Individual Wage Growth: The Role of Industry Experience

This paper focuses on the effect of experience within an industry on wages. I use a correlated random effects simultaneous equation model that allows individual and match heterogeneity to affect wages, job tenure, and industry experience. I estimate my model separately for men and women using a large panel of young Italian workers for the years 1986–2004. Results show that wage returns to industry experience are much higher than wage returns to job seniority. The hypotheses of exogeneity of job seniority and industry experience in the wage equation are rejected: high‐wage workers and high‐wage matches last longer.     

Transitions into Permanent Employment in Spain: An Empirical Analysis for Young Workers

This article analyses the transitions into permanent employment of a sample of young temporary employees in Spain for the period 1996–2003. For this purpose, we apply multiple‐spell duration techniques to a longitudinal dataset of temporary workers obtained from Social Security registers. Our main findings are as follows. First, the transitions from a temporary contract into unemployment and into another temporary contract are very high when compared with transitions into permanent employment. Second, the entry into permanent employment — although slightly increasing with tenure at the temporary contract — is very low; the only exception is that of semi‐skilled and unskilled individuals, who are particularly likely to enter into permanent employment at the 24th and the 36th month of tenure (respectively). Third, we find that there exists a substantial proportion of workers with unobservable characteristics that make them show high exit rates from temporary employment and, at the same time, a rapid exit from unemployment — while the remaining individuals exit from unemployment more slowly, particularly those who are receiving unemployment benefits.     

Fixed‐Term Contracts: Short‐Term Blessings or Long‐Term Scars? Empirical Findings from the Netherlands 1980–2000

Using a comprehensive longitudinal dataset of prime‐age Dutch workers over the period 1980–2000, we examine how a previously held job with a fixed‐term contract influences both the likelihood and the duration of a future spell of unemployment. Analyses show that Dutch workers with fixed‐term contracts experience higher risks of future unemployment and have no shorter spells of unemployment compared to workers with regular contracts. Results also reveal that swifter employment re‐entries among men with fixed‐term contracts can be explained by their job search efforts before unemployment. Our study (partly) invalidates theoretical positions that claim that fixed‐term contracts foster employment security by shortening unemployment durations; suggesting that fixed‐term contracts are a short‐term blessing that could end, for some workers, in a recurrent unemployment trap.     

Internal Labor Markets and Worker Quits

This article uses establishment-level data to explore the impact of internal labor markets on worker quits. Quits are lower where job ladders are long, pay growth from the bottom to the top of job ladders is high, and seniority is used as a criterion for promotion. Using a system of internal promotion without a commitment to seniority is associated with higher worker quits. These results hold true even when controlling for the specific human capital skills of workers, suggesting that personnel factors other than specific training are responsible both for the existence of internal labor markets and for the impact of internal labor markets on worker quits.     

Corporate social responsibility as an employee governance tool: Evidence from a quasi‐experiment

Research summary : This study examines whether companies employ corporate social responsibility (CSR) to improve employee engagement and mitigate adverse behavior at the workplace (e.g., shirking, absenteeism). We exploit plausibly exogenous changes in state unemployment insurance (UI) benefits from 1991 to 2013. Higher UI benefits reduce the cost of being unemployed and hence increase employees' incentives to engage in adverse behavior. We find that higher UI benefits are associated with higher engagement in employee‐related CSR. This finding suggests that companies use CSR as a strategic management tool—specifically, an employee governance tool—to increase employee engagement and counter the possibility of adverse behavior. We further examine plausible mechanisms underlying this relationship. Managerial summary : This study examines whether companies employ corporate social responsibility (CSR) to improve employee engagement and mitigate adverse behavior at the workplace (e.g., shirking, absenteeism). We find that companies react to increased risk of adverse behavior by strategically increasing their investment in employee‐related CSR (e.g., work‐life balance benefits, health and safety policies). Our findings have important managerial implications. In particular, they suggest that CSR may help companies motivate and engage their employees. Hence, companies dealing with employees that are unmotivated, regularly absent, or engage in other forms of adverse behavior, may find it worthwhile to design and implement effective CSR practices. Further, our findings suggest that CSR can be used as employee governance tool. Accordingly, managers could benefit from integrating CSR considerations into their strategic planning. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who Benefits from Teams? Comparing Workers,Supervisors, and Managers

This article offers a political explanation for the diffusion and sustainability of team-based work systems by examining the differential outcomes of team structures for 1200 workers, supervisors, and middle managers in a large unionized telecommunications company. Regression analyses show that participation in self-managed teams is associated with significantly higher levels of perceived discretion, employment security, and satisfaction for workers and the opposite for supervisors. Middle managers who initiate team innovations report higher employment security but otherwise are not significantly different from their counterparts who are not involved in innovations. By contrast, there are no significant outcomes for employees associated with their participation in off-line problem-solving teams.     

