A general-equilibrium model of a traditional Soviet-type economy

This paper presents an abstract, static model of a traditional Soviet-type economy, in which there are three kinds of agents (planners, firms, and consumers). A quantity-oriented incentive system for managers is described, as is a planners' allocation mechanism. There are technology-determined prices for producer goods and market prices for labor and consumer goods, which are sold by retail stores from which the planners collect a turnover tax. There are also profit and income taxes. A consumer-market equilibrium is shown to exist for each plan, and the results of simulations using fixed-point computation techniques are discussed. J. Comp. Econ., June 1977, 1(2), pp. 147–165. International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.     

Effort,efficiency, and incentives in economic organizations

This paper establishes the possibility of achieving both efficiency and incentive compatibility within a hierarchical organization, even when managers are effortaverse, as long as efficiency is defined as incorporating managers' effort disutilities as opportunity costs of production. It is further argued that this approach yields the same (i.e., Pareto) type of efficiency as achieved by the perfectly competitive price system when managerial disutility of effort is allowed. Thus, the negative results published by Miller and Murrell hold because of the non-Paretian objective functions assumed for central planners.     

Mutual understanding and its influence on formulation during planning

Planning success often depends on the ability of managers who initiate a planning process and their agents (planners) to develop mutual understanding. In this article, argumentation is used to show how planners and managers communicate during the formulation stage of planning. This analysis finds that process-oriented planners attempting to work with managers who take on a broker, rationalist, zealot, or visionary roles are faced with a variety of pitfalls and opportunities. Planning techniques that complement each role's strengths and overcome weaknesses as well as techniques that cater to the role's biases are suggested. The feasibility of using each technique for each role is discussed.     

激励机制影响新创企业知识转移的系统动力学分析

激励机制对新创企业知识转移影响的主导作用已引起业界广泛关注,根据知识管理理论和激励理论,在将激励机制划分为内在激励和外在激励的基础上,构建了反映激励机制对新创企业知识转移影响的系统动力学模型,利用Vensim软件仿真分析了工作价值、心理契约两种内在激励机制以及股权激励、薪酬激励两种外在激励机制对知识转移的影响,并就两类激励机制及二者互动对转移效果的影响进行了灵敏度分析。结果表明,内在激励和外在激励均能有效促进新创企业的知识转移,且二者存在互补耦合效应,据此可为提高新创企业知识转移绩效的激励机制设计问题提供决策支持。     

When it comes to planning hospitals, the VA marches to its own beat.

If you want to build a hospital, you have to convince state and local health planners that the facility is needed and won't add to any oversupply of hospital beds in the area. You have to, that is, unless you're the Veterans Administration. The VA is exempt from the federal health planning law, even on a voluntary basis, and that's caused some problems recently. In Baltimore, for example, the VA intends to erect a 400-bed hospital even though local planners say the area already has more beds than patients to fill them. And in Minneapolis and Portland, Ore., there are similar conflicts between health planners and the VA.     

State Development Planning: Did it Create an East Asian Miracle?

East Asian countries have recorded large increases in per capita GDP over the last fifty years. Some observers have referred to this growth as an “East Asian Miracle.” One popular explanation attributes the rapid growth to state led industrial development planning. This paper critically assesses the arguments surrounding state development planning and East Asia’s growth. Whether the state can acquire the knowledge necessary to calculate which industries it should promote and how state development planning can deal with political incentive problems faced by planners are both examined. When we look at the development record of East Asian countries we find that to the extent development planning did exist, it could not calculate which industries would promote development, so it instead promoted industrialization. We also find that what rapid growth in living standards did occur can be better explained by free markets than state planning because, as measured in economic freedom indexes, these countries were some of the most free market in the world.JEL classification: O200, O170, O530, B530, P170     

软件行业知识员工的组合激励机制研究

本文针对国内软件业人才流失严重及软件开发过程"不可视化"的问题,探求解决我国软件业激励问题的可行方法,设计了一个委托-代理模型,研究了在软件业物质激励和精神激励的组合机制.研究结果表明:在软件企业的一个生命周期中,由于企业发展的不同阶段和员工个体的职业发展特点,需要不同的激励组合机制与之相适应,呈现出明显的阶段性与动态性.根据这一分析结果实证分析了我国目前软件业激励现状,提出了我国软件业组合激励机制演进变化的发展方向.     

基于声誉理论的研发外包动态激励机制研究

基于声誉理论,本文建立了企业研发外包的动态激励机制模型,研究了承包方在同一个契约里长期激励与短期激励相结合的激励模式,得出了实现声誉有效激励的条件和提高声誉激励效应的途径。研究结果表明:考虑声誉机制时,承包方在第1期、第2期的努力水平比不考虑声誉机制时提高了,承包方从第1期、第2期产出里分享的剩余份额比不考虑声誉机制时提高了。因此,与没有引入声誉机制的契约模型相比,声誉激励机制和显性激励机制相结合的最优动态契约模型可以实现帕累托改进、提高激励强度,并能起到很好的约束作用。     

高管激励对企业创新影响的实证分析——基于分析师关注的中介效应研究

基于2011-2018年A股上市公司的面板数据,采用中介效应模型和Bootstrap检验,实证分析了高管激励、分析师关注和企业创新三者之间的关系.结果 表明:薪酬激励、股权激励都可以促进企业创新,高管激励力度越大,企业的创新投入和创新产出越多;高管激励与分析师关注呈正相关关系,不论是薪酬激励还是股权激励,都会提高分析师对企业的关注程度;分析师关注在高管激励与企业创新关系中发挥了重要中介作用,高管激励通过提高分析师关注进而促进了企业创新,在控制了高管激励因素后,分析师关注对企业创新仍然存在明显正效应.     

