcement policy governing contracts confers substantial market power to a group of otherwise competitive agents. We also investigate government oversight of the self-regulatory process. The threat of government enforcement leads to more enforcement by the SRO, just enough to pre-empt any government enforcement. 相似文献
8.
George Economides Hyun Park Apostolis Philippopoulos 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2007,109(1):153-175
We incorporate weak property rights into an otherwise standard general equilibrium model of growth and second‐best optimal policy. In this setup, the state plays two of its key roles: it protects property rights and provides public services. The government chooses policy (the income tax rate, as well as the allocation of collected tax revenues between law enforcement and public services) to maximize the growth rate of the economy. The focus of our analysis is on how weak property rights generate multiple decentralized competitive equilibria, the different properties of these equilibria, and the implications of second‐best optimal policies. 相似文献
9.
Enforcement agencies issuing warnings are an empirical regularity in the enforcement of laws and regulations, but a challenge to the standard economic theory of public enforcement. A number of recent contributions explain the popularity of warnings as a response to information asymmetries between regulator and regulatee. We offer a distinct, but complementary explanation: Warnings can serve as a signaling device in the interaction between the enforcement agency and its budget-setting authority. By using costly warnings for minor offenses that would otherwise not be pursued, the agency can generate observable activity to escape budget cuts in subsequent periods. We show in a stylized model that warnings may indeed occur in an equilibrium of a game in which warnings are entirely unproductive in the agency-regulatee interaction, and thereby derive a testable hypothesis on regulatory agency behavior. 相似文献
10.
MARTIN BESFAMILLE PHILIPPE DE DONDER JEAN‐MARIE LOZACHMEUR 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2013,15(6):856-883
The objective of this paper is to understand the determinants of the enforcement level of indirect taxation in a positive setting. We build a sequential game where individuals, who differ in their willingness to pay for a taxed good, vote over the enforcement level. Firms then compete à la Cournot and choose the fraction of sales taxes to evade. We assume in most of the paper that the tax rate is set exogenously. Voters face the following trade‐off: more enforcement not only increases tax collection but also increases the consumer price of the goods sold in an imperfectly competitive market. We obtain that the equilibrium enforcement level is the one most preferred by the individual with the median willingness to pay, that it is not affected by the structure of the market (number of firms) and the firms’ marginal cost, and that it decreases with the resource cost of evasion and with the tax rate. We also compare the enforcement level chosen by majority voting with the utilitarian level. In the last section, we endogenize the tax rate by assuming that individuals vote simultaneously over tax rate and enforcement level. We prove the existence of a Condorcet winner and show that it entails full enforcement (i.e., no tax evasion at equilibrium). The existence of markets with less than full enforcement then depends crucially on the fact that tax rates are not tailored to each market individually. 相似文献
11.
We investigate entry in a dynastic entrepreneurship (overlapping generations) environment created by employee spinoffs. Contracting failures, caused by non-verifiability of profits from new activities in original firms and overall profits from subsequent entrants, may lead respectively to implementation of new employee ideas in spinoffs and constraints on borrowing to buy out non-compete agreements. If borrowing constraints are not binding, enforcement of non-compete agreements unambiguously improves social welfare outcomes, increasing the entry of both original firms and subsequent generations of spinoffs. However, if employees are unable to buy out their non-compete covenants, enforcement of these agreements shuts down socially profitable spinoff firms. Non-enforcement sacrifices entry of original firms that would be marginally profitable in the absence of employee spinoffs, but otherwise clearly improves social welfare outcomes over enforcement in the presence of binding finance constraints. 相似文献
12.
Thorsten V. Koeppl 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,134(1):34-60
Societies provide institutions that are costly to set up, but able to enforce long-run relationships. We study the optimal decision problem of using self-governance for risk sharing or governance through enforcement provided by these institutions. Third-party enforcement is modelled as a costly technology that consumes resources, but permits the punishment of agents who deviate from ex ante specified allocations. We show that it is optimal to employ the technology whenever commitment problems prevent first-best risk sharing and fixed costs are sufficiently low, but never optimal to provide incentives exclusively via this technology. Commitment problems then persist and the optimal incentive structure changes dynamically over time with third-party enforcement monotonically increasing in the relative inequality between agents. 相似文献
13.
In an economy with consumption externalities, existing studies find that a competitive equilibrium is efficient in the long run and remains efficient in transitions if preferences are homothetic. This paper revisits the efficiency issue in an otherwise standard one-sector growth model where consumption externalities affect a utility via their effects on the time preference. We find that even if preferences are homothetic, the externality changes the marginal rate of substitution between now and future and leads to a disparity in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between the centrally planned economy and a decentralized economy. As a result, a competitive equilibrium is inefficient in transition dynamics. We characterize an optimal tax/subsidy structure that enables the allocation in a decentralized economy to replicate the social optimum. 相似文献
14.