Highly Educated Immigrants and Native Occupational Choice

Economic debate about the consequences of immigration in the United States has largely focused on how influxes of foreign‐born labor with little educational attainment have affected similarly educated native‐born workers. Fewer studies analyze the effect of immigration within the market for highly educated labor. We use O*NET data on job characteristics to assess whether native‐born workers with graduate degrees respond to an increased presence of highly educated foreign‐born workers by choosing new occupations with different skill content. We find that highly educated native and foreign‐born workers are imperfect substitutes. Immigrants with graduate degrees specialize in occupations demanding quantitative and analytical skills, whereas their native‐born counterparts specialize in occupations requiring interactive and communication skills. When the foreign‐born proportion of highly educated employment within an occupation rises, native employees with graduate degrees choose new occupations with less analytical and more communicative content.     

Direct Labor Market Effects of Unemployment Insurance

It has been established that relatively high income families receive a disproportionately large share of UI benefits. Little information on the distribution of costs by income class is available, but it is quite possible that the upper income groups may also bear a disproportionately large share of the costs. More empirical research is needed before the redistributive effects of UI can be known with any degree of confidence. There is little argument about the desirability on income mainlenance grounds of extending Unemployment insurance benefits in a recessionary period, all other things being equal. U1 is quite efficient as an income maintenance tool for covered workers. With respect to the unemployment problem, though, it is feared by some that the program goes too far in maintaining the incomes of covered workers, and as a result any extension of UI benefits will aggravate the unemployment problem. The evidence presented here suggests that fears of a major increase in unemployment as a result of such changes are largely unwarranted. However, extended UI benefits would appear to have some small, nontrivial adverse impact on unemployment. Finally, it seems that UI's income distributional impact has been portrayed unjustly as pro-rich. It may be that income is transferred through the UI system from the relatively well-to-do to the relatively poor. There is no scientific way of bringing these considerations to bear in deciding whether or not to restructure the unemployment insurance system. This question can be answered only by invoking fundamental value judgments to decide how sociely would be better off, and I would not presume here to offer my own. This paper will have served its purpose if it has provided the basis for a more informed decision.     

What Types of Diversity Benefit Workers? Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Co‐worker Dissimilarity on the Performance of Employees

This study explores the consequences of grouping workers into diverse divisions on the performance of employees using a dataset containing the detailed personnel records of a large U.S. firm from 1989 to 1994. In particular, I examine the effects of demographic dissimilarity among co‐workers, namely differences in age, gender, and race among employees who work together within divisions, and non‐demographic dissimilarity, namely differences in education, work function, firm tenure, division tenure, performance, and wages among employees within divisions. I find evidence that age dissimilarity, dissimilarity in firm tenure, and performance dissimilarity are associated with lower worker performance, while wage differences are associated with higher worker performance. My analysis also reveals that the effects of certain types of dissimilarities get smaller in magnitude the longer a worker is a part of a division. Finally, the paper provides evidence that the relationships between performance and the various measures of dissimilarity vary by occupational area and division size.     

Why Are Some Union Organizing Campaigns More Successful Than Others?

This paper reports a study of two union organizing campaigns in the higher education sector. Using mobilization theory, we tried to explore why one campaign was more successful than the other as measured by membership growth and recruitment of activists. We found that in the more successful campaign, the union was perceived as more effective in voicing workers’ concerns, generated greater social cohesion and union identification amongst employees, was more successful in convincing employees that the university management was to blame for their problems and promoted amongst employees a stronger sense of union instrumentality.     

Who Queues for a Union Job?

A survey of unemployed workers was undertaken to determine these individuals' union membership preference. Standard probit specifications reveal that those unemployed workers more likely to require a union position to return to work include female, minorities, workers with greater experience, and those with higher reservation wages. However, both the duration of unemployment and the perception of widespread unemployment lower the likelihood of such a requirement. These results are consistent with the wage and tenure effects of unions and with the influence of unemployment characteristics on job search.     

The Swedish Model: Relevant for Other European Countries?

By the late 1970s, supply-side theory had become something of a new economic orthodoxy. From the supply-side perspective, labour market inflexibility explains mass unemployment. In this context the presumably greater flexibility of the labour market in the USA was seen as an explanation of its superior employment record relative to European economies. Unlike most European countries, Sweden, which is highly regulated, does reasonably well in employment terms. The authors conclude that the Swedish model has proved its value with regard to labour market policy, especially with regard to the duration of unemployment, and that the Swedish model still contains relevant characteristics for other European countries. Active labour market policy is a way out of the unemployment trap. The active labour market policy may serve as an alternative for deregulation in order to augment the flexibility of the labour market.     

Assessing the effects of mergers and acquisitions on firm performance,plant productivity,and workers: newl evidence from matched employer‐employee data

Empirical studies of mergers and acquisitions typically focus on firm‐level financial performance. In contrast, we use human capital theory to model these events as transactions that simultaneously have cross‐level, real effects on workers, plants, and firms. Our empirical analysis is based on longitudinal, linked employer‐employee data for virtually all Swedish manufacturing firms and employees. We find that mergers and acquisitions enhance plant productivity, although they also result in the downsizing of establishments and firms. Firm performance does not decline in the aftermath of these ownership changes. We conclude that such transactions constitute a mechanism for improving the sorting and matching of plants and workers to more efficient uses. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hispanic Immigration and Labor Market Segmentation

This paper investigates the wage and employment effects of Hispanic immigration on native-born, low-skilled urban workers. The study develops a multiquation model to counter simultaneity bias, isolates the impact of recent illegal aliens from that of settled immigrants and of native interstate movers, calculates separate estimates for female and male employees, subdivided by race and Spanish origin, and tests both conventional and dual labor market theories. The results indicate that recent immigration has not had substantial adverse wage or employment effects.     

Evaluating the Illegal Employer Practice of Under‐Reporting Employees’ Salaries

This article advances understanding of the prevalence and distribution of the illegal employer practice of under‐reporting employees’ salaries, explains this practice and evaluates policy approaches. Analysing a 2013 Eurobarometer survey of 11,025 employees in 28 European countries, one in 33 employees receive under‐reported salaries, mostly in small businesses and vulnerable groups (e.g. unskilled workers, with lower education levels and financial difficulties). Explaining this practice, not as an individual criminal act that increasing the risk of detection can tackle, but as a symptom of systemic problems, which require improvements both in tax morale at the individual level and in the formal institutional environment at the country level to resolve, we then discuss the implications for theory and policy.     

Long‐Run Patterns of Labour Market Polarization: Evidence from German Micro Data

The past four decades have witnessed dramatic changes in the structure of employment. In particular, the rapid increase in computational power has led to large‐scale reductions in employment in jobs that can be described as intensive in routine tasks. These jobs have been shown to be concentrated in middle‐skill occupations. A large literature on labour market polarization characterizes and measures these processes at an aggregate level. However, to date, there is little information regarding the individual worker adjustment processes related to routine‐biased technological change. Using an administrative panel dataset for Germany, we follow workers over an extended period of time and provide evidence of both the short‐term adjustment process and medium‐run effects of routine task‐intensive job loss at an individual level. We initially demonstrate a marked, and steady, shift in employment away from routine, middle‐skill, occupations. In subsequent analysis, we demonstrate how exposure to jobs with higher routine task content is associated with a reduced likelihood of being in employment in both the short term (after one year) and medium term (five years). This employment penalty to routineness of work has increased over the past four decades. More generally, we demonstrate that routine task work is associated with reduced job stability and more likelihood of experiencing periods of unemployment. However, these negative effects of routine work appear to be concentrated in increased employment to employment, and employment to unemployment transitions rather than longer periods of unemployment.     

Japanese Employees' Attitudes Toward Changes in Traditional Employment Practices

This study examines Japanese employees' attitudinal opposition to changes in such employment practices as nenko (seniority)-based wages and promotions, and implicit long-term employment guarantees for the regular workforce. The study shows that (1) overall, Japanese employees are strongly opposed to placing a cap on senior employees' pay and to mid-career transfers to subsidiary companies, and (2) the level of opposition is a function of their perceptions of unions' past performance and of employers' human resource policies.     

The psychological costs of pay‐for‐performance: Implications for the strategic compensation of employees

Most research linking compensation to strategy relies on agency theory economics and focuses on executive pay. We instead focus on the strategic compensation of nonexecutive employees, arguing that while agency theory provides a useful framework for analyzing compensation, it fails to consider several psychological factors that increase costs from performance‐based pay. We examine how psychological costs from social comparison and overconfidence reduce the efficacy of individual performance‐based compensation, building a theoretical framework predicting more prominent use of team‐based, seniority‐based, and flatter compensation. We argue that compensation is strategic not only in motivating and attracting the worker being compensated but also in its impact on peer workers and the firm's complementary activities. The paper discusses empirical implications and possible theoretical extensions of the proposed integrated theory. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Delegating recruitment under asymmetric information

This paper studies the incentive to delegate recruitment. The owner decides whether or not to delegate recruitment to senior employees who are better able to evaluate candidates but may avoid recruiting the best candidates as they threaten their seniority. We find that senior employees will not deliberately choose bad candidates if the only information asymmetry between the owner and the recruiter relates to candidates' ‘type’. Delegation is then superior to direct (owner) recruitment although ‘tenure’ may still be offered to elicit the ‘type’ of the recruit. If additional information asymmetry is present, however, moral hazard may exist and tenure is offered to ensure that the best candidate is selected.     

Efficiency Wages in Weitzman's Share Economy

Weitzman proposes widespread profit or revenue sharing as a way of guaranteeing both very low levels of equilibrium unemployment and increased stability in the face of aggregate shocks. The benefits of a share economy come from the subsidy that current workers pay to marginal workers. In an efficiency-wage model, the wage subsidy paid by current workers costs the firm as much in lower productivity as it gains from lower labor costs. There is, therefore, neither a reduction of the equilibrium unemployment rate nor a necessary increase in macroeconomic stability when the share economy is introduced.