组织内人工设计激励机制的不完备性、激励偏差与激励强度

与其他契约一样,作为一种契约的激励机制是不完备的.行动与结果间关系的不确定性、量化和质量确认问题、多种活动或产品的加总、团队产品的分解、被激励者目标的多重性以及激励机制执行中的问题,都会造成组织内人工设计的激励机制不完备.激励机制越不完备,由激励机制产生的行动偏差就越大.在激励机制不完备的情况下,激励强度与激励偏差正相关:激励强度越大,则产生的激励偏差越大.因此,在设计和执行激励机制时,应谨慎从事,尤其要慎用较强的激励机制,在组织内一般应采取较弱的激励机制.     

高管过度激励、所有权性质与企业国际化战略

文章采用中国制造业上市公司的数据讨论高管薪酬激励和股权激励对企业国际化程度的影响。研究证实,由于边际递减效应在一定程度上形成所谓的过度激励,中国上市公司高管股权激励与企业国际化程度之间表现为倒U形关系;进一步研究发现,国有和民营上市公司薪酬激励和股权激励在促使企业高管开展国际化经营方面的作用迥然相异。     

农业循环经济发展中农户行为的激励机制探讨

农业循环经济是适合农村经济发展的全新模式,也是实践科学发展观、建设社会主义新农村的有效途径。本文以建设社会主义新农村思想为指导,应用激励理论对农业循环经济发展中激励机制的特点进行分析,从政府激励、技术激励和文化激励三个方面探讨农业循环经济发展中农户行为的激励机制构建,以期更好地促进社会主义新农村建设。     

An experimental study on individual choice, social welfare, and social preferences

We experimentally study subjects’ compliance with dominance relationships of income distributions in a ranking task. The experiment consisted of four different treatments: Lottery, individual choice, social preferences, and social planner. Our results suggest that people's risk attitudes do not adequately reflect their inequality attitudes. Uninvolved social planners exhibit randomization preferences, while self-interested social planners are generally more inequality averse and try to avoid extreme outcomes.     

基于政府管理的技术创新扩散激励机制研究

政府与技术创新扩散企业之间是一种委托——代理关系，表现出若干激励冲突。政府通过政策组合和优化市场环境管理手段可以有效地抑制或弱化这些冲突的发生。在分析政府与技术创新扩散主体之间的激励冲突的基础上，对政府管理的政策激励机制和市场激励机制进行了研究，从政策激励和市场激励两方面构建了基于政府管理的技术创新扩散激励机制。     

Lender's risk incentive and debt concession

This paper demonstrates that a lender's risk incentive may render it difficult to conduct efficient debt renegotiation. When a lending bank has a risk incentive, the bank is not likely to make a debt concession, even though such a concession could resolve inefficiencies caused by a borrower's risk incentive. If the lender refrains from renegotiation the debt, then the borrowing firm chooses a value-decreasing risky project. As a result, the cash flow that the lending bank collects becomes risky, and the wealth of the bank's shareholders increases. The lender's risk incentive thus accelerates the borrower's risk incentive.     

Relaxing benevolence: public choice, socialist calculation, and planner self-interest

The Austrian calculation argument suggests that inability to engage in economic calculation worsened outcomes in socialist states. We suggest that this is hardly the case. When Austrian assumptions of benevolence are relaxed, inability to engage in economic calculation prevents the non-benevolent planner from fully extracting all available surplus from the citizenry. Consequently, when planners are non-benevolent, calculation ceases to be a relevant argument against the desirability of central planning; its normative force reverses absent benevolent planners. JEL Code P0, P16, P50     

A Regulated Firm's Incentive to Discriminate: A Reevaluation and Extension of Weisman's Result

This note reexamines the incentive of a regulated monopolist with an unregulated, vertically-related affiliate to discriminate against rivals of the affiliate. Taking Weisman's (1995) model as a framework, I show that his analysis understates the incentive to discriminate. My analysis shows that the incentive to discriminate exists more generally than his analysis suggests, and that the size of the incentive depends in an intuitive way on factors such as the stringency of regulation, the cost of discriminating, and the degree of substitution between the products of the affiliate and its rival.     

晋升激励与创业板上市公司创新绩效

选用全部创业板上市公司为研究样本,探讨了企业内部晋升激励对创新绩效的影响。实证研究表明,内部高管晋升激励抑制了企业创新项目投入和产出,员工晋升激励则促进了企业创新水平提升;在企业研发投入保持不变的情况下,高管激励仍会抑制企业创新产出,员工激励则会显著正向促进企业创新绩效提升;进一步研究发现,晋升激励对企业创新绩效的影响因企业成长性水平不同存在较大差异。研究重新认识了晋升激励这一心理契约对于创新绩效的影响,对企业采取科学的激励机制具有重要的理论和实践意义。     

董事会激励对公司效率影响的随机前沿分析

本文将激励形式分为两种内部激励——显性激励、隐性激励和两种外部激励——产品市场压力、资本市场压力,并以2005—2008年度中国纺织服装行业上市公司为样本,利用随机前沿模型实证分析了董事会激励对公司效率的影响。结果表明:显性激励方面,董事会薪酬激励优于权益激励;隐性激励方面,董事长更替对公司效率有积极显著的影响,而董事长和总经理的两职合一对公司效率有负面的影响。外部激励方面,产品市场的竞争压力比资本市场的收购风险对公司董事会更有约束力。     

独立董事独立性、关联激励与行为均衡

本文通过对委托-代理激励理论和关联博弈激励思想的运用和拓展,主要考察了在独立性、激励和风险分担三重约束下,独立董事激励合约的基本参数特征以及诱使独立董事高水平合作的关联激励机制.