We propose an infinite-horizon quantity-setting differential game with learning spillovers and organizational forgetting to analyze the optimal management decisions affecting the evolution of the stock of know-how, and, in turn, the dynamics of productive efficiency. Specifically, we study the long run impact of inter-firm knowledge diffusion on market power, i.e. the ability of a firm to raise the price above the marginal cost, and welfare. We consider two types of processes through which knowledge is acquired: (i) passive learning, or learning-by-doing, where managers do not actively invest in information and (ii) active learning, or learning-by-investing, where managers acquire new and additional information through specific investments in human capital. We show that: under (i), knowledge diffusion reduces market power; under (ii), knowledge diffusion reduces market power as long as learning spillovers are sufficiently important. From a welfare viewpoint, we also show that: under (i), knowledge diffusion is always welfare-enhancing; under (ii), weak spillovers are required in order for knowledge diffusion to be welfare-enhancing. 相似文献
15.
《International Review of Economics & Finance》1998,7(4):379-392
This paper examines how debt-induced risk shifting arising in the labor choice contributes to the interaction between investment and financing decisions. Due to equity's limited liability, increased use of debt leads to labor over-utilization compared with all-equity financing. In turn, increasing leverage to finance investment has no effect on the cost but, via labor, influences the expected benefit of marginal investment by affecting the size of shareholders' claim while reducing its likelihood. If the equity claim is reduced, investment and debt are inversely related; otherwise they could be positively related. The linkage between debt and investment exists because both are chosen anticipating the subsequent optimal labor choice, all three decisions are made before price uncertainty is resolved, and equity flotation costs exist. 相似文献
16.
This paper uses a vertical product differentiation model to discuss the influences caused by counterfeiting on prices and outputs of original products, consumer surplus and social welfare. We also explore the impact of the government??s enforcement on counterfeiting and social welfare. We find that as counterfeiting may occur, sales of the original product could either increase or decrease. The welfare effects of government enforcement are shown as follows. First, a strict enforcement on counterfeiting by government may either increase or decrease welfare. Second, when counterfeiting emerges, welfare under a stricter enforcement is not necessarily larger than that without enforcement. Last, a strict enough enforcement can still improve welfare even if there is a relatively high enforcement cost. 相似文献
17.
Project-based emissions trading schemes, like the Clean Development Mechanism, are particularly prone to problems of asymmetric information between project parties and the regulator. In this paper, we extend the general framework on incomplete enforcement of policy instruments to reflect the particularities of credit-based mechanisms. The main focus of the analysis is to determine the regulator??s optimal spot-check frequency given plausible assumptions of incomplete enforcement under asymmetric information on reduction costs and heterogeneous verifiability of projects. We find that, depending on the actual abatement cost and penalty schemes, optimal monitoring for credit-based systems is often discontinuous and significantly differs from the one to be applied for cap-and-trade schemes or environmental taxes. We conclude that, in a real-world context, project admission should ultimately be based on the criterion of verifiability. 相似文献
18.
Anton Bekkerman 《Applied economics》2016,48(15):1402-1415
Discretion in schools’ discipline choices can provide an efficient and effective misconduct management structure, but could lead to discipline based on unrelated factors. Consequently, schools’ disciplinary decisions can significantly limit students’ access to education by removing students from familiar learning environments. We investigate schools’ disciplinary decisions for serious misconducts and show that punishments are more severe in schools that do not report misconducts to local law enforcement agencies. Moreover, we show that schools that report fewer misconducts to law enforcement impose more severe punishments when the student body is characterized as having a higher proportion of minority students, lower socioeconomic status students and a higher proportion of students who are below the 15th percentile of standardized test scores. These results suggest that between-school punishment differentials are associated with student body traits. 相似文献
19.
Dorothée Brécard 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2011,49(3):387-403
We examine the impact of an emission tax in a green market characterized by consumers’ environmental awareness and competition
between firms for both environmental quality and product prices. The unique aspect of this model comes from the assumption
that the cost for an increase in quality is fixed. We show that the emission tax improves welfare, thanks to a decline in
pollution and despite an accentuation of product differentiation. The higher the marginal environmental damage is, the higher
the optimal tax will be. The optimal tax, however, becomes lower than the marginal damage when the market is not too large.
Finally, when marginal environmental damage is not too low, the optimal tax leads to a green product monopoly. 相似文献
20.
Negotiated Enforcement and Credible Deterrence 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Luigi Alberto Franzoni 《Economic journal (London, England)》1999,109(458):509-535
This paper develops a model of law enforcement in which indicted offenders and the prosecutor can negotiate the penalty prior to the completion of the investigation. The analysis focuses on the credibility of the conviction threat: the prosecutor cannot commit to any predetermined level of investigative effort should the negotiation fail. The settlement stage introduces several new features of the optimal enforcement policy, including the possibility that maximal sanctions may not be optimal. We show that the screening process associated with the negotiation stage reduces the incentives for the prosecutor to undertake thorough investigations and increases the rate of noncompliance. 相似